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ABSTRACT	  
Ontology	   attempts	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   “What	   is	   there?”	   Trying	   to	   pursue	   this	   question,	  
contemporary	  analytic	  philosophers	  argue	  over	  whether	  there	  are	  tables	  over	  and	  above	  parti-­‐
cles	  arranged	  tablewise,	  whether	  ordinary	  objects	  persist	   through	  time	  by	  having	   instantane-­‐
ous	  temporal	  parts	  and	  whether	  particles	  can	  compose	  both	  a	  lump	  and	  a	  distinct	  statue	  at	  the	  
same	  time.	  The	  disputes	  are	  highly	  technical	  and	  contrived,	  yet	  ontologists	  carry	  on.	  But	  there	  
is	  trouble	  in	  paradise.	  So-­‐called	  ontological	  deflationists	  attempt	  to	  undermine	  the	  disputes	  by	  
arguing	  that	  the	  disputes	  are	  insubstantial;	  they	  are	  not	  about	  the	  world,	  but	  rather	  about	  the	  
correct	  use	  of	   language.	  Eli	  Hirsch	   is	  one	  of	   the	  philosophers	  who	  have	  challenged	  ontology,	  
and	   his	   flavor	   of	   deflationism,	   quantifier	   variantism,	   says	   that	   there	   are	   many	   ontological	  
languages	   with	   different	   answers	   to	   the	   ontological	   question.	   Ontologists	   merely	   disagree	  
about	  which	  language	  to	  speak	  –	  they	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  verbal	  dispute.	  Furthermore,	  ontology	  
conducted	  in	  English	  (or	  any	  other	  natural	  language)	  is	  pointless,	  for	  the	  ontological	  beliefs	  of	  
ordinary	  people	  –	   their	  beliefs	   in	   the	  existence	  of	   tables	   and	  chairs,	   statues	  and	   lumps	  –	  are	  
trivially	  true.	  In	  sum:	  either	  ontologists	  speak	  different	  languages,	  in	  which	  case	  their	  ontolog-­‐
ical	  “theses”	  will	  merely	  reflect	  their	  linguistic	  choice,	  or	  they	  speak	  English,	  in	  which	  case	  any	  
“results”	  will	  be	  trivial.	  In	  any	  case,	  ontology	  as	  we	  know	  it	  is	  undermined.	  	  
	   This	  thesis	  explores	  Hirsch’s	  view	  in	  more	  detail	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  critically	  examin-­‐
ing	  his	  arguments.	  I	  provide	  two	  main	  lines	  of	  argument	  against	  Hirsch:	  (1)	  The	  idea	  of	  differ-­‐
ent	  ontological	   languages	   is	  more	  radical	  and	  problematic	   than	   it	   is	  usually	  assumed,	  poten-­‐
tially	  undercutting	  the	  philosophical	  significance	  of	  Hirsch’s	  arguments;	   (2)	  Commonsensical	  
ontological	  claims	  are	  not	  trivially	  true	  in	  English,	  and	  it	  might	  be	  possible	  to	  conduct	  ontolo-­‐
gy	  in	  English	  after	  all.	  I	  also	  consider	  a	  recent	  reply	  to	  Hirsch	  by	  Theodore	  Sider	  to	  the	  effect	  
that	   ontologists	   should	   leave	   English	   for	   a	   dedicated	   ontological	   language.	   I	   show	   how	   this	  
reply	  will	  rehabilitate	  ontology,	  but	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  successful.	  	  
The	  present	  work	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  defense	  of	  ontology,	  but	  tries	  to	  an-­‐
swer	  one	  influential	  criticism	  in	  illuminating	  detail.	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INTRODUCTION	  	  
In	  a	  paper	  that	  has	  been	  credited	  with	  reviving	  ontology	  in	  analytic	  philosophy,1	  Quine	  claims	  
that	   the	  ontological	  question	   is	   “What	   is	   there?”	   (1948,	  p.	  21).	   In	  the	  next	  breath,	  Quine	  says	  
that	  everyone	  agrees	   that	   the	  correct	  answer	   is	   “everything”,	  but	   that	   there	   is	   room	  for	  disa-­‐
greement	   about	   cases	   (1948,	   p.	   21).	   Since	   then,	   and	   with	   the	   important	   contribution	   from	  
philosophers	   such	   as	  Chisholm,	  Armstrong	   and	  Lewis,	   considerable	  disagreement	  over	   cases	  
has	   ensued.	   Ontology	   has	   overcome	   its	   troubled	   past2	  and	   become	   a	   thriving	   research	   pro-­‐
gram.	  Not	  only	  have	  philosophers	   caught	  up	  on	   traditional	  questions	   about	   the	   existence	  of	  
universals,	  God	  and	  numbers,	  but	  the	  revival	  of	  metaphysics	  has	  also	  made	  way	  for	  new	  ques-­‐
tions,	  some	  more	  parochial	  than	  others.	  To	  the	  uninaugurated,	  the	  dispute	  over	  the	  existence	  
of	  macroscopic	  composite	  objects	  such	  as	  tables	  and	  chairs	  will	  perhaps	  seem	  silly,	  and	  non-­‐
philosophers	  will	  probably	  not	  share	  philosophers’	  qualms	  about	  believing	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  
both	   copper	   statutes	   and	   lumps	   of	   copper.	   Lack	   of	   understanding	   from	  ordinary	   people	   has	  
seldom	  stopped	  a	  philosopher’s	  theorizing,	  however.	  
	   Ontologists	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  Quine	  –	  which	  is	  the	  tradition	  I	  will	  be	  concerned	  with	  –	  
consider	  ontological	  disputes	  as	  substantive	  and	  about	  objective	  reality;	  settling	  them	  requires	  
complex	  arguments	  and	  theoretical	  sophistication.	  Theodore	  Sider	  describes	  the	  methodology	  
for	  answering	  ontological	  questions	  thus:	  
	  
Competing	  positions	  are	  treated	  as	  tentative	  hypothesis	  about	  the	  world,	  and	  are	  assessed	  by	  a	  
loose	  battery	  of	  criteria	  for	  theory	  choice.	  Match	  with	  ordinary	  usage	  and	  belief	  sometimes	  plays	  
a	  role	  in	  this	  assessment,	  but	  typically	  not	  a	  dominant	  one.	  Theoretical	  insight,	  considerations	  
of	   simplicity,	   integrations	   with	   other	   domains	   (for	   instance	   science,	   logic,	   and	   philosophy	   of	  
language),	  and	  so	  on,	  play	  important	  roles.	  (Sider	  2009,	  p.	  385)	  
	  
Manley	  (2009,	  p.	  4)	  characterizes	  this	  as	  mainstream	  ontology,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  flourishing	  for	  
the	  last	  decades.	  But	  lately,	  ontology	  has	  come	  under	  attack.	  So-­‐called	  deflationists	  argue	  that	  
ontological	   disputes	   are	   in	   some	   way	   or	   other	   misconceived.	   The	   diagnoses	   of	   the	   malady	  
differ,	  and	  the	  exact	  disputes	  the	  criticism	  is	  targeted	  at	  varies,3	  but	  deflationists	  have	  in	  com-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Putnam	  claims	  that	  Quine	  “single-­‐handedly	  made	  Ontology	  a	  respectable	  subject”	  (2004,	  p.	  78).	  
2	  Ontology,	  and	  metaphysics	  in	  general,	  has	  been	  under	  attack	  in	  several	  periods	  of	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  The	  
first	  critics	  were	  perhaps	  the	  sophists,	  and	  Hume	  famously	  wanted	  to	  commit	  metaphysics	  to	  the	  flames	  (1993).	  In	  
more	   recent	   times,	  both	   the	   logical	  positivists	   (Ayer	   1978;	  Carnap	   1950)	  and	  ordinary	   language	  philosophers	   (e.g.	  
1953)	  took	  a	  negative	  attitude	  towards	  metaphysics.	  As	  will	  become	  clear	  in	  the	  following	  thesis,	  also	  contemporary	  
philosophers	  are	  skeptical	  of	  metaphysics.	  Recent	  criticisms	  can	  be	   found	   in	  Hofweber	  (2009),	  Thomasson	  (2007,	  
2009)	  and	  Yablo	  (2009),	  in	  addition	  to	  Eli	  Hirsch,	  whose	  criticism	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
3	  Thus	  Yablo	  thinks	  the	  dispute	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  numbers	  is	  insubstantial	  and	  silly,	  but	  seems	  more	  positive	  
towards	   the	   dispute	   over	   the	   existence	   of	  God	   and	   theoretical	   posits	   (1998,	   p.	   259).	   This	   can	   be	   contrasted	  with	  
	   2	  
mon	  a	  skeptical	  attitude	  towards	  ontology,	  believing	  that	  something’s	  wrong	  with	  the	  hyper-­‐
theoretical	  disputes	  of	  ontology.	  The	  general	  attitude	  may	  perhaps	  be	  summed	  up	  by	  this	  sigh:	  
“There	  is	  nothing	  at	  stake	  here!”	  	  
	   In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  concentrate	  on	  the	  perhaps	  most	  influential	  and	  arguably	  best	  form	  
of	  ontological	  deflationism,	  the	  quantifier	  variantism	  of	  Eli	  Hirsch	  (2011).4	  The	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  
Hirsch’s	   arguments	   against	   ontology	   is	   to	   defend	   a	   “common	   sense”	   view	   on	   what	   there	   is	  
(2011,	  pp.	  97–98).	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  with	  most	  contemporary	  ontologists,	  who	  at	  least	  consider	  
it	  an	  open	  question	  whether	  all	  and	  only	  the	  objects	  of	  common	  sense	  exist.5	  Hirsch	  defends	  a	  
conception	  of	  ontology	  in	  which	  ontological	  disputes	  are	  “shallow”	  and	  where	  there	  is	  no	  room	  
for	   the	   speculative	   debates	   of	  mainstream	  ontology,	  which	  Hirsch	   characterizes	   as	   “afflicted	  
with	  a	  kind	  of	  hyper-­‐theoreticalness”	  (2011,	  p.	  82)	  that	  leads	  to	  “futile	  and	  interminable	  pseu-­‐
do-­‐theoretical	   arguments”	   (2011,	   p.	   82).	   In	   another	   essay,	  Hirsch	   describes	   ontological	   ques-­‐
tions	   as	   “laughably	   trivial”	   (2011,	   p.	   90).	   According	   to	   Hirsch,	   ontological	   questions	   can	   be	  
answered	  by	  determining	  which	  sentences	  about	  existence	  are	  true,6	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  chari-­‐
ty	  plays	  a	  central	  role	   in	  this	  process	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  231).	  Correct	   linguistic	   interpretation	  of	  
English	  yields	   the	   trivial	   falsity	  of	  non-­‐commonsensical7	  existence	   claims,	   such	  as	   “There	  are	  
no	  buildings	  in	  New	  York	  City,”	  and	  the	  trivial	  truth	  of	  commonsensical	  existence	  claims,	  such	  
as	  “There	  is	  at	  least	  one	  building	  in	  New	  York	  City”	  (2011,	  p.	  xiii).	  Given	  Hirsch’s	  view	  on	  how	  
ontology	  should	  proceed,	  mainstream	  ontology	  is	  misconceived.	  	  
	   The	  goal	  of	   the	   following	  chapters	   is	   to	   look	   for	   the	  best	  defense	  of	  ontology	  against	  
Hirsch,	   but	   as	   the	   arguments	   turn	   on	   difficult	   questions	   in	   adjoining	   fields,	   especially	   the	  
philosophy	  of	   language	  and	  epistemology,	  there	   is	   little	  hope	  of	  a	  defense	  that	  will	  satisfy	  all	  
philosophers.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  a	  virtue	  in	  trying	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  challenges	  facing	  
ontology,	   for	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   recent	   criticism,	   ontology	   cannot	   continue	   untouched.	   The	  
goal	  is	  primarily	  negative:	  it	  is	  to	  show	  that	  Hirsch’s	  arguments	  don’t	  undermine	  mainstream	  
ontology,	  not	  to	  give	  an	  independent	  justification	  of	  why	  the	  method	  of	  mainstream	  ontology	  
is	  adequate	  for	  ontology.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Thomasson,	   whose	   focus	   is	   squarely	   on	   the	   dispute	   over	   ordinary	   objects.	   Hirsch	   thinks	   all	   disputes	   about	   the	  
nature	  and	  existence	  of	  macroscopic	  objects	  are	  trivial,	  see	  section	  1.3.	  
4	  Referencing	  Hirsch’s	  work	  poses	  a	  challenge.	  His	  papers	  on	  metaontology	  are	  collected	  in	  Hirsch	  (2011),	  and	  thus	  it	  
is	  convenient	  to	  use	  it	  as	  a	  common	  source	  of	  reference.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  necessary	  to	  reference	  
his	  papers	  as	  a	  whole.	  I’ve	  solved	  this	  by	  citing	  individual	  papers	  by	  the	  year	  they	  were	  published,	  but	  direct	  quotes	  
and	  passages	  are	  referenced	  by	  their	  page-­‐number	  of	  the	  essay	  in	  Hirsch	  (2011).	  	  
5	  An	  example	  of	  a	  defense	  of	  “common	  sense”	  ontology	  within	  mainstream	  ontology	  is	  Markosian	  (1998).	  
6	  Hirsch’s	  metaontological	  arguments	  are	  of	  a	  linguistic	  nature.	  Hirsch	  (2011,	  p.	  98)	  expresses	  certain	  sympathies	  for	  
so-­‐called	   “Moorean”	   epistemic	  arguments	   for	   common	  sense	  ontology,	  but	  believes	   that	   the	   linguistic	   arguments	  
discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  harder	  to	  ignore	  for	  ontologists.	  I	  agree.	  
7	  I	  will	  talk	  about	  ontological	  claims	  such	  as	  “There	  are	  no	  tables”	  and	  “There	  is	  an	  object	  that	  has	  the	  Eiffel	  tower	  
and	  Plato’s	  nose	  as	  parts”	   as	   “non-­‐commonsensical”	  or	   “revisionary”	  ontological	   (or	  quantificational	  or	   existence)	  
claims.	  	  
	   3	  
Quinean	  Metaontology	  
This	   is	   a	   thesis	   in	   what	   has	   recently	   been	   known	   as	  metaontology.	   While	   ontologists	   asks	  
“What	  is	  there?”	  and	  argues	  about	  whether	  there	  are	  numbers	  or	  temporal	  parts,	  metaontology	  
deals	   in	  meta-­‐questions	   such	   as	   “What	   are	   we	   asking	  when	  we	   ask	   ontological	   questions?”,	  
“Are	  there	  objective	  answers	  to	  the	  ontological	  question?”	  and	  “How	  do	  we	  know	  what	  there	  
is?”	   In	   this	   regard,	  metaontology	   is	   similar	   to	  metaethics,	   and	   thus	   ventures	   into	   other	   sub-­‐
disciplines	  of	  philosophy	  for	  answers.	  	  
	   Philosophy	   is	   a	   diversified	   field	   with	   little	   consensus,	   so	   one	  must	   make	   certain	   as-­‐
sumptions	   and	   choices	   before	   moving	   on	   to	   arguments.	   By	   focusing	   on	   Hirsch’s	   attack	   on	  
ontology,	   I	   have	   by	   implication	   chosen	   to	   focus	   on	   what’s	   often	   called	   Quinean	   ontology,	  
because	  Hirsch’s	  arguments	  are	  most	  directly	  targeted	  at	  Quineans.	  Besides	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  
challenges	  Hirsch	  has	  posed,	  the	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  to	  defend	  this	  specific	  framework	  is	  that	  
I	   consider	   it	   the	  most	   promising	   and	   interesting	   “framework”	   for	   conducting	   ontology.	   It	   is	  
also	  presently	  the	  sociologically	  most	  dominant	  one,8	  and	  a	  Quinean	  metaontology	  is	  presup-­‐
posed	  by	  much	  recent	  work	  in	  ontology.9	  Mainstream	  ontology	  is	  usually	  assumed	  to	  presup-­‐
pose	  a	  Quinean	  metaontology,	  which	  makes	  a	  defense	  of	  it	  all	  the	  more	  pressing	  if	  one	  cares	  
for	  mainstream	  ontology.	  
Quinean	  metaontology	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  correspond	  to	  Quine’s	  specific	  theory	  of	  on-­‐
tology.	  Contemporary	  philosophers	  have	  rejected	  aspects	  of	  his	  metaontology,	  and	  many	  have	  
departed	  from	  Quine	  in	  different	  ways.	  My	  preferred	  condition	  for	  understanding	  a	  dispute	  as	  
conducted	  within	  a	  Quinean10	  framework	  is	  that	  it	  focuses	  heavily	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  existentially	  
quantified	   sentences.11	  Quine	   writes	   that:	   “If	   we	   affirm	   a	   sentence	   governed	   by	   ‘something’	  
there	  had	  better	  be	  an	  object	   in	  our	  universe	  that	  meets	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  sentence	   im-­‐
poses”	  (1984,	  p.	  17).	  What	  Quine	  has	  in	  mind	  is	  that	  something	  has	  to	  exist	  for	  a	  “there	  is”-­‐	  or	  
“exists”-­‐sentence	  to	  be	  true.12	  This	  criterion	  does	  a	  good	  job	  at	  distinguishing	  what	  intuitively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Chalmers,	  Manley	  and	  Wasserman’s	   (2009)	  consist	  of	  many	  of	   the	  most	   important	  new	  metaontological	   essays.	  
The	  wide	  majority	  of	  the	  essays	  in	  that	  anthology	  take	  something	  like	  a	  Quinean	  view	  as	  presumption,	  though	  they	  
diverge	  in	  quite	  significant	  ways	  in	  their	  overall	  metaontology.	  Thus	  Fine	  (2009,	  p.	  157)	  writes	  that	  Quinean	  meta-­‐
ontology	  is	  “accept[ed]	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another	  by	  all	  of	  the	  other	  contributors	  to	  the	  present	  volume”.	  	  
9	  Sider	  (2009,	  p.	  169)	  writes	  that	  “recent	  work	  on	  ontology	  nearly	  always	  relies	  on	  the	  Quinean	  methodology”.	  
10	  One	  might	  want	  to	  call	  mainstream	  ontology	  “neo-­‐Quinean”.	  I	  won’t	  take	  a	  stance	  on	  which	  name	  is	  more	  appro-­‐
priate;	   that	   depends	   on	   an	   exegesis	   of	   Quine’s	   view	   compared	   to	  mainstream	   ontology,	   which	   is	   a	   task	   I	   won’t	  
pursue	  because	  it	  is	  largely	  immaterial	  to	  the	  present	  topic.	  	  
11	  This	   is	   especially	   intended	   to	   exclude	   theories	   that	   use	   different	   ideology	   to	   frame	   ontological	   questions.	   For	  
instance,	  Schaffer	  (2009)	  takes	  metaphysics	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  “What	  grounds	  what”,	  and	  thus	  uses	  “x	  grounds	  y”	  
as	  the	  central	  ideology.	  Fine	  (2001,	  2009)	  appeals	  to	  an	  “in	  reality”-­‐operator	  to	  frame	  ontological	  questions.	  	  
12	  I	   shift	   unproblematically	   between	   the	   existential	   idioms	   “there	   is”	   and	   “exists”.	   It	   is	   a	   common	   assumption	   in	  
contemporary	   analytic	   philosophy,	   explicit	   in	   Quine	   and	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   Quinean	   metaontology,	   that	   these	  
expressions	  mean	  the	  same.	  Even	  though	  a	  minority	  of	  contemporary	  philosophers	  disputes	  this,	  early	  on	  Alexius	  
Meinong	  (1960),	  more	  recently	  Parsons	  (1980)	  and	  Fine	  (2009),	  I	  will	  not	  distinguish	  between	  these	  locutions.	  If	  one	  
wants	  argument,	  see	  Quine	  (1948)	  and	  van	  Inwagen	  (1998).	  See	  also	  section	  1.2.4.	  
	   4	  
is	  a	  Quinean	  metaontology	  from	  those	  that	  are	  not,	  but	  in	  the	  end	  the	  relevance	  of	  my	  discus-­‐
sion	  for	  a	  particular	  philosopher’s	  ontological	  aspirations	  depends	  on	  whether	  she	   is	  affected	  
by	  Hirsch’s	  arguments.	  Lately,	  several	  accounts	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  Quinean	  ontology	  have	  
been	  developed,	   and	   they	   provide	   variations	   on	   the	  method,	   epistemology	   and	   semantics	   of	  
ontological	   disputes.13	  I	   will	   unfortunately	   not	   be	   able	   to	   discuss	   these	   different	   “Quinean”	  
metaontological	   frameworks.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   Hirschean	   arguments	   would	   seem	   to	   affect	  
most	   versions	   of	  Quinean	  metaontology,	   and	   thus	   I	   believe	   the	  discussion	  will	   have	   general	  
relevance	  for	  Quinean	  ontologists.	  	  
By	  adopting	  other	  metaontological	  frameworks	  one	  can	  bypass	  Hirsch’s	  challenges,	  but	  
none	  of	   these	  alternative	  metaontological	   frameworks	  will	  be	  discussed	  here.	   In	  the	  scope	  of	  
this	  thesis,	  I	  can	  only	  do	  the	  Quinean	  framework	  justice.	  As	  I	  said,	  one	  must	  make	  choices.	  
	  
Roadmap	  
The	   thesis	  has	   four	   chapters.	  The	   first	   chapter	   lays	  out	  Hirsch’s	   arguments,	   focusing	  on	   two	  
arguments	  and	  two	  theses	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  follow	  from	  them.	  The	  theses,	  quantifier	  vari-­‐
antism14	  and	  linguistic	  choice,	  are	  both	  thought	  to	  have	  deflationary	  consequences.	  I	  argue	  that	  
quantifier	   variantism	   consists	   of	   two	   claims,	   a	   weak	   and	   a	   strong.	   Chapter	   1	   is	   devoted	   to	  
presentation	   of	   Hirsch’s	   arguments,	   and	   I	   criticize	   them	   only	   to	   illuminate	   the	   position.	   In	  
chapter	  2,	   I	  evaluate	  the	  weak	  thesis	  and	  after	  defending	  it	  against	  some	  recent	  arguments,	   I	  
argue	  that	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  thesis	  cannot	  do	  the	  work	  the	  deflationist	  needs	  it	  
to	  do.	  I	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  thesis	  entails	  quite	  radical	  changes	  to	  our	  conception	  of	  language	  
with	  problematic	  consequences.	  Chapter	  3	  discusses	   linguistic	  choice	  and	  argues	   that	  Hirsch	  
has	  not	  shown	  that	  revisionary	  ontological	  claims	  in	  English	  are	  trivially	  false,	  thus	  indirectly	  I	  
defend	  the	  contention	  that	  ontology	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  English.	  Finally,	  chapter	  4	  discusses	  
a	  recent	  reply	  to	  strong	  quantifier	  variantism	  by	  Ted	  Sider	  (2009,	  2011).	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  exact	  
way	  in	  which	  Sider	  attempts	  to	  answer	  Hirsch	  fails,	  but	  I	  keep	  it	  open	  whether	  the	  defense	  can	  
eventually	  succeed.	  I	  briefly	  conclude	  in	  section	  5.	  In	  sum,	  then,	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  ways	  for	  
the	  ontologist	   to	   avoid	  Hirsch’s	  deflationary	   conclusions,	   but	   I	   do	  not	  provide	   a	   full-­‐fledged	  
defense	   of	   ontology.	   That	  would	   require	   a	   full	  metaontology,	  which	   is	   a	   project	   for	   another	  
day.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Two	  different	  statements	  of	  consciously	  Quinean	  metaontological	  frameworks	  are	  van	  Inwagen	  (1998,	  2009)	  and	  
Sider	  (2009,	  2011).	  	  
14	  This	  thesis	  has	  often	  been	  called	  “quantifier	  variance”	  in	  the	  literature,	  but	  I	  will	  follow	  Hirsch	  (2011)	  in	  calling	  the	  
thesis	  “quantifier	  variantism”.	  When	  I	  use	  “quantifier	  variance,”	  it	  is	  to	  describe	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  the	  quantifier	  
varies	  in	  meaning	  between	  different	  ontological	  languages,	  see	  below.	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1	   HIRSCH’S	  ARGUMENTS	  AGAINST	  ONTOLOGY	  
1.1	   Overview	  
The	  topic	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  Hirsch’s	  arguments	  against	  mainstream	  ontology.	  The	  conclusions	  of	  
those	  arguments	  can	  be	  put	  forward	  as	  two	  theses,	  both	  with	  deflationary	  consequences.	  I	  will	  
give	   an	   initial	   characterization	  of	   them	  here,	   and	   then	  describe	   them	   in	  more	  detail	   later	   in	  
section	  1.3	  and	  1.4	  respectively.	  
Hirsch	  presents	  the	  first	  thesis,	  which	  I	  will	  call	  quantifier	   variantism,	  as	   follows:	  “the	  
world	   can	  be	   correctly	  described	  using	  a	   variety	  of	   concepts	  of	   the	   ‘existence	  of	   something’”	  
(Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  68).	  We	  can	  talk	  about	  what	  there	  is	  in	  a	  number	  of	  quantificationally	  differ-­‐
ent,	  but	  descriptively	  equivalent,	  ways.	  A	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  quantifier	  that	  is	  
metaphysically	   privileged	   –	   there	   is	   no	   best	   language	   to	   talk	   about	   which	   things	   there	   are	  
(Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  xii;	  84).	  	  
The	  other	   thesis	   is	   that	  ontological	  disputes	   reduce	   to	   linguistic	   choice	   (2011,	   p.	   xiii).	  
Hirsch	   argues	   that	   either	   ontologists	   are	   speaking	   different	   languages,	   in	   which	   case	   their	  
dispute	  is	  verbal,	  or	  they	  are	  speaking	  English,	  in	  which	  case	  non-­‐commonsensical	  ontological	  
claims	  are	  trivially	  false.	  Call	  the	  argument	  for	  this	  thesis	  the	  argument	  from	  charity,15	  and	  the	  
thesis	  itself	  linguistic	  choice.16	  	  
Both	   theses	   are	  meant	   to	   show	   that	   ontology	   is	   pointless	   and	   futile,	   but	   in	   different	  
ways.	  Quantifier	  variantism	  entails	   that	  distinct	  ways	  of	  describing	  the	  world	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  
existence	  of	  things	  are	  equally	  good,	  and	  therefore	  there	  is	  no	  real	  disagreement	  about	  ontolo-­‐
gy	  to	  have	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Talking	  about	  objects	  persisting	  by	  having	  temporal	  parts	  or	  being	  
“wholly	   present”	   are	   equally	   good	  metaphysically;	   for	   the	   several	   languages	   one	  may	   speak,	  
none	   is	   “nearer	   to	   reality”	   than	   the	  others,	   so	   there	   is	  nothing	   to	  disagree	  about.17	  The	  argu-­‐
ment	  from	  charity	  partly	  presupposes	  quantifier	  variantism.	  It	  says	  that	  correct	  interpretation	  
of	  the	  linguistic	  behavior	  of	  ontologists	  and	  ordinary	  people	  entail	  that	  either	  ontologists	  are	  
speaking	   different	   languages	   (which	   are	   equally	   good	   at	   describing	   the	   world),	   and	   are	   en-­‐
gaged	  in	  a	  verbal	  dispute,	  or	  they	  are	  speaking	  English,	  but	  revisionary	  ontological	  claims	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Hirsch	   (2002b)	   uses	   this	   name	   for	   an	   argument	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   non-­‐commonsensical	   ontological	   claims	   in	  
English,	  such	  as	  “There	  are	  no	  tables”	  or	  “Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  had	  in	  1916	  a	  temporal	  part	  that	  participated	  in	  the	  
First	  World	  War”	  are	  trivially	  false	  in	  English.	  I	  have	  extended	  the	  meaning	  of	  that	  name	  a	  little,	  including	  also	  the	  
arguments	  of	  Hirsch	  (2005,	  2009)	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  ontological	  disputes	  are	  verbal.	  It	  is	  still	  a	  telling	  name	  for	  the	  
argument,	  as	  both	  arguments	  rely	  on	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  considerations	  of	  charity.	  See	  section	  1.4.3	  below.	  	  
16	  I’m	  following	  Eklund	  (2011)	  half	  way	  in	  labeling	  the	  two	  theses	  in	  this	  way	  (I	  use	  ‘”linguistic	  choice”	  instead	  of	  his	  
“verbal	  dispute”).	  Hirsch	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  two	  theses	  are	  “meddled	  together”	  in	  his	  writings	  on	  metaontology	  
(2011,	  p.	  212).	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  continue	  Eklund’s	  job	  of	  disentangling	  the	  claims	  and	  arguments	  for	  them.	  
17	  The	  phrase	  “nearer	  to	  reality”	  is	  from	  Urmson	  (1956,	  p.	  186),	  and	  is	  quoted	  in	  Hirsch	  (2011,	  p.	  xi).	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trivially	   false.	   Ontological	   disputes	   are	   reduced	   to	   linguistic	   choice,	   which	   there	   is	   nothing	  
“deep”	  or	  “theoretical”	  about.	  When	  we	  have	  chosen	  a	  way	  to	  talk,	  there	  is	  no	  substance	  left	  to	  
ontology.	  It	  would	  seem	  to	  follow	  from	  both	  arguments	  that	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  the	  elaborate	  
method	  and	  complicated	  arguments	  of	  mainstream	  ontology.	  
	   Linguistic	   choice	   and	  quantifier	   variantism	  can	  be	   construed	  as	   either	   local	  or	   global	  
theses.	  Hirsch	  holds	   linguistic	   choice	   only	   locally:	  He	   believes	   that	   the	   dispute	   between	   en-­‐
durantists	   and	   perdurantists	   is	   merely	   verbal,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   holds	   that	   the	   dispute	  
between	  nominalists	   and	  platonists	   in	   the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	   is	   not	   (2009,	   p.	   224f).	  
This	  is	  because	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  trades	  on	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  disputes	  themselves;	  
linguistic	  choice	   is	  a	  dispute-­‐relative	  thesis,	  which	  Hirsch	  holds	   for	  ontological	  disputes	  over	  
the	  nature	  and	  existence	  of	  middle-­‐sized	  dry	  goods	  (2011,	  p.	  101).	  Quantifier	  variantism,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  is	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it	  the	  global	  claim	  that	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  world	  can	  be	  correctly	  
described	  using	  different	  concepts	  of	  existence	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  68).	  However,	  Hirsch’s	  discus-­‐
sion	   of	   quantifier	   variantism	   focuses,	   as	  with	   linguistic	   choice,	   on	   the	   ontology	   of	  medium-­‐
sized	  dry	  goods.	  As	  I	  argue	  in	  section	  1.3,	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  more	  precisely	  formulated	  as	  
the	  thesis	  that	  certain	  aspects	  of	  reality	  are	  describable	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  concepts	  of	  the	  “exist-­‐
ence	  of	  something”,	  and	  thus	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  a	  local	  claim	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  linguistic	  
choice.	   Hence	   the	   example-­‐disputes	   in	   this	   thesis	   will	   all	   concern	   the	   ontology	   of	   physical	  
objects.18	  
1.2	   Four	  assumptions	  
There	  are	  four	  key	  assumptions	  underlying	  Hirsch’s	  arguments.	   It	  will	  be	  convenient	  to	  have	  
them	  all	  on	  the	  table	  initially	  to	  understand	  where	  Hirsch	  is	  coming	  from.	  This	  also	  makes	  it	  
possible	   for	   the	   reader	   to	  evaluate	  whether	   she	  accepts	   them	  or	  wants	   to	  challenge	   them	  on	  
grounds	  I	  don’t	  consider.	  Space	  constraints	  prohibit	  me	  from	  arguing	  for	  them	  in	  any	  detail,	  so	  
I	  will	  be	  content	  by	  laying	  them	  out	  (Hirsch	  doesn’t	  argue	  for	  them	  either).	  I	  will	  discuss	  some	  
of	  them	  critically	  in	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow.	  For	  now,	  they	  must	  simply	  be	  assumed.	  	  
1.2.1	   A	  priori	  necessity	  
The	  first	  assumption	  is	  that	  ontological	  disputes	  concern	  matters	  of	  a	  priori	  necessity	  (Hirsch	  
2011,	  p.	  222).	   If	   two	  ontologists	  disagree	  about	  what	  there	   is,	   they	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  de-­‐
fending	  their	  claims	  on	  grounds	  of	  a	  priori	  necessity.	  Ontological	  questions	  have	  answers	  that	  
are	  a	   priori	   knowable,	   and	   the	   answers	   are	   necessary	   truths.	   This	   assumption	   figures	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   global	   formulations	   of	   the	   theses	   are	   uninteresting,	   but	   justifying	   it	   would	   require	  
significantly	  more	  argument	   than	  Hirsch	  has	  provided.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	  general	   strategy	   could	  be	   ex-­‐
tended	  to	  other	  disputes,	  but	  that	  it	  will	  be	  a	  question	  of	  sustained	  argument	  whether	  such	  a	  strategy	  will	  succeeds	  
in	  deflating	  e.g.	  the	  ontology	  of	  mathematics.	  There	  might	  be	  different	  opinions	  here.	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argument	  from	  charity,	  and	  the	  claim	  about	  necessity	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  argument	  for	  quantifi-­‐
er	  variantism.19	  This	  assumption	  will	  be	  critically	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.3.2.	  	  
1.2.2	   The	  intensional	  assumption	  
The	   second	   assumption	   is	   an	   intensional	   view	   on	   language.	   Consider	   some	   ways	   the	   world	  
could	  have	  been:	  Al	  Gore	  could	  have	  won	  the	  2000	  presidential	  election;	  the	  Scottish	  vote	  on	  
independence	  could	  have	   turned	  out	  differently.	  Possible	  worlds	  are	  maximally	  specific	  ways	  
the	  world	  might	  have	  been,	  and	  Hirsch	  assumes	  that	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  a	  sentence	  can	  be	  
identified	  with	  the	  set	  of	  possible	  worlds	  in	  which	  it	  holds	  true	  (Lewis	  1986).	  Because	  of	  space	  
constraints,	  I	  will	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  reader’s	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  intensional	  semantics,	  alter-­‐
natively	  her	  intuitive	  grasp	  of	  the	  concepts.	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  “the	  intensional	  assumption”,	  
and	   assure	   the	   reader	   that	   it	  won’t	   be	  playing	   a	   technical	   role.	  What’s	   important	   about	   this	  
assumption	   is	   that	   it	   entails	   a	   specific	   way	   of	   individuating	   truth-­‐conditions:	   by	   possible	  
worlds.	   In	   section	   1.3,	   I	   will	   discuss	   what	   it	  means	   for	   two	   languages	   to	   describe	   the	   world	  
equally	   well,	   and	   there	   the	   claim	   will	   be	   that	   it	   requires	   that	   they	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent.	  Given	  the	  intensional	  assumption,	  this	  amounts	  to	  expressing	  the	  same	  intensions.	  	  
1.2.3	   The	  interpretation	  assumption	  
A	  third	  assumption	  is	  that	  interpretation	  is	  done	  at	  the	  sentence	  level,	  and	  thus	  that	  it	  is	  sen-­‐
tences,	  not	   terms,	   that	  primarily	  describe	   the	  world.	  Hirsch	  writes	   that	   the	  primary	   focus	   in	  
interpretation	  is	  “always	  on	  whole	  sentences	  and	  how	  to	  assign	  truth	  conditions	  to	  them	  in	  the	  
most	  charitable	  way	  possible”	  (2011,	  p.	  150).	  The	  meaning	  of	  terms	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  mean-­‐
ing	  of	  sentences.	  According	  to	  Hirsch,	   the	  “essence	  of	   language	   is	   the	  distribution	  of	  a	  set	  of	  
characters	  over	  a	  set	  of	  syntactically	  structured	  sentences”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  239).	  Characters	  are	  
functions	   that	   take	   a	   context	   as	   input	   and	   deliver	   a	   proposition	   for	   each	   context.20	  Hirsch	  
rejects	  a	  “picture	  of	  language	  in	  which	  the	  characters	  at	  the	  level	  of	  sentences	  are	  generated	  by	  
some	   underlying	   referential	   mechanisms	   at	   the	   level	   of	   words”	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   238).	   On	  
Hirsch’s	  picture	  of	  language	  there	  are	  no	  a	  priori	  constraints	  on	  which	  sentences	  can	  be	  associ-­‐
ated	  with	  which	  characters.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  requirement	  that	  the	  ultimate	  explanation	  
of	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  singular	  term	  is	  that	  it	  refers	  to	  an	  object.	  Interpretation	  is	  association	  of	  a	  
sentence	  with	  a	  character,	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  a	  set	  of	  sentences	  (see	  section	  1.4.2).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  This	  assumption	  is	  regularly	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  ontology,	  see	  for	  instance	  Sider	  (2001a,	  p.	  202–203);	  Arm-­‐
strong	  (1997,	  p.	  12–13);	  Markosian	  (1998,	  p.	  216–217).	  An	  example	  of	  someone	  denying	  it	  is	  Cameron	  (2007).	  
20	  Hirsch	  has	  taken	  the	  term	  “character”	  from	  Kaplan	  (1989).	  Kaplan	  took	  characters	  to	  be	  functions	  from	  contexts	  
to	  contents,	  but	  Hirsch	  talks	  about	  propositions	  or	  truth-­‐conditions	  instead	  of	  content.	  The	  differences	  in	  terminol-­‐
ogy	  do	  not	  matter	  here.	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Associated	  with	  this	  assumption	  is	  a	  liberal	  view	  on	  the	  individuation	  of	  languages.	  Let	  
an	   interpretation	  of	  a	  language	  be	  a	  set	  of	  ordered	  sequences	  of	  the	  well-­‐formed	  sentences	  of	  
the	  target	  language	  and	  a	  character,	  <Sentence,	  character>,	  for	  every	  sentence	  of	  the	  language.	  
The	  claim	  is	  that	  languages	  are	  differentiated	  by	  their	  interpretation:	  distinct	  languages	  do	  not	  
have	  the	  same	  interpretation	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  224).	  Hirsch’s	  view	  on	  language	  may	  be	  character-­‐
ized	  as	  liberal	  because	  he	  quite	  freely	  stipulates	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  different	  languages	  based	  on	  
this.	   All	   that	   is	   required	   for	   a	   “language”	   is	   a	   sufficiently	   described	   set	   of	   sentences	   and	   an	  
interpretation	  of	  these.	  To	  present	  Hirsch’s	  argument,	  I	  will	  have	  to	  follow	  this	  practice.	  Thus	  
when	  I	  in	  the	  following	  talk	  of	  different	  languages,	  I	  will	  be	  talking	  about	  completely	  interpret-­‐
ed	  languages	  where	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  sentences	  are	  already	  defined.	  	  
1.2.4	  	   The	  existential	  assumption	  
The	   fourth	   assumption	   connects	   Hirsch’s	   arguments	   to	   Quinean	   ontology.	   Hirsch	   assumes	  
that	   ontological	   questions	   are	   answered	  by	   considering	  which	  quantificational	   sentences	   are	  
true.21	  A	   quantificational	   sentence	   is	   a	   sentence	   having	   a	   term	   satisfying	   the	   core	   inferential	  
role	   of	   the	   English	   quantifier.	  We	   say	   that	   such	   sentences	   have	   a	   “quantifier	   expression”	   or	  
simply	  a	   “quantifier”.	  Most	  abstractly,	  a	  quantifier	   is	  an	  expression	   that	   satisfies	   the	   “formal-­‐
syntactic	  inferential	  roles	  familiar	  from	  formal	  logic”	  of	  the	  existential	  quantifier	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  
p.	  xiv).	  The	  only	  examples	  of	  such	  formal-­‐syntactic	   inferential	   roles	  Hirsch	  suggests	  are	  exis-­‐
tential	   introduction	   and	   existential	   elimination,	   so	   I	  will	   take	   the	   validity	   of	   these	   inference	  
schemata	  to	  sufficiently	  define	  a	  “quantifier	  expression”.	  Another	  way	  of	  using	  the	  word	  “quan-­‐
tifier”	  is	  for	  the	  quantifier	  expression	  of	  a	  specific	  language.	  This	  is	  the	  expression	  in	  that	  lan-­‐
guage	   that	   plays	   the	   same	   inferential	   role	   in	   that	   language	   as	   the	   English	   quantifier	   does.	  
Context	  will	  ensure	  that	  these	  notions	  are	  kept	  apart	  (see	  also	  sections	  1.3	  and	  2.3).	  	  
Let	  this	  be	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  quantificational	  sentence:	  A	  quantificational	  sentence	  is	  a	  
sentence	  of	  a	  language	  that	  has	  an	  expression	  that	  satisfies	  the	  formal-­‐syntactic	  inferential	  role	  
of	  the	  existential	  quantifier	  from	  formal	  logic.	  This	  sits	  well	  with	  what	  was	  said	  about	  Quinean	  
ontology	  in	  the	  introduction.	  Ontological	  questions	  are	  answered	  by	  determining	  which	  quan-­‐
tificational	   sentences	  are	   true.	   If	   the	  paraphrased	  quantificational	   sentence	  ∃𝑥𝐹𝑥	  in	   language	  
L1	   is	   true,	   then	   the	  ontological	   question	  of	  whether	   Fs	   exist	   is	   solved	   for	   speakers	   of	   L1,	   and	  
there	  is	  no	  further	  ontological	  question	  about	  Fs.	  The	  place	  where	  Hirsch	  differs	  from	  Quinean	  
ontologists	   is	   in	   how	   one	   determines	   whether	   quantified	   sentences	   are	   true.	   While	   Hirsch	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Hirsch	  does	  not	  formulate	  this	  assumption	  explicitly	   in	  writing,	  but	  his	  examples	  of	  ontological	  disputes	  always	  
involve	  sentences	  starting	  with	  “there	  is”	  or	  “there	  exists	  something”,	  and	  he	  writes,	  “to	  know	  the	  truth-­‐value	  of	  the	  
sentence	   ‘There	  are	  tables’	   is	  to	  know	  whether	  there	  are	  tables	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  101).	  In	  all	  of	  Hirsch’s	  writings,	  the	  
question	  of	  relevance	  for	  ontology	  is	  whether	  sentences	  involving	  one	  of	  the	  existential	  idioms	  are	  true.	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thinks	  this	  is	  solved	  solely	  by	  considerations	  of	  linguistic	  interpretations,	  mainstream	  ontolo-­‐
gists	  answer	  such	  questions	  by	  the	  elaborate	  method	  described	  in	  the	  introduction.	  	  
1.3	  	   Quantifier	  Variantism	  
1.3.1	   The	  position	  
In	  section	  1.1,	  I	  quoted	  an	  important	  paper	  by	  Hirsch	  where	  he	  describes	  quantifier	  variantism	  
as	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  “the	  world	  can	  be	  correctly	  described	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  concepts	  of	  ‘the	  
existence	  of	   something’”	   (2011,	   p.	   68),	   and	   added	   to	   that	   characterization	   that	  none	  of	   these	  
different	   concepts	   are	   metaphysically	   privileged.	   I	   chose	   that	   formulation	   because	   it	   nicely	  
captures	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   thesis.	   That	   formulation	   is	   from	   2002,	   however,	   and	  Hirsch	   has	  
developed	  his	  view	  since	  then.	  To	  arrive	  at	  the	  best	  and	  most	  recent	  formulation	  of	  quantifier	  
variantism,	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  operate	  with	  a	  formulation	  of	  the	  thesis	  from	  the	  introduction	  of	  
Hirsch	  (2011)	  supplied	  with	  other	  papers	  on	  quantifier	  variantism.22	  
	   A	  succinct	  formulation	  of	  quantifier	  variantism	  takes	  it	  to	  consist	  of	  the	  following	  two	  
claims	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  xiv):	  
	  
(i) “There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  ontological	  lan-­‐
guages.”23	  
(ii) “The	  possible	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  ontological	  languages	  are	  of	  equal	  
metaphysical	  merit.”24	  
	  
Call	   (i)	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism,	   and	   (ii)	   strong	   quantifier	   variantism.	   Weak	   quantifier	  
variantism	  may	  be	  true	  without	  strong	  quantifier	  variantism	  being	  true.25	  It	  is	  clear	  throughout	  
Hirsch’s	  work	  that	  he	  takes	  “quantifier	  variantism”	  to	  consist	  of	  both	  claims,	  but	  it	  is	  advanta-­‐
geous	  to	  consider	  them	  apart	  because	  the	  arguments	  for	  them	  differ.	  	  
An	  ontological	   language	   in	  (i)	  and	  (ii)	  is	  a	  language	  individuated	  by	  which	  quantifica-­‐
tional	   sentences	   are	   true	   in	   that	   language,	   and	   two	   languages	   are	   different	   ontological	   lan-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	   the	   introduction	  in	  Hirsch	  (2011)	  seems	  to	  characterize	  quantifier	  variantism	  in	  at	   least	  two	  
distinct	  ways	  (in	  one	  way	  on	  p.	  xii	  and	  another	  on	  p.	  xiv).	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  find	  the	  best	  formulation	  of	  the	  thesis	  to	  
avoid	  attacking	  a	  straw	  man,	  and	  the	  definition	  in	  Hirsch	  (2011,	  p.	  xiv)	  seems	  to	  me	  the	  clearest.	  	  
23	  This	  corresponds	  to	  the	  claim	  of	  “several	  concepts	  of	  ‘the	  existence	  of	  something’”	  from	  the	  introduction.	  As	  will	  
be	   readily	   explained,	   these	   different	   languages	   will	   have	   different	   quantifiers,	   and	   as	   Hirsch	   uses	   the	   terms,	   a	  
“concept	  of	  ‘the	  existence	  of	  something’”	  just	  is	  a	  quantifier.	  	  
24	  This	  corresponds	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  no	  ontological	  language	  that	  is	  metaphysically	  privileged.	  	  
25	  Can	  (ii)	  be	   true	  without	   (i)	  being	   true?	  Yes,	  because	   if	   there	   is	  only	  one	  ontological	   language,	   then	  all	  possible	  
truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   languages	   are	   of	   equal	   metaphysical	   merit.	   This	   vacuous	   truth	   of	   (ii)	   will	   not	   be	  
important,	  however,	  because	  I	  consider	  such	  cases	  (whether	  there	  is	  only	  one	  ontological	  language)	  as	  denials	  of	  (i),	  
and	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  interest	  in	  (ii)	  if	  (i)	  is	  false.	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guages	  if	  they	  provide	  different	  answers	  to	  ontological	  questions.	  So	  if	  ∃𝑥𝐹𝑥	  is	  true	  in	  L1,	  and	  ~∃𝑥𝐹𝑥	  is	  true	  in	  L2,	  L1	  and	  L2	  are	  different	  ontological	  languages.	  	  
Recalling	  Hirsch’s	   intensional	  view	  on	  language,	  two	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent	  if,	  “for	  any	  sentence	  in	  one,	  there	  is	  a	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  sentence	  in	  the	  
other”,	   and	   two	   sentences	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   if,	   “relative	   to	   any	   (actual	   or	  
possible)	  context	  of	  utterance,	  they	  are	  true	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  same	  possible	  worlds”	  (Hirsch	  
2011,	   p.	   xi–xii).	   So	   for	   any	   proposition	   expressible	   in	   one	   language	   in	   any	   context,	   the	   same	  
proposition	  is	  expressible	  in	  the	  other	  language	  in	  the	  same	  context.	  Example:	  Assume	  that	  the	  
sentences	   “There	  are	   tables”	   and	   “There	  are	  particles	   arranged	   tablewise”	  belong	   to	  different	  
languages,	  and	  that	  both	  sentences	  hold	  true	  in	  the	  same	  set	  of	  possible	  worlds.26	  In	  that	  case,	  
the	  sentences	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent,	  and	  if	  one	  could	  continue	  the	  procedure	  for	  
every	   sentence	   in	   each	   language,	   the	   languages	  would	  be	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent,	  but	  
different	  ontological	  languages.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  languages	  will	  have	  the	  same	  fact	  stating,	  or	  
expressive,	  power	  (see	  Hirsch	  2008b;	  Eklund	  2007,	  2009).	  	  
	   (ii)	   says	   that	   truth-­‐conditional	   equivalence	   is	   sufficient	   for	   the	   languages	   to	   describe	  
the	  world	  equally	  well,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  no	  further	  constraints	  on	  which	  language	  one	  should	  
speak	  when	  talking	  about	  what	  there	  is.27	  If	  the	  languages	  can	  express	  the	  same	  content,	  then	  
one	  cannot	  be	  any	  better	  metaphysically	  than	  the	  other.	  So	  even	  though	  two	  different	  ontolog-­‐
ical	  languages,	  e.g.	  L1	  and	  L2,	  are	  different	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  they	  say	  there	  is,	  e.g.	  Fs,	  they	  
describe	  the	  world	  equally	  well	  as	  long	  as	  they	  can	  express	  the	  same	  intensions.	  For	  quantifier	  
variantism	   to	  be	   true,	   then,	   there	  have	   to	  be	   (i)	   a	  number	  of	  different	  ontological	   languages	  
that	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent,	   and	   (ii)	   these	   languages	   are	   of	   equal	   metaphysical	  
merit.28	  Thus	   “metaphysical	   merit”	   is	   reduced	   to	   truth-­‐conditional	   equivalence.	   This	   reveals	  
the	  importance	  of	  the	  intensional	  assumption;	  see	  Hawthorne	  (2009)	  for	  criticism.	  	  
A	  common	  characterizations	  of	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  that	  there	  are	  several	  meanings	  
of	  the	  concept	  of	  “the	  existence	  of	  something”	  or	  several	  candidate-­‐meanings	  for	  the	  quantifi-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  I	  here	  ignore	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  tables	  are	  ontologically	  multiply	  realizable,	  as	  does	  Hirsch.	  	  
27	  This	  holds	  only	  as	  long	  as	  the	  languages	  are	  not	  expressively	  impoverished	  relative	  to	  a	  third	  language.	  If	  there	  are	  
facts	   that	  can	  only	  be	  expressed	   in	  a	   third	   language,	  and	  not	   in	   the	  other	   two,	  also	  Hirsch	  would	  claim	  that	  one	  
should	  use	  that	  language	  to	  describe	  the	  world;	  one	  may	  make	  more	  true	  claims	  about	  the	  world.	  Crucially,	  Hirsch	  
thinks	  that	  differences	  in	  which	  physical	  objects	  languages	  say	  exist	  don’t	  have	  any	  bearing	  on	  the	  expressiveness	  of	  
languages;	  languages	  can	  differ	  ontologically	  and	  still	  be	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent.	  	  
28	  If	   two	   languages	  are	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   in	   this	   sense,	  we	  have	  a	   translation	  between	   them.	  We	  can	  
define	  a	  translation	  function	  between	  the	  two	  languages,	  such	  that	  a	  sentence	  in	  one	  is	  mapped	  to	  the	  sentence	  in	  
the	  other	  language	  that	  expresses	  the	  same	  character.	  If	  a	  sentence	  is	  be	  mapped	  to	  a	  sentence	  with	  another	  quanti-­‐
ficational	   structure,	   then	   the	   languages	  have	  different	   quantifiers.	   For	   instance,	   if	   the	  quantifier	   of	   one	   language	  
binds	   a	   singular	   variable	   in	   a	   predicate,	   and	   the	   sentence	   in	   the	   other	   language	   it	   is	   mapped	   to	   involve	   plural	  
quantification,	  then	  the	  languages	  have	  different	  quantifiers.	  Thus	  if	  the	  sentences	  “There	  are	  tables”	  and	  “There	  are	  
particles	  arranged	  tablewise”	  hold	  true	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  same	  possible	  worlds,	  they	  will	  be	  mapped	  to	  each	  other.	  
As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this,	  ontological	  questions	  will	  receive	  different	  answers	  in	  these	  languages.	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er.29	  This	  is	  a	  correct	  description	  if	  we	  grant	  Hirsch	  the	  following:	  The	  meaning	  of	  the	  quantifi-­‐
er	   (over	  and	  above	   its	   inferential	   role)	   is	  defined	  by	  how	   it	   interacts	  with	  other	   terms	  of	   the	  
language	   to	   determine	   the	   truth-­‐conditions	   of	   sentences	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   71).	   Thus	  ∃𝑥	  would	  
have	  different	  meanings	  in	  L1	  and	  L2,	  because	  ∃𝑥𝐹𝑥	  is	  true	  in	  L1,	  and	  ~∃𝑥𝐹𝑥	  is	  true	  in	  L2.	  Note	  
straight	  away	  that	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  not	  the	  thesis	  that	  only	  the	  quantifier	  has	  different	  
meaning	   in	   alternative	   ontological	   languages.	   It	   entails	   that	   the	   truth-­‐conditions	   of	   singular	  
sentences	  varies	  from	  one	  ontological	  language	  to	  another	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  xii).30	  
	   As	  noted,	  Hirsch	  must	  define	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  quantifier	  as	  something	  over	  and	  above	  
its	  conceptual	  role.	  What	  may	  this	  be?	  Hirsch	  answers:	  	  
	  
In	  general,	  we	  explain	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  logical	  constant	  by	  describing	  the	  role	  it	  plays	  in	  deter-­‐
mining	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  sentences.	  …	  [W]e	  explain	  the	  relevant	  change	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  
the	  quantifier,	  which	  will	  render	  the	  mereologist’s	  sentence	  true,	  roughly	  as	  follows:	  In	  the	  new	  
meaning,	  any	  sentence	  of	  the	  form	  “There	  exists	  something	  composed	  of	  the	  F-­‐thing	  and	  the	  G-­‐
thing”	   is	   true	   if	   the	   expression	   “the	   F-­‐thing”	   refers	   to	   something	   and	   the	   expression	   “the	  G-­‐
thing”	  refers	  to	  something.	  (2011,	  p.	  71–72)	  
	  
Thus	  what’s	  over	  and	  above	   the	  conceptual	   role	   is	   the	  quantifier’s	  contribution	   to	   the	   truth-­‐
conditions	  of	  sentences.	  The	  sentence	  “There	  is	  something	  composed	  of	  the	  Eiffel	  Tower	  and	  
Plato’s	  nose”	   is	   false	   in	  English,	  but	   true	   in	   the	  artificial	   language	  Universalese,	  which	   is	  de-­‐
fined	  to	  make	  the	  typical	  assertions	  of	  universalists,	  i.e.	  philosophers	  who	  believe	  that	  for	  any	  
plurality	  of	  objects,	  there	  is	  something	  they	  compose,	  come	  out	  true.	  If	  we	  assume	  that	  these	  
languages	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   (see	   below),	   there	   must	   be	   a	   difference	   in	   the	  
meaning	   of	   the	   terms.	  One	   of	   the	   expressions	   that	   contribute	   to	   this	  meaning-­‐difference	   is	  
“There	   is	   something”,	   which	   thus	   plausibly	   has	   different	   meanings	   in	   these	   languages.	   The	  
alternative	  would	   be	   to	   “blame	   it	   all”	   on	   the	   predicates	   and	   names,	   but	   given	   that	   a	   conse-­‐
quence	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  this	  sentence	  is	  that	  an	  object	  with	  the	  Eiffel	  Tower	  and	  Plato’s	  nose	  as	  
parts	  is	  in	  the	  universal	  domain	  of	  Universalese,	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  quantified	  over,	  it	  is	  plausible	  
to	   say	   that	   also	   “There	   is	   something”	   has	   another	   meaning	   in	   Universalese	   than	   it	   does	   in	  
English.	  	  
	   We	  can	  give	  another	  argument	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  quantifier	  has	  different	  meanings	  
in	  the	  languages.	  For	  at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  someone	  who	  believes	  that	  two	  things	  never	  com-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Thus	  the	  suggestion	  is	  not	  the	  trivial	  claim	  that	  the	  strings	  of	  letters	  “There	  is”	  or	  “exists”	  can	  be	  assigned	  different	  
meanings	  because	  language	  is	  conventional,	  nor	  that	  obviously	  false	  claim	  that	  in	  our	  sense	  of	  the	  quantifier	  there	  
both	  are	  and	  aren’t	  tables.	  It	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  quantifier	  shares	  inferential	  properties,	  but	  differs	  in	  meaning.	  	  
30	  There	   is	  much	  more	   to	  be	   said	  here,	  but	   the	   in-­‐depth	  discussion	   is	  projected	   to	   chapter	   2.	  There	   I	  discuss	   the	  
notion	  of	  “truth-­‐conditional	  equivalence”	  in	  more	  detail,	  and	  I	  also	  discuss	  an	  objection	  based	  on	  an	  argument	  by	  
Harris	   (1982)	   and	  Williamson	   (1987-­‐1988)	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   if	   two	   expressions	  of	   different	   languages	   satisfies	   the	  
same	  formal-­‐syntactic	  inferential	  role,	  they	  must	  have	  the	  same	  meaning.	  If	  this	  argument	  is	  sound,	  it	  entails	  that	  
there	  can	  be	  no	  quantifier	  variance.	  	  
	   12	  
pose	  something	  (a	  nihilist),	  and	  a	  universalist,	  they	  will	  disagree	  about	  what	  there	  is	  in	  a	  vacu-­‐
um	  chamber	  containing	  two	  mereological	  simples	  (things	  without	  proper	  parts).	  The	  univer-­‐
salist	  will	  accept,	  and	  the	  nihilist	  will	  reject,	  the	  sentence:31	  
	   ∃𝑥∃𝑦∃𝑧(𝑥 ≠ 𝑦  &  𝑥 ≠ 𝑧  &  𝑦 ≠ 𝑧)	  
	  
This	   sentence	   is	   construed	   to	   contain	  only	  quantifiers,	   truth-­‐functional	   connectives,	   and	   the	  
identity	   predicate.	   If	   we	   suppose,	   with	   Hirsch,	   that	   the	   disputants	   speak	   different	   truth-­‐
conditionally	   equivalent	   ontological	   languages,	   then	  because	   there	   is	   no	   equivocation	   in	   the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  truth-­‐functional	  connectives	  or	  the	  identity	  predicate,	  the	  universalist	  and	  the	  
nihilist	  must	  be	  disagreeing	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  quantifier	  (Sider	  2009,	  p.	  390).	  	  
If	   what	   I	   have	   said	   is	   correct,	   a	   consequence	   is	   this.	   If	   two	   languages	   are	   truth-­‐
conditionally	  equivalent,	  yet	  quantify	  over	  different	  things:	  they	  have	  different	  quantifiers	  (in	  
the	   required	   sense).	   But	   then	   it	   follows	   that	   if	   two	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   languages	  
have	  different	  ontologies,	  they	  have	  different	  quantifiers,	  for	  the	  ontology	  is	  simply	  what	  one	  
quantifies	  over.	  This	   fits	  well	  with	  how	  Hirsch	   formulates	  his	   view,	  but	   is	   a	   consequence	  he	  
doesn’t	  point	  out	  directly.	  	  
	   It	  might	  seem	  counterintuitive	  that	  the	  things	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  language	  contribute	  to	  
individuate	   quantifiers.	   But	  we	  must	   recall	   that	  we	   are	   now	  only	   talking	   about	   the	   sense	   in	  
which	  different	  ontological	   languages	  have	   “different	  quantifiers”,	   and	   this	   sense	   is	  naturally	  
linked	  to	  the	  domain.	  If	  “quantifier”	  is	  understood	  as	  conceptual	  role,	  then	  the	  “meaning	  of	  the	  
quantifier”	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  domain.32	  
	   In	  Hirsch’s	   terminology,	   the	  denial	   of	   quantifier	   variantism	   is	   quantifier	   invariantism	  
(Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  xiv).	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  of	  being	  a	  quantifier	  invariantist:	  either	  by	  denying	  (i)	  
or	  by	  denying	  (ii).	  Call	  those	  who	  reject	  (i)	  quantifier	   invariantists.33	  They	  hold	  that	  there	  are	  
not	  several	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  ontological	   languages,	  there	   is	  only	  one.	  This	  posi-­‐
tion	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  chapter	  2.	  The	  other	  option	  is	  to	  accept	  (i),	  but	  deny	  (ii)	  and	  be	  a	  norma-­‐
tive34 	  quantifier	   invariantist	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   xv).	   Normative	   invariantism	   holds	   that	   even	  
though	   there	   are	   several	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   languages,	   there	   is	   a	   best,	   privileged	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  This	   argument	   is	   from	   Sider	   (2009,	   p.	   390).	   Sider	   (2009,	   p.	   387–390)	   provides	   arguments	   for	   why	   one	   cannot	  
blame	  only	  the	  predicate	  for	  the	  meaning-­‐change	  involved	  in	  quantifier	  variance.	  	  
32	  We	  can	  note	  that	  the	  interpretative	  assumption,	  i.e.	  the	  claim	  that	  interpretation	  is	  done	  at	  the	  level	  of	  sentences,	  
plays	   a	   role	   here.	   The	  meaning	   of	   the	   quantifier	   is	   construed	   not	   as	   a	   function	   of	   what	   is	   in	   the	   domain	   inde-­‐
pendently	  of	  which	  sentences	  are	  true,	  but	  instead	  as	  a	  function	  of	  which	  quantificational	  sentences	  are	  considered	  
true	  in	  a	  given	  language.	  Because	  of	  the	  language	  assumption,	  we	  can	  define	  different	  languages	  where	  stipulated	  
sentences	  are	  true,	  and	  as	  long	  as	  we	  can	  show	  that	  such	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  to	  e.g.	  Eng-­‐
lish,	  we	  have	  different	  ontological	  languages,	  and	  thus	  different	  answers	  to	  ontological	  questions.	  
33	  Hirsch	  calls	  this	  position	  “necessity”	  quantifier	   invariantism	  (2011,	  p.	  xv),	  because	  it	   is	  then	  necessary	  to	  use	  the	  
one	  quantifier.	  I’ve	  chosen	  to	  omit	  “necessity”	  as	  I	  don’t	  think	  it	  contributes	  much	  to	  the	  term.	  	  
34	  We	  call	  it	  normative	  invariantism	  because	  it	  says	  there	  is	  a	  best	  language	  for	  talking	  about	  what	  there	  is.	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language	  to	  talk	  about	  what	  there	  is.	  Because	  the	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent,	  
the	   normative	   invariantist	   must	   hold	   that	   there	   is	   a	   further	   epistemic	   virtue	   that	   makes	   it	  
rationally	   required	   to	   describe	   the	   world	   in	   a	   specific	   language:	   truth	   is	   not	   enough	   when	  
doing	  metaphysics.	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  the	  position	  of	  Sider	  (2011),	  and	  this	  position	  is	  discussed	  
in	  chapter	  4.	  	  
	   We	   can	   now	   clarify	   why	   quantifier	   variantism	   plausibly	   is	   a	   local	   thesis:	   It	   requires	  
argument	   to	  show	  that	  there	  are	  two	  different	  ontological	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	   lan-­‐
guages	   in	   a	   given	   ontological	   dispute.	  Quantifier	   variantism	  would	   prove	   false	   for	   a	   dispute	  
over	   certain	   objects	   if	   two	   languages	   where	   the	   different	   views	   came	   out	   correct	   were	   not	  
truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent.	   Hirsch	   thinks	   that	   in	   the	   dispute	   between	   nominalists	   and	  
platonists	  there	  is	  no	  language	  which	  doesn’t	  quantify	  over	  numbers	  that	  is	  truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent	  to	  a	   language	  that	  does	  quantify	  over	  numbers.	  Thus	  Hirsch	  believes	  that	  there	   is	  
no	  quantifier	  variance	  in	  disputes	  about	  mathematical	  objects	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  243–245).	  
	   A	  last	  topic	  that	  must	  be	  mentioned	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  quantifier	  variantism	  
and	   realism.	   A	   common	   criticism	   of	  Hirsch	   (and	   especially	   his	   predecessor	   Putnam)	   is	   that	  
quantifier	   variantism	   leads	   to	   an	  unattractive	   anti-­‐realism.	  Hirsch	   insists	   that	   this	   is	  not	   the	  
case,	   though	   there	   are	   versions	  of	   “realism”	   incompatible	  with	  quantifier	   variantism	   (2011,	  p.	  
79).	  I’m	  inclined	  to	  agree	  with	  him	  on	  this;	  quantifier	  variantism	  doesn’t	  entail	  anti-­‐realism.	  In	  
any	  case,	  this	  will	  not	  be	  a	  central	  criticism	  of	  the	  present	  discussion	  (though	  see	  section	  4.5)	  
We	  may	  now	  formulate	  a	  refined	  version	  of	  the	  deflationary	  argument	  based	  on	  quanti-­‐
fier	  variantism	  that	  I	  alluded	  to	  in	  section	  1.1:	  
	  
P1.	  	   There	   are	   several	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   ontological	   languages	   (weak	  
quantifier	  variantism)	  
P2.	  	   If	  several	  ontological	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent,	  then	  they	  are	  
of	  equal	  metaphysical	  merit	  (strong	  quantifier	  variantism)	  ∴	  	   C.	  	   The	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  ontological	  languages	  are	  of	  equal	  	  
metaphysical	  merit.	  	  
	  
The	  argument	  is	  valid,	  and	  the	  premises	  are	  the	  claims	  of	  quantifier	  variantism.	  We	  may	  call	  
this	  the	  argument	  from	  arbitrary	  languages,	  as	  it	  trades	  on	  the	  apparent	  arbitrariness	  of	  ontol-­‐
ogy	  when	  we	  appreciate	  the	  fact	  that	  ontological	  questions	  have	  different	  answers	   in	  the	  dif-­‐
ferent	   ontological	   languages.	   As	   I	   will	   presently	   exemplify,	   Hirsch	   argues	   that	   ontological	  
languages	   reflecting	   popular	   positions	   in	   the	   ontology	   of	   physical	   objects	   all	   are	   truth-­‐
conditionally	   equivalent.	   Noticing	   that	   there	   are	   several	   ontological	   languages,	   and	   none	   of	  
them	  privileged,	  one	  may	  worry	  why	  we	  should	  care	  about	  the	  truth	  in	  our	  language,	  or	  in	  any	  
other	   language,	   for	   that	  matter.	   For	   they	   are	   all	   of	   equal	  metaphysical	  merit.	   Ontology	   be-­‐
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comes	   the	  provincial	  activity	  of	  determining	  which	   language	  one	   is	   speaking.	  When	  one	  has	  
done	  that,	  the	  ontology	  follows.	  We	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  argument,	  but	  it	  attracts	  attention	  
to	  a	  potential	  deflationary	  consequence	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  quantifier	  variantism.	  
1.3.2	   Arguments	  for	  quantifier	  variantism	  
So	  much	  for	  background	  theory	  and	  abstract	  characterizations.	  I	  will	  give	  two	  examples	  of	  how	  
Hirsch	  argues	  for	  quantifier	  variantism	  for	  a	  given	  dispute	  in	  the	  ontology	  of	  physical	  objects.	  
The	  general	  form	  of	  the	  arguments	  is	  as	  follows:	  
	  
1. Start	  with	  two	  different	  ontological	  languages,	  x	  and	  y.	  	  
2. Then	  show	  that:	  	  
a. If	   we	   assume	   x,	   then	   for	   any	   sentence	   in	   y,	   one	   can	   find	   a	   truth-­‐
conditionally	  equivalent	  sentence	  in	  x.	  
b. If	   we	   assume	   y,	   then	   for	   any	   sentence	   in	   x,	   one	   can	   find	   a	   truth-­‐
conditionally	  equivalent	  sentence	  in	  y.	  
	  
In	  both	  arguments,	  Hirsch	  takes	  well-­‐known	  ontological	  positions	  in	  the	  ontology	  of	  physical	  
objects	   and	   stipulates	   that	   there	   are	  distinct	   languages	   in	  which	   sentences	   corresponding	   to	  
the	  characteristic	  assertions	  by	  adherents	  of	  these	  theories	  come	  out	  true.	  Quantifier	  variant-­‐
ism	   requires	  merely	   that	   there	   are	   several	   possible	   ontological	   languages,	   so	   this	   stipulation	  
might	  be	   considered	  a	  possibility-­‐statement	  of	   such	   languages.35	  I	  will	   therefore	   speak	  about	  
ontological	  languages	  such	  as	  Endurance-­‐	  and	  Perdurance-­‐English,	  Universalese	  and	  Nihilish.	  
These	  names	  are	  shorthand	  for	  languages	  in	  which	  typical	  utterances	  by	  endurantists,	  univer-­‐
salists	   and	   so	   on	   are	   true.	   Thus	   they	   are	   consciously	   construed	   to	   have	   specific	   truth-­‐
conditions.	   For	   instance,	   in	   a	   language	   construed	   to	  make	   universalism	   come	   out	   true,	   the	  
linguistic	  string	  “There	  is	  something	  having	  the	  Eiffel	  Tower	  and	  Capitol	  Hill	  as	  parts”	  is	  true	  if	  
what	  we	  would	  usually	   refer	   to	  as	   the	  Eiffel	  Tower	  and	  Capitol	  Hill	   exists.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  
languages	   are	   completely	   interpreted.	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   English,	   where	   we	   don’t	   really	  
know	  whether	  this	  sentence	  is	  true	  or	  false	  (at	  least	  not	  without	  argument;	  section	  1.4).	  
Recall	   that	  different	  ontological	   languages	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  express	  the	  same	  
propositions.	  So	  the	  reason	  why	  assertions	  by	  speakers	  of	  these	  languages	  come	  out	  true	  even	  
though	  they	  may	  seem	  to	  contradict	  each	  other	  is	  that	  they	  express	  the	  same	  propositions.	  	  
	   The	  general	  conclusion	  of	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  that	  certain	  ontologi-­‐
cal	  disputes	  per	  se	  are	  futile.	  The	  strategy	  described	  by	  (1)–(2)	  applies	  to	  only	  some	  positions	  of	  
a	  given	  dispute,	  so	  does	  not	  warrant	  a	  general	  deflationary	  conclusion.	  To	  establish	  deflation-­‐
ism	  firmly,	  one	  will	  have	  to	  repeat	  the	  exercise	  for	  all	  the	  different	  answers	  to	  the	  ontological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  That	   there	   are	   several	   ontological	   languages	   follows	   from	   the	   interpretative	   and	   language	   assumptions.	   If	   a	  
language	  merely	  is	  a	  set	  of	  sentences	  associated	  with	  characters,	  we	  may	  consider	  the	  surface	  structure	  of	  sentences	  
apparently	  expressing	  different	  ontological	  positions	  and	  yet	  associate	  them	  with	  the	  same	  characters.	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question.	   That	   being	   said,	   I	   will	   only	   go	   through	   two	   alternative	   positions	   for	   each	   dispute	  
below	  for	  practical	  reasons,	  but	  if	  the	  argumentative	  strategy	  is	  successful,	  I	  suppose	  that	  it	  has	  
general	  relevance.	  	  
Step	  (1)	  is	  relatively	  unproblematic	  if	  we	  assume	  Hirsch’s	  view	  on	  language.	  As	  we	  will	  
see,	   the	   way	   Hirsch	   establishes	   (2)	   is	   by	   suggesting	   methods	   for	   construing	   the	   truth-­‐
conditions	   of	   an	   alternative	   ontological	   language	   in	   another	   ontological	   language,	   and	   vice	  
versa.	  This	  method	  will	  be	  general,	  characterized	  by	  example	  or	  recursion,	  and	  is	  intended	  to	  
persuade	  the	  reader	  that	  the	  process	  could	  be	  carried	  out	  for	  all	  sentences.	  	  
I	  will	  illustrate	  the	  argumentative	  strategy	  described	  by	  (1)–(2)	  by	  going	  through	  two	  of	  
Hirsch’s	   favorite	   examples;	   the	   dispute	   over	   the	   persistence	   of	   objects	   and	   the	   dispute	   over	  
when	  some	  objects	  compose	  a	  further	  object.	  	  
Existence	  over	  time:	  perdurance	  vs.	  endurance36	  
In	  slogan	  form,	  endurantists	  believe	  that	  objects	  persist	  by	  being	  “wholly	  present”	  throughout	  
their	  lifespan,	  and	  perdurantists	  believe	  that	  objects	  persist	  by	  having	  temporal	  parts	  existing	  
at	   different	   times	   (Lewis	   1986;	   Sider	   2001b).	   Assume	   that	   the	   dispute	   between	   perdurantists	  
and	  endurantists	  only	  concerns	  the	  existence	  of	  temporal	  parts,	  as	  Hirsch	  does	  (2011,	  p.	  222).	  
Following	  the	  above	  schema,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  (a)	  an	  endurantist	  can	  adopt	  a	  “perdurantist	  
language”,	  and	  (b)	  a	  perdurantist	  may	  adopt	  an	  “endurantist	  language”,	  and	  this	  adoption	  of	  a	  
different	  ontological	  language	  shows	  that	  the	  newly	  adopted	  one	  is	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equiva-­‐
lent	   to	   the	   original	   one.	  We	  may	   note	   that	   strictly	   speaking,	   this	   is	   the	   inverse	   of	   (b).	   The	  
essence	   of	   the	   argument	   is	   nonetheless	   the	   same:	   one	   shows	   that	   two	   languages	   are	   truth-­‐
conditionally	   equivalent	   by	  providing	   a	  way	  of	   associating	   sentences	   of	   one	   language	  with	   a	  
truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  sentence	  of	  the	  other.	  How	  one	  does	  this	  is	  irrelevant.37	  	  
	   Suppose	  that	  Edna	  is	  an	  endurantists	  and	  talks	  like	  one,	  but	  she	  wishes	  to	  pass	  herself	  
off	  as	  a	  perdurantist.	  Call	  the	  language	  she	  originally	  speaks	  E-­‐English,	  in	  which	  she	  may	  truth-­‐
fully	  utter	   sentences	   like	   “Lincoln	  was	  bearded	   in	   1860”.	  Hirsch	  claims	   that	  Edna	  may	  adopt	  
the	   following	   convention	   to	  pass	  herself	   off	   as	   a	  perdurantist:	   “Henceforth	   I	  will	   use	   the	   ex-­‐
pression	   ‘temporal	  part	  of	  an	  object’	  when	  I	  want	   to	   talk	  about	  how	  an	  object	   is	  at	  a	  certain	  
time.	  I’ll	  say	  ‘Lincoln	  had	  in	  1860	  a	  temporal	  part	  that	  was	  bearded’	  to	  describe	  the	  situation	  in	  
which	  Lincoln	  was	  bearded	  in	  1860.	  In	  general,	  I’ll	  use	  a	  sentence	  of	  the	  form	  ‘a	  has	  at	  time	  t	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  I	   have	   stripped	   down	  Hirsch’s	   original	   argument	   to	  make	   it	   clearer	   and	   hopefully	  more	   successful	   in	   showing	  
what	  I	  take	  it	  is	  supposed	  to.	  	  
37	  I’ve	  chosen	  to	  follow	  Hirsch’s	  way	  of	  presenting	  the	  argument.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  bit	  tidier	  to	  follow	  
the	  schema	  of	  (ii),	  but	  on	  the	  other	  it	  would	  require	  divergence	  in	  presentation	  from	  Hirsch’s	  original	  paper,	  and	  I	  
consider	  the	  costs	  of	  reformulating	  Hirsch’s	  argument	  to	  outweigh	  the	  benefits.	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temporal	  part	  that	  is	  F’	  to	  be	  true	  of	  any	  situation	  in	  which	  a	   is	  F	  at	  t”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  223).38	  
Call	  the	  language	  Edna	  speaks	  after	  adopting	  this	  convention	  P-­‐English.	  	  
	   To	  establish	  (b),	  Hirsch	  asks	  us	  to	  consider	  a	  perdurantist,	  Pedro,	  who	  adopts	  a	  “secret	  
language	   that	   will	   enable	   him	   to	   sound	   like	   an	   endurantist”	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   223).	   Thus	   he	  
adopts	  the	  following	  convention:	  “Henceforth	  I	  will	   in	  every	  context	  restrict	  my	  quantifier	  to	  
objects	   accepted	   by	   endurantists	   –	   roughly,	   objects	   other	   than	   (proper)	   temporal	   parts	   of	  
ordinary	  objects”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  223).	  Call	  the	  language	  Pedro	  speaks	  after	  consistently	  adopt-­‐
ing	  this	  convention	  E-­‐English.	  
	   Hirsch	  claims	  that	  in	  P-­‐English,	  typical	  assertions	  involving	  the	  (proper)	  temporal	  parts	  
of	  objects	  are	  true,	  but	  that	  they	  are	  false	   in	  E-­‐English	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  223).	  How	  should	  one	  
evaluate	   this	   example?	   First,	   one	   might	   worry	   about	   the	   plausibility	   of	   adopting	   “another	  
language”	  by	   adopting	   a	   convention.	  Hirsch	  doesn’t	   address	   this,	   but	  we	  may	   answer	   that	   it	  
seems	  we	   can	   at	   least	   start	   uttering	   sentences	   belonging	   to	   another	   language	   as	   long	   as	  we	  
know	  the	  truth-­‐conditions,	  and	  thus	  flawlessly	  can	  carry	  out	  the	  language-­‐shift.	  Eventually	  we	  
may	  end	  up	  speaking	  the	  “new”	  language.	  Second,	  the	  argument	  assumes	  that	  Edna	  and	  Pedro	  
were	   speaking	   different	   languages	   before	   adopting	   the	   conventions.	   But	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	  
simply	  because	  they	  accepted	  different	  theories	  of	  persistence,	  they	  spoke	  different	  languages	  
initially.	  To	  avoid	  that	  problem,	  we	  may	  suppose	   that	  Edna	   from	  infancy	  belonged	  to	  an	  en-­‐
durantists	  community	  and	  that	  Pedro	  belonged	  to	  a	  perdurantist	  community	  (see	  Dorr	  2005).	  	  
Given	   these	   assumptions,	   the	   function	  of	   the	   conventions	   is	   to	   clarify	  how	  Edna	   and	  
Pedro	  may	  define	   the	   truth-­‐conditions	  of	  different	  ontological	   languages	   in	   their	  own,	  prior,	  
language.	  If	  they	  carry	  on	  following	  the	  conventions,	  they	  will	  systematically	  and	  successfully	  
utter	  sentences	  corresponding	  to	  the	  sentences	  perdurantists	  and	  endurantists	  accept.	  So	   for	  
instance,	  when	  Edna	  wants	  to	  talk	  about	  Lincoln	  being	  bearded	  in	  1860,	  she	  talks	  about	  him	  
having	  a	  temporal	  part.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  know	  how	  to	  define	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  the	  alter-­‐
native	  ontological	  languages	  in	  their	  own	  prior	  language,	  which	  is	  just	  what	  step	  2	  requires.	  	  
	   Hirsch’s	   central	   claim	   is	   that	   “When	   we	   ask	   whether	   objects	   have	   temporal	   parts	   it	  
seems	  that	  our	  answer	  ought	  to	  be	  ‘yes’	  if	  our	  language	  is	  P-­‐English,	  and	  ‘no’	  if	  our	  language	  is	  
E-­‐English”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  223).	  In	  P-­‐English,	  which	  is	  the	  language	  Edna	  speaks	  after	  adopting	  
the	  convention,	  the	  sentence	  “Lincoln	  had	  in	  1860	  a	  temporal	  part	  that	  was	  bearded”	  is	  true.	  In	  
E-­‐English,	   this	   sentence	   (string	   of	   letters)	   is	   false,	   because	   there	   are	   no	   temporal	   parts	   (to	  
quantify	  over	  with	  Pedro’s	  quantifiers	  anyways).	  This	  conclusion	  doesn’t	  obviously	  follow	  from	  
the	  example,	  however.	  If	  the	  point	  is	  that	  if	  we	  already	  spoke	  P-­‐English,	  then	  the	  existence	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Hirsch’s	  (2011,	  p.	  222)	  way	  of	  introducing	  these	  conventions	  is	  by	  having	  Edna	  (and	  Pedro)	  “write	  in	  their	  diaries”	  
the	  directions	  of	  the	  conventions.	  I	  have	  avoided	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  story,	  as	  it	  is	  inessential	  to	  the	  argument.	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temporal	   parts	   simply	   follows	   from	   the	   stipulation	   that	   we	   already	   spoke	   P-­‐English.39	  The	  
problem	  is	  that	  it	  isn’t	  obvious	  that	  when	  Edna	  uses	  sentences	  of	  P-­‐English,	  her	  utterances	  are	  
true,	  because	  they	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  her	  beliefs,	  and	  the	  same	  goes	  for	  Pedro’s	  utterances	  in	  
E-­‐English.	  Reply:	  The	  urgent	  point	  is	  whether	  the	  conventions	  explain	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  
P-­‐English	  sentences	  in	  E-­‐English,	  and	  for	  E-­‐English	  sentences	  in	  P-­‐English,	  cf.	  (b).	  This	  is	  how	  
Hirsch	  describes	  the	  relationship	  between	  E-­‐English	  and	  P-­‐English:	  	  
	  
…	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  sentences	  and	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  characters,	  and	  the	  characters	  are	  dis-­‐
tributed	  differently	  over	  the	  sentences	  of	  the	  two	  languages	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  that	  the	  sentences	  
asserted	  by	  endurantists	  in	  one	  language	  have	  the	  same	  characters	  as	  the	  different	  sentences	  as-­‐
serted	  by	  perdurantists	  in	  the	  other	  language.	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  234)	  
	  
The	  example	  of	  Edna	  and	  Pedro	   is	  supposed	  to	  show	  that	   this	   is	  a	  correct	  description	  of	   the	  
case.	   If	   it	   is,	   the	   languages	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent,	   for	  Hirsch’s	  description	  of	   the	  
case	  entails	  that	  Edna	  has	  understood	  how	  to	  use	  P-­‐English,	  and	  Pedro	  has	  understood	  how	  to	  
use	  E-­‐English.	  Another	  point	  can	  be	  made:	  When	  Edna	  speaks	  P-­‐English,	  she	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  
confident	   that	  her	  P-­‐English	  utterances	  are	  merely	   linguistic	  variations	  of	   the	  characters	   she	  
expresses	   in	  her	  primary	  language.	  The	  two	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent,	  but	  
the	  existential	  assumption	  implies	  that	  the	  answers	  to	  ontological	  questions	  are	  different.	  This	  
should	  elicit	  the	  feeling	  that	  something	  is	  wrong	  with	  ontology.	  
The	  deflationary	  conclusion	  Hirsch	  draws	  from	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  because	  P-­‐English	  
and	  E-­‐English	  describe	  the	  world	  equally	  well	  –	  one	  may	  express	  exactly	  the	  same	  intensions	  
using	  these	  languages,	  but	  use	  different	  sentences	  doing	  so	  –	  there	  is	  no	  point	  in	  arguing	  over	  
whether	  there	  are	  temporal	  parts.40	  There	  is	  no	  point	  in	  trying	  to	  mimic	  the	  “quantificational	  
structure”	   of	   the	  world,	   because	   the	  world	   can	   be	   described	   equally	  well	   by	   languages	  with	  
different	  quantifiers.	  	  
Composition:	  “common	  sense”	  vs.	  universalism	  
A	   second	  dispute	   in	  which	  Hirsch	   claims	   there	   is	   quantifier	   variance	   is	   the	  dispute	  over	   the	  
special	  composition	  question,	  i.e.	  “Under	  what	  circumstances	  do	  several	  things	  compose	  some-­‐
thing?”41	  Hirsch	  (2002a)	  imagines	  a	  dispute	  between	  a	  mereologist,42	  who	  believes	  that	  compo-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  This	  follows	  from	  the	  assumption	  inherent	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  languages:	  the	  languages	  are	  defined	  to	  make	  
the	  distinct	  ontologically	  sentences	  come	  out	  true.	  One	  may	  object	  that	  this	  definition	  of	  a	  languages	  is	  incomplete,	  
presupposing	  the	  conclusion.	  However,	  it	  follows	  from	  the	  intensional,	  interpretative	  and	  existential	  assumptions.	  	  
40	  If	  anything,	  there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  exactly	  which	  language	  ordinary	  language	  users	  speak,	  which	  is	  central	  in	  the	  
argument	  for	  linguistic	  choice.	  	  
41	  The	   question	   was	   first	   posed	   by	   Peter	   van	   Inwagen	   (1987).	   The	   question,	   and	   its	   implications,	   is	   thoroughly	  
discussed	   in	   van	   Inwagen	   (1990).	   van	   Inwagen	   (1990)	   considers	   several	   formulations.	   The	   official	   formulation	   is	  
“When	  is	  it	  true	  that	  ‘∃𝑦	  the	  xs	  compose	  y?’”	  (van	  Inwagen	  1990,	  p.	  30).	  The	  question	  is	  intimately	  related	  to	  mere-­‐
ology,	  the	  theory	  of	  part–whole-­‐relations,	  but	  we	  will	  not	  focus	  on	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  debate,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  direct-­‐
ly	  relevant	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  Hirsch’s	  arguments.	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sition	   always	   occurs;	   for	   any	   things	   whatsoever,	   there	   is	   something	   they	   compose,43	  and	   an	  
“anti-­‐mereologist”,	  who	  denies	  this,	  and	  who	  believes	  in	  the	  composite	  objects	  ordinary	  Eng-­‐
lish	  speakers	  normally	  seem	  to	  quantify	  over.	  Again,	  the	  strategy	  is	  to	  show	  that	  for	  any	  sen-­‐
tence	  in	  one	  language,	  one	  can	  find	  a	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  sentence	  is	  the	  other.	  
Consider	   a	   sentence	   that	  mereologist	   will	   be	   disposed	   to	   assert:	   “There	   exists	   some-­‐
thing	  that	  is	  composed	  of	  Clinton’s	  nose	  and	  the	  Eiffel	  Tower”.	  According	  to	  Hirsch,	  this	  sen-­‐
tence	   “can	  be	   interpreted	   in	  a	  way	   that	  makes	   the	   sentence	   true	  or	   in	  a	  way	   that	  makes	   the	  
sentence	  false”	  (2011,	  p.	  69).	  Because	  “both	  interpretations	  are	  available	  to	  us,	  we	  have	  a	  choice	  
between	  operating	  with	  a	  concept	  of	  “the	  existence	  of	  something”	  that	  satisfies	  the	  mereologist	  
or	   operating	  with	   a	  different	   concept	   that	   satisfies	   the	   anti-­‐mereologist”	   (2011,	   p.	   69).	  When	  
Hirsch	  writes	  that	  “both	  interpretations	  are	  available	  to	  us”,	  he	  supposedly	  mean	  that	  we	  can	  
understand	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  the	  two	  possible	  languages	  in	  which	  the	  sentence	  is	  respec-­‐
tively	  true	  and	  false,	  and	  thus	  understand	  their	  “concept	  of	  existence”,	  i.e.	  the	  different	  quanti-­‐
fiers	  of	  two	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  languages.	  	  
Hirsch	  gives	  the	  following	  suggestion	  for	  truth-­‐conditions	  for	  the	  mereologist	  interpre-­‐
tation	  of	  the	  sentence	  if	  one	  speaks	  the	  anti-­‐mereologist’s	  language:	  The	  sentence	  “There	  exists	  
something	  composed	  of	   the	  F-­‐thing	  and	   the	  G-­‐thing”	   in	   the	  mereologist’s	   language	   is	   true	   if	  
the	   expressions	   “the	   F-­‐thing”	   refers	   to	   something	   and	   the	   expression	   “the	  G-­‐thing”	   refers	   to	  
something”	  in	  the	  anti-­‐mereologist’s	  language	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  72).	  He	  calls	  this	  “explaining	  the	  
relevant	  change	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  quantifier”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  72).44	  We	  here	  have	  a	  proce-­‐
dure	  for	  finding	  the	  truth-­‐condition	  of	  an	  arbitrary	  sentence	  of	  Universalese	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
the	  anti-­‐mereologist,	  and	  thus	  one	  side	  of	  step	  2	  is	  accomplished.	  
Hirsch	  (2002a)	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  translation-­‐scheme	  for	  the	  mereologist	  to	  explain	  the	  
truth-­‐conditions	  of	  the	  anti-­‐mereologist’s	  language.	  Perhaps	  he	  didn’t	  consider	  it	  important,	  or	  
perhaps	  he	  thought	  it	  was	  obvious.	  To	  remedy	  this,	  we	  may	  first	  note	  that	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  
provide	  a	  principled	  definition	  of	  which	  anti-­‐mereologist	  sentences	  are	  true	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
the	   mereologist.	   The	   anti-­‐mereologist	   utters	   sentences	   about	   composite	   objects	   typical	   of	  
those	  of	  English	  speakers,	  and	  as	  far	  as	  we	  know,	  there	   is	  no	  well-­‐defined	  criterion	  by	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  This	  position	  is	  usually	  called	  “universalism”.	  I	  will	  follow	  Hirsch’s	  definition	  for	  expository	  reasons.	  	  
43	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  keep	  the	  discussion	  as	  non-­‐technical	  as	  possible,	  but	  this	  position,	  universalism,	  is	  often	  character-­‐
ized	  by	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  ‘theorem	  of	  unrestricted	  composition’,	  which	  is	  a	  theorem	  of	  ‘classical’	  mereology	  as	  
formulated	  by	  Leonard	  and	  Goodman	  (1940),	  and	  states	  that	  for	  all	  things	  (quantifying	  plurally),	  there	  is	  something	  
(singular	  quantification)	  such	  that	  those	  things	  compose	  that	  thing.	  	  
44	  A	  superficial	  problem	  is	  that	  Hirsch	  hasn’t	  provided	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  sentences	  in	  
the	  universalist’s	  language.	  The	  sentence	  “There	  exists	  something	  composed	  of	  a	  F-­‐thing+G-­‐thing	  and	  a	  F’-­‐thing+G’-­‐
thing”,	  where	  the	  predicates	  are	  predicates	  of	  English	  and	  “+”	  the	  mereological	  sum-­‐function,	  makes	  sense	  for	  the	  
universalist,	   but	   Hirsch’s	   translation	   scheme	   won’t	   give	   it	   truth	   conditions.	   The	   problem	   is	   merely	   that	   Hirsch	  
hasn’t	  given	  a	  recursive	  definition	  of	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  Universalese	  in	  English,	  but	  that	  is	  quite	  easily	  done.	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English	  speakers	  decide	  which	  pluralities	  compose	  a	  thing,	  and	  thus	  are	  quantified	  over	  by	  a	  
singular	   quantifier.	   This	   has	   been	   thoroughly	   illuminated	   in	   the	   literature	   (Cartwright	   1975;	  
Lewis	  1986,	  p.	  213–214;	  Hirsch	  1982;	  for	  an	  attempt	  at	  identifying	  a	  unifying	  theme,	  see	  Schaffer	  
and	  Rose	  draft).	  We	  would	  thus	  lack	  a	  way	  of	  clearly	   identifying	  the	  limited	  subset	  of	  all	   the	  
objects	  the	  mereologist	  talks	  about.	  We	  can	  nonetheless	  circumvent	  this	  problem	  by	  adopting	  
the	   suggestion	  of	  Hirsch	   (2009)	  with	   respect	   to	  Pedro,	   and	   simply	  make	   the	  mereologist	   re-­‐
strict	  her	  quantifiers	  to	  the	  mereological	  sums	  English	  speakers	  talk	  about.45	  Thus	  it	  seems	  that	  
we	  have	   the	   kind	  of	   truth-­‐conditional	   equivalence	  necessary	   for	  Hirsch’s	   “demonstration”	   of	  
quantifier	  variantism	  for	  this	  dispute.	  	  
If	  this	  is	  correct,	  we	  have	  another	  example	  of	  a	  debate	  in	  which	  the	  two	  sides	  can	  ex-­‐
plain	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  the	  other	  party’s	  language,	  and	  thus	  have	  two	  truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent	   different	   ontological	   languages.	   The	   disputants	   are	   merely	   expressing	   the	   same	  
truth-­‐conditions	  using	  sentences	  with	  different	  quantificational	  surface	  structures.	  	  
1.3.3	   Concluding	  remarks	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  Hirsch’s	  examples	  illustrate	  how	  one	  may	  argue	  that	  two	  different	  ontologi-­‐
cal	   languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent.	  The	  central	  element	   is	  whether	  a	  speaker	  of	  
one	  ontological	   language	  may	  explain,	  or	  define,	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  the	  other	   language’s	  
sentences	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	   she	  can	  always	   find	  a	   sentence	   in	  her	  own	   language	   that	  holds	  
true	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   same	  possible	  worlds.	   If	   she	   can,	   then	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   in	   the	  
expressive	  powers	  of	  the	  languages	  if	  they	  are	  individuated	  intensionally.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  general	  
argument	  for	  quantifier	  variantism,	  however.	   It	  says	  nothing	  about	  why	  normative	  quantifier	  
invariantism	   is	   false.	   The	   conclusion	   of	   truth-­‐conditional	   equivalence	   has	   no	   bearing	   on	  
whether	  truth	  is	  enough	  for	  metaphysics,	  but	  Hirsch	  seems	  to	  derive	  this	  from	  the	  intensional	  
assumption.	  These	  questions	  are	  touched	  upon	  in	  chapter	  4,	  but	  are	  of	  minor	  relevance	  to	  the	  
truth	  of	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  and	  the	  argument	  from	  charity.	  	  
1.4	   Linguistic	  Choice	  
1.4.1	   The	  position	  
What	  I	  have	  called	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  has	  taken	  various	  forms	  over	  the	  years.46	  I	  will	  
formulate	   it	   by	   considering	   a	   “dilemma”	  which	   incorporates	   both	   variants	   of	   the	   argument.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  This	  method	  presupposes	  that	  the	  mereologist	  knows	  which	  things	  English	  speakers	  commonly	  quantify	  over,	  or	  
at	  least	  has	  access	  to	  English	  speakers	  to	  discover	  when	  they	  use	  singular	  quantification.	  
46	  In	  an	  early	  paper	  where	   it	  appears	  (Hirsch	  2002b),	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	   is	  targeted	  at	  revisionary	  ontolo-­‐
gists,	   i.e.	   ontologists	  who	  holds	   that	  many	  common	  sense	   judgments	   about	  what	   there	   is	   are	   a	  priori	  necessarily	  
false	  (2011,	  p.	   101).	   In	  that	  paper,	  Hirsch	  argues	  that	   the	  principle	  of	  charity	   implies	   that	   the	  common	  sense	   judg-­‐
ments	  are	  false	  in	  English.	  This	  is	  quite	  akin	  to	  the	  first	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma.	  In	  other	  papers,	  Hirsch	  (2005,	  2009)	  
argues	  that	  philosophers	  with	  different	  ontological	  stands	  should,	  because	  of	  “correct	  linguistic	  interpretation”,	  be	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Hirsch	  poses	  the	  following	  dilemma	  to	  philosophers	  engaged	  in	  an	  ontological	  dispute:	  “Either	  
you	  are	  both	  speaking	  plain	  English,	  in	  which	  case	  you	  are	  both	  asserting	  trivial	  falsehoods,	  or	  
each	  of	  you	  is	  in	  effect	  asserting	  trivial	  truths	  in	  your	  own	  ontological	  language,	  in	  which	  case	  
your	  dispute	  is	  verbal”	  (2011,	  p.	  xiii).	  Hirsch	  says	  he	  has	  no	  stake	  in	  pressing	  either	  horn	  of	  the	  
dilemma,	  but	  holds	  that	  these	  are	  the	  only	  two	  options	  (2011,	  p.	  xiii).	  Analyzing	  the	  dilemma	  a	  
little	   further,	   it	   is	   construed	   to	   be	   open	   on	  whether	   correct	   linguistic	   interpretation	   implies	  
that	   ontologists	   are	   speaking	  English	   or	   distinct	   ontological	   languages.	  Hirsch	   (2005,	   2008a,	  
2009)	  seems	  to	  be	  convinced	  that	  correct	  linguistic	  interpretation	  of	  actual	  ontologists	  leads	  to	  
the	  result	  that	  they	  are	  speaking	  distinct	  languages,	  but	  if	  this	  is	  incorrect,	  they	  are	  at	  any	  rate	  
asserting	   “trivial	   falsehoods”	   in	   English	   when	   they	   state	   their	   non-­‐commonsensical	   conclu-­‐
sions.	  Thus	  there	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  no	  adequate	  “language	  of	  ontology”.	  	  
	   The	  argument	  from	  charity	  is	  the	  argument	  that	  proves	  that	  one	  of	  the	  disjuncts	  of	  the	  
dilemma	  is	  true.	  Thus	  it	  must	  show	  that	  either	  of	  (iii)	  or	  (iv)	  is	  true:	  
	  
(iii) If	  ontological	  disputants	  are	  speaking	  plain	  English,	  then	  ontological	  claims	  di-­‐
verging	  from	  common	  sense	  judgments	  about	  what	  there	  is	  are	  trivially	  false.	  
(iv) If	  ontological	  disputants	  are	  not	  speaking	  plain	  English,	  then	  they	  are	  speaking	  
distinct	  ontological	   languages,	   asserting	   trivial	   truths	   in	   their	   own	  ontological	  
languages.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  dispute	  is	  verbal.	  	  
	  
Hirsch	  (2002b)	  argues	   for	   (iii),	  but	  Hirsch	  has	  spilled	  most	   ink	  arguing	   for	   (iv)	   (2005,	  2008a,	  
2009).	  When	  Hirsch	  says	  he	  has	  no	  stake	  in	  pushing	  either	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma,	  he	  presuma-­‐
bly	  means	   that	   because	   the	   antecedents	   of	   the	   conditionals	   in	   the	   dilemma	   contradict	   each	  
other,	  and	  he	  believes	  both	  conditionals,	  there	  is	  really	  nothing	  to	  argue	  about	  here.	  It	  is	  the	  
same	   view	   on	   linguistic	   interpretation	   that	   motivates	   both	   conditionals,	   and	   thus	   the	   next	  
section	   elaborates	  Hirsch’s	   view	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   charity,	  which	   is	   central	   to	   the	   view	   on	  
interpretation.	  Section	  1.4.3	  shows	  how	  the	  argument	  for	  (iii)	  and	  (iv)	  goes.	  	  
1.4.2	   The	  principle	  of	  charity	  
It	   is	  uncontroversial	   that	   the	  principle	  of	  charity	   is	  central	   to	   linguistic	   interpretation.	  There	  
are	  several	  formulations	  of	  the	  principle,	  but	  a	  least	  common	  multiple	  is	  that	  it	  demands	  of	  us	  
that,	  when	   interpreting	   someone,	  we	   attempt	   to	  make	   as	  many	   as	  possible	  of	  her	   assertions	  
come	  out	   true,	   or	   at	   least	   reasonable	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   148).	   If	  we	  have	   a	   choice	   between	   two	  
interpretations	  of	  a	  set	  of	  sentences	  asserted	  by	  a	  speaker,	  and	  one	  interpretation	  would	  imply	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
taken	  to	  speak	  different	  ontological	  languages,	  thus	  having	  a	  verbal	  dispute.	  My	  hope	  is	  that	  by	  using	  the	  dilemma	  
in	  the	  exposition	  of	  the	  argument,	  I	  can	  capture	  both	  these	  ideas.	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that	  the	  speaker	  is	  correct	  and	  rational	  in	  asserting	  those	  sentences,	  and	  the	  other	  implies	  that	  
she	  is	  incorrect	  and	  irrational,	  then	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  imposes	  a	  presumption	  in	  favor	  of	  
the	   first	   interpretation	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   99).	   In	   essence,	   there	   is	   a	   presumption	   that	   widely	  
accepted	  sentences	  are	  true	  or	  reasonable	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  150).	  If	  speakers	  consider	  a	  sentence	  
as	  obviously	  true,	  such	  as	  “There	  is	  at	  least	  one	  building	  in	  New	  York	  City”,	  then	  that	  counts	  
heavily	  in	  favor	  of	  interpreting	  it	  as	  true	  –	  so	  it	  is	  true.	  Given	  the	  existential	  assumption,	  there	  
are	  buildings.	  Hirsch	  has	  a	  thoughtful	  and	  interesting	  discussion	  of	  the	  considerations	  relevant	  
in	   linguistic	   interpretation	   (2003,	  2005	  and	  2009).	  Besides	  considerations	  of	   “use”	   in	  general,	  
Hirsch	  gives	   special	   attention	   to	   three	  elements	  of	   the	  principle	  of	   charity	   that	  he	   considers	  
especially	  relevant	  when	  interpreting	  the	  participants	  of	  ontological	  disputes.	  	  
First,	   perceptual	   report	   sentences	   are	   accorded	   special	  weight	   in	   interpretation,	  what	  
Hirsch	  calls	  “charity	  to	  perception”	  (2011,	  p.	  149f).	  Hirsch	  assumes	  that	  perceptual	  reports	  are	  
generally	  accurate	   (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	   149).	  Given	  the	   importance	  of	  perceptual	   input	   in	  rational	  
behavior,	  we	  should	  expect	  speakers	  to	  be	  correct	  about	  what	  they	  perceive.	  Perceptual	  reports	  
demand	  more	  charity	  than	  most	  other	  assertions,	  because	  it	  is	  harder	  to	  explain	  why	  someone	  
should	  be	  wrong	  about	  what	  they	  perceive.	  Ordinary	  people	  consider	  the	  sentence	  “There	  is	  at	  
least	  one	  building	  in	  New	  York	  City”	  true	  based	  on	  their	  perceptual	  experiences,	  and	  there	  is	  
therefore	  strong	  pressure	  to	  interpret	  it	  as	  true.	  Hirsch	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  highly	  implausible	  that	  
we	  are	  wrong	  about	  things	  that	  are	  “right	  in	  front	  of	  our	  eyes”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  90).	  	  
Second,	  we	   should	  not	  expect	   speakers	   to	  be	  wrong	  about	  what	   is	  a	   priori	   knowable.	  
Hirsch	   calls	   this	   “charity	   to	   understanding”	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   149).	   Hirsch	   points	   out	   that	   we	  
should	   assume	   fluent	   speakers	   of	   a	   language	   to	   have	   a	   “sufficiently	   adequate	   grasp	   of	   their	  
linguistic	  and	  conceptual	   resources	   so	   that	   they	  don’t	  generally	  make	  a	   priori	   (conceptually)	  
false	   assertions”	   (Hirsch	  2011,	   p.	   149).	  This	   is	   especially	   so	   if	   the	  a	   priori	   truths	  don’t	   require	  
elaborate	  computation	  or	  calculations.	  For	  instance,	  the	  nihilist	  position	  implies	  that	  ordinary	  
people	  are	  wrong	  about	  there	  being	  buildings	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  But	  given	  the	  assumption	  of	  
section	  1.2.1,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  special	  composition	  question	  is	  knowable	  a	  priori,	  so	  ordinary	  
people	  are	  wrong	  about	  an	  a	  priori	  matter.	  But	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  a	  priori	  and	  the	  apparently	  
trivial	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  are	  buildings	  in	  New	  York	  City,	   it	   is	  highly	  implausible	  that	  
speakers	   are	   wrong	   about	   this,	   because	   ordinary	   speakers	   take	   it	   to	   be	   rather	   obvious	   that	  
there	  are	  buildings	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  An	  interpretation	  that	  implies	  widespread	  a	  priori	  mis-­‐
takes	  to	  speakers	  has	  little	  credibility,	  and	  should,	   if	  possible,	  be	  dispensed	  with	  on	  behalf	  of	  
an	  interpretation	  that	  does	  not.	  	  
Third,	  Hirsch	  attributes	   special	  weight	   to	   “charity	   to	   retraction”	   (Hirsch	  2011,	   p.	   151f).	  
Hirsch	  writes	   that	   “Certainly	  we	  must,	  other	   things	  being	  equal,	   favor	  an	   interpretation	   that	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makes	  the	  community’s	  retractions	  in	  the	  face	  of	  additional	  evidence	  come	  out	  right”	  (Hirsch	  
2011,	  p.	  152).	  This	  is	  an	  element	  of	  interpretation	  Hirsch	  notes	  may	  single-­‐handedly	  deliver	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  a	  dispute	  is	  substantive:	  “Many	  disputes	  …	  are	  immediately	  shown	  to	  be	  sub-­‐
stantive	   by	   the	   consideration	   of	   charity	   to	   retraction”	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   152).	   For	   instance:	   If	  
something	  that	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  evidence	  for	  a	  judgment	  really	  is	  not	  evidence,	  one	  should	  
consider	  revising	  one’s	  earlier	  judgment.	  One	  should	  also	  consider	  revising	  one’s	  judgment	  if	  it	  
turns	  out	  that	  there	  is	  more	  relevant	  evidence	  than	  one	  assumed	  when	  making	  the	  judgment.	  
We	  must	  not	  only	  try	  to	  maximize	  the	  number	  of	  assertions	  of	  a	  speaker	  that	  come	  out	  true,	  or	  
give	  weight	  to	  perceptual	  reports	  and	  a	  priori	  assertions,	  but	  also	  consider	  whether	  it	  is	  plausi-­‐
ble	  that	  the	  person	  is	  making	  a	  mistake	  and	  will	  retract	  her	  judgment	  later.	  	  
Prima	  facie,	  these	  elements,	  or	  refinements,	  of	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  charity	  are	  plau-­‐
sible.	  The	  essence	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  is	  that	  one	  should	  interpret	  speakers	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	  they,	  everything	  considered,	  come	  out	  as	  rational	  (or	  “sensible”)	  as	  possible	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  
p.	   230).	  On	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   it	   is	   implausible	   that	   speakers	   should	   be	  wrong	   about	  what	   they	  
perceive,	   or	   about	   a	   priori	   knowable	   truths	   (excluding	   mathematics	   and	   logic).	   Charity	   to	  
retraction	  turns	  on	  the	  rational	  imperative	  of	  evaluating	  the	  relevant	  evidence	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  
231).	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  soundness	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  charity,	  what	  matters	  is	  whether	  
the	  principle	  of	  charity,	  when	  applied	  to	  ontological	  disputes,	  leads	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  (iii)	  and	  (iv).	  	  
1.4.3	   The	  argument	  from	  charity	  
As	   stated,	   Hirsch	   thinks	   that	   considerations	   of	   linguistic	   charity	   implies	   that	   either	   of	   the	  
following	  disjuncts	  of	  the	  dilemma	  are	  true:	  
	  
(iii) If	  ontological	  disputants	  are	  speaking	  plain	  English,	  then	  ontological	  claims	  di-­‐
verging	  from	  common	  sense	  judgments	  about	  what	  there	  is	  are	  trivially	  false.	  
(iv) If	  ontological	  disputants	  are	  not	  speaking	  plain	  English,	  then	  they	  are	  speaking	  
distinct	  ontological	   languages,	   asserting	   trivial	   truths	   in	   their	   own	  ontological	  
languages.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  dispute	  is	  verbal.	  	  
	  
As	  noted,	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  consequents	  is	  supposed	  to	  follow	  from	  considerations	  of	  charity.	  	  
Consider	  (iii)	  first.	  The	  truth	  of	  the	  consequent	  of	  (iii)	  requires	  that	  a	  correct	  interpre-­‐
tation	   of	   English	   implies	   that	   non-­‐commonsensical	   ontological	   claims	   are	   trivially	   false	   in	  
English.	   As	   Ted	   Sider	   expresses	   it:	   “According	   to	   Eli	   Hirsch,	   non-­‐commonsensical	   [English]	  
ontological	  claims	  just	  couldn’t	  be	  true”	  (2014,	  p.	  565).	  This	  is	  because	  of	  strong	  metasemantic	  
pressure	   to	   charitably	   interpret	   English	   sentences	   about	   ordinary	   objects	   as	   true,	   and	   as	   a	  
consequence,	  revisionary	  ontological	  claims	  are	  false.	  The	  metasemantic	  pressure	  is	  generated	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by	  the	  elements	  of	  charity	  just	  mentioned	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  English	  speakers	  seem	  to	  consider	  
non-­‐commonsensical	  existence	  claims	  to	  be	  false,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  countervailing	  metasemantic	  
pressure	  (see	  Sider	  2014,	  p.	  565).	  I	  will	  only	  sketch	  Hirsch’s	  reasons	  for	  believing	  this	  here,	  but	  
they	  derive	  from	  what	  was	  said	  above.	  The	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  data	  points	  as	  the	  following:	  
	  
• Ordinary	  English	  speakers	  consider	  the	  sentence	  “There	  is	  at	  least	  one	  building	  in	  New	  
York	  City”	  true	  based	  on	  their	  perceptual	  experiences.47	  
• Ordinary	  English	  speakers	  consider	  the	  sentence	  “There	  is	  an	  object	  which	  has	  the	  Eif-­‐
fel	  Tower	  and	  Barack	  Obama’s	  nose	  as	  parts”	  to	  be	  obviously	  false.48	  
• Ordinary	  English	  speakers	  consider	  the	  sentence	  “Something	  in	  the	  yard	  is	  a	  highly	  vis-­‐
ible	  brown	  wooden	  object	  that	  contains	  branches	  during	  the	  daytime	  and	  contains	  no	  
branches	  during	  the	  nighttime”	  to	  be	  false.49	  
	  
Hirsch	  thinks	  that	  these	  data	  points	  indicate	  a	  pattern:	  ordinary	  speakers	  of	  English	  will	  con-­‐
sider	   non-­‐commonsensical	   ontological	   conclusions	   false.	   They	   will	   be	   so	   judged	   based	   on	  
perceptual	  reports,	  and	  if	  the	  non-­‐commonsensical	  ontological	  claims	  are	  true,	  then	  ordinary	  
speakers	   are	  making	   widespread	   a	   priori	  mistakes.	   This	   is	   highly	   implausible.	   There	   are	   no	  
metasemantic	  considerations	  that	  can	  outweigh	  those	  I	  have	  now	  mentioned,	  and	  thus	  correct	  
linguistic	  interpretation	  implies	  that	  the	  sentences	  are	  true.	  So	  if	  revisionary	  ontologists	  claim	  
to	  be	  speaking	  English,	  they	  are	  asserting	  falsehoods.	  	  
	   Now	  consider	  (iv).	  In	  Hirsch	  (2005),	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  correct	  linguistic	  interpretation	  of	  
ontologists	   implies	   that	   they	  must	  be	   taken	   to	  assert	   truths	   in	   their	  own	   language,	  but	   then	  
they	  are	  using	  different	   languages,	   so	   they	  are	  engaged	   in	  a	  verbal	  dispute.	   In	   the	  context	  of	  
the	  dilemma,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  if	  the	  disputants	  claim	  to	  not	  be	  speaking	  
English	  (so	  reject	  (iii)),	  then	  considerations	  of	  charity	  imply	  that	  they	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  verbal	  
dispute.	  If	  they	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  verbal	  dispute,	  mainstream	  ontology	  is	  misconceived.	  	  
Hirsch	  defines	  a	  (merely)50	  verbal	  dispute	  as	  ‘a	  dispute	  in	  which,	  given	  the	  correct	  view	  
of	   linguistic	   interpretation,	  each	  party	  will	   agree	   that	   the	  other	  party	   speaks	   the	   truth	   in	  his	  
own	  language’	  (2009,	  p.	  239).	  Consider	  an	  example	  with	  a	  universalist	  and	  a	  nihilist.	  Suppose	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  The	  nihilist	  rejects	  this	  sentence,	  and	  in	  general	  judges	  a	  big	  class	  of	  perceptual	  reports	  in	  English	  about	  compo-­‐
site	  objects	  as	  simply	  incorrect.	  	  
48	  The	  universalist	  believes	   in	  a	  very	   large	  number	  of	  objects	   that	  are	  unfamiliar	   to	   the	  ordinary	  English	   speaker.	  
One	  can	  create	  a	  big	  class	  of	  examples	  of	  sentences	  the	  universalist	  would	  have	  to	  say	  are	  true,	  but	  that	  the	  ordinary	  
English	  speaker	  apparently	  rejects.	  	  
49	  Given	  perdurance	  theory	  conjoined	  with	  universalism	  (a	  very	  common	  combination),	  one	  can	  create	  a	  big	  class	  of	  
objects	   very	  unfamiliar	   to	   the	  ordinary	  English	   speaker,	   such	  as	   the	  object	  having	  a	   tree’s	   trunk	  and	  branches	  as	  
parts	  in	  the	  daytime,	  and	  only	  the	  trunk	  as	  a	  part	  during	  the	  night.	  
50	  Hirsch	  usually	  talks	  about	  “merely	  verbal	  disputes”,	  but	   in	  the	  original	  text	  he	  here	  only	  uses	  the	  words	  “verbal	  
dispute”.	  As	  he	  seems	  to	  use	  the	  terms	  interchangeably,	  I	  will	  as	  well.	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that	  we	  have	  a	  vacuum	  chamber	  that	  the	  nihilist	  and	  the	  universalist	  agree	  contains	  two	  sim-­‐
ples.	  They	  will	  then	  produce	  seemingly	  contradictory	  utterances	  when	  talking	  about	  the	  num-­‐
ber	  of	  objects	  in	  the	  chamber.	  The	  nihilist	  will	  say:	  	  
	  
There	  are	  only	  two	  things	  in	  the	  chamber.	   	   	   	   	   	   (1)	  
	  
The	  universalist,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  will	  utter:	  
	  
There	  are	  not	  only	  two	  things	  in	  the	  chamber.	   	   	   	   	   (2)	  
	  
This	   is	   because	   the	   universalist	   holds	   that	   there	   is	   a	   further	   thing	   in	   the	   chamber:	   a	   thing	  
composed	  of	  the	  two	  simples.	  	  
In	  contrast	   to	   the	  apparently	  genuine	  disagreement	  between	  the	  nihilist	  and	  the	  uni-­‐
versalist,	  Hirsch	  holds	  that	  we	  must	  understand	  them	  as	  involved	  in	  a	  merely	  verbal	  dispute.	  If	  
the	   nihilist	   should,	   based	   on	   correct	   interpretation,	   take	   the	   universalist	   to	   produce	   a	   true	  
utterance	  when	  uttering	  (2),	  but	  insist	  on	  (2)	  being	  false	  in	  her	  own	  language,	  and	  the	  univer-­‐
salist	  should	  take	  the	  nihilist	  to	  utter	  a	  truth	  when	  uttering	  (1),	  but	  insist	  that	  (1)	  is	  false	  in	  her	  
own	  language,	  then	  they	  must	  express	  different	  propositions	  when	  uttering	  (1)	  and	  (2),	  and	  are	  
not	  really	  disagreeing.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  speaking	  different	  ontological	  languages.	  This	  problem	  
would	  generalize	  to	  other	  assertions	  about	  composite	  objects.	  Thus	  the	  crucial	  premise	  in	  the	  
argument	   for	   (iv)	   is	  whether	   “correct	   interpretation”	   lead	   to	   the	  conclusion	   that	  both	  dispu-­‐
tants	  should	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  other	  party	  is	  uttering	  the	  truth.	  	  
	   It	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  lead	  to	  this	  conclusion.	  First	  of	  all,	  we	  
note	   that	   philosophers	   of	   different	   ontological	   views	  will	   give	   systematically	   conflicting	   per-­‐
ceptual	   reports.	   Faced	   with	   the	   Empire	   State	   Building,	   a	   universalist	   will	   be	   prone	   to	   utter	  
“There	   is	   a	   tall	  building	   in	   front	  of	  me”,	  but	   the	  nihilist	  will	   reject	   this	   sentence.	   In	  general,	  
ontological	  disputants	  will	  utter	  consistently	  different	  utterances	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  situations.	  
This	  use-­‐consideration,	   in	  addition	   to	   the	  differences	   in	  perceptual	   reports	   and	   the	   fact	   that	  
the	  questions	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  priori,	  should	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  following	  conclusion:	  Accord-­‐
ing	  to	  correct	   linguistic	   interpretation	  of	   the	  disputants,	   they	  are	  speaking	  truthfully	   in	  their	  
own	  language,	  and	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  verbal	  dispute.	  	  
So	  far,	  charity	  to	  retraction	  has	  been	  ignored.	  Initially,	  one	  would	  expect	  that	  the	  phi-­‐
losophers,	   rational	   inquirers	  as	   they	  are,	  would	  retract	   their	  ontological	  positions	  –	  and	  thus	  
the	   “languages”	   they	   are	   speaking	  –	   if	   faced	  with	  new	  evidence.	  Hirsch	  answer	   to	   this	   is	   the	  
assumption	   that	   ontologists	   don’t	   retract	   their	   positions,	   rather	   they	   have	   reached	   a	   stage	  
where	  “all	  is	  said	  and	  done”,	  and	  they	  rely	  on	  ontological	  axioms	  that	  they	  do	  not	  revise.	  If	  this	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is	  correct,	  then	  charity	  to	  retraction	  won’t	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  how	  we	  should	  interpret	  ontolo-­‐
gists	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  pp.	  159–161;	  230–231).	  
Considering	  these	  elements	  of	  interpretation,	  then,	  we	  may	  conclude	  that	  if	  disputing	  
ontologists	  are	  not	  speaking	  English	  (in	  which	  case	   their	  assertions	  would	  be	   false),	   they	  are	  
speaking	  different	  ontological	  languages,	  and	  so	  engaged	  in	  a	  verbal	  dispute.	  Thus	  there	  is	  no	  
point	  in	  engaging	  in	  contemporary	  ontology.	  	  
1.4.4	   Concluding	  remarks	  
Hirsch	  argues	  that	  ontologists	  should	  agree	  that	  the	  correct	  linguistic	  interpretation	  of	  fellow	  
ontologists	  implies	  that	  they	  are	  all	  speaking	  the	  truth	  in	  their	  own	  language,	  alternatively	  that	  
they	  are	   simply	  wrong	   if	   they	  are	   speaking	  English.	  The	  argument	   for	   (iv)	  presupposes	  weak	  
quantifier	   variantism.51	  If	  Hirsch’s	   application	  of	   the	  principle	  of	   charity	   is	   correct,	   and	   there	  
are	  no	  other	  essential	  elements	  of	  linguistic	  interpretation	  that	  must	  be	  respected,	  then	  ques-­‐
tions	   of	   ontology	   will	   to	   some	   extent	   “have	   to	   do	   with	   issues	   of	   linguistic	   interpretation”	  
(Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  229).	  The	  sense	   in	  which	  ontological	  disputes	  are	  deflated	   is	   that	  one	  merely	  
has	  to	  make	  a	  “linguistic	  choice”	  between	  analyzing	  ontological	  disputants	  as	  speaking	  English	  
or	   having	   a	   verbal	   dispute,	   but	   in	   either	   case,	   ontology	   is	   futile.	   If	   ontological	   disputes	   are	  
merely	   verbal,	   then	   there	   is	   nothing	   deep	   or	   substantive	   for	   philosophers	   to	   get	   hyper-­‐
theoretical	  about;	  nothing	  is	  substantively	  at	  stake	  beyond	  the	  correct	  use	  of	  language.	  	  
I’ve	  presented	  Hirsch’s	  arguments	  in	  detail,	  and	  we	  can	  now	  supplement	  the	  roadmap	  
of	   the	   introduction.	   In	  chapter	  2,	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism	   is	  challenged.	   If	   it	   is	   false,	   then	  
ontologists	  aren’t	  engaged	  in	  a	  verbal	  dispute,	  but	  denying	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  will	  not	  
in	  itself	  block	  the	  conclusion	  that	  non-­‐commonsensical	  ontological	  claims	  are	  false	  in	  English.	  
That	   question	   is	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   3,	  where	   I	   first	   defend	   the	   notion	   that	   ontologists	   are	  
speaking	  English,	  because	  Hirsch	  has	  misapplied	   the	  argument	   from	  charity,	  and	   then	  argue	  
that	  revisionary	  ontological	  claims	  aren’t	  “trivially	  false”	  in	  English,	  thus	  opening	  the	  door	  for	  
the	  possibility	  of	  ontology	  in	  English.	  In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  evaluate	  a	  suggestion	  to	  avoid	  the	  whole	  
problem	  of	   several	   ontological	   languages	  by	  moving	  ontological	   disputes	   to	   a	  distinct,	   privi-­‐
leged	  ontological	  language	  (Sider	  2011).	  If	  that	  is	  possible,	  the	  considerations	  of	  charity	  consid-­‐
ered	  here	  would	  have	  no	  bearing	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  mainstream	  ontological	  inquiry.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  such	  a	  suggestion	  is	  the	  most	  revisionary	  way	  of	  answering	  Hirsch,	  and	  should	  be	  
considered	  last	  and	  as	  a	  last	  resort.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Hirsch	  (2011,	  224)	  makes	  the	  “stipulation”	  that	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  expressible	  by	  the	  two	  languages	  are	  the	  same	  
when	  he	  argues	  for	  linguistic	  choice.	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2	   QUANTIFIER	  INVARIANTISM	  
2.1	  	   Overview	  
As	   it	  was	  characterized	   in	  chapter	   1,	  weak	  quantifier	   variantism	   is	   the	  claim	   that	   there	  are	  a	  
number	  of	  possible	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  ontological	  languages	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  xiv).	  If	  
this	  thesis	  is	  true,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  arbitrary	  which	  ontological	  language	  we	  use	  to	  describe	  what	  
there	  is,	  as	  the	  argument	  from	  arbitrary	  languages	  attempted	  to	  show	  (section	  1.3.1).	  Take	  Edna	  
and	   Pedro	   as	   examples.	   They	   were	   born	   to	   different	   linguistic	   communities,	   and	   quantifies	  
over	   different	   things.	   But	   given	   strong	   quantifier	   variantism,	   neither	   of	   these	   languages	   is	  
objectively	   better	   than	   the	   other	   –	   correctness	   of	   ontological	   position	   is	   simply	   to	   use	   one’s	  
language	  correctly.	  The	  future	  of	  ontology	  looks	  bleak.	  	  
The	  rejection	  of	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  quantifier	   invariantism.	  This	   is	  Hirsch’s	  
description	  of	  the	  thesis:	  	  
	  
…	   [T]here	   is	   only	   one	   (metaphysically)	   possible	   ontological	   language:	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	   any	  
language	  to	  lack	  the	  quantifier-­‐meaning	  that	  we	  have	  in	  our	  language.	  Linguistic	  constructions	  
that	  purport	  to	  yield	  alternative	  ontological	  languages	  merely	  produce	  some	  form	  of	  secondary	  
languages,	  but	  not	  possibly	  genuine	  (primary,	  natural)	  languages.	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  xv)	  
	  
Quantifier	  invariantism	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  quantifier	  meaning,	  and	  every	  lan-­‐
guage	   able	   to	   quantify	   employs	   the	   same	  quantifier.	   If	   all	   possible	   languages	   have	   the	   same	  
quantifier	  meaning,	   then	   there	   is	   only	   one	   kind	   of	   ontological	   language	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   the	  
definitions	  of	  chapter	  1,	  the	  one	  having	  the	  quantifier	  meaning	  of	  (inter	  alia)	  English.52	  
If	   quantifier	   invariantism	   is	   true,	   then	  we	   have	   a	   partial	   defense	   of	   ontology	   against	  
Hirsch.	  We	  can	  avoid	  the	  argument	  from	  arbitrary	  languages,	  for	  there	  is	  only	  one	  ontological	  
language.53	  The	  argument	  from	  charity	  also	  partly	  depends	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  quantifier	  variant-­‐
ism,	   and	   if	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism	   is	   false,	   then	   any	   attempt	   to	   define	   an	   “ontologically	  
privileged	  language”	  is	  unnecessary	  and	  pointless,	  for	  there	  is	  only	  one.	  Finally,	  weak	  quantifier	  
variantism	  by	  itself	  has	  problematic	  consequences	  we	  would	  like	  to	  avoid	  (see	  below).	  
Most	  generally,	  quantifier	  invariantism	  is	  the	  position	  that	  something	  goes	  wrong	  when	  
Hirsch	  argues	  that	  different	  ontological	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent.	  This	  says	  
nothing	  about	  what	   goes	  wrong:	  different	   arguments	   against	  weak	  quantifier	   variantism	  will	  
lead	  to	  different	  analyses	  of	  exactly	  what’s	  wrong	  with	  Hirsch’s	  argument	  (there	  may	  of	  course	  
be	   several	   problems).	   The	   unifying	   theme	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   that	   the	   arguments	   discussed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  This	  thesis	  has	  another	  advantage.	  It	  makes	  clear	  why	  ontology	  in	  different	  natural	  languages	  comes	  to	  the	  same.	  	  
53	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  we	  know	  that	  we	  speak	  different	  natural	  languages,	  so	  if	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  
there	  aren’t	  different	  possible	  ontological	  languages,	  we	  should	  fall	  back	  on	  our	  ordinary	  languages.	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herein	  focuses	  on	  ways	  of	  rejecting	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism,	  as	  opposed	  to	  arguing	  against	  
the	  argument	  from	  charity	  (chapter	  3)	  or	  strong	  quantifier	  variantism	  (chapter	  4).	  	  
This	  chapter	  considers	  arguments	  against	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  (often	  just	  denot-­‐
ed	   “quantifier	   variantism”).54	  The	   first	   section	   discusses	   an	   argument	   by	   Peter	   van	   Inwagen	  
that	   I	   find	  unsuccessful,	  but	  objecting	   to	   it	  helps	  us	  better	  understand	  quantifier	  variantism.	  
Section	  2.3	  deals	  with	  two	  arguments	  that	  I	   think	  ultimately	  can	  be	  resisted,	  but	  the	  defense	  
has	   problematic	   consequences.	   Section	   2.4	   argues	   that	   one	   version	   of	   quantifier	   variantism	  
entails	  a	  problematic	  account	  of	  the	  semantics	  of	  mathematical	  terms,	  and	  section	  2.5	  argues	  
that	  Hirsch’s	   notion	   of	   “truth-­‐conditional	   equivalence”	   is	   difficult	   to	   grasp,	   and	   furthermore	  
that	  Hirsch	  makes	   an	  unwarranted	  assumption.	  The	   last	   section	  argues	   that	  weak	  quantifier	  
variantism	  has	  widespread	  consequences	  for	  how	  we	  conceive	  of	  ontological	  languages.	  
2.2	   Peter	  van	  Inwagen’s	  incoherence	  argument	  
Peter	  van	  Inwagen	  has	  argued,	  directly	  and	  indirectly,	  against	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism.	  By	  
“indirectly”	   I	  mean	   that	   van	   Inwagen	  has	   targeted	  Hillary	   Putnam’s	   “conceptual	   relativity,”55	  
but	   those	  arguments	  would,	   if	   sound,	  create	  problems	   for	  weak	  quantifier	  variance	  as	  well.	   I	  
will	   critically	   examine	   van	   Inwagen’s	   (2009)	   argument	   against	   Putnam’s	   (2004)	   conceptual	  
relativity,	  but	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  whether	  the	  arguments	  defeat	  Hirsch’s	  flavor	  of	  ontological	  defla-­‐
tionism,	  not	  Putnam’s.	  	  
Putnam	  (2004,	  pp.	  33–52)	  argues	  for	  a	  deflationism	  not	  unlike	  that	  of	  Hirsch.56	  The	  cen-­‐
tral	  claim	  is	  that	  we	  can	  extend	  the	  meaning	  of	  “there	  is”	  by	  convention.	  Putnam	  holds	  that	  in	  
a	  situation	  like	  the	  vacuum	  chamber	  described	  in	  sections	  1.3.1	  and	  1.4.2,	  one	  can	  either	  speak	  
like	  a	  nihilist	  and	  say	  that	  there	  are	  only	  two	  objects,	  or	  extend	  the	  meaning,	  i.e.	  by	  convention	  
adopt	  another	  usage,	  of	  “there	  is”	  so	  that	  it	  is	  true	  that	  there	  is	  a	  sum	  of	  the	  two	  simples,	  and	  
hence	   three	  objects.	  Because	  we	  can	  choose	  which	  meaning	  of	   “there	   is”	  we	  wish	   to	  operate	  
with,	  there	  is	  no	  deep	  question	  about	  what	  there	  is.	  This	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  Hirsch’s	  claim	  that	  
“two	  interpretations	  are	  available	  to	  us”	  when	  describing	  which	  objects	  there	  are	  (2011,	  p.	  69).	  	  
van	  Inwagen	  objects	  to	  this	  line	  of	  argument:	  	  
	  
Extending	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  term	  so	  that	  that	  term	  will	  apply	  to	  objects	  beyond	  those	  it	  already	  
applies	   to	   is	  precisely	  analogous	  to	  extending	  a	  geographical	  boundary:	  you	  can	  extend	  a	  geo-­‐
graphical	  boundary	   to	  encompass	  new	  territory	  only	   if	   that	   territory	   is	  already	   there.	   (van	   In-­‐
wagen	  2009,	  p.	  491)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  The	  arguments	  against	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  are	  arguments	  against	  quantifier	  variantism	  as	  well.	  
55	  Putnam	  defends	   this	   idea	   in	   several	  works.	   In	   an	   early	  work	   (1981)	   it	   is	   called	   an	   “internalist	   view”,	   but	   by	  his	  
(1987)	  the	  name	  of	  “conceptual	  relativity”	  has	  emerged.	  I	  will	  only	  discuss	  Putnam	  (2004)	  here.	  	  
56	  See	  especially	  Hirsch	  (1999)	  and	  (2002a)	  for	  a	  comparison	  of	  Hirsch’s	  view	  with	  Putnam’s.	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van	  Inwagen’s	  objection	  to	  Putnam	  and	  Hirsch	   is	   that	  extending	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	   term	  pre-­‐
supposes	   that	   there	  already	   is	   something	   to	   be	   in	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   new,	   extended	   term.	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  answering	  this	  objection,	  Hirsch’s	  view	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  having	  clarified	  
some	  issues	  that	  gives	  him	  resources	  to	  reply	  to	  this	  argument.	  
	   First	   of	   all,	  Hirsch	   is	   not	  wedded	   to	   the	   notion	   that	   one	   “extends”	   one’s	   quantifier.57	  
“Extending”	  sounds	  like	  one	  is	  merely	  loosening	  a	  contextual	  quantifier	  domain	  restriction,	  but	  
Hirsch	   is	   adamant	   that	   this	   is	   not	  what	   quantifier	   variantism	   amounts	   to	   (2011,	   p.	   86f).	   van	  
Inwagen’s	  objection	  seems	  to	  attribute	  too	  much	  weight	  to	  the	  word	  “extending”	  the	  meaning	  
of	  “there	  is”.	  According	  to	  Hirsch,	  we	  change	  the	  quantifier	  by	  an	  ostensive	  definition	  of	  new	  
truth-­‐conditions	  for	  a	  language	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  80).	  The	  essence	  of	  language,	  thinks	  Hirsch,	  is	  
merely	   the	   distribution	   of	   truth-­‐conditions	   over	   sentences.	   This	   is	   done	   in	   one	   big	   sweep,	  
altering	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  the	  sentences	  in	  a	  systematic	  way,	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  ostensive	  definition.	  	  
In	  the	  quoted	  passage	  above,	  van	  Inwagen	  says	  that	  extending	  the	  meaning	  of	  “there	  is”	  
is	   like	  extending	  one’s	  boundaries:	  we	  can	  do	  it	  only	   if	   the	  territory	   is	  already	  there.	  I	  take	  it	  
that	  the	  point	  of	  this	  comparison	  is	  that	  for	  both	  existence	  and	  territory,	  “it’s	  there	  or	  it	  isn’t”.	  
If	   it’s	   there,	   you	   can	  extend	   the	  meaning	  of	   “there	   is”	   to	   apply	   to	   it,	   but	   then	   it	  was	   already	  
there,	   independent	   of	   the	   convention	   one	   adopted.	   If	   it	   isn’t	   there,	   you	   can’t	   “extend”	   the	  
meaning	  of	  “there	  is”	  (or	  any	  other	  term)	  to	  apply	  to	  it:	  you	  would	  just	  end	  up	  speaking	  falsely.	  
You	  cannot	  create	  objects	  by	  convention;	  that	  would	  be	  an	  unacceptable	  linguistic	  idealism.	  	  
van	  Inwagen’s	  objection	  tries	  to	  show	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  extending	  the	  meaning	  of	  “there	  
is”	  (in	  Hirsch’s	  terms:	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  ontological	  language)	  is	  incoherent	  by	  appealing	  
to	  the	  apparent	  truth	  of	  “it’s	  there	  or	  it	  isn’t”.	  But	  the	  objection	  presupposes	  the	  quantifier	  of	  
the	   language	   the	  objection	   is	   formulated	   in,	  and	   it’s	   exactly	   the	  quantifier	   that	   is	  at	   stake.	   If	  
one	  were	   confined	   to	   speaking	   the	   same	   language	   as	   van	   Inwagen	   does,	   then	   the	   objection	  
would	  be	  sound	  –	   “it’s	   there	  or	   it	   isn’t”,	  and	  either	  option	   is	  bad.	  However,	  when	  we	  change	  
ontological	   languages,	  we	  also	  change	   the	   things	  we	   talk	  about	  –	   that’s	   the	  point.	  We	  aren’t	  
constrained	  by	  the	  truth	  of	  “it’s	  there	  or	  it	  isn’t”	  in	  van	  Inwagen’s	  language,	  for	  the	  meaning	  of	  
“it”	   changes	   (because	   “it”	   can	  only	   successfully	   refer	   if	   there	   is	   something,	   and	  what	   there	   is	  
depends	  on	   the	  quantifier),	   so	   the	  meaning	  of	   “it’s	   there	  or	   it	   isn’t”	   changes	   as	  well.	   van	   In-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  whether	  Putnam	  is.	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  commentators	  and	  critics	  of	  Putnam	  that	  
his	  formulations	  of	  conceptual	  relativity	  too	  often	  borders	  on	  a	  kind	  of	  linguistic	  idealism	  or	  at	  least	  an	  unattractive	  
anti-­‐realism,	  perhaps	  susceptible	  to	  van	  Inwagen’s	  arguments.	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wagen’s	  objection	  expresses	  a	  language-­‐internal	  truth,58	  but	  when	  we	  adopt	  a	  new	  ontological	  
language	  we	  “break	  free”	  of	  the	  two	  alternatives	  van	  Inwagen	  lays	  out	  for	  us	  by	  “it’s	  there	  or	  it	  
isn’t”.	  The	  language-­‐internal	  truth	  that	  to	  extend	  a	  word’s	  meaning	  presupposes	  that	  there	  is	  
something	   there	   for	   the	  word	   to	   apply	   to,	   does	  not	   stand	   in	   the	  way	   for	   us	   to	   imagine	  new	  
ontological	  languages	  with	  new	  quantifiers	  and	  evaluate	  whether	  they	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent.	  	  
Above,	   I	   understood	   van	   Inwagen’s	   objection	   to	  weak	  quantifier	   variantism	   as	   an	   ar-­‐
gument	   for	   why	   one	   can’t	   end	   up	   speaking	   other	   ontological	   languages	   because	   one	   can’t	  
extend	  the	  meaning	  of	  “there	  is”.	  I	  took	  it	  to	  be	  a	  logical,	  or	  semantic,	  argument.	  But	  perhaps	  
van	  Inwagen’s	  objection	  instead	  has	  a	  robust	  realism	  as	  a	  premise,	  where	  the	  objects	  are	  “out	  
there”	   like	   the	   territory	   is,	   and	   there	   is	   only	   one	   quantifier	   we	   can	   use	   to	   talk	   about	   those	  
things	  –	  the	  English	  one.	  There	  are	  some	  problems	  with	  making	  this	   idea	  cogent,	  as	   it	  needs	  
spelling	   out	   to	   explain	  how	   the	  English	  quantifier	  matches	   “the	   objects”	   perfectly,	  while	   the	  
other	  suggested	  ontological	  languages	  does	  not,	  but	  I	  will	  here	  be	  content	  with	  noting	  that	  van	  
Inwagen	  hasn’t	   said	  anything	   in	  defense	  of	   such	  a	   realism,	  or	   filled	   it	  with	  content,	   so	   I	  will	  
bypass	  this	  formulation	  of	  the	  objection.	  For	  a	  formulation	  and	  defense	  of	  such	  a	  robust	  real-­‐
ism,	  see	  chapter	  4.	  
Putnam	  argues	  against	  the	  thesis	  that	  there	  is	  a	  singled	  “fixed	  in	  advance”	  meaning	  for	  
“there	   is”	   (2004,	  84).	  This	   thesis	   is	  quite	   similar	   to	  quantifier	   invariantism:	   there	   is	  only	  one	  
sense	  of	  the	  quantifier.59	  van	  Inwagen	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  “fixed	  in	  advance”	  sense	  of	  the	  
quantifier:	  “you	  need	  a	  fixed-­‐in-­‐advance	  sense	  of	   ‘there	  is’	  to	  express	  your	  belief	  (a	  belief	  you	  
must	  have	  if	  you	  are	  contemplating	  such	  a	  convention)	  that	  the	  class	  of	   ‘new’	  things	  that	  the	  
term	  is	  to	  apply	  to	  is	  not	  empty”	  (2009,	  p.	  491).	  This	  again	  overlooks	  the	  radical	  shift	  in	  truth-­‐
conditions	  that	  occurs	  when	  we	  define	  an	  alternative	  language.	  Which	  sets	  there	  are	  is,	  in	  part,	  
determined	  by	  which	  things	  there	  are.	  And	  which	  things	  there	  are	   is	  determined,	   in	  part,	  by	  
which	   ontological	   language	   one	   is	   employing.60	  So	   it	   would	   seem	  we	   don’t	   need	   a	   fixed-­‐in-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  By	  ”language	  internal”,	  I	  mean	  claims	  that	  hold	  within	  a	  language,	  but	  not	  between	  them.	  Given	  quantifier	  vari-­‐
antism	  and	  several	  possible	  ontological	   languages,	   some	  claims	  will	  only	  hold	   internal	   to	  a	   specific	   language.	  See	  
section	  2.3	  and	  the	  (T)-­‐	  and	  (T*)-­‐principles	  there	  for	  examples.	  
59	  A	  difference	  between	  Putnam	  and	  Hirsch	  here,	  which	  has	  only	   superficial	   impact	  on	   the	  general	  point,	   is	   that	  
while	  Hirsch	  thinks	  there	  is	  one	  sense	  of	  the	  quantifier	  in	  English,	  Putnam	  thinks	  that	  there	  is	  a	  variety	  of	  uses	  of	  
the	  quantifier	   in	  English	   itself,	   or	   alternatively	   that	  we	  can	  adopt	  a	  different	  use	  of	   the	  quantifier	   and	   still	   speak	  
English,	  while	  Hirsch	  would	  consider	  that	  situation	  as	  a	  change	  of	  language	  (see	  Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  80f).	  With	  regard	  to	  
van	  Inwagen’s	  argument,	  it	  is	  formulated	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  several	  senses	  of	  the	  quantifier	  in	  English,	  
but	   it	  may	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  point	  against	   the	  ”possible	  quantifier	  variance”	  of	  Hirsch	  as	  well,	  as	   I	  do	  here.	  At	   least	  
construed	  as	  an	  objection	  to	  Hirsch,	  I	  think	  the	  argument	  fails.	  	  
60	  Of	  course	  not	  all	  sets	  depends	  for	  their	  existence	  on	  what	  physical	  objects	  there	  are.	  Also,	  ZFC	  is	  independent	  of	  
which	  physical	  things	  there	  are,	  because	  one	  can	  take	  the	  empty	  set	  as	  the	  basic	  constituent	  and	  create	  sets	  with	  it	  
as	  members,	  and	  so	  on.	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advance	  sense	  of	  “there	  is”	  to	  successfully	  imagine	  new	  ontological	  languages	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  
truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  to	  English	  or	  other	  ontological	  languages.61	  
A	  general	   insight	  of	  this	  answer	  on	  behalf	  of	  Hirsch	  is	  that	  we	  must	  acknowledge	  the	  
breadth	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	   a	   language-­‐shift.	   The	   next	   section	   expands	   on	   this	   theme,	  
showing	   that	   the	   quantifier	   variantist	   is	   forced	   to	   accept	   some	   further	   consequences	   that	  
perhaps	  aren’t	  that	  attractive.	  	  
2.3	   The	  Eklund/Hawthorne	  argument	  	  
Matti	  Eklund	  (2007,	  2009)	  and	  John	  Hawthorne	  (2006)	  have	  argued	  that	  weak	  quantifier	  vari-­‐
antism	   is	   false	   because	   different	   ontological	   languages	   aren’t	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent.	  
Their	  argument	  depends	  on	  the	  standard	  Tarskian	  definition	  of	  truth	  for	  atomic	  sentences,	  so	  
alternatively,	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  must	  reject	  this	  Tarskian	  principle,	  which	  is	  a	  compelling	  
principle	   of	   referential	   semantics.	   I	   shall	   argue	   that	   the	   quantifier	   variantist	   can	   meet	   the	  
challenge	  posed	  by	  the	  Eklund/Hawthorne	  argument,	  but	  that	  doing	  so	  has	  unattractive	  con-­‐
sequences.	  
Eklund	  and	  Hawthorne’s	  argument	  goes	  as	   follows.	  Consider	  two	  individuals,	  Big	  and	  
Small,	   who	   belong	   to	   different	   linguistic	   communities.62	  Big	   speaks	   a	   language,	   Biglish,	   in	  
which	  speakers	  quantify	  over	  tables.	  Exhibiting	  the	  common	  linguistic	  capacity	  of	  name	  giving,	  
he	  gives	  a	  certain	  table	  the	  name	  a.	  He	  can	  then	  truthfully	  assert	  “a	   is	  a	  table”.	  Small	  speaks	  a	  
language	  in	  which	  one	  doesn’t	  quantify	  over	  tables,	  only	  over	  particles	  arranged	  tablewise,	  so	  a	  
sentence	  of	  the	  form	  “a	  is	  a	  table”	  is	  false	  on	  any	  interpretation	  of	  a	  in	  Small’s	  language.	  	  
	   Suppose	   that	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism	   is	   true,	   and	   that	   this	   is	   a	   situation	   of	   two	  
truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  ontological	  languages.	  It	  follows	  from	  Hirsch’s	  characterization	  
of	  such	  cases	  that	  Small	  should	  consider	  Big’s	  sentence	  “a	  is	  a	  table”	  as	  true	  in	  Biglish,	  and	  vice	  
versa	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   149;	   229).	   Given	   quantifier	   variantism,	   they	   are	   both	   correct	   in	   their	  
respective	   languages,	  but	  by	  our	  assumptions	  about	  Smallish,	   it	   is	   false	   in	  that	   language	  that	  
there	  are	  tables.	  However,	  and	  this	  is	  Eklund	  and	  Hawthorne’s	  point,	  this	  implies	  that	  if	  Small	  
uses	   Smallish	   to	   talk	   about	   Biglish	   (i.e.	   uses	   Smallish	   as	   a	  metalanguage),	   Small	  must	   reject	  
that	  the	  following	  principle	  of	  Tarskian	  semantics	  holds	  for	  any	  target	  language,	  L:	  
	  
(T)	   For	  a	  sentence	  of	  the	  syntactic	  form	  “F(a)”	  of	  L	  to	  be	  true	  in	  L,	  the	  syntactically	  
singular	  term	  “a”	  must	  refer.63	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Whether	  we	  can	  end	  up	  speaking	  these	  languages	  is	  another	  matter,	  see	  section	  3.2.	  
62	  The	  names	  of	  the	  characters	  are	  from	  Sider’s	  (2011,	  p.	  181f)	  exposition	  of	  the	  argument.	  	  
63	  This	  is	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  principle	  Hirsch	  (2011,	  p.	  240)	  and	  Eklund	  (2009,	  p.	  145)	  uses	  in	  their	  formula-­‐
tions	  of	   the	  argument.	   In	  spirit,	   it	   is	  similar	  to	  the	  premise	  used	   in	  Eklund	  (2007).	  Hawthorne	  applies	  a	  principle	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If	   Small	   is	   a	  quantifier	   variantist,	   she	  must	   reject	   (T).	  This	   can	  be	   showed	  by	  a	   simple	  argu-­‐
ment.	   If	   Small	   claims	   that	  Big’s	   sentence	   “a	   is	   a	   table”	   is	   true	   in	  Biglish	   (which	   is	   a	  possible	  
language),	  and	  accepts	  (T),	  then	  a	  refers.	  Smallish	  is	  the	  metalanguage	  in	  which	  we	  apply	  (T)	  
to	  Biglish,	  so	  a	  must	  refer	  in	  Smallish.	  If	  a	  refers,	  then	  it	  refers	  to	  table,	  but	  by	  definition	  one	  
cannot	  quantify	  over,	  thus	  can’t	  refer	  to,	  tables	  in	  Small’s	  language.	  So	  if	  we	  accept	  (T)	  and	  the	  
described	  scenario,	  we	  must	  either	  accept	  the	  contradiction	  that	  one	  can	  and	  one	  can’t	  quanti-­‐
fy	  over	  tables	  in	  Smallish,	  or	  alternatively	  accept	  that	  Small’s	  language	  is	  expressively	  impover-­‐
ished	  relative	  to	  Biglish.	  In	  either	  case,	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  false.	  	  
	   The	  only	  premise	  to	  challenge	  is	  (T),	  but	  on	  what	  grounds	  may	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  
do	   so?	   (T)	   is	   an	   important	   part	   of	   perhaps	   our	   best	   semantic	   paradigm,	   and	   has	   earned	   its	  
keep.64	  If	  the	  only	  ground	  for	  rejecting	  (T)	  is	  that	  it	  implies	  the	  falsity	  of	  weak	  quantifier	  vari-­‐
antism,	   it	   would	   seem	   like	   a	   problematic	   ad	   hoc	   response	   from	   the	   quantifier	   variantist,	  
providing	  pressure	  to	  reject	  quantifier	  variantism	  instead.	  	  
	   The	  quantifier	   variantist	  has	  a	  principled	   response,	  however.65	  She	  could	   say	   that	  dif-­‐
ferent	  ontological	  languages	  have	  different	  names,	  predicates,	  and	  other	  expressions	  connect-­‐
ed	   to	  quantification.	  To	  use	  Sider’s	  phrasing,	  a	  name	   is	   “an	  expression	   that	   refers	   to	  a	   single	  
thing;	  a	  predicate	  is	  an	  expression	  that	  applies	  to	  one	  or	  more	  things”	  and	  so	  on	  (2011,	  p.	  181).66	  
The	  tight	  connection	  between	  quantification	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  names	  and	  predicates	  on	  
the	   other,	   is	   definitive	   of	   the	   semantic	   categories	   themselves.	   If	   names	   are	   expressions	   that	  
refer	  to	  a	  single	  thing,	  and	  “thing”	  varies	  between	  ontological	  languages,	  then	  what	  it	  means	  to	  
be	  a	  name	  varies	  as	  well.	  So	  different	  meanings	  of	  the	  quantifier	  would	  seem	  to	  lead	  to	  differ-­‐
ent	  senses	  of	  “name”	  and	  “predicate”	  in	  the	  different	  ontological	  languages.	  This	  in	  fact	  seems	  
to	   be	   accepted	   by	  Hirsch	   (inter	   alia	   2011,	   p.	   xii;	   37;	   157f),	   who	   notes	   that	   when	  we	   vary	   the	  
meaning	   of	   the	   quantifier,	  we	   also	   vary	   the	  meaning	   of	   several	   semantic	   categories,	   such	   as	  
names	  and	  predicates,	  even	  the	  meaning	  of	  “reference”	  (see	  below).	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   to	   “Sentences	  of	   the	   form	   ‘That	   is	  F’	   are	   true	  only	   if	   the	   speaker	   refers	   to	   something	  by	   ‘that’”	  as	  holding	  of	  
other	  speakers’	  languages	  (2006,	  p.	  59).	  	  
64	  Eklund	  (2007)	  argues	  that	   if	   the	  quantifier	  variantist	   rejects	   (T),	   then	  there	  are	  semantics	   facts	   that	  she	  cannot	  
express,	  and	  thus	  that	  a	  language	  in	  which	  (T)	  is	  false	  will	  be	  expressively	  impoverished.	  But	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  (T)	  
rather	  is	  a	  part	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  semantics,	  and	  that	  other	  theories	  could	  express	  the	  same	  semantic	  facts	  using	  differ-­‐
ent	  vocabulary.	  Hirsch	  (2009)	  notes	  that	  perhaps	  (T)	  is	  a	  principle	  that	  will	  give	  you	  a	  nice	  semantic	  theory,	  but	  that	  
such	  reasons	  are	  merely	  pragmatic,	  without	  purchase	  on	  the	   fundamental	  questions	  quantifier	  variantism	  tries	   to	  
deal	  with.	  I	  join	  Sider	  (2011)	  in	  finding	  this	  response	  essentially	  correct.	  	  
65	  This	  reply	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  is	  not	  profound.	  Both	  Hirsch	  (2009)	  and	  Sider	  (2011,	  p.	  181f)	  make	  
quite	  similar	  points.	  	  
66	  This	  at	  least	  holds	  in	  first	  order	  logic.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  too	  simple	  a	  criterion;	  Empty	  names	  don’t	  refer,	  but	  arguably	  
they	  are	  names.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  other	  accounts	  of	  names	  will	  have	  the	  same	  consequences	  as	  
those	  I	  spell	  out	  for	  this	  simple	  criterion,	  see	  Turner	  (2010,	  p.	  15f).	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   What	  I’ve	  said	  requires	  that	  we	  use	  a	  semantic	  criterion	  for	  names	  and	  predicates.67	  But	  
that	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  built	  into	  the	  quantifier	  variantist’s	  treatment	  of	  names	  and	  predicates	  
in	   a	   language	   anyway.	   The	   sense	   in	  which	   the	   quantifiers	   of	   different	   ontological	   languages	  
differ	   is	   exactly	   semantically;	   by	   an	   inferential	   or	   syntactic	   criterion,	   different	   ontological	  
languages	  have	  the	  same	  quantifier,	  but	  surely	  ontological	  languages	  are	  distinguished	  by	  their	  
quantifier.	  	  
The	   suggested	   reply	   to	   the	   Eklund-­‐Hawthorne-­‐argument	   is	   then	   this:	   The	   quantifier	  
variantist	  can	  say	  that	  (T),	  which	  says	  that	  “F(a)”	  being	  true	   in	  target	   language	  entails	   that	  a	  
refers	   in	   the	  metalanguage,68	  does	   not	   hold	  when	   (T)	   is	   used	   to	   interpret	   a	   language	  with	   a	  
different	  quantifier	  than	  the	  metalanguage.	  Different	  ontological	  languages	  will	  have	  different	  
notions	  of	  name	  and	  predicate,	  which	  has	  consequences	  for	  whether	  it	  is	  true	  that	  a	  refers	  in	  
Smallish.	   Big’s	   expression	   “a”	   is	   not	   a	   name	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   Smallish,	   because	   “a”	  
doesn’t	  refer	  to	  somethingSmallish,	  so	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  accept	  the	  semantic	  paradigm	  (T)	  is	  
a	  principle	  of	  (see	  below).	  Given	  this	  difference	  between	  ontological	  languages,	  the	  rejection	  of	  
(T)	  is	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  taking	  seriously	  the	  consequences	  of	  quantifier	  variance	  for	  semantics	  
in	   general,	   and	   the	   semantic	   categories	   specifically.	   Thus	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   the	   quantifier	  
variantist	  has	  a	  principled	  response	  to	  the	  argument,	  following	  naturally	  from	  the	  view	  itself.	  	  
A	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  must	  reject	  that	  any	  language	  can	  
be	   a	  metalanguage	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   providing	   a	   general	   referential	   semantics	   for	   all	   other	  
languages.	  We	  should	  nonetheless	  note	  that	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  can	  accept	  a	  weak	  inter-­‐
pretation	  of	   (T),	  on	  which	   it	  holds	   internal	   to	   a	   language,	   i.e.	  when	   the	   target	   and	  metalan-­‐
guage	  is	  the	  same,	  but	  not	  when	  interpreting	  other	  ontological	  languages:	  
	  
(T*)	   For	  a	  sentence	  of	  the	  syntactic	  form	  “F(a)”	  to	  be	  true,	  the	  syntactically	  singular	  
term	  “a”	  must	  refer.	  
	  
(T*)	  may	   be	   an	   important	   part	   of	   a	   language-­‐internal	   semantic	   theory.	  Whether	   a	   semantic	  
theory	   incorporating	   (T*)	   is	   favorable	   depends	   on	  whether	   (T*)	   gives	   a	   good	   account	   of	   the	  
language	   one’s	   speaking.	  That’s	   a	   question	   largely	   independent	   of	   the	   question	  of	   quantifier	  
variantism,	  but	  the	  potential	  truth	  of	  (T*)	  in	  a	  certain	  language	  would	  not	  have	  any	  untoward	  
consequences	  for	  the	  quantifier	  variantist.	  
	   In	   reply	   to	   what	   I’ve	   said	   on	   behalf	   of	   quantifier	   variantism,	   it	   can	   be	   objected	   that	  
there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  dispense	  with	  (T)	  if	  one	  uses	  an	  ontologically	  “more	  expansive”	  language.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  As	  opposed	  to	  an	  inferential	  criterion,	  see	  Turner	  (2010,	  p.	  14f).	  	  
68	  The	   truth-­‐conditions	   suggested	   for	   ”F(a)”	   in	   (T)	   follows	   from	   the	   standard	  Tarskian	   truth	   definition	   of	   atomic	  
sentences	  (Hawthorne	  2006).	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If	  we	  use	  Biglish	  to	   interpret	  Smallish,	   then	  there	   is	  no	  pressure	  to	  reject	  (T),	   for	  Biglish	  can	  
provide	  a	  Tarskian	  analysis	  of	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  all	  the	  sentences	  of	  Smallish.	  This	  could	  
be	   reason	   to	   prefer	   a	   “bigger	   language”	   in	   general	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   providing	   a	   semantic	  
theory,	  so	  Biglish	  is	  better	  than	  Smallish.	  
	   There	  are	  two	  responses	  to	  this.	  First,	  quantifier	  variantism	  can	  acknowledge	  that	  some	  
languages	  are	  better	  than	  others	   for	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  a	  tidy	  theory	  of	  semantics.	  But	  
the	   quantifier	   variantist	   can	   hold	   that	   this	   doesn’t	   have	   any	   ontological	   consequences;	   the	  
languages	  are	   still	   truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	   (see	  Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	   240f;	  Sider	  2011,	  p.	   182).	  
The	   variantist	  might	  hold	   that	   this	   should	  be	   accepted	  by	   the	  mainstream	  metaphysician	   as	  
well,	   as	   an	   argument	   from	   “better	  metalanguage”	   would	   itself	   seem	   to	   trivialize	   ontological	  
disputes,	   privileging	   the	  most	   expansive	   ontological	   proposals	   –	   universalism,	   perdurantism,	  
etc.	  –	  by	  default.69	  Second,	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  hope	  of	  a	  general	  com-­‐
plete	   theory	  of	   semantics	  across	  possible	   languages	   is	  anyway	  misconceived,	  not	   recognizing	  
the	  consequences	  of	  quantifier	  variantism.	  Such	  a	  rejection	  of	  “bottom	  up”,	  or	  compositional,	  
semantics,	  where	  the	  meaning	  of	  sentences	  is	  ultimately	  given	  by	  the	  meaning	  of	  its	  constitu-­‐
ents,	  may	  be	  unattractive	   to	   some	  philosophers,	   cf.	   the	   interpretation	  assumption	  of	   section	  
1.2.3.	   Instead	  of	  pushing	  this	  objection,	  I’ll	   leave	  it	  to	  the	  reader	  to	  evaluate	  how	  problematic	  
this	  consequence	  is.	  	  
Another	  argument,	  due	  to	  a	  proof	  by	  Harris	  (1982)	  and	  found	  in	  more	  accessible	  form	  
in	  Williamson	   (1987-­‐8),	   can	   be	   used	   to	   bolster	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   quantifier	   variantist	  
should	  accept	  that	  the	  semantic	  categories	  connected	  to	  quantification	  differs	  between	  onto-­‐
logical	   languages.	  The	  point	   is	   that	   if	  we	  can	  have	  different	  existential	  quantifiers	  that	  none-­‐
theless	   obey	   the	   same	   inference	   rules,	   then	  we	   can	   presumably	   create	   a	   language,	   L,	   which	  
contains	  both	  these	  quantifiers.70	  But	  if	  they	  obey	  the	  same	  inference	  rules,	  then	  we	  can	  prove	  
that	   the	  quantifiers	   are	   logically	   equivalent.	  To	   take	  an	  example	   from	  Sider	   (2007,	  p.	   217):	   If	  
one	  of	  the	  quantifiers	  is	  ∃!	  and	  the	  other	  ∃!,	  then	  if	  ∃!𝜙(𝑥),	  by	  ∃!-­‐elimination,	  𝜙(𝑎).	  But	  then	  
by	  ∃!-­‐introduction,	  ∃!𝜙(𝑥).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  quantifiers	  range	  over	  the	  same	  things,	  and	  
have	  the	  same	  meaning	  after	  all.	  	  
	   To	  avoid	  this	  conclusion,	  one	  must	  show	  that	  the	  just	  mentioned	  inference	  is	   invalid.	  
One	  way	   of	   doing	   that	   is	   to	   adopt	   the	   suggested	   reply	   to	   the	   Eklund/Hawthorne-­‐argument,	  
and	  say	  that	  because	  different	  quantifiers	  entail	  different	  names	  and	  predicates,	  L	  is	  a	  disjunc-­‐
tive	  language.	  When	  constructing	  a	  language	  with	  two	  different	  quantifiers,	  one	  doesn’t	  have	  
one	  stock	  of	  names	  and	  predicates.	  The	  inference-­‐rules	  that	  connect	  a	  quantifier	  to	  names	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Indeed,	  both	  Eklund	  (2007,	  2009)	  and	  Hawthorne	  (2006)	  argue	  for	  such	  expansive	  ontologies.	  	  
70	  This	  might	  in	  fact	  be	  of	  interest,	  because	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  knowing	  how	  the	  expressions	  interact.	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predicates	  hold	  only	  between	  the	  quantifiers	  and	  predicates	  and	  so	  on	  of	  the	  same	  type.	  This	  is	  
also	  the	  reply	  advocated	  by	  Sider	  (2007,	  p.	  217f).	  Thus	  the	  above	   inference	  would	  be	  blocked	  
because	  L	   operates	  with	   two	   types	   of	   quantifiers,	   and	   consequently	   two	   types	   of	   names	   and	  
predicates.	  So	  if	  we	  have	  ∃!𝜙(𝑥),	  then	  by	  ∃!-­‐elimination,	  𝜙(𝑎!),	  but	  it	  would	  be	  invalid	  to	  use	  ∃!-­‐introduction	  to	  get	  ∃!𝜙(𝑥),	  because	  ∃!	  and	  𝑎!	  are	  of	  different	  types.	  	  
	   A	  different	  reply	  would	  be	  to	  insist	  that	  one	  simply	  cannot	  construe	  a	  language	  like	  L,	  
but	  without	  a	  further	  rationale,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  rather	  empty	  insistence.	  Expression	  meanings	  
aren’t	   like	  magnets	   repelling	   each	   other,71	  so	   the	   quantifier	   variantist	  must	   somehow	  have	   a	  
principled	   rejection	   of	   inferences	   that	   entail	   equivalence.	  One	   such	   rejection	   is	   to	   hold	   that	  
there	  is	  no	  inference	  from	  the	  formulae	  after	  ∃!	  to	  ∃!	  because	  names	  and	  predicates	  are	  infer-­‐
entially	  connected	  to	  a	  distinct	  quantifier.	  This	  is	  the	  best	  reply	  I	  know	  of	  that	  the	  quantifier	  
variantist	  can	  give,	  and	   it	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	   trading	  on	  the	  same	   ideas	  as	   the	  reply	  to	  the	  
Eklund/Hawthorne-­‐argument,	  thus	  avoiding	  further	  divergence	  from	  traditional	  logic.	  	  
	   I’ve	   argued	   that	   the	   quantifier	   variantist	   can	   respond	   to	   two	   potentially	   devastating	  
semantic	  arguments	  against	  quantifier	  variantism.	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  response	  is	  that	  the	  
semantic	   categories	  of	  names	   and	  predicates	   themselves	   vary	  when	  we	  vary	   the	  quantifier.	   I	  
also	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  a	  natural	  consequence	  of	  the	  view	  itself,	  because	  names	  and	  predicates	  
are	  tightly	  connected	  to	  quantification.	  Thus	  for	  the	  different	  ontological	  languages	  L1	  and	  L2,	  
L1	  will	  have	  names1	  and	  L2	  will	  have	  names2;	  L1	  will	  have	  predicates1	  and	  L2	  will	  have	  predicates2.	  
As	  the	  reply	  to	  the	  Harris-­‐argument	  required,	  there	  are	  no	  completely	  general	  truth-­‐preserving	  
inferential	  connections	  from	  expressions	  of	  one	  of	  these	  languages	  to	  the	  other.	  It	  follows	  from	  
this	  that	  predicates	  and	  names	  must	  have	  different	  meanings	  in	  the	  languages.	  Thus	  “red”	  in	  L1	  
is	  not	   the	   same	  predicate	   as	   “red”	   in	  L2.	  Another	   route	   to	   this	   conclusion	   is	   to	   acknowledge	  
that	   the	   treatment	   of	   predicates	   that	   sits	   best	   with	   Hirsch’s	   intensional	   assumption	   is	   the	  
orthodox	  understanding	  of	  them;	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  predicate	  is	  given	  by	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  
predicate,	  i.e.	  the	  set	  of	  things	  satisfying	  the	  predicate.	  The	  meaning	  of	  “red”	  is	  the	  set	  of	  red	  
things,	  the	  meaning	  of	  “mammals”	  the	  set	  of	  mammals.	  So	  if	  we	  go	  from	  English	  to	  Smallish,	  
“red”	  would	  get	  a	  new	  meaning,	  because	   the	  set	  of	   red	   things	  has	  changed	  (there	   is	  no	  such	  
things	  as	  my	  red	  copy	  of	  Metametaphysics).	  So	  the	  meaning	  of	  predicates	  must	  vary.	  
We	  can	  now	  formulate	  a	  problem	  for	  quantifier	  variantism.72	  Suppose	  that	  two	  philos-­‐
ophers	   speak	  different	  ontological	   languages	  and	   that	   they	  disagree	  about	  whether	   there	  are	  
tables	  or	  holes.	  By	  what	  I’ve	  said,	  they	  mean	  different	  things	  by	  “tables”	  and	  “holes”.	  This	  has	  
the	   consequence	   that	   believers	   in	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism	   cannot	   make	   the	   following	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  This	  phrase	  was	  used	  by	  Matti	  Eklund	  in	  correspondence.	  	  
72	  Thanks	  to	  Matti	  Eklund	  for	  helping	  me	  acknowledge	  this.	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speech,	  attractive	  to	  some	  adherents	  of	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism:	  “While	  it	  may	  be	  absurd	  to	  
deny	  that	  there’s	  any	  sense	  in	  which	  –	  for	  example	  –	  there	  is	  a	  hole	  in	  a	  perforated	  sock,	  it’s	  not	  
absurd	  to	  deny	  that	   ‘in	  a	  metaphysical	  sense’	  there	  exist	  holes”	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	   172).	  For	  “hole”	  
will	  have	  a	  one	  meaning	  in	  the	  language	  which	  employs	  the	  “metaphysical	  sense”	  of	  the	  quan-­‐
tifier,	  another	  in	  English.	  Similarly,	  if	  we	  accept	  the	  suggested	  reply	  to	  the	  two	  semantic	  argu-­‐
ments,	   then	   it	   is	  wrong	  to	  describe	   the	  dispute	  over	  persistence	  as	  one	  over	   the	  existence	  of	  
temporal	  parts,	  as	  Hirsch	  does	  (2011,	  p.	  222),	  for	  “temporal	  part”	  will	  have	  different	  meanings	  in	  
the	   mouths	   of	   Edna	   and	   Pedro.	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   misleading	   when	   Hirsch	   writes	   that	   the	  
sentence	  “There	  exists	  something	  that	  is	  composed	  of	  Clinton’s	  nose	  and	  the	  Eiffel	  Tower”	  as	  
being	   interpretable	   in	  one	  way	   that	  makes	   it	   true,	  and	  another	  which	  makes	   it	   false	   (2011,	  p.	  
69).	   For	   he	   seems	   to	   imply	   that	   the	   only	   part	   of	   the	   sentence	   that	   varies	   in	  meaning	   is	   the	  
quantifier,	  but	  in	  light	  of	  the	  consequences	  that	  I’ve	  been	  pointing	  to	  follows	  from	  the	  reply	  to	  
the	  Eklund/Hawthorne	  argument,	  also	  “compose”	  and	  “part”	  may	  have	  a	  different	  meanings.	  	  
	   In	   general,	   the	   suggested	   reply	   to	   the	   semantic	   arguments	   entail	   that	   the	   quantifier	  
variantist	   cannot	   formulate	  her	  characteristic	  criticism	  of	  ontology.	  She	  cannot	  claim,	  as	   she	  
usually	  does,	  that	  ontological	  disputes	  over	  Fs	  are	  deflated	  by	  quantifier	  variantism	  because	  in	  
one	  sense	  of	  the	  quantifier	  there	  are	  Fs,	  and	  in	  another	  there	  aren’t	  Fs.	  For	  “F”	  doesn’t	  have	  the	  
same	  meaning	  in	  these	  languages.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  question	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  Fs	  is	  
left	  standing	  if	  we	  accept	  the	  suggested	  reply	  to	  the	  semantic	  arguments,	  for	  clearly,	  there	  not	  
being	  F*s,	  where	  F*s	  aren’t	  Fs,	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  direct	  bearing	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  Fs.	  Thus	  there	  
isn’t	  one	  sense	  in	  which	  there	  are	  Fs,	  and	  another	  in	  which	  there	  are	  no	  Fs.	  We	  can	  therefore	  
formulate	  the	  following	  dilemma	  to	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  with	  deflationary	  ambitions:	  
	  
(a) Either	   different	   ontological	   languages	   have	   different	   names	   and	   predicates,	  
which	  means	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  different	  ontological	  languages	  doesn’t	  have	  
direct	  ontological	  consequences,	  or	  
(b) The	  Eklund/Hawthorne	  and	  Harris	  arguments	  entail	  that	  quantifier	  variantism	  
is	  false.73	  
	  
The	  disjunct	  (b)	  presupposes	  that	  there	  are	  no	  other	  answers	  to	  the	  semantic	  arguments,	  but	  I	  
don’t	  know	  of	  any	  other	  general	  reply	  to	  them,	  and	  as	  we	  saw,	  there	  are	  independent	  reasons	  
to	  believe	  the	  consequence	  that	  names	  and	  predicates	  vary	  with	  the	  quantifier.	  If	  we	  therefore	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  As	   should	  be	   clear,	   the	  arguments	  and	   replies	  used	   to	  arrive	  at	   this	  dilemma	  are	  not	   entirely	  novel,	  but	   to	  my	  
knowledge	   there	   is	   no	   formulation	   of	   this	   dilemma	   in	   the	   literature.	   Thus	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   observe	   that	   Sider	  
(2007,	   p.	   218–219)	   apparently	   accepts	   both	   the	   reply	   to	   the	   Eklund/Hawthorne-­‐argument,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	  
seems	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  predicates	  doesn’t	  change	  (2011,	  p.	  172).	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try	  to	  avoid	  (b),	  we	  are	  pushed	  towards	  (a).	  If	  predicates	  and	  names	  have	  different	  meanings	  in	  
different	  languages,	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  way	  of	  rehabilitating	  the	  deflationary	  arguments	  based	  
on	   quantifier	   variantism.	   This	   seems	   like	   a	   significant	   blow	   to	   quantifier	   variantism,	   for	   the	  
main	  motivation	   for	   accepting	   the	   view	  was	   clearly	   that	   it	  would	  dispense	  with	   the	  difficult	  
questions	  of	   ontology.	  That	  being	   said,	  quantifier	   variantism	  may	   still	   be	   true,	  but	   it	  has	  no	  
impact	  on	  ontology;	  ontological	  disputes	  over	  Fs	  can	  continue	   independently	  of	   the	   truth	  of	  
quantifier	  variantism.	  	  
2.4	   The	  meaning	  of	  mathematical	  terms	  
I’ve	  argued	  that	  to	  avoid	  the	  semantic	  arguments,	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  should	  accept	  that	  
names	   and	   predicates	   also	   vary	   between	   ontological	   languages.	   As	   I	   also	   argued,	   accepting	  
name	  and	  predicate	  variance	  has	  problematic	  consequences	  for	  the	  deflationary	  ambitions	  of	  
quantifier	   variantism.	   The	   quantifier	   variantist	   might	   want	   to	   avoid	   these,	   so	   let	   us	   in	   the	  
following	  suppose	  that	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  has	  some	  other	  way	  of	  avoiding	  the	  semantic	  
arguments	  than	  the	  one	  I	  suggested,	  and	  thus	  continues	  to	  hold	  that	  names	  and	  predicates	  in	  
different	   ontological	   languages	  have	   the	   same	  meaning.	  This	   section	   argues	   that	   this	   view	   –	  
that	   there	   are	   different	   ontological	   languages	  with	   different	   quantifiers	   but	   the	   same	   predi-­‐
cates	  –	  has	  another	  problem.	  Under	  plausible	  assumptions,	  this	  version	  of	  quantifier	  variant-­‐
ism	  entails	  that	  mathematical	  terms	  have	  different	  meaning	  in	  different	  ontological	  languages.	  	  
The	  argument	  starts	  with	  an	  observation	  made	  by	  Peter	  van	  Inwagen	  (2009,	  p.	  483),	  in-­‐
spired	  by	  Frege	  (1980):	  To	  say	  that	  Fs	  exist	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  number	  of	  Fs	  is	  not	  0,	  and	  to	  say	  
that	  Fs	  don’t	  exist	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  number	  of	  Fs	  is	  0.	  Assume	  that	  this	  is	  correct.	  Make	  also	  
the	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  number-­‐words	  have	  the	  same	  meaning	  in	  all	  languages;	  after	  all,	  
mathematical	  objects,	   in	  contrast	   to	  e.g.	  physical	  objects,	  are	   “untouched”	  by	   the	  differences	  
between	  ontological	   languages,	  and	  thus	   it’s	  natural	   to	  expect	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms	  
referring	  to	  mathematical	  objects	  is	  constant	  across	  ontological	  languages.74	  The	  contention	  is	  
not	  that	  mathematical	  terms	  have	  the	  same	  meaning	  in	  different	  languages	  because	  the	  ontol-­‐
ogy	  is	  constant,	  but	  simply	  that	   it	   is	  a	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  they	  don’t	  change	  meaning;	  
even	  if	  we	  should	  accept	  variance	  in	  a	  term	  like	  “exists”,	  it	  is	  a	  radical	  move	  to	  posit	  variance	  in	  
the	  meaning	  of	  terms	  like	  “0”	  or	  “1”.	  	  
Now	  consider	  a	  sentence	  that	  Hirsch	  believes	  is	  true	  in	  English:	  “Tables	  exist”.	  By	  van	  
Inwagen’s	  principle,	   this	  entails	  “The	  number	  of	  tables	   is	  not	  0”.	   In	  contrast,	  Small	   truthfully	  
asserts:	   “Tables	  don’t	  exist”,	  and	  thus	   “The	  number	  of	   tables	   is	  0”.	  Since	   the	   latter	   is	   just	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Thus	  the	  argument	  presupposes	  that	  there	  are	  mathematical	  objects.	  Hirsch	  himself	  presupposes	  platonism	  (2011,	  
p.	  191),	  but	  what	  about	  nominalists?	  Also	  nominalists	  need	  some	  theory	  about	  the	  semantics	  of	  mathematical	  terms,	  
so	  I	  would	  think	  the	  argument	  has	  some	  relevance	  for	  them	  as	  well,	  but	  I	  cannot	  discuss	  this	  in	  any	  detail	  here.	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negation	  of	  “The	  number	  of	  tables	  is	  not	  0”,	  English	  and	  Smallish	  assign	  different	  truth-­‐values	  
to	  this	  sentence.	  Under	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent,	  
the	  meaning	  of	  these	  sentences	  must	  be	  different.	  It	  follows	  that	  either	  “the	  number	  of”,	  “0”	  or	  
“not”	  means	  different	   things	   in	  English	   and	   Smallish.	  By	   the	   current	   assumption	   that	   predi-­‐
cates	   remain	   constant	  between	  ontological	   languages,	   “table”	  has	   the	   same	  meaning	   in	  both	  
the	  languages.	  Since	  no	  one	  would	  want	  the	  logical	  operator	  “not”	  to	  vary	  in	  meaning,	  either	  
“the	  number	  of”	  or	  “0”	  varies	  in	  meaning,	  and	  both	  alternatives	  go	  against	  the	  assumption	  that	  
mathematical	  terms	  have	  the	  same	  meaning	  in	  different	  ontological	  languages.	  	  
I	  won’t	  be	  arguing	  for	  van	  Inwagen’s	  theory	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  quantification	  
and	  number.	   It	   is	  an	   intuitive	  and	  attractive	  claim,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  a	  consequence	  of	   the	  
notion	  of	   the	   extension	  of	   a	   predicate:	   a	   predicate	   applies	   to	   a	   set	   of	   things,	   and	  on	   the	   as-­‐
sumption	   of	   platonism,	   this	   set	   exists	   independently	   of	   whether	   it	   actually	   is	   the	   semantic	  
value	  of	  the	  predicate.	  And	  if	  a	  predicate	  has	  an	  extension,	  then	  the	  extension	  counts	  a	  certain	  
number.75	  If	  we	  accept	  van	  Inwagen’s	  principle,	  the	  consequence	  for	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  is	  
that	   she	  must	  accept	   that	  either	   “the	  number	  of”	  or	   “0”	   (or	  both)	  has	  a	  different	  meaning	   in	  
alternative	  ontological	  languages.	  When	  the	  quantifier	  varies,	  so	  do	  mathematical	  terms.	  	  
Both	  options	  contradict	  our	  initial	  supposition	  that	  mathematical	  terms	  are	  constant	  in	  
meaning.	  Especially	   the	  contention	   that	   there	   is	  an	  ambiguity	   in	   the	  meaning	  of	   “0”	   is	  unat-­‐
tractive	   (I	   come	  back	   to	  why	  below).	  Let’s	   therefore	   instead	   focus	  on	  whether	   it	   is	  plausible	  
that	   the	  meaning	  of	   “the	  number	  of”	   is	  equivocal	  across	  ontological	   languages.	  First,	  observe	  
that	  even	  though	  the	  number	  of	  things	  depends	  on	  what	  there	  is,	  that	  doesn’t	  imply	  that	  the	  
meaning	   of	   “the	   number	   of”	   varies.	   Second	   we	   may	   wonder	   whether	   “the	   number	   of”	   is	   a	  
mathematical	   term,	   as	   I’ve	   been	   implicitly	   assuming.	   This	   is	   a	   difficult	   question	   to	   answer	  
generally,	   but	   it	   is	   often	   assumed	   that	   the	   locution	   “the	   number	   of”	   in	   “the	   number	   of	   the	  
planets	  is	  8”	  refers	  to	  8.	  Furthermore,	  “the”	  and	  “of”	  are	  purely	  grammatical	  categories	  that	  we	  
wouldn’t	  expect	  to	  change	  meaning	  between	  different	  ontological	  languages	  either,	  especially	  
if	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  restrict	  the	  meaning-­‐change	  to	  the	  quantifier.	  If	  so,	  only	  “number”	  is	  a	  plau-­‐
sible	  candidate	  for	  meaning	  variation.	  It	  is	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  “number”	  refers	  to	  mathe-­‐
matical	  objects,	  namely	  numbers,	  which	  are	  surely	  part	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  mathematics.	  
So	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  if	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  wants	  to	  accept	  van	  Inwagen’s	  principle,	  she	  
will	   have	   to	   accept	   that	   either	   “0”	   or	   “the	   number	   of”	   (which	   I	   will	   continue	   talk	   about	   as	  
“mathematical	  terms”),	  have	  different	  meanings	  in	  different	  ontological	  languages.76	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  This	  is	  at	  least	  true	  for	  some	  predicates,	  such	  as	  “table”.	  It	  might	  not	  hold	  for	  plural	  mass	  nouns	  such	  as	  “water”,	  but	  this	  nuance	  seems	  immaterial	  of	  the	  general	  point.	  	  76	  Thanks	  to	  Einar	  Duenger	  Bøhn	  and	  Jørgen	  Dyrstad	  for	  correcting	  prior	  mistakes	  and	  improving	  this	  section.	  	  
	   38	  
One	  may	  wonder	  what’s	  so	  problematic	  about	  that.	  As	  I	  pointed	  out	  above,	  the	  quanti-­‐
fier	  variantist	  must	  hold	  that	  several	  words	  change	  meaning	  when	  we	  vary	   the	  quantifier,	   so	  
what	  makes	  the	  case	  of	  these	  terms	  any	  different?	  We	  can	  first	  note	  that	  the	  meaning-­‐variation	  
that	  was	   a	   consequence	  of	   the	  Eklund/Hawthorne-­‐argument	  was	   in	   a	  domain	   the	  quantifier	  
variantist	  actually	  makes	  a	  claim	  about,	  the	  physical	  one.	  Hirsch	  does	  not	   think	  that	  the	  dis-­‐
pute	  over	  platonism	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  is	  verbal	  (2011,	  p.	  243f),	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
obvious	   reason	   why	   quantifier	   variance	   about	   the	   physical	   domain	   would	   lead	   to	  meaning-­‐
variance	  for	  mathematical	  terms.	  Furthermore,	  the	  stripe	  of	  quantifier	  variantism	  that	  we	  are	  
now	  concerned	  with	  is	  interested	  in	  restricting	  the	  meaning	  variance	  to	  the	  quantifier	  only.	  It	  
should	  nonetheless	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  meaning-­‐variance	  does	  not	  have	  any	  direct	  consequenc-­‐
es	   for	   the	  ontology	  of	  mathematics;	   under	   the	   assumption	  of	  Platonism,	   every	   language	  will	  
talk	  about	  the	  same	  domain	  of	  mathematical	  objects.	  My	  argument	  attempts	  to	  show	  that	  we	  
won’t	   be	   able	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	   the	   same	   referential	   relation	   that	  holds	  between	   e.g.	  number-­‐
words	  and	  numbers	  in	  all	  languages.	  So	  it	  has	  consequences	  for	  the	  semantics	  of	  mathematics.	  
This	  seems	  like	  an	  unattractive	  and	  unwanted	  consequence,	  because	  even	  though	  how	  
we	  manage	  to	  refer	  to	  mathematical	  objects	  is	  an	  unsolved	  puzzle	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  math-­‐
ematics,	  we	  would	   expect	   it	   to	   be	   the	   same	  mechanism	   in	   all	   languages	  with	   the	   expressive	  
power	  to	  do	  so.	  With	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  uniform	  treatment	  of	  how	  we	  refer	  to	  mathematical	  objects,	  
the	  mystery	  of	  mathematics	  becomes	  even	  bigger.	  If	  we	  figure	  out	  how	  we	  manage	  to	  refer	  to	  
mathematical	   objects	   in	   English,	   it	   will	   be	   unobvious	   whether	   that	   solution	   carries	   over	   to	  
other	   ontological	   languages.	   This	   isn’t	   a	   refutation	   of	   quantifier	   variantism,	   but	   imposes	   an	  
explanatory	  demand	  upon	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  that	  is	  burdensome.	  	  
The	   quantifier	   variantist’s	   answer	   to	   this	  must	   be	   that	  mathematical	   terms	   get	   their	  
meaning	   holistically	   within	   the	   language,	   and	   that	   mathematical	   terms	   in	   languages	   with	  
expressive	  powers	  to	  talk	  about	  mathematics	  have	  different	  referential	  relations	  to	  mathemati-­‐
cal	  objects.	  The	  point,	  according	  to	  this	  response,	  is	  that	  if	  a	  language	  has	  terms	  for	  mathemat-­‐
ical	  objects,	  then	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  one	  can	  use	  those	  number-­‐terms	  to	  refer	  to	  mathematical	  
objects.	   Whether	   the	   referential	   relation	   between	   mathematical	   terms	   and	   mathematical	  
objects	  in	  one	  language	  is	  the	  same	  as	  in	  another	  language	  is	  not	  important.	  This	  response	  may	  
be	  right	  as	  far	  as	  it	  goes,	  but	  again,	  it	  seems	  to	  go	  against	  the	  motivation	  behind	  the	  version	  of	  
quantifier	  variantism	  that	  we	  are	  considering,	  which	  wants	  to	  restrict	  meaning-­‐variation	  to	  the	  
quantifier	  only.	  It	  is	  also	  an	  intuitively	  surprising	  response,	  for	  it	  means	  that	  also	  this	  version	  
of	  quantifier	  variantism	  has	  consequences	  in	  other	  areas	  than	  the	  one	  it	  presumably	  wants	  to	  
make	  a	  claim	  about:	  the	  ontology	  of	  physical	  objects.	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2.5	   Truth-­‐conditional	  equivalence	  
We	  now	  move	  on	  to	  another	  argument	  against	  quantifier	  variantism.	  Central	  to	  Hirsch’s	   for-­‐
mulation	   of	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism	   is	   the	   notion	   of	   “truth-­‐conditional	   equivalence”.	   As	  
defined	   in	   chapter	   1,	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism	   is	   the	   view	   that	   there	   are	   at	   several	   truth-­‐
conditionally	   equivalent	   languages	   in	   which	   different	   quantificational	   sentences	   are	   true.	  
Given	  the	  intensional	  assumption,	  two	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  if,	  for	  any	  
sentence	  in	  a	  context	  in	  one	  of	  the	  languages,	  a	  speaker	  of	  the	  other	  language	  can,	  in	  the	  same	  
context,	   find	  a	  sentence	  in	  her	  own	  language	  which	  is	  true	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  same	  possible	  
worlds.	   So	   a	   sentence	   of	   one	   ontological	   language	   is	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   with	   a	  
sentence	  of	  another	  ontological	  language	  if	  a	  speaker	  can	  always	  express	  the	  same	  proposition	  
(set	  of	  possible	  worlds)	  as	  her	  ontological	  opponent,	  even	  though	  she	  will	  use	  sentences	  with	  
different	   surface	   structure	  doing	   so.	  A	  crucial	   question	   is	   thus	  whether	   different	   ontological	  
languages	  really	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  –	  can	  they	  describe	  the	  same	  possibilities?	  
Based	  on	  this	  overarching	  question,	  we	  can	  formulate	  two	  sub-­‐questions:	  	  
	  
(i)	   For	  a	  quantificational	  sentence,	  S,	  of	  one	  ontological	  language,	  is	  it	  always	  pos-­‐
sible	  to	   find	  a	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  sentence	  (i.e.	  a	  sentence	  express-­‐
ing	  the	  same	  proposition),	  S1,	  in	  another	  ontological	  language?	  
	  
That	   is,	   are	   the	   different	   ontological	   languages	   we	   have	   been	   considering	   really	   truth-­‐
conditionally	  equivalent?	  To	  determine	  (i),	  we	  first	  need	  to	  answer	  this	  question:	  
	  
(ii)	   How	  do	  we	  evaluate	  whether	  two	  sentences	  in	  alternative	  ontological	  languages	  
are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent?	  	  
	  
Let	   us	   therefore	   try	   to	   answer	   (ii)	   first.	   To	   evaluate	   whether	   two	   sentences	   are	   truth-­‐
conditionally	  equivalent,	  we	  must	  determine	  whether	  they	  are	  “true	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  same	  
possible	  worlds”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  xi).	  By	  standard	  referential	  semantics	  this	  is	  quite	  simple:	  we	  
evaluate	  whether	  the	  sentences	  talk	  about	  the	  same	  objects	  having	  the	  same	  properties,	  stand-­‐
ing	   in	   the	  same	  relations,	  and	  so	  on.	  Quantifier	  variantism	  makes	   this	  evaluation	  harder,	   for	  
we	  don’t	  necessarily	  have	  the	  same	  objects	  to	  compare	  the	  properties	  of.	  The	  quantifier	  vari-­‐
antist	  is	  committed	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  sentences	  that	  appear	  to	  
imply	   the	   existence	   of	   different	   things	   describe	   the	   same	   possibilities.	   The	   possible	   worlds	  
themselves	  are	  of	  course	  unaffected	  by	  the	  different	  descriptions	  of	  them,	  but	  when	  we	  have	  
systematically	  different	  descriptions	  it	  is	  harder	  to	  know	  whether	  two	  sentences	  are	  true	  with	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respect	  to	  exactly	  the	  same	  possible	  worlds.	  This	  is	  the	  basic	  problem	  with	  quantifier	  variant-­‐
ism	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  answering	  (ii).	  	  
Ontological	  views	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  necessary	  truths,	  so	  while	  a	  nihilist	  will	  describe	  
the	  possible	  worlds	  as	  containing	  only	  simples,	  the	  universalist	  describes	  the	  possible	  worlds	  as	  
including	  all	  sorts	  of	  composite	  objects.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  given	  language,	  the	  mereo-­‐
logical	  and	  persistence	  properties	  of	  the	  possible	  worlds	  vary.	  This	  much	  follows	  from	  quanti-­‐
fier	  variantism.	  Despite	  this,	  and	  as	  (i)	  makes	  clear,	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  the	  two	  views	  describe	  the	  
same	   possible	   worlds	   equally	   well.	   This	   claim	   seems	   made	   from	   a	   view	   from	   nowhere,	   by	  
someone	   who	   simply	   knows	   that	   the	   languages	   describes	   the	   same	   possible	   worlds,	   but	   by	  
trying	  to	  answer	  (ii),	  we	  seek	  an	  explanation	  of	  just	  how	  we	  know	  this.	  	  
Two	  sentences	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  because	  they	  express	  the	  same	  propo-­‐
sition.	  But	  then	  a	  proposition	  is	  a	  set	  of	  worlds	  without	  us	  having	  any	  further	  grasp	  of	  what	  the	  
possible	   worlds	   are	   like.	   Given	   that	   the	   different	   ontological	   languages	   can	   describe	   these	  
worlds	   equally	   well	   using	   different	   quantificational	   apparatus,	   the	   worlds	   themselves	   seem	  
underspecified,	   insufficient	  to	  illuminate	  whether	  the	  sentences	  really	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent.	   Before	  we	   have	   some	  quantificational	   grip	   on	   the	   possible	  worlds	   (and	   a	   unified	  
stock	  of	  names	  and	  predicates)	  they	  are	  explanatorily	  idle	  with	  regard	  to	  answering	  our	  ques-­‐
tion.	  We	  seem	  to	  want	  a	  quantificational	  scheme	  imposed	  (i.e.	   the	  possible	  worlds	  described	  
by	   a	   language)	   to	   evaluate	   whether	   the	   languages	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent,	   or	   at	  
least,	  we	  need	  something	  more	  than	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  sentences	  being	  “true	  with	  respect	   to	  
the	  same	  possible	  worlds”	  to	  answer	  (ii).	  
To	   exemplify	   the	   difficulties	   in	   answering	   (ii),	   consider	   these	   allegedly	   truth-­‐
conditionally	  equivalent	  sentences:	  	  
	  
There	  are	  tables.Biglish	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3)	  




In	  1860,	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  had	  a	  temporal	  part	  that	  was	  bearded.Perdurance	   	   (5)	  
In	  1860,	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  was	  bearded.Endurance	   	   	   	   	   (6)	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  (3)	  and	  (4),	  and	  (5)	  and	  (6),	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  they	  are	  truth-­‐
conditionally	   equivalent?	  What	   I	   hope	   to	   have	   shown	   in	   this	   section	   so	   far,	   is	   that	   talking	  
about	  the	  possible	  worlds	  themselves	  won’t	  get	  us	  any	  further	  in	  answering	  this	  questions.	  For	  
on	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  common	  set	  of	  objects	  to	  appeal	  to	  when	  comparing	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	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of	  the	  sentences,	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  we	  know	  that	  they	  express	  the	  same	  propositions.	  That	  (3)	  
and	  (4),	  and	  (5)	  and	  (6),	  hold	  true	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  same	  possible	  worlds	  is	  merely	  a	  descrip-­‐
tion	  of	  the	  problem.	  By	  which	  criterion	  are	  we	  supposed	  to	  evaluate	  it?	  
As	  we	  have	   seen,	   truth-­‐conditional	   equivalence	   comes	   to	   being	   “true	  with	   respect	   to	  
the	  same	  possible	  worlds”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  xi).	  Perhaps	  we	  can	  get	  some	  help	  answering	  (ii)	  by	  
analyzing	   this	   relationship	   further.	   One	   way,	   the	   least	   demanding	   way,	   of	   analyzing	   this	   is	  
simply	  as	  being	  necessarily	  equivalent,	  that	  is	  holding	  in	  all	  the	  same	  worlds.	  But	  the	  sentences	  
“Nothing	  is	  both	  red	  and	  blue	  all	  over”	  and	  “Everything	  is	  self-­‐identical”	  are	  true	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  same	  possible	  worlds,	  but	  they	  won’t	  do	  as	  “truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  sentences”	  in	  
the	  required	  sense	  (Eklund	  2007).	  Furthermore,	  these	  sentences	  hold	  true	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
same	  possible	  worlds	  because	  they	  by	  are	  true	  in	  all	  possible	  worlds.	  This	  explanation	  is	  easy	  to	  
grasp,	  but	   in	   the	  case	  of	   sentences	  about	  physical	  objects,	  which	  are	   contingent,	  how	  do	  we	  
know	   that	   the	   sentences	   are	   true	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   same	   possible	   worlds?	   This	   criterion	  
doesn’t	  seem	  to	  give	  us	  much	  help.	  
Necessary	   equivalence	   is	   the	   weakest	   relation	   that	   can	   hold	   between	   truth-­‐
conditionally	   equivalent	   sentences.	   The	   strongest	   is	   synonymy.	   But	   this	  won’t	   do	   either,	   for	  
one	  can	  hardly	  say	  that	  (3)	  and	  (4),	  and	  (5)	  and	  (6),	  are	  synonymous.	  The	  sentences	  belong	  to	  
different	   languages,	   which	   would	   seem	   to	   disqualify	   them	   as	   synonyms.	   A	   final	   suggestion,	  
intermediate	   in	   strength,	   is	   that	   the	   sentences	   are	  a	   priori	  necessarily	   equivalent.	   In	   a	   book	  
preceding	   his	  writings	   on	   quantifier	   variance	   (but	   not	   unrelated	   to	   the	   it),	  Hirsch	   defines	  a	  
priori	  necessary	  equivalence	  as:	  “Two	  sentences	  are	  [a	  priori	  necessarily]	  equivalent	  if	  someone	  
who	  understands	  both	  of	  them	  can	  know	  a	  priori	  that	  they	  hold	  true	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  possi-­‐
ble	  situations”	  (1997,	  p.	  4).	  In	  one	  sense,	  this	  is	  better.	  If	  we	  simply	  by	  understanding	  the	  sen-­‐
tences	  know	  that	  they	  hold	  true	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  same	  possible	  worlds,	  then	  our	  question	  is	  
answered.	  The	  answer	  to	  (ii)	  is	  that	  understanding	  the	  sentences	  is	  enough.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
this	   still	   has	   the	   problem	   of	   counting	   sentences	   that	   are	   intuitively	   not	   truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent	   as	   equivalent,	   such	   as	   “Nothing	   is	   both	   red	   and	  blue	   all	   over”	   and	   “Everything	   is	  
self-­‐identical,”	   for	  we	  know	  a	  priori	   that	  they	  are	  true	   in	  the	  same	  possible	  worlds.	  But	   leave	  
such	  problems	  aside,	  let’s	  look	  closer	  at	  a	  priori	  necessity.	  	  
One	  problem	  with	  this	  characterization	  of	  the	  relationship	  is	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  give	  us	  all	  
we	  want;	  it	  doesn’t	  tell	  us	  in	  virtue	  of	  what	  the	  languages	  describe	  the	  same	  possible	  worlds.	  It	  
simply	  postulates	  understanding	  the	  sentences.	  An	  example	  of	  a	  satisfactory	  explanation	  was	  
given	  above:	  if	  the	  sentences	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  things,	  uses	  the	  same	  predicates	  and	  so	  on,	  then	  
we	   know	   why	   the	   sentences	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent.	   But	   this	   explanation	   is	   not	  
available	   to	  Hirsch,	   for	   the	   objects	   referred	   to	   and	  meaning	   of	   predicates	   plausibly	   changes	  
	   42	  
between	  the	  ontological	   languages.	  The	  general	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  don’t	  have	  a	  uniform	  no-­‐
tion	  of	  “truth-­‐condition”	  to	  use	  to	  compare	  the	  different	  languages	  and	  persuade	  ourselves	  that	  
the	  sentences	  hold	   true	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  same	  possible	  worlds.	  Referential	   semantics	  pro-­‐
vides	  a	  uniform	  treatment	  of	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  of	  any	  language	  (cf.	  (T)	  above),	  but	  Hirsch	  
must	  appeal	  to	  our	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  the	   languages	  and	  in	  virtue	  of	  this,	  we	  come	  to	  
know	  that	  the	  sentences	  hold	  true	  in	  the	  same	  possible	  worlds.	  For	  those	  generally	  skeptical	  of	  
holistic	  meaning	  theories,	  this	  might	  be	  a	  reason	  to	  reject	  Hirsch’s	  explanation.	  
Even	  if	  one	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  there	  are	  no	  problems	  with	  the	  holistic	  character	  of	  
Hirsch’s	  answer	   to	   (ii),	   there	  are	  other	  problems	  with	   the	   suggestion.	   It	   is	  not	  at	  all	  obvious	  
that	  we	  know	  a	  priori	  that	  the	  sentence	  “Abraham	  Lincoln	  had	  in	  1860	  a	  temporal	  part	  that	  was	  
bearded”	   in	   the	   language	  of	   the	  perdurantist	  and	   “Abraham	  Lincoln	  was	  bearded	   in	   1860”	   in	  
the	  language	  of	  the	  endurantist	  necessarily	  hold	  true	  of	  the	  same	  possible	  situations.	  Given	  the	  
big	   difference	   between	   the	   alternative	   languages,	   it	   is	   unclear	   that	   we	   understand	   the	   two	  
languages	   well	   enough	   to	   evaluate	   whether	   they	   hold	   true	   in	   exactly	   the	   same	   situations.	   I	  
cannot	   speak	   for	   others,	   but	   I	   find	   it	   unobvious	   that	   the	   sentences	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent.	  We	  may	  bring	  in	  some	  witnesses	  here:	  David	  Lewis	  and	  Peter	  van	  Inwagen	  accept-­‐
ed	  different	   theories	  of	  parthood,	  and	  by	  Hirsch’s	   lights,	   spoke	  different	   languages.	  But	   they	  
nonetheless	  engaged	  in	  the	  dispute	  and	  rejected	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  languages	  they	  used	  were	  
truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent.	   It	   can	   also	   be	   noted	   that	   for	   philosophers	   who	   reject	   the	   a	  
priori,	  Hirsch’s	  notion	  of	  truth-­‐conditional	  equivalence	  evaporates.	  	  
	  I’ve	   tried	   to	   argue	   that	   there	   are	   several	   aspects	   of	  Hirsch’s	   suggested	   answer	   to	   (ii)	  
that	   make	   it	   hard	   to	   know	   exactly	   how	   to	   evaluate	   whether	   two	   ontological	   languages	   are	  
truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent.	  To	  me,	  it	  seems	  like	  somewhat	  of	  a	  mystery	  how	  we	  know	  this.	  
But	  let’s	  assume	  that	  we	  have	  a	  good	  enough	  grasp	  of	  how	  we	  evaluate	  whether	  two	  sentences	  
are	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent.	   To	   determine	   whether	   two	   sentences	   are	   truth-­‐
conditionally	  equivalent,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  know	  what	  the	  possibilities	  are.	  We	  need	  a	  concep-­‐
tion	  of	  what	   the	  possibilities	  are	   to	  claim	   that	  alternative	  ontological	   languages	  describe	   the	  
same	  possibilities.	  Question	  (i)	  asks	  whether	  it	  is	  always	  possible,	  for	  any	  sentence	  of	  an	  onto-­‐
logical	   language,	   to	   find	   a	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   sentence	   in	   another.	   But	   as	   truth-­‐
conditional	  equivalence	  is	  a	  question	  of	  expressing	  the	  same	  propositions,	  which	  are	  individu-­‐
ated	  by	  possible	  worlds,	  the	  two	  languages	  must	  operate	  with	  the	  same	  set	  of	  possibilities.	  This	  
is	  a	  potential	  problem,	  because	  some	  ontological	  views	  reject	  some	  distinctions	  of	  possibility	  
that	  the	  other	  does	  not.	  	  
I	  now	  wish	   to	  argue	   that	  Hirsch	  overlooks	   the	   fact	   that	  different	  ontological	   theories	  
take	  there	  to	  be	  different	  possibilities.	  To	  formulate	  a	  notion	  of	  truth-­‐conditional	  equivalence,	  
	   43	  
Hirsch	  must	  presuppose	  that	  the	  different	  ontological	  languages	  operate	  with	  the	  same	  set	  of	  
possible	  worlds.	  But	  this	  assumption	  is	  proven	  unwarranted	  if	  we	  look	  closer	  at	  how	  ontology	  
actually	  proceeds,	  thus	  undermining	  the	  project	  of	  deflationism.	  	  
We	  may	  get	  a	  hang	  on	  this	  by	  asking:	  Why	  engage	  in	  ontology?	  One	  reason	  is	  that	  one	  
is	  curious	  about	  what	  there	  is.	  Another	  reason	  is	  that	  one	  is	  curious	  about	  what’s	  possible.	  For,	  
as	  Hawthorne	  puts	   it,	  different	  ontologies	   “multiply	  possibilities	   in	  ways	   that	  are	   resisted	  by	  
other	  ontologies”	  (2009,	  p.	  221).	  Ontological	  views	  may	  have	  consequences	  for	  what	  the	  possi-­‐
bilities	  are.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  quantifier	  variantism	  requires	  that	  different	  ontological	  languages	  
describe	  the	  same	  possibilities.	  They	  reflect	  different	  ways	  of	  describing	  the	  same	  possibilities,	  
but	  because	  the	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent,	  they	  must,	  by	  Hirsch’s	  definition	  
of	  truth-­‐conditional	  equivalence,	  describe	  he	  same	  worlds.	  But	  ontological	  theories	  sometimes	  
have	   implications	   for	   which	   possibilities	   there	   are.	   Thus,	   the	   argument	   goes,	   the	   quantifier	  
variantist	  has	  made	  an	  unwarranted	  assumption	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  different	  ontological	  position	  
she	  claim	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent;	  that	  they	  operate	  with	  the	  same	  possibilities.	  	  
	   To	  argue	  for	  this,	  I	  will	  give	  two	  examples	  in	  the	  ontology	  of	  physical	  objects	  where	  the	  
different	   ontological	   views	   have	   different	   consequences	   for	   what	   the	   possibilities	   are.	   The	  
argument	  is	  based	  on	  Hawthorne	  (2009).	  The	  argument	  is	  successful	  if	  we	  can	  point	  to	  distinct	  
possibilities	  countenanced	  by	  one	  ontology,	  and	  rejected	  by	  another.	  	  
Let	   us	   start	   by	   considering	   the	   famous	   rotating	   disc	   argument	   of	   Kripke77	  and	   Arm-­‐
strong	  (1980).	  The	  argument	  is	  thought	  to	  have	  bearing	  on	  the	  dispute	  between	  endurantists	  
and	  perdurantists,	  because	  the	  perdurantist	  has	  trouble	  explaining	  the	  difference	  between	  two	  
intuitively	  distinct	  possibilities	  that	  the	  endurantists	  accept.	  Imagine	  a	  perfectly	  homogenous	  
disc,	   i.e.	  a	  perfectly	  spherical	  disc	  of	  homogenous	  matter,	  so	  that	  no	  parts	  of	   the	  disc	  can	  be	  
distinguished	  by	   their	   intrinsic	  properties.	   It	  would	   seem	   that	  we	   can	  distinguish	  between	  a	  
scenario	   in	   which	   the	   disc	   is	   stationary	   and	   a	   duplicate	   disc	   rotating.	   The	   endurantists	   can	  
quite	  easily	  distinguish	  these	  possibilities.	  She	  can	  identify	  the	  rotating	  disc	  as	  the	  one	  where	  
the	  same	  segment	  of	  the	  disc	  is	  at	  different	  locations	  at	  different	  times,	  and	  the	  stationary	  disc	  
as	   the	  disc	  where	   the	   same	   segment	   is	   at	   the	   same	   location	  at	  different	   times.	  Thus	   the	   en-­‐
durantists	  uses	  the	  identity-­‐over-­‐time	  of	  the	  same	  segment	  to	  distinguish	  the	  possibilities.	  In	  
contrast,	  it	  is	  widely	  assumed	  that	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  standard	  perdurantism	  to	  distinguish	  
these	  possibilities	   (e.g.	  Sider	  2001b,	  p.	   225).	  For	   it	  would	   seem	  that	   the	   relationship	  between	  
the	  different	  temporal	  parts	  are	  the	  same	  whether	  the	  disc	  is	  rotating	  or	  not.	  As	  the	  perdurant-­‐
ist	   cannot	   appeal	   to	   the	   identity-­‐over-­‐time	  of	   the	   same	   segment,	  but	  only	   relations	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Kripke	  has	  only	  presented	  the	  argument	  in	  lectures	  and	  unpublished	  manuscripts,	  so	  I	  base	  what’s	  said	  here	  on	  
Callender	  (2001).	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the	  different	  instantaneous	  temporal	  parts	  of	  the	  disc,	  she	  seems	  without	  resources	  to	  accom-­‐
modate	  this	  distinction	  of	  possibility.	  Thus	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  the	  perdurantist	  must	  accept	  that	  
a	  possible	  world	  with	  a	  stationary	  disc	  is	  the	  same	  possible	  world	  as	  one	  with	  a	  spinning	  disc.	  
In	  response	  to	  this	  argument,	  different	  modifications	  and	  additions	  have	  been	  made	  to	  
perdurantism.	  Some	  have	  brought	  in	  causal	  notions	  to	  explain	  the	  differences,78	  this	  has	  been	  
criticized,79	  and	   so	   the	   discussion	   goes.	   There	   is	   no	   point	   in	   considering	   all	   the	   possible	   re-­‐
sponses	  here,	  for	  the	  general	  point	  is	  that	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  two	  ontological	  positions	  
describe	  the	  “same	  possibilities”,	  one	  must	  engage	   in	  ontology,	  and	  it	  is	  just	  such	  engagement	  
Hirsch’s	  flavor	  of	  deflationism	  attempts	  to	  avoid.	  Furthermore,	  one	  reaction	  to	  this	  argument	  
is	  to	  bite	  the	  bullet	  and	  not	  countenance	  the	  possibilities	  the	  endurantist	  distinguishes.	  So	  for	  
instance	  Sider	  (2001b,	  p.	  225f)	  tries	  to	  distinguish	  the	  world	  with	  the	  rotating	  disc	  and	  the	  one	  
with	  the	  duplicate	  stationary	  disc	  by	  appealing	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  discs.	  
But,	   he	   says,	   if	   the	  worlds	   cannot	   thus	  be	  distinguished,	  he	  will	   accept	   that	   the	  possibilities	  
aren’t	  distinct	   (Sider	  2001b,	  p.	  233f).	  So	   if	   the	  perdurantist	  cannot	  distinguish	  a	  world	  with	  a	  
rotating	   disc	   and	   a	   duplicate	   world	   with	   a	   stationary	   disc,	   Hirsch’s	   Perdurance-­‐English	   and	  
Endurance-­‐English	  aren’t	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  after	  all.	  	  
I	   will	   consider	   possible	   replies	   after	   I’ve	   presented	   the	   next	   case	   where	   ontological	  
views	  accept	  different	  possibilities.	  But	  we	  may	  note	  straight	  away	  that	  if	  the	  perdurantist	  and	  
endurantist	   disagree	   on	   the	   possibilities,	   then	   their	   languages	   cannot	   be	   truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent.	  This	  might	  either	  be	  cashed	  out	  as	  the	  ontological	  disputants	  operating	  with	  differ-­‐
ent	  sets	  of	  possible	  worlds,	  or	  we	  may	  interpret	  then	  with	  a	  common	  set	  of	  possible	  worlds	  in	  
which	   case	   their	   languages	   aren’t	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   after	   all.	   In	   any	   case,	   this	  
apparently	  shows	  that	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  false	  for	  this	  dispute.	  	  
Another	   example	   where	   ontological	   positions	   will	   have	   different	   views	   on	   what	   the	  
possibilities	   are	   is	   in	   the	  dispute	  over	   composition.	   For	   instance,	   Sider	   (1993)	   argues	   against	  
van	   Inwagen’s	   (1990)	   view	   that	   only	   simples	   and	   living	  organisms	   exist	   by	   showing	   that	   van	  
Inwagen’s	   position	   rejects	   the	   possibility	   of	   gunky	   worlds,	   i.e.	   worlds	   where	   the	   composite	  
objects	  aren’t	  composed	  of	  mereological	  simples.	  Possible	  responses	  to	  this	  argument	  notwith-­‐
standing,	  it	  shows	  that	  ontological	  theories	  sometimes	  have	  consequences	  for	  which	  possibili-­‐
ties	  there	  are,	  and	  thus	  that	  we	  cannot	  simply	  assume,	  as	  Hirsch	  does,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fixed	  set	  
of	   possible	   worlds	   to	   operate	   with	   when	   defining	   truth-­‐conditional	   equivalence.	   Again,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  See,	   for	   instance,	  Russell	   (1914,	  pp.	   114–116)	  who	  claims	  that	  a	  sequence	  of	   temporal	  parts	  counts	  as	  a	  persisting	  
object	  only	  if	  the	  sequence	  falls	  under	  a	  casual	  law;	  Armstrong	  (1980,	  p.	  77)	  claims	  the	  earlier	  parts	  of	  the	  sequence	  
must	  be	  “nomically	  required”	  for	  the	  later	  parts	  for	  it	  to	  count	  as	  an	  object.	  	  
79	  Zimmerman	  (1998,	  p.	  270–274)	  argues	  that	  the	  sort	  of	  causal	  relations	  required	  to	  distinguish	  the	  possibilties	  are	  
incompatible	  with	  the	  thesis	  of	  Humean	  Supervenience	  (Lewis	  1986,	  p.	  xi),	  and	  in	  general	  that	  one	  must	  accept	  a	  sui	  
generis	  notion	  of	  causation	  to	  accept	  the	  causal/nomic	  reply	  to	  the	  rotating	  disc	  argument.	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problem	  is	  that	  one	  ontological	  position	  countenance	  more	  possibilities	  than	  another.	  Hirsch	  
cannot	   accommodate	   this,	   because	   the	   different	   ontological	   positions	   must	   merely	   reflect	  
different	  descriptions	  of	  the	  same	  possibilities.80	  
Hirsch	  can	  attempt	  to	  reply	  that	  ontologists	  in	  general	  won’t	  accept	  these	  differences	  of	  
possible	  worlds,	  but	  rather	  try	  to	  converge	  on	  which	  possibilities	  there	  are.	  So	  for	  instance,	  as	  
we	  have	   seen,	   some	  perdurantists	   try	   to	   find	  ways	   to	   distinguish	  worlds	  with	   a	   rotating	  ho-­‐
mogenous	  disc	  and	  a	  stationary	  homogenous	  disc.	  But	  this	  reply	  simply	  ignores	  how	  ontology	  
proceeds	  and	  what	  ontologists	  are	  up	  to.	  By	  adopting	  sui	  generis	  causal	  notions	  the	  perdurant-­‐
ist	  can	  account	   for	   the	  same	  possibilities	  as	   the	  endurantist,	  but	  this	  may	  be	   in	  conflict	  with	  
her	   commitment	   to	   Humean	   Supervenience	   (see,	   for	   instance,	   Sider	   2001b,	   p.	   225f).	   Such	  
interconnections	   have	   relevance	   for	   which	   possibilities	   the	   different	   ontologists	   claim	   there	  
are.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  Hirsch	  must	  take	  a	  stance	  on	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  in	  ontology	  to	  at	  all	  be	  
able	  to	  have	  a	  fixed	  set	  of	  possible	  worlds	  for	  the	  sentences	  to	  be	  true	  with	  respect	  to,	  and	  this	  
is	  part	  of	  what’s	  at	  stake	  in	  ontology.	  	  
May	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  object	  that	  her	  arguments	  are	  supposed	  to	  prove	  just	  that	  
the	  different	  ontological	  views	  operate	  with	  the	  same	  set	  of	  possible	  worlds?	  To	  talk	  about	  the	  
possibility	  of	  “truth-­‐conditional	  equivalent	  alternative	  ontological	  languages”	  does	  no	  such	  
thing.	  Usually	  in	  philosophy,	  it	  is	  considered	  a	  substantive	  question	  just	  which	  possibilities	  
there	  are	  (consider	  the	  debate	  over	  whether	  there	  are	  zombie-­‐worlds	  after	  Chalmers	  1996).	  
Even	  though	  philosophers	  would	  generally	  attempt	  to	  countenance	  all	  the	  intuitive	  possibili-­‐
ties,	  it	  would	  seem	  implausible	  that	  Hirsch’s	  arguments	  on	  general	  grounds	  show	  that	  ontolo-­‐
gists	  necessarily	  operate	  with	  the	  same	  set	  of	  possibilities.	  	  
In	  general,	  Hirsch	  must	  take	  a	  stance	  on	  what	  the	  possibilities	  are	  without	  regard	  for	  
what	   the	   ontologists	   actually	   disagree	   about.	   But	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   ontologists	   sometimes	  
disagree	   about	   possibility,	   and	   given	   that	   it	   is	   not	   a	   trivial	   question	   just	   which	   possibilities	  
there	  are,	  Hirsch	  cannot	  simply	  assume	  that	  ontologists	  describe	  the	  same	  possibilities.	  	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  Hirsch	  has	  trouble	  with	  giving	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  how	  we	  know	  
that	   two	   sentences	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent.	   One	   part	   of	   the	   problem	   is	   that	   it	   is	  
unclear	  how	  we	  evaluate	  whether	  two	  sentences	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  in	  the	  first	  
place,	  another	  problem	  is	   that	  ontologists	  disagree	  on	  what	   the	  possibilities	  are.	  Hirsch’s	  ac-­‐
count	  of	  truth-­‐conditional	  equivalence	  essentially	  turns	  on	  there	  being	  a	  unified	  set	  of	  possi-­‐
bilities	  that	  all	  ontologists	  talk	  about,	  but	  without	  engaging	  in	  the	  ontological	  disputes	  them-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Hawthorne	  mentions	  another	  example	  of	  a	  possibility	  that	  the	  universalist	  might	  accept,	  but	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  
rejected	  by	  the	  nihilist:	  “If	  one	  accepts	  the	  possibility	  of	  pairs	  of	  worlds	  that	  differ	  de	  re	  at	  the	  level	  of	  certain	  macro	  
objects	  but	  are	  alike	  –	  qualitatively	  and	  de	  re	  –	  at	   the	   level	  of	   simples,	   then	  one	  will	   think	  the	  nihilist’s	   language	  
intensionally	  too	  coarse	  grained”	  (2009,	  p.	  222).	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selves,	  and	  taking	  a	  stance	  on	  which	  theory	  actually	  is	  true,	  Hirsch	  cannot	  make	  this	  assump-­‐
tion.	  Thus	  we	  cannot	  avoid	  mainstream	  ontology	  by	  retreating	  to	  quantifier	  variantism.	  
2.6	   Differences	  
In	  the	  following,	  I	  assume	  that	  quantifier	  variantist	  must	  reject	  (T),	  because	  I	  know	  of	  no	  other	  
good	  replies	  to	  the	  semantic	  arguments	  of	  section	  2.3.	  The	  rejection	  of	  (T)	  and	  embrace	  of	  the	  
variation	   of	   semantic	   categories	   are	   examples	   of	   consequences	   of	   quantifier	   variance	   that	  
requires	  us	  to	  revise	  our	  views	  on	  language.	  In	  sum,	  quantifier	  variantism	  entails	  quite	  radical	  
divergences	  from	  traditional	  views	  on	  language.	  This	  section	  concludes	  this	  chapter.	  While	  it	  
doesn’t	   contain	  any	  direct	   arguments	  against	  quantifier	   variantism,	   I	  point	  out	   some	   further	  
consequences	  of	  quantifier	  variantism	  that	  show	  how	  the	  view	  differs	  from	  traditional	  views	  on	  
language	  and	  quantification.	   It	   is	  a	  contention	  of	   this	  section	  that	  we	  believe	  we	  understand	  
quantifier	   variance	  better	   than	  we	   in	   fact	  do.	  The	  differences	  between	  ontological	   languages	  
that	  I	  point	  out	  here	  will	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
	   In	   section	   1.3	   I	   described	   two	   conventions	   to	   go	   from	   speaking	   like	   a	  perdurantist	   to	  
speaking	  like	  an	  endurantist,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Those	  conventions	  were	  from	  Hirsch	  (2009),	  and	  
exhibited	   an	   asymmetry	   between	   going	   from	   a	   language	  with	  what	  we	  may	   call,	   for	   now,	   a	  
more	  “permissive	  ontology”,	  such	  as	  universalism	  or	  perdurantism,	  being	  true,	  to	  a	  language	  in	  
which	  a	  more	  “restrictive	  ontology”,	  such	  as	  nihilism	  or	  endurantism,	  is	  true.	  When	  going	  from	  
a	  “big	  language”	  to	  a	  “small	  language”	  (a	  change	  from	  “big	  to	  small”),	  the	  suggestion	  was	  that	  
we	   simply	   “restrict	   our	   quantifiers”.	   But	  when	   going	   from	   a	   small	   to	   a	   big	   language,	  Hirsch	  
provided	   a	  more	   elaborate	   convention.	   Some	  philosophers	   have	   focused	   on	   this	   asymmetry,	  
finding	  it	  more	  pressing	  to	  give	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  we	  may	  go	  from	  small	  to	  big,	  than	  the	  
other	  way	  around	  (see	  for	  instance	  Dorr	  2005).	  Philosophers	  have	  found	  the	  change	  from	  big	  
to	  small	  rather	  unproblematic	  because	  it	  appears	  quite	  similar	  to	  a	  familiar	  semantic	  phenom-­‐
enon	   from	   natural	   language,	   quantifier	   domain	   restriction,	   but	   we	   have	   no	   corresponding	  
phenomenon	   in	  natural	   language	  when	   going	   from	   small	   to	   big.81	  However,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  
shift	  from	  big	  to	  small	  is	  as	  radical	  as	  a	  shift	  from	  small	  to	  big.	  The	  take	  home	  message	  is	  that	  
the	   semantic	  mechanisms	   involved	   in	   quantifier	   variance	   are	  more	   alien	   than	   is	   usually	   as-­‐
sumed.	  	  
	   First,	   note	   that	   natural	   language	   quantifier	   restriction	   is	   a	   function	   of	   the	   context.	  
When	  someone	  asserts	  “Every	  bottle	  is	  empty”	  on	  a	  given	  occasion,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  it	  means	  
that	  every	  bottle	   in	  the	  universe	  is	  empty.	  Rather,	  the	  speaker	  presumably	  intends	  to	  restrict	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  That	  one	  can	  lift	  the	  already	  imposed	  quantifier	  restrictions	  won’t	  do.	  For	  both	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  claim	  to	  be	  
using	  an	  unrestricted	  quantifier.	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the	  domain	  of	  quantification	  on	  this	  occasion	  to	  some	  subset	  of	  the	  universal	  domain,	  and	  this	  
is	  accommodated	  in	  interpretation	  by	  contextually	  restricting	  the	  domain	  (Stanley	  and	  Szabo	  
2000).	  Exactly	  how	  the	  context	  contributes	  to	  interpretation	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  correct	  quantifier	  
domain	  restriction	  is	  disputed,	  but	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  context	  plays	  an	  essential	  role.	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  change	  from	  big	  to	  small,	  one	  is	  “restricted”	  to	  the	  new,	  smaller	  domain	  
in	  any	  context.	  When	  Pedro	  restricts	  his	  quantifiers,	   this	   is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  permanent	  fea-­‐
ture	  of	  his	  language.	  What	  we	  might	  call	  “ontological	  domain	  restriction”	  is	  not	  a	  function	  of	  
the	  context,	  but	  must	  be	   inherent	   in	   the	  semantics	  of	   the	  whole	   language.	  Thus	   the	   familiar	  
explanations	  of	  how	  natural	  language	  domain	  restriction	  gets	  operative	  in	  a	  given	  context	  are	  
inadequate	  to	  explain	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  ontological	  domain	  restriction.	  	  
	   Furthermore,	   natural	   language	   domain	   restriction	   presupposes	   a	   bigger	   domain.	   If	  
there	  is	  no	  bigger	  domain,	  there	  is	  no	  quantifier	  restriction.	  If	  one	  quantifies	  unrestrictedly	  in	  
natural	  language,	  then	  by	  definition	  there	  is	  no	  quantifier	  domain	  restriction.82	  This	  is	  not	  the	  
case	  with	  ontological	  domain	  restriction,	  where	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  new	  “restricted”	  domain	  is	  
supposed	   to	   be	   the	   new	   universal	   domain	   –	   ontologists	   intends	   to	   quantify	   unrestrictedly.	  
Relatedly,	  with	  natural	  language	  restriction	  one	  can	  loosen	  the	  bonds	  of	  the	  restriction,	  or	  lift	  
it	  completely,	  by	  saying	  “No,	  I	  don’t	  only	  mean	  that	  every	  bottle	  in	  fridge	  is	  empty,	  I	  mean	  that	  
every	  bottle	  in	  the	  universe	  is	  empty”.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  successful	   language-­‐
shift	  (which	  is	  a	  more	  apt	  description	  of	  the	  phenomenon)	  is	  that	  the	  new	  unrestricted	  domain	  
of	  quantification	  simply	  doesn’t	  contain	  the	  objects	  one	  earlier	  quantified	  over.	  	  
	   Finally,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  interestingly,	  while	  an	  ontological	  domain	  restriction	  would	  
seem	  to	  change	  the	  meaning	  of	  predicates,	  a	  natural	  language	  domain	  restriction	  does	  not.	  The	  
first	  sense	  in	  which	  this	  happens	  was	  illuminated	  in	  the	  reply	  to	  the	  Eklund/Hawthorne	  argu-­‐
ment;	   quantifier	   variantism	   seems	   to	   imply	   that	   the	   semantic	   categories	   of	   name,	   predicate	  
and	  reference	  change	  between	  ontological	  languages.	  But	  there	  is	  also	  another	  sense	  in	  which	  
predicates	   change	   meaning	   (which	   was	   briefly	   mentioned	   in	   section	   2.3).	   If	   we	   assume	   an	  
orthodox	  treatment	  of	  the	  semantics	  of	  predicates,	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  predicate	  is	  given	  by	  the	  
extension	  of	  the	  predicate,	  i.e.	  the	  set	  of	  things	  satisfying	  the	  predicate.	  The	  meaning	  of	  “red”	  is	  
the	   set	  of	   red	   things,	   the	  meaning	  of	   “mammals”	   the	   set	  of	  mammals.	  Now	  consider	  natural	  
language	   quantifier	   domain	   restriction:	   If	   the	  meaning	   of	   “red”	   varied	   with	   the	   domain	   re-­‐
striction,	   it	  would	  entail	  a	  problematic	  semantic	   instability.	   If	   the	  domain	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  
things	   in	  my	   apartment,	   the	   sentence	   “I	   have	   touched	   every	   red	   thing”	   is	   true,	   because	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  This	   statement	   ignores	   the	   controversy	   over	   whether	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   quantify	   (absolutely)	   unrestrictedly	   (see	  
Rayo	  and	  Uzquiano	  2006).	   It	   seems	   to	  me	   that	  we	  can	   safely	   ignore	   those	  problems	  because	  we	  are	  here	   talking	  
about	  rather	  mundane	  quantification	  over	  physical	  objects.	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domain	   is	   restricted	   to	   a	   subset	   of	   the	   red	   things.	  A	   case	   of	   innocent	   quantifier	   domain	   re-­‐
striction	  doesn’t	  alter	  the	  meaning	  of	  “red”	  or	  any	  other	  predicate.	  This	  is	  different	  in	  an	  onto-­‐
logical	  quantifier	  restriction:	  If	  we	  go	  from	  English	  to	  Smallish,	  “red”	  would	  get	  a	  new	  meaning,	  
because	   the	   set	   of	   red	   things	   has	   changed	   (there	   is	   no	   such	   things	   as	   my	   red	   copy	   of	  
Metametaphysics).	  This	  kind	  of	  meaning-­‐change	  is	  foreign	  to	  the	  natural	  language	  case.	  Based	  
on	   these	   three	   examples	   of	   differences	  between	   the	  phenomena,	   I	   conclude	   that	   there	   is	   no	  
clear	  relationship	  between	  them,	  except	  that	  we	   in	  a	  sense	  go	  from	  a	  bigger	  to	  a	  smaller	  do-­‐
main	  to	  quantify	  over.	  
	   However,	  can	  we	  actually	  characterize	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  big	  language	  to	  a	  small	  language	  
as	  just	  that;	  a	  change	  from	  “big	  to	  small”?	  In	  one	  sense	  we	  can,	  and	  in	  another	  sense	  we	  can-­‐
not.	  The	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  can:	  For	  every	  thing,	  we	  can	  count	  it,	  and	  because	  the	  universalist	  
believes	   in	   all	   the	   simples	   the	   nihilist	   believes	   in,	   and	   in	   addition	   all	   mereological	   sums	   of	  
these,	  when	  Big	  counts	  all	  physical	  things	  he	  will	  arrive	  at	  a	  number	  much	  higher	  than	  Small.	  
In	  this	  language-­‐internal	  sense,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  Big’s	  language	  is	  much	  bigger	  or	  more	  permis-­‐
sive.	  Thus	  the	  “number	  of	   things”	   is	  bigger.	  But	  this	  masks	  the	   fact	   that	   “thing”	  has	  changed	  
meaning.	  For	  the	  two	  languages	  describe	  the	  same	  world	  equally	  well,	  and	  because	  they	  oper-­‐
ate	  with	  different	  concepts	  of	  “thing”,	  we	  cannot	  directly	  compare	  the	  numbers	  they	  arrive	  at	  
when	   counting	   everything.	   Thus	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   the	   quantifier	   variantist	   would	   have	   to	  
give	  up	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  world	  has	  a	  fixed	  cardinality.	  In	  this	  connection,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  
quote	  Tim	  Maudlin:	  “If	  there	  are	  no	  objective	  facts	  about	  the	  comparative	  character	  of	  objects,	  
we	  must	  fall	  back	  into	  the	  unpalatable	  position	  that	  the	  only	  real	  structure	  of	  the	  universe	  is	  its	  
cardinality”	   (2007,	   p.	   84).	   There	   isn’t	   even	   any	   real	   cardinality-­‐structure	   on	   the	   quantifier	  
variantist’s	  picture	  of	  reality,	  which	  is	  intuitively	  surprising.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  will	  be	  convenient	  
to	  talk	  about	  the	  “size”	  of	  languages	  also	  in	  the	  following,	  but	  keep	  in	  mind	  this	  caveat.	  	  
	   This	  section	  shows	  that	  what	  I	  will	  call,	  for	  lack	  of	  a	  better	  word,	  the	  difference	  between	  
alternative	  ontological	   languages	  is	  bigger	  than	  we	  first	  have	  expected.	  As	  noted,	   in	  rejecting	  
(T)	   a	   speaker	   of	   Smallish	  must	   reject	   that	  Big’s	   sentence	   “a	   is	   a	   table”	   is	   a	   subject-­‐predicate	  
sentence,	  that	  “a”	  is	  a	  name	  that	  refers	  and	  also	  that	  “table”	  in	  Biglish	  has	  the	  same	  meaning	  as	  
“table”	  in	  Smallish.	  These	  terms	  are	  language-­‐specific,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  way	  to	  close	  the	  
gulf	   between	   the	   languages.	   Further	   differences	   between	   different	   ontological	   languages	   are	  
that	  predicates	  change	  meaning	  when	  we	  shift	  language,	  and	  that	  we	  cannot	  directly	  compare	  
the	  number	  of	  things	  because	  this	  is	  a	  language-­‐internal	  issue.	  Quantifier	  variantism	  has	  wide-­‐
ranging	  consequences	  for	  how	  we	  conceive	  of	  world	  and	  language	  (A	  topic	  not	  treated	  here	  is	  
that	   it	   also	   implies	   vagueness	  of	   identity,	   see	  Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   45–67).	  The	  difference	  between	  
different	  ontological	  languages	  is	  bigger	  than	  we	  would	  expect.	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3	   THE	  ARGUMENT	  FROM	  CHARITY	  
3.1	   Overview	  
In	  chapter	  1,	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  was	  formulated	  as	  two	  conditionals:	  
	  
(iii) If	  ontological	  disputants	  are	  speaking	  plain	  English,	  then	  ontological	  claims	  di-­‐
verging	  from	  common	  sense	  judgments	  about	  what	  there	  is	  are	  trivially	  false.	  
(iv) If	  ontological	  disputants	  are	  not	  speaking	  plain	  English,	  then	  they	  are	  speaking	  
distinct	  ontological	   languages,	   asserting	   trivial	   truths	   in	   their	   own	  ontological	  
languages.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  dispute	  is	  verbal.	  	  
	  
The	  antecedents	  of	  the	  conditionals	  contradict	  each	  other,	  so	  one	  of	  them	  is	  true.	  Both	  conse-­‐
quents	  deflate	  ontology,	  so	  if	  one	  of	  the	  conditionals	  is	  non-­‐vacuously	  true,	  ontology	  is	  deflat-­‐
ed.	   To	   avoid	   the	   deflationary	   conclusion	   of	   the	   argument	   from	   charity	   one	   must	   therefore	  
accept	  one	  of	  the	  antecedents,	  and	  deny	  the	  corresponding	  consequent.	  	  
As	  was	  pointed	  out	  in	  chapter	  1,	  the	  truth	  of	  (iv)	  presupposes	  weak	  quantifier	  variant-­‐
ism.	  In	  chapter	  2,	  I	  provided	  arguments	  against	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism.	  If	  those	  arguments	  
are	  any	  good,	  we	  can	  deny	  that	  ontologists	  are	  speaking	  different	  ontological	  language,	  effec-­‐
tively	   undermining	   (iv).	   However,	   rejecting	   (iv)	   on	   this	   ground	   doesn’t	   say	   anything	   about	  
which	  language	  ontologists	  in	  fact	  are	  speaking.	  As	  English	  (or	  some	  other	  natural	  language)83	  
is	   the	   ordinary	   language	   of	   ontologists,	   the	  most	   conspicuous	   candidate	   for	   the	   language	   of	  
ontologists	   is	  English	  supplied	  with	  technical	  vocabulary.	  But	   if	  ontologists	  use	  English,	  then	  
the	   truth	   of	   (iii)	   entails	   that	   non-­‐commonsensical	   ontological	   claims	   are	   simply	   false.	   Thus	  
rejecting	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism	   does	   not	   suffice	   to	   avoid	   the	   argument	   from	   charity.	  
Accordingly,	  quantifier	  invariantists	  who	  are	  concerned	  about	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  will	  
have	  to	  take	  on	  (iii).84	  
Even	  if	  one	  does	  not	  find	  the	  arguments	  of	  chapter	  2	  persuasive,	  and	  accept	  (or	  are	  ag-­‐
nostic	  about)	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism,	  the	  best	  way	  to	  challenge	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  
is	  to	  take	  on	  (iii).	  For	  the	  best	  answer	  to	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  is	  to	  hold	  that	  ontologists	  
speak	  plain	  English,	  and	  simultaneously	  reject	  the	  consequent	  of	  (iii).	  This	  might	  be	  thought	  
to	   go	   against	  what	   I’ve	   said	   about	   the	   argument	   from	   charity	   presupposing	  weak	   quantifier	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  will	  omit	  the	  qualification	  “or	  some	  other	  natural	  language”.	  This	  is	  simply	  to	  make	  the	  presen-­‐
tation	  easier	  to	  read.	  	  
84	  This	  is	  barring	  the	  change	  to	  an	  ontologically	  privileged	  language,	  the	  existence	  of	  which	  is	  controversial.	  These	  
issues	  are	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4,	  and	  I	  will	  generally	  not	  include	  the	  caveat	  “barring	  the	  change	  to	  an	  ontological	  
privileged	  language”	  when	  discussing	  the	  options	  for	  rejecting	  Hirsch’s	  conclusions	  in	  this	  chapter.	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variantism.	   This	   thought	   is	   unwarranted.	   If	   one	   rejects	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism,	   one	   has	  
avoided	   the	   argument	   from	   arbitrary	   languages,	  which	   is	   a	   deflationary	   threat	   in	   itself.	   Fur-­‐
thermore,	   if	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism	   is	   true,	   it	   is	   easier	   to	   argue	   that	   ontologists	   speak	  
different	   languages,	  which	   entail	   that	   they	   are	  having	   a	   verbal	  dispute.	   So	   those	  who	  accept	  
weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  but	  wish	  to	  avoid	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  will	  
then	  have	   to	  provide	   independent	  arguments	   for	  why	   it	   is	  plausible	   that	  ontologists	  actually	  
speak	  the	  same	  language.	  I	  provide	  such	  independent	  arguments	  in	  section	  3.2,	  but	  this	  exer-­‐
cise	   is	  unnecessary	   for	   those	  who	  already	   reject	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism,	   for	   there	   is	  only	  
English	  to	  speak.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  a	  reason	  for	  focusing	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  weak	  quantifier	  
variantism	   is	   that	   (iv)	   is	   the	   horn	   of	   the	   dilemma	   that	   has	   received	  most	   attention.	   In	   the	  
literature	  on	  Hirsch’s	  arguments,	  it	  appears	  that	  philosophers	  haven’t	  worried	  too	  much	  about	  
(iii).85	  This	   is	   in	   itself	   a	   good	   reason	   to	   consider	   (iii)	   in	   detail.	   In	   any	   case,	   to	   provide	   a	   full	  
treatment	   of	   Hirsch’s	   arguments,	   which	   is	   what	   I’m	   attempting,	   both	   conditionals	   must	   be	  
addressed.	  	  
A	  final	  and	  independent	  reason	  for	  focusing	  on	  the	  standing	  of	  ontology	  in	  English	  is	  
that	  English	  has	   its	  own	  ontological	   tensions	   that	  we	  would	   like	   to	  disentangle.	  Many	  of	   the	  
problems	  ontologists	  are	  concerned	  with	  –	  such	  as	  the	  question	  of	  how	  two	  objects	  may	  occu-­‐
py	  the	  same	  region	  of	  space,	  the	  problems	  of	  composition,	  and	  the	  paradoxes	  of	  persistence	  –	  
all	  arise	  in	  English.86	  Thus	  we	  would	  like,	  on	  independent	  grounds,	  a	  solution	  to	  these	  puzzles.	  
Hirsch	  recognizes	  that	  there	  are	  tensions	  in	  English	  that	  generate	  the	  problems	  ontologists	  are	  
concerned	   with	   and	   that	   they	   must	   be	   addressed,	   but	   doesn’t	   think	   such	   tensions	   has	   any	  
bearing	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  common	  sense	  ontology	  (2011,	  p.	  232).	  If	  the	  arguments	  of	  this	  chapter	  
are	  successful,	  they	  vindicate	  ontology	  conducted	  in	  English.	  
In	  conclusion,	  accepting	  the	  pre-­‐theoretical	  claim	  that	  ontologists	  are	  speaking	  English	  
is	  the	  best	  option	  for	  those	  who	  want	  to	  avoid	  the	  deflationary	  consequences	  of	  the	  argument	  
from	  charity.	  In	  deference	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  true,	  this	  chap-­‐
ter	  will	  first	  argue	  that	  ontologists	  speak	  plain	  English	  (section	  3.2).	  This	  might	  seem	  like	  a	  silly	  
thing	  to	  argue	  for,	  but	  is,	  as	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  made	  clear,	  important	  to	  answer	  the	  argument	  from	  
charity	  by	  affirming	  the	  antecedent	  of	   (iii).	  By	  arguing	  that	  ontologists	  speak	  English,	   I	   indi-­‐
rectly	  argue	  that	  they	  don’t	  speak	  different	  ontological	  languages.	  I	  then	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
case	   that	   non-­‐commonsensical	   ontological	   claims	   are	   “trivially	   false”	   in	   English,	   effectively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Some	  of	  the	  papers	  dealing	  with	  (iv)	  are	  Bennett	  (2009),	  Dorr	  (2005),	  Hawthorne	  (2009),	  Jackson	  (2013),	  McGrath	  
(2008)	  and	  Sider	  (2009).	  As	  far	  as	  I	  know,	  no	  published	  paper	  discusses	  (iii)	  directly,	  but	  Hawthorne	  (2009,	  p.	  218f)	  
makes	  some	  remarks	  about	  the	  issue.	  
86	  Or	   so	   it	   seems.	  As	   far	   as	   I	   know,	  no	  one	  has	   argued	   that	  one	   starts	   speaking	  another	   language	  as	   soon	  as	  one	  
recognizes	  these	  tensions.	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denying	   the	   consequent	  of	   (iii)	   (section	   3.3).	  Together,	   this	   amounts	   to	   arguing	   against	   (iii).	  
Section	  3.4	  deals	  with	  some	  loose	  ends.	  If	  my	  arguments	  are	  sound,	  they	  leave	  open	  the	  ques-­‐
tion	  of	  which	  quantificational	  sentences	  are	  true	  in	  English.	  This	  is	  a	  question	  for	  ontology.	  
3.2	   Ontologists	  are	  speaking	  plain	  English	  
So	  what	  are	  the	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  ontologists	  actually	  conduct	  their	   inquiry	   in	  English?	  
First,	   philosophers	   who	   engage	   in	   ontology	   in	   international	   philosophy	   journals	   are	   either	  
native	  English	  speakers	  or	  have	  at	  some	  point	  learned	  English.	  They	  write	  their	  non-­‐ontology	  
papers	  in	  English,	  and	  the	  words	  and	  sentences	  of	  their	  ontology-­‐papers	  appear	  to	  be	  English	  
words	   and	   sentences	   (supplemented	   with	   technical	   vocabulary).	   Despite	   this,	   Hirsch	   (2005,	  
2009)	  claims	  that	  philosophers	  doing	  ontology	  are	  really	  speaking	  ontological	   languages	  that	  
aren’t	  English.	  This	  has	  a	  presumption	  against	  it.	  Excluding	  the	  rare	  occasion	  of	  a	  philosopher	  
explicitly	  announcing	  that	  she	  isn’t	  speaking	  English,	   it	  would	  on	  the	  face	  be	  uncharitable	  to	  
assume	  that	  philosophers	  have	  tacitly,	  and	  without	  recognizing	  it,	  started	  speaking	  an	  artificial	  
ontological	   language.	   The	  most	   natural	   assumption	   is	   that	   ontologists	   speak	   English.	   Below	  
follows	  three	  more	  arguments	  for	  this	  conclusion.87	  
3.2.1	   Difference	  between	  ontological	  languages	  
If	  ontologists	  aren’t	  speaking	  English,	  they	  are	  speaking	  different	  ontological	  languages.	  But	  as	  
I	   argued	   in	   section	   2.3	   and	   2.6,	   the	   difference	   between	   English	   and	   alternative	   ontological	  
languages	   is	   vast,	   so	   it	   is	   implausible	   that	  ontologists	  unintentionally	  and	   inadvertently	   sud-­‐
denly	  start	  speaking	  different	  languages.	  Based	  on	  the	  Eklund/Hawthorne-­‐argument	  I	  argued	  
that	   the	   meaning	   of	   both	   quantifier	   and	   predicates	   systematically	   varies	   between	   different	  
ontological	   languages.	  A	  plausible	  principle	  of	   language-­‐change	  is	  that	  the	  smaller	  the	  differ-­‐
ence	  between	  the	  languages,	  the	  easier	  it	  is	  to	  slip	  into	  speaking	  a	  different	  language.	  When	  we	  
consider	  these	  big	  differences	  between	  ontological	  languages,	  it	  is	  implausible	  that	  ontologists	  
should	  inadvertently	  “slip	  into”	  speaking	  different	  ontological	   languages.	  Hirsch	  believes	  that	  
van	   Inwagen	   and	   Lewis	   spoke	   different	   ontological	   languages	   when	   they	   disagreed	   about	  
which	  composite	  objects	  there	  are.	  But	   in	  that	  case,	  he	  would	  have	  to	  say	  that	  they	  uninten-­‐
tionally	   ended	  up	  using	  different	  names	   and	  predicates	   in	   the	  dispute.	  That’s	   intuitively	  not	  
likely.	  There	   is	  a	   significant	  difference	  between	  starting	   to	  use	  a	  certain	   term,	   such	  as	   “cup”,	  
with	   a	   non-­‐conventional	   meaning	   (e.g.	   such	   that	   it	   also	   applies	   to	   glasses),	   and	   starting	   to	  
speak	  a	  different	  ontological	  language.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Hirsch	   (2005,	   2009)	   thinks	   that	   there	   are	   good	   reasons	   to	   believe	   that	   ontologists	   speak	   different	   ontological	  
languages	  because	  of	  considerations	  of	  charity,	  see	  section	  1.4.	  However,	  I	  argue	  indirectly	  in	  section	  3.3	  that	  those	  
reasons	  doesn’t	  support	  such	  a	  conclusion,	  because	  Hirsch’s	  application	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  charity	  is	  unsatisfactory.	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In	  section	  2.6	  we	  saw	  that	  the	  semantic	  mechanism	  involved	  in	  changing	  between	  on-­‐
tological	   languages	   is	   semantically	   unfamiliar,	   as	   it	   isn’t	   a	   close	   cousin	   of	   natural	   language	  
domain	   restriction.	   This	   would	   seem	   to	   increase	   the	   height	   of	   the	   hurdle	   for	   a	   language	  
change.	  Simply	  put,	   an	  act	  of	   considerable	   semantic	  power	  would	   seem	  necessary	   to	   change	  
ontological	  languages,	  but	  real	  life	  ontologists	  haven’t	  even	  attempted	  the	  feat.	  	  
It	   can	   be	   objected	   that	   different	   ontological	   languages	   are	   systematically	   related	   to	  
English,	  and	  thus	  that	  the	  hurdle	  is	  easier	  to	  overcome	  than	  I	  contend.	  In	  reply	  to	  this,	  I	  want	  
to	  direct	  the	  objectors	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  ontologists	  unwittingly	  slip	  into	  using	  alter-­‐
native	  ontological	  languages,	  they	  end	  up	  using	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  predicates	  with	  a	  new	  mean-­‐
ing,	  and	  also	  with	  a	  different	  meaning	  from	  one’s	  linguistic	  community	  at	  large	  (see	  3.2.3	  be-­‐
low).	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   explicit	   linguistic	   act	   to	   this	   effect,	   I	   find	   it	   hard	   to	   believe	   that	  
English	  speakers	  inadvertently	  change	  languages	  in	  the	  way	  Hirsch’s	  view	  requires.	  
3.2.2	   Charity	  to	  retraction	  is	  overlooked	  
The	  two	  considerations	  I’ve	  so	  far	  given	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  ontologists	  speak	  plain	  Eng-­‐
lish	  have	  been	   independent	   of	  Hirsch’s	   arguments.	   I	   now	  want	   to	   consider	  Hirsch’s	   positive	  
reasons	  for	  rejecting	  the	  presumption	  that	  ontologists	  speak	  English.	  	  
In	  at	  least	  three	  papers,	  Hirsch	  has	  argued	  directly	  that	  ontologists	  are	  speaking	  differ-­‐
ent	  ontological	  languages	  (the	  antecedent	  of	  (iv)),	  which	  implies	  that	  at	  least	  some	  of	  them	  are	  
not	  speaking	  English	  (2005,	  2008a,	  2009).	  If	  this	  argument	  is	  incorrect	  and	  doesn’t	  warrant	  the	  
intended	  conclusion,	  one	  (indirect)	  argument	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  ontologists	  are	  speaking	  
English	  is	  dispensed	  with,	  and	  I	  don’t	  know	  of	  any	  other	  arguments	  against	  this	  claim.	  
The	  argument	  for	  the	  antecedent	  of	  (iv)	  that	  I	  presented	  in	  chapter	  1	  was	  that	  a	  correct	  
linguistic	  interpretation	  of	  ontologists	  implies	  that	  they	  are	  speaking	  different	  languages.	  Here	  
I	  argue	  that	  Hirsch’s	  “correct	  linguistic	  interpretation”	  suffers	  from	  an	  incomplete	  application	  
of	  the	  principle	  of	  charity,	  and	  thus	  that	  we	  don’t	  have	  good	  reasons	  for	  believing	  the	  conclu-­‐
sion	  which	  is	  solely	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  charity.	  	  
Recall	  that	  charity	  to	  retraction	  is	  the	  constraint	  on	  interpretation	  that	  says	  interpret-­‐
ers	  must	  consider	  whether	  speakers	  will	  retract	  their	  utterances	   in	  the	  face	  of	  additional	  evi-­‐
dence.	   If	   there	   is	  a	  high	  probability	   that	  ontological	  disputants	  will	   retract	   their	  positions	   in	  
light	  of	  additional	  evidence,	  then	  the	  contention	  that	  ontologists	  are	  speaking	  different	  onto-­‐
logical	   languages	   is	   undermined.	   For	  we	   conclude	   that	   they	   speak	   different	   languages	  when	  
the	   alternative	   is	   to	   impute	   widespread	   confusion	   and	   false	   belief.	   But	   that	   is	   not	   the	   only	  
alternative	  if	  the	  dispute	  is	  of	  a	  kind	  that	  requires	  retraction	  under	  rational	  constraints	  and	  we	  
can	  expect	  the	  disputants	  to	  react	  rationally	  and	  quite	  uniformly	  to	  new	  evidence.	  In	  that	  case,	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the	  disputants	  agree	  on	  more	  or	   less	  clear	  conditions	  under	  which	  either	  party	  would	  recog-­‐
nize	  her	  claims	  as	   false	  or	  not	   justified,	  and	  consequently	  act	  upon	   it.	   It	   is	  not	  uncharitable,	  
then,	  to	  impute	  the	  same	  meaning	  to	  both	  parties	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  agreed	  upon	  rational	  con-­‐
straints,	  since	  given	  the	  evidence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  interpretation,	  they	  both	  behave	  rationally.88	  
On	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   ontologists,	   as	   the	  more	   or	   less	   rational	   inquirers	   they	   aim	   to	   be,	  
would	  be	  expected	  to	  retract	  their	  positions	  if	  faced	  with	  new	  evidence.	  This	  undermines	  the	  
argument	  that	  they	  are	  speaking	  different	  languages	  if	  we	  consider	  charity	  to	  retraction,	  which	  
Hirsch	  notes	  may	  immediately	  show	  that	  a	  dispute	  is	  substantive	  (Hirsch	  2005,	  p.	  74).	  If	  ontol-­‐
ogists	  are	  expected	  to	  react	  in	  the	  same	  way	  to	  new	  evidence,	  if	  not	  retracting	  their	  positions	  
then	  at	  least	  address	  the	  argument	  and	  provide	  responses,	  they	  share	  a	  stock	  of	  evidence,	  and	  
there	   are	   some	   rational	   constraints	   governing	   their	   practice.	   It	   is	   plausible	   to	   suppose	   that	  
when	  we	  interpret	  ontologists,	  we	  must	  pay	  attention	  to	  charity	  to	  retraction.	  	  
What	  does	  Hirsch	  have	  to	  say	  about	  the	  relevance	  of	  charity	  retraction	  when	  interpret-­‐
ing	   ontologists?	   Hirsch	   does	   not	   argue	   that	   the	   disputants	   will	   not	   retract	   their	   positions.	  
Rather,	   he	   assumes	   that	   they	  will	   not.	   The	   assumption	   is	   that	   ontology	   has	   reached	   a	   stage	  
where	  ‘all	  is	  said	  and	  done’,	  but	  where	  there	  still	  is	  disagreement:	  
	  
What	  about	  charity	  to	  retraction?	  Should	  that	  also	  play	  a	  role	  here?	  Of	  course	  ontologists	  do	  oc-­‐
casionally	  retract	  their	  positions,	  but,	  as	  Lewis	  remarks,	  a	  stage	  seems	  eventually	  to	  be	  reached	  
in	   ontology	  when	   “all	   is	   said	   and	  done,”	  when	   “all	   the	   tricky	   arguments	   and	  distinctions	   and	  
counterexamples	  have	  been	  discovered,”	  so	  that	  each	  position	  has	  achieved	  a	  state	  of	  “equilibri-­‐
um.”	   I’m	  assuming	   that	   in	   the	  ontological	  disputes	  under	  discussion	   the	   ‘all	   is	   said	  and	  done’	  
stage	  has	  been	  reached.	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  159)89	  
	  
In	  a	  later	  paper,	  Hirsch	  says	  that	  his	  method	  for	  deflating	  ontological	  disputes	  applies	  only	  if	  
the	  dispute	  is	  at	  the	  “all	  is	  said	  and	  done”-­‐stage	  (2011,	  p.	  231).	  That	  ontology	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  all	  
having	   been	   said	   and	   done	   is	   a	   premise	   in	  Hirsch’s	   argument	   from	   charity.	   But	   do	  we	  have	  
good	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is?	  
An	   “all	   is	   said	   and	   done”-­‐stage	   is	   a	   stage	   where	   the	   ontologists	   do	   not	   change	   their	  
views:	  “The	   ‘all	   is	  said	  and	  done’-­‐point	  has	  been	  reached	  when	  ontologists	  have	  gone	  around	  
the	  dialectical	  block	  enough	   times	   to	   feel	   secure	   that	   they	  are	   prepared	   to	   reject	  any	   [meta-­‐
physical	  principle]	  that	  might	  undermine	  their	  ontological	  assertions”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  161).	  The	  
“all	  is	  said	  and	  done”-­‐assumption	  is	  what	  justifies	  not	  considering	  charity	  to	  retraction.90	  Thus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Thanks	  to	  Reier	  Helle	  here.	  	  
89	  Hirsch	  is	  quoting	  Lewis	  (1983a,	  p.	  x).	  
90	  If	  we	  can	  ignore	  charity	  to	  retraction	  when	  interpreting	  ontological	  disputants,	  Hirsch	  contends	  that	  the	  dispu-­‐
tants	  should	  interpret	  each	  other	  as	  speaking	  truthfully	  in	  their	  own	  language	  (2005,	  2009).	  I	  won’t	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  
this.	  McGrath	  (2008)	  disputes	  it.	  He	  thinks	  Hirsch	  has	  overlooked	  an	  important	  element	  of	  charity.	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the	  crucial	  question	  is	  whether	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  ontological	  disputes	  have	  
reached	  such	  a	  stage.	  	  
Publications	   on	   composition,	   temporal	   parts,	   coinciding	   objects,	   and	   related	   meta-­‐
questions	  do	  not	   seem	  to	  be	   stopping	  any	   time	  soon,	   so	   it	   seems	  as	   if	   the	  ontologists	   them-­‐
selves	  think	  that	  there	  are	  still	  arguments	  to	  be	  made	  over	  these	  topics,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  do	  
not	  believe	  that	  all	  is	  said	  and	  done.	  In	  general,	  one	  would	  expect	  ontologists	  to	  notice	  if	  all	  is	  
said	  and	  done,	  for	  then	  there	  is	  nothing	  more	  to	  argue	  about.	  Though	  there	  may	  be	  exceptions	  
to	   this,	   this	   seems	   like	   a	   ceteris	   paribus	   plausible	   claim.	   The	   same	   seems	   to	   hold	   for	   verbal	  
disputes:	  one	  would	  in	  general	  expect	  people	  to	  eventually	  discover	  that	  they	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  
verbal	  dispute.91	  Thus	  Hirsch’s	  assumption	  of	  “all	  is	  said	  and	  done”	  in	  ontology	  is	  not	  support-­‐
ed	  by	  the	  most	  obvious	  source	  of	  evidence	  for	  it.	  	  
Here	   is	  a	   suggestion	  of	  how	  Hirsch	  may	   try	   to	  argue	   for	  his	  assumption:	  Ontology	  as	  
currently	  practiced	  is,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  empirical	  fact,	  in	  a	  state	  where	  “all	  is	  said	  and	  done”	  be-­‐
tween	  the	  disputants	  because	  ontologists	  don’t	  retract	  their	  positions.	  	  
This	  is	  a	  distinctively	  empirical	  claim,	  perhaps	  a	  little	  unfamiliar	  in	  mainstream	  philos-­‐
ophy.	  However,	  metaontology	   sometimes	   have	   to	   venture	   into	   the	   empirical.	   If	   there	   is	   any	  
support	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  “all	   is	  said	  and	  done”	  in	  Hirsch’s	  writings,	   it	   is	  the	  claim	  that	  
ontologists	   rely	  on	   ‘ontological	  axioms’	   in	   their	   theorizing	   (2011,	  p.	   164–164).	  Here	  are	   two	  of	  
Hirsch’s	  examples	  of	  such	  axioms	  (2011,	  p.	  165):	  
	  
a) A	  composite	  thing	  must	  have	  causal	  powers	  beyond	  the	  causal	  powers	  of	  its	  parts.	  
b) It	  cannot	  be	  indeterminate	  whether	  two	  things	  compose	  a	  third	  thing.	  
These	   propositions	   are	   certainly	   appealed	   to	   as	   premises	   in	   arguments	   in	   ontology.	   But	   are	  
appeals	  to	  such	  basic	  principles	  a	  symptom	  of	  a	  dispute	  where	  “all	   is	  said	  and	  done”?	  Hirsch	  
suggests	  so	  by	  describing	  how	  he	  takes	  ontological	  disputes	  to	  work:	   ‘[E]ach	  camp	  will	  try	  to	  
defend	  its	  position	  by	  appealing	  to	  its	  favored	  axioms.	  The	  axioms	  themselves	  can’t	  be	  defend-­‐
ed	  –	  they	  are,	  so	  to	  speak,	  the	  bottom	  line	  for	  each	  camp’	  (Hirsch	  2005,	  p.	  80).	  	  
In	   general,	  Hirsch	   does	   not	   come	   close	   to	   establishing	   this	   as	   a	   plausible	   descriptive	  
claim	   about	   the	   discipline	   of	   ontology.	   Given	   many	   metaphysicians’	   commitment	   to	   main-­‐
stream	  metaphysicians,	  where	  holistic	  theoretical	  considerations	  determine	  our	  acceptance	  of	  
propositions	  and	  principles	  with	  ontological	   import,	   I	  believe	   it	   is	   false	   to	  claim	  that	  ontolo-­‐
gists	  treat	  principles	   like	  (a)	  and	  (b)	  as	  (close	  to)	  axioms.	  While	   it	  would	  be	  simplistic	  to	  say	  
that	  these	  principles	  by	  themselves	  are	  used	  to	  reach	  conclusions	  in	  ontology,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Chalmers	   (2011)	   suggests	   one	   method	   for	   identifying	   verbal	   disputes.	   When	   applied	   to	   disputes	   in	   ontology,	  
Chalmers	  (2009)	  finds	  that	  such	  disputes	  are	  not	  verbal,	  so	  the	  parties	  are	  not	  using	  distinct	  languages.	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that	  (a)	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in,	  for	  instance,	  Trenton	  Merricks’	  (2001,	  chapter	  3)	   ‘overdetermi-­‐
nation	  argument’	  against	  the	  existence	  of	   inanimate	  objects	  such	  as	  tables	  and	  baseballs,	  but	  
Merricks	  surely	  seems	  to	  argue	   for	  its	  truth	  (2001,	  p.	  56–84).	  Ted	  Sider	  applies	  something	  like	  
(b)	  in	  an	  argument	  for	  four-­‐dimensionalism,	  but	  the	  discussion	  of	  (b)	  is	  comprehensive	  and	  far	  
from	  giving	  the	  impression	  that	  (b)	  is	  treated	  as	  an	  axiom	  (2001b,	  p.	  120–133).	  	  
Furthermore,	  here	  is	  an	  empirical	  observation	  that	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  ontologists	  
in	   fact	   retract	   their	  views:	  One	  of	   contemporary	  ontology’s	  main	  contenders,	  Ted	  Sider,	   em-­‐
braces	  nihilism	  in	  one	  of	  his	  latest	  papers	  (2014),	  although	  he	  argues	  directly	  against	  it	  in	  Sider	  
(1993),	  whilst	  Sider	  (2001b)	  defends	  universalism.	  Sider	  has	  retracted	  his	  position.	  So	  we	  can’t,	  
without	  further	  argument,	  assume	  that	  all	  is	  said	  and	  done	  and	  that	  ontologists	  won’t	  retract.	  	  
Thus	  I	  think	  Hirsch	  is	  wrong	  in	  his	  description	  of	  how	  ontology	  unfolds.	  In	  any	  case,	  he	  
should	  provide	  much	  more	  evidence	   for	   the	  claim	  that	  all	  ontologists	  are	   ‘prepared	   to	   reject	  
any	  axioms	   that	  might	  undermine	   their	  ontological	   assertions’	   (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	   160).	   Just	   as	   I	  
pointed	  to	  Sider,	  Hirsch	  should	  provide	  some	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  his	  empirical	  assumption	  
that	  ontological	  disputes	  are	  at	  a	  stage	  where	  all	  is	  said	  and	  done.	  	  
Is	  it	  shown	  by	  considerations	  of	  charity	  to	  retraction	  that	  ontologists	  are	  speaking	  the	  
same	  language?	  Hirsch	  can	  object	  that,	  indeed,	  there	  is	  some	  retraction	  going	  on,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  
too	  little,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  outweighed	  by	  other	  interpretative	  considerations.	  In	  response	  to	  this,	  I	  
insist	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  is	  on	  Hirsch	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  there	  is	  too	  little	  retraction.	  
As	  far	  as	  I	  know,	  ontologists	  quite	  conscientiously	  evaluate	  arguments	  against	  their	  positions	  
and	  occasionally	  retract.	  The	  fact	  that	  ontology	  is	  difficult	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  evidence	  
that	  ontologists	   are	   speaking	  different	   languages.	   Second,	   even	   though	   I	   think	   charity	   to	   re-­‐
traction	  is	  sufficient	  (at	  least	  together	  with	  the	  other	  arguments	  of	  this	  section)	  to	  show	  that	  
ontologists	   speak	   English,	   those	   who	   disagree	   are	   invited	   to	   evaluate	   my	   arguments	   about	  
other	  elements	  of	   charity	   in	   section	  3.3.	  There	   I	   argue	   that	   charity	   to	  perception	  and	  under-­‐
standing	  create	  little	  pressure	  to	  interpret	  English	  blindly	  in	  accordance	  with	  what	  people	  are	  
inclined	  to	  say.	  If	  those	  arguments	  are	  sound,	  then	  there	  are	  few	  considerations	  of	  charity	  left	  
to	  outweigh	  charity	   to	   retraction.	  Overall,	   considerations	  of	   charity	  don’t	   imply	   that	  ontolo-­‐
gists	  speak	  different	  languages.	  	  
Could	  Hirsch	  object	  that	  he	   isn’t	   in	  fact	  making	  an	  empirical	  claim	  about	  the	  present	  
status	  of	  ontology,	  but	  rather	  a	  claim	  about	  a	  hypothetical	   ‘all	   is	  said	  and	  done’-­‐stage,	  where	  
there	  is	  no	  retraction,	  but	  where	  the	  ontologists	  nonetheless	  disagree	  (as	  opposed	  to	  agree,	  in	  
which	  case	  they	  presumably	  speaks	  the	  same	  language)?	  Hirsch	  clearly	  thinks	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
substance	   to	   the	  debate,	   so	   everything	   is	   always	   said	   and	  done.	   If	   this	   is	   the	   ground	   for	   the	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assumption,	  Hirsch	  is	  simply	  presupposing	  one	  of	  his	  controversial	  deflationary	  conclusions.	  A	  
strong	  claim	  like	  this	  requires	  strong	  arguments,	  and	  it	  seems	  Hirsch	  hasn’t	  provided	  any.	  	  
In	   conclusion,	   ontologists’	   common	   retraction,	   or	   at	   least	   their	   shared	   propensity	   to	  
evaluate	  arguments	  with	  potential	  bearing	  on	  their	  ontological	  positions,	  suggests	  that	  all	  isn’t	  
said	  and	  done.	  As	  we	  saw,	  this	  was	  a	  premise	  in	  Hirsch’s	  argument	  for	  why	  charity	  to	  retrac-­‐
tion	   is	   irrelevant	   when	   interpreting	   ontologists.	   I	   suggest	   that	   we	  must	   consider	   charity	   to	  
retraction,	  and	  that,	  together	  with	  the	  arguments	  of	  section	  3.3,	  this	  suggests	  that	  ontologists	  
speak	  English.	  They	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  contrived	  dispute,	  yes,	  but	  supposedly	  not	  a	  verbal	  one.	  	  
3.2.3	   Anti-­‐individualism	  	  
A	   final	   argument	   for	   why	   ontologists	   should	   be	   taken	   to	   speak	   English,	   rather	   than	   other	  
ontological	   languages,	   comes	   from	   considering	   the	   relevance	   of	   anti-­‐individualism	   to	   lan-­‐
guage-­‐switches.92	  Tyler	  Burge	  has	   influentially	   argued	   that	   the	   content	   of	  mental	   states,	   and	  
linguistic	  meaning,	  is	  not	  only	  determined	  by	  an	  individual’s	  intrinsic	  properties	  and	  disposi-­‐
tions,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  other	  speakers	  of	  the	  linguistic	  community.	  The	  meaning	  of	  language	  is	  
to	  some	  degree	  dependent	  on	  the	  social	  environment.	  Anti-­‐individualism	  has	  bearing	  on	  the	  
plausibility	  of	  ontologists	  speaking	  different	  languages	  because	  if	  we	  assume	  the	  truth	  of	  anti-­‐
individualism	  (in	  some	  form	  or	  other),	  then	  it	  in	  effect	  becomes	  harder	  for	  an	  individual	  of	  the	  
linguistic	  community	  to	  “drift	  away”	  from	  the	  common	  language.	  For	  if	  a	  member	  of	  a	  linguis-­‐
tic	  community	  uses	  the	  language	  in	  an	  unconventional	  way,	  then	  instead	  of	  simply	  assuming	  
that	  she	  is	  speaking	  her	  “own	  language”,	  we	  must	  consider	  whether	  she	  is	  having	  a	  false	  belief,	  
because	  the	  content	  of	  thought,	  and	  meaning	  of	  language,	  is	  in	  part	  determined	  by	  the	  linguis-­‐
tic	  community.	  So	  if	  an	  ontologist	  born	  in	  England	  starts	  using	  quantificational	  phrases	  (and	  
consequently	  other	  words)	  in	  a,	  relative	  to	  the	  overall	  linguistic	  community,	  deviant	  way,	  then	  
the	  fact	  that	  meaning	  is	  determined	  in	  part	  by	  her	  linguistic	  community	  creates	  inertia	  against	  
us	  interpreting	  her	  as	  suddenly	  composing	  her	  own	  linguistic	  community	  with	  a	  language	  that	  
is	  systematically	  different	  from	  English.	  	  
Hirsch	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  relevance	  of	  anti-­‐individualism	  to	  his	  arguments	  (2011,	  
p.	  146–8;	  229),	  but	  attempts	  to	  “circumvent”	  the	  topic,	  because	  he	  “think[s]	  it	  doesn’t	  have	  any	  
bearing	  on	  what	  I’m	  driving	  at”	  (2011,	  p.	  229).	  He	  writes	  that	  to	  get	  around	  anti-­‐individualism:	  
	  
…	  I’m	  going	  to	  stipulate	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  discussion,	  the	  language	  of	  side	  X	  in	  any	  dispute	  
is	   the	   language	   that	   would	   belong	   to	   an	   imagined	   linguistic	   community	   typical	   members	   of	  
which	  exhibits	  linguistic	  behavior	  that	  is	  relevantly	  similar	  to	  X’s.	  We	  can,	  if	  we	  wish,	  think	  of	  X	  
as	  forming	  its	  own	  linguistic	  community.	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  229)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  The	   paper	   that	   really	   introduces	   the	   idea	   in	   Burge	   (1979),	   but	   also	   Burge	   (1986)	   is	   a	   central	   work	   on	   anti-­‐
individualism.	  Burge	  (2007)	  comprises	  Burge’s	  essays	  on	  anti-­‐individualism.	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In	   this	  quote,	  X	   is	  a	   stance	  with	   respect	   to	  an	  ontological	  question.	  What	  Hirsch	   in	  effect	   is	  
doing,	  is	  creating	  a	  linguistic	  community	  by	  stipulation	  or	  imagination.	  As	  I	  explained	  in	  chap-­‐
ter	   1,	   Hirsch	   allows	   himself	   to	   liberally	   define	   (imagine)	   languages	   in	  which	   certain	   deviant	  
sentences,	   e.g.	   “A	   glass	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   cup”,	   or	   to	   take	   an	   example	   with	   bearing	   on	   ontology,	  
“There	  are	  no	  tables”,	  are	  true.	  Important	  for	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  section	  is	  that	  this	  is	  done	  with-­‐
out	  regard	  of	  whether	  any	  actual	  philosopher	  can	  end	  up	  speaking	  this	  as	  a	  public	   language.	  
Plausibly	  the	  Burge-­‐point	  has	  no	  bearing	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  different	  ontological	  languages	  are	  
possible	   (we	   can	   imagine	   them),	   but	   it	  does	   seem	   to	  bear	   on	  whether	   ontologists	   should	  be	  
interpreted	  as	  actually	  speaking	  ontologically	  different	  languages.	  	  
The	   same	   disregard	   for	   this	   topic	   is	   found	   in	   another	   paper	   arguing	   for	   (iv)	   (Hirsch	  
2005).	  When	  trying	  to	  formulate	  what	  it	  takes	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  verbal	  dispute	  between	  himself	  
and	  a	  speaker,	  A,	  who	  believes	  that	  a	  glass	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  cup,	  Hirsch	  writes:	  
	  
What	  is	  important	  for	  my	  purposes	  is	  that	  the	  sentences	  asserted	  by	  A	  are	  true	  in	  A-­‐English,	  so	  
that	  the	  only	  real	  question	  is	  whether	  A-­‐English	  is	  plain	  English.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  dispute	  with	  A	  
is	  merely	  verbal.	  In	  effect	  I	  am	  redefining	  “A’s	  idiolect”	  to	  mean	  the	  (imagined)	  public	  language	  
associated	  with	  A’s	  position.	  This	  redefined	  sense	  of	  “A’s	  idiolect”	  captures	  the	  relevant	  sense	  in	  
which	  “A	  is	  right	  in	  A’s	  idiolect	  (and	  we	  are	  right	  in	  ours).	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  148)	  
	  
Clearly,	  an	  idiolect	  can	  have	  idiosyncrasies,	  but	  Burge’s	  point	  is	  that	   in	  some	  cases,	   linguistic	  
idiosyncrasies	  don’t	  result	  in	  personal	  linguistic	  communities,	  but	  rather	  in	  false	  beliefs.	  Again,	  
Hirsch	  is	  here	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  defining	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  a	  dispute	  can	  be	  verbal	  –	  one	  
is	   correct	   in	  one’s	   own	   language	   –	  but	  doesn’t	   consider	  whether	   actual	   speakers	   can	   end	  up	  
speaking	  these	  different	  languages.	  
Hirsch	  never	  engages	  with	   the	  question	  of	  how	  Burge’s	  point	  affects	  whether	  ontolo-­‐
gists	  that	  start	  out	  speaking	  English	  can	  end	  up	  speaking	  artificial	  ontological	  languages.	  If	  we	  
assume	  that	  Burge	  is	  right	  about	  anti-­‐individualism,	  it	  becomes	  harder	  to	  believe	  that	  ontolo-­‐
gists,	  commonly	  speakers	  of	  English,	  should	  be	   interpreted	  as	  speaking	  a	  distinct	  ontological	  
language	  merely	   because	   they	   have	   unconventional	   beliefs	   about	   what	   there	   is.	   In	   general,	  
disagreement	   with	   the	   overall	   population	   doesn’t	   create	   linguistic	   sub-­‐communities.	   Anti-­‐
individualism	  generates	   inertia	   against	  ontologists	   ending	  up	   speaking	  ontological	   languages	  
radically	  different	  from	  English.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  no	  absolute	  constraint	  on	  interpretation,	  but	  
it	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  merely	  having	  unconventional	  views	  on	  what	  there	  is	  hardly	  suffices	  to	  
detach	   from	   English	   and	   drift	   off	   into	   other	   languages.	   The	   alternative	   explanation	   of	   the	  
philosophers’	  disagreement	  with	  the	  folks	  is	  this:	  someone	  is	  simply	  wrong.	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Considering	  these	  four	  arguments	  together,	  I	  believe	  that	  ontologists	  should	  be	  taken	  
to	  speak	  plain	  English,	  which	  means	  they	  are	  not	  engaged	  in	  a	  verbal	  dispute.	  	  
3.3	   Against	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  
If	   ontologists	   are	   speaking	   English,	   (iii)	   says	   that	   considerations	   of	   charity	   imply	   that	   their	  
non-­‐commonsensical	   ontological	   claims	   are	   “trivial	   falsehoods”,	   and	   thus	   ontology	   is	   rather	  
pointless.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	   argue	   that	   Hirsch’s	   application	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   charity	   when	  
interpreting	  English	   is	   flawed,	   so	   (iii)	   is	   false.	  The	  contention	   is	   that	   the	  elements	  of	   charity	  
Hirsch	   emphasizes	   don’t	   make	   it	   plausible	   that	   revisionary	   ontological	   claims	   are	   false	   in	  
English.	  The	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  argue	  that	  any	  specific	  ontological	  conclusion	  is	  true	  in	  English,	  that	  
is	  a	  job	  for	  first	  order	  ontology,	  but	  simply	  to	  keep	  it	  open	  which	  sentences	  expressing	  ontolog-­‐
ical	  claims	  are	  true	  by	  denying	  that	  such	  revisionary	  sentences	  are	  “trivially	  false”.93	  
	   Some	  big	  picture	  issues	  first.	  If	  ontology	  is	  possible,	  then	  only	  one	  ontological	  theory	  is	  
correct.	  English	  sentences	  expressing	  this	  ontological	  theory	  are	  true;	  sentences	  contradicting	  
it	  will	  be	  false.	  On	  the	  naïve	  interpretation	  of	  English	  that	  Hirsch	  thinks	  follows	  from	  a	  correct	  
application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  charity,	  the	  English	  sentence	  “There	  are	  tables”	  is	  true,	  so	  nihil-­‐
ism	   is	   false.	   If	   the	  English	   sentence	   “Abraham	  Lincoln	  had	   in	   1860	   a	   temporal	  part	   that	  was	  
bearded”	  is	  true,	  then	  a	  perdurance-­‐theory	  is	  true.	  Thus	  there	  is	  no	  “special	  class”	  of	  ontologi-­‐
cal	   assertions;	   they	   are	   simply	   everyday	  English	  quantificational	   sentences.94	  Whether	   this	   is	  
ultimately	  a	  tenable	  theory	  of	  English	  is	  a	  question	  for	  another	  day.	  Here	  I	  simply	  ask	  whether	  
Hirsch	  has	  shown	  it	  untenable	  by	  arguing	  that	  revisionary	  ontological	  claims	  are	  false.	  	  
Hirsch’s	  argument	  for	  (iii)	  is	  based	  on	  “correct	  linguistic	  interpretation”,	  cf.	  chapter	  1.	  I	  
will	  argue	  that	  an	  interpretation	  of	  English	  in	  which	  sentences	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  ordinary	  
composite	  objects	  come	  out	  true	  is	  not	  interpretatively	  superior	  to	  one	  in	  which	  they	  come	  out	  
false,	   so	   revisionary	  ontological	   claims	   are	  not	   trivially	   false.	  To	  do	   this	   successfully,	   I	   argue	  
that	  ordinary	  people	  are	  correct	  in	  asserting	  sentences	  about	  ordinary	  objects.	  The	  discussion	  
will	  focus	  on	  the	  debate	  over	  composition,	  because	  it	  is	  the	  simplest	  and	  easiest	  to	  frame.	  	  
The	  dispute	  between	  Hirsch	  and	  me	  is	  over	  whether	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  entails	  the	  
falsity	  of	  revisionary	  claims.	  Hirsch	  gives	  the	  following	  description	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  charity:	  
	  
Suppose	  we	  have	  two	  candidate	   interpretations	  for	  a	  set	  of	  sentences	  that	   fluent	  speakers	  of	  a	  
language	  would	  typically	  be	  prepared	  to	  assert	  (or	  assent	  to).	  If	  one	  of	  these	  interpretations	  im-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  In	  the	  following,	  all	   I	  say	  about	  language	  and	  which	  sentences	  are	  true	  pertain	  to	  the	  natural	   language	  English.	  
The	  reader	  should	  note	  that	  I	  now	  disregard	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  ontologists	  speak	  different	  languages,	  and	  only	  
focus	  on	  whether	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  revisionary	  ontological	  claims	  are	  “trivially	  false”	  in	  English.	  
94	  This	  approach	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Merricks	  (2001,	  chapter	  7),	  but	  in	  contrast	  to	  some	  other	  important	  suggestions	  on	  
the	  semantics	  of	  ontological	  claims.	  For	  instance,	  van	  Inwagen	  (1990,	  2014)	  believes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  special	  “ontologi-­‐
cal	  context”,	  and	  that	  utterances	  of	  ontology	  doesn’t	  really	  contradict	  ordinary	  utterances.	  Sider	  (2011)	  believes	  that	  
ontology	  (sometimes)	  is,	  or	  should	  be,	  conducted	  in	  a	  special	  ontological	  language,	  see	  chapter	  4.	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plies	  that	  the	  speakers	  are	  correct	  in	  asserting	  these	  sentences,	  and	  the	  other	  interpretation	  im-­‐
plies	  that	  they	  are	  incorrect,	  then	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  imposes	  a	  presumption	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  
first	  interpretation.	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  98)	  
	  
In	  this	  context,	  “correct”	  and	  “incorrect”	  should	  be	  taken	  at	  face	  value,	  and	  not	  to	  mean	  “true”	  
and	  “false”.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  Hirsch’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  principle,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  understand-­‐
ing	  the	  revisionist	  must	  have	  to	  avoid	  the	  argument.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  a	  revisionary	  inter-­‐
pretation,	  RI,	  and	  a	  Hirschean	  one,	  HI,	  for	  a	  set	  of	  ordinary	  English	  sentences.	  On	  the	  revision-­‐
ary	  interpretation,	  RI,	  some	  ordinary	  ontological	  claims	  are	  false.	  On	  the	  Hirschean	  interpreta-­‐
tion,	  HI,	  those	  claims	  are	  true	  (assume	  that	  these	  are	  the	  only	  differences	  between	  the	  interpre-­‐
tations).	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  truth	  says	  that	  we	  must	  
maximize	   truth,	  and	   thus	  choose	  HI	  over	  RI.	  However,	   if	  we	   take	   “correct”	   to	  not	  necessarily	  
entail	  truth,	  there	  is	  room	  for	  the	  revisionist	  to	  argue	  that	  RI	  is	  as	  correct,	  or	  as	  good	  an	  inter-­‐
pretation,	  as	  HI,	  effectively	  undermining	  the	  argument	  from	  charity.	  	  
Hirsch	   believes	   that	   the	   principle	   of	   charity	   has	   “more	   to	   do	   with	   rationality	   –	   with	  
good	  reasons	  –	  than	  with	  truth”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  99).	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  generally	  accepted	  in	  the	  
literature.	  The	  exact	  role	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  is	  supposed	  to	  play	  in	  a	  complete	  metaseman-­‐
tic	  theory	   is	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down,	  as	  we	  are	  far	   from	  having	  such	  a	  theory,	  but	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  is	  justified	  in	  an	  assumption	  of	  rationality	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  target	  of	  
interpretation,	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  charity	  should	  be	  a	  guide	  to	  truth	  –	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  to	  be	  
rational	  than	  by	  having	  true	  beliefs.	  Because	  of	  the	  difficult	  foundational	  questions	  that	  arise	  
in	  this	  area,	  my	  reply	  to	  Hirsch	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  arguments	  Hirsch	  formulates	  based	  
on	  the	  principle	  of	  charity.	  Thus	  I	  will	  not	  attempt	  to	  analyze	  how	  correctness	  integrates	  with	  
truth	   or	   rationality,	   but	   take	   an	   intuitive	   notion	   of	   correctness	   for	   granted.	   However	   I	   will	  
broach	  the	  issue	  more	  as	  we	  get	  clearer	  on	  what	  exactly	  Hirsch’s	  arguments	  demand	  of	  RI	  for	  it	  
to	  be	  as	  correct	  an	  interpretation	  as	  HI.	  
In	  light	  of	  this,	  we	  may	  say	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  imposes	  an	  explanatory	  demand	  
upon	  the	  revisionist.	  It	  will	  be	  practical	  to	  have	  it	  clearly	  stated:	  
	  
Expl	   Revisionary	   ontologists	   must	   explain	   how	   the	   assertions	   of	   ordinary	   people	   about	  
ordinary	  objects	  are	  correct,	  albeit	  false.	  	  
	  
Whether	   assertions	   of	   a	   certain	   kind	   are	   correct	   in	   the	   required	   sense	  must	   be	   argued	   on	   a	  
case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  The	  ontologist	  must	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  that	  ordinary	  people	  have	  the	  beliefs	  
they	  have,	  when	  they	  are	  false.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  understand	  it,	  most	  comprehensive	  revisionary	  theo-­‐
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ries	   attempt	   to	   satisfy	  Expl,	   though	   in	  different	  ways.95	  What’s	   important	   to	  note	   initially,	   is	  
that	  if	  such	  a	  project	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  to	  satisfaction,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  nothing	  in	  the	  prin-­‐
ciple	   of	   charity	   that	   blocks	   the	   revisionary	   ontologist’s	   claims.	   That’s	   not	   to	   say	   that	   there	  
aren’t	  other	   reasons	  to	  believe	   in	  composite	  objects.	  Surveying	  and	  replying	  to	  all	  such	  argu-­‐
ments	  is	  a	  tremendous	  task,	  however,	  and	  this	  chapter	  is	  dedicated	  to	  showing	  Hirsch	  wrong.	  	  
	   In	  the	  following,	  I	  assume	  that	  what	  physical	  objects	  there	  are	  is	  an	  objective	  matter.	  I	  
will	  talk	  about	  this	  as	  there	  being	  “object	  facts”,	  but	  this	  might	  simply	  be	  what	  is	  often	  called	  
unstructured	  facts.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  this	  notion	  is	  understood	  in	  this	  minimally	  demanding	  
sense,	   and	   not	   understood	   as	   saying	   anything	   about	   the	   world’s	   structure,	   fundamentality,	  
ground	  or	  other	  metaontological	  notions.	  This	  is	  an	  admissible	  assumption	  because	  the	  issue	  
in	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  is	  not	  whether	  there	  are	  such	  facts	  –	  if	  it	  were,	  this	  assumption	  
would	   be	   begging	   the	   question	   –	   but	   whether	   “correct	   linguistic	   interpretation”	   of	   English	  
implies	  that	  any	  non-­‐commonsensical	  ontological	  theory	  of	  physical	  objects	  is	  “trivially	  false”.	  
This	   shouldn’t	  be	  a	  controversial	  assumption,	   for	  as	   long	  as	  one	   isn’t	  an	  anti-­‐realist,	  holding	  
that	  the	  facts	  about	  which	  objects	  there	  are	  obtain	  because	  we	  have	  the	  beliefs	  we	  have,	  there	  
must	  be	  facts	  that	  determine	  which	  objects	  there	  are.	  Hirsch	  believes	  that	  there	  are	  such	  facts,	  
because	  he	  believes	  that	  the	  sentence	  “There	  are	  tables”	  is	  objectively	  true	  in	  English.96	  That’s	  
all	  that’s	  required.	  
Metaphysicians	   may	   have	   different	   opinions	   on	   the	   character	   of	   these	   facts	   (for	   in-­‐
stance	  whether	  they	  are	  structured	  or	  unstructured)	  and	  what	  the	  facts	  in	  fact	  are.	  The	  goal	  of	  
answering	  such	  questions	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  thesis,	  and	  all	  I	  need	  to	  assume	  is	  
that	  English	  sentences	  are	  true	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  objective	  facts.	  This	  is	  simply	  realism.	  	  
I	  have	  said	  that	  the	  ontologist	  must	  explain	  how	  it	   is	  that	  ordinary	  people	  are	  correct	  
although	   they	  have	   (wildly)	   false	  beliefs.	   I	  will	  not	  be	  able	   to	   take	  on	  all	   arguments	   for	  why	  
ordinary	  people	  may	  end	  up	  having	   the	  beliefs	   they	  do.	  There	  may	   for	   instance	  be	  other	  ex-­‐
planatory	  virtues	  connected	  to	  having	  ordinary	  objects	  in	  one’s	  ontology,	  but	  such	  arguments	  
belong	  to	  the	  substantial	  debates	  that	  Hirsch	  wishes	  to	  avoid	  by	  the	  argument	  from	  charity.	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Merricks	  (2001,	  chapter	  7)	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  belief	  in	  ordinary	  objects	  are	  ”close	  to	  true”;	  
Dorr	  (2002,	  p.	  77–110)	  for	  a	  fictionalist	  account	  of	  ordinary	  talk	  about	  composite	  objects,	  and	  Chisholm	  (1976)	  for	  a	  
an	  account	  of	  how	  ordinary	  people	  are	  correct	  in	  a	  ”loose”	  sense.	  	  
96	  Hirsch	  thinks	  such	  facts	  are	  unstructured,	  and	  that	  they	  can	  be	  described	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  ways.	  Thus	  how	  we	  
talk	   about	   these	   facts	  will	   vary	   from	   language	   to	   language.	   This	   follows	   from	  Hirsch’s	   combination	   of	   quantifier	  
variantism	  and	  realism.	  Hirsch	  firmly	  believes	  that	  the	  sentence	  “There	  are	  tables”	  is	  objectively	  true	  in	  English,	  and	  
that	  the	  sentence	  “It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  had	  a	  temporal	  part	  in	  1860	  that	  was	  bearded”	  is	  objec-­‐
tively	  true	  in	  English.	  By	  virtue	  of	  being	  objectively	  true,	  there	  are	  facts	  making	  the	  sentences	  true	  (2011,	  p.	  72–79).	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  were	  speakers	  of	  another	  ontological	  language,	  other	  ontological	  claims	  would	  be	  true,	  and	  
thus	  the	  facts,	  as	  we	  describe	  them,	  would	  be	  different,	  but	  the	  unstructured	  facts	  wouldn’t	  be.	  How	  we	  describe	  the	  
“facts”	  is	  a	  language-­‐sensitive	  matter,	  though	  truth	  isn’t.	  See	  especially	  Hirsch	  (2002a)	  for	  more	  on	  this.	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shall	  therefore	  restrict	  myself	  to	  whether	  considerations	  of	  charity	  implies	  that	  RI	  is	  inferior	  to	  
HI	  because	  RI	  entails	  that	  ordinary	  people	  are	  incorrect,	  while	  HI	  does	  not.	  	  
3.3.1	   Problems	  with	  charity	  to	  perception	  
Consider	  an	  empty	  room	  containing	  what	  we	  would	  ordinarily	  describe	  as	  a	  table	  and	  a	  chair.	  
Everyone	   agrees	   that	   there	   are	   particles	   arranged	   tablewise	   and	   that	   there	   are	   particles	   ar-­‐
ranged	  chairwise	  in	  the	  room.	  The	  ontological	  question	  is	  what	  more,	  if	  anything,	  these	  things	  
compose.	   The	   English-­‐speaking	   nihilist	   says	   “nothing”,	   the	   ordinary	   English	   speaker	   says	   “a	  
chair	   and	   a	   table”,97	  while	   the	   English	   universalist	   says”	   a	   chair,	   a	   table,	   a	   ‘table-­‐chair’”,	   and	  
various	   other	   sums	   of	   the	   particles.	  What	   reasons	   do	   they	   have	   for	   their	   beliefs?	   Both	   the	  
universalist	  and	  the	  nihilist	  can	  probably	  cite	  quite	  complicated	  philosophical	  arguments.	  The	  
ordinary	  person	  claims	  to	  have	  a	  quite	  different,	  yet	  powerful,	  reason	  for	  her	  belief:	  her	  percep-­‐
tual	  experience.	  For	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  there	  is	  a	  chair,	  a	  table,	  and	  no	  other	  composite	  objects	  in	  the	  
room.	  The	  revisionary	  ontologists	  have	  to	  say	  that	  the	  ordinary	  person	  is	  mistaken	  when	  she	  
claims	  that	  the	  correct	  perceptual	  report	  of	  what	  she	  sees	  is	  “The	  room	  only	  contains	  a	  table	  
and	   a	   chair”.	   In	   doing	   so,	   they	  would	   be	   going	   against	   the	   strong	   presumption	   imposed	   by	  
charity	  to	  perception,	  and	  say	  that	  the	  ordinary	  person	  is	  incorrect.	  Thus	  HI	  would	  be	  a	  better	  
interpretation	  than	  RI,	  and	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  creates	  trouble	  for	  the	  revisionist.	  	  
	   In	   none	   of	   his	   essays	   does	   Hirsch	   discuss	   charity	   to	   perception	   in	   much	   detail.	   He	  
seems	  to	  take	  it	  as	  quite	  obvious	  that	  people’s	  perceptual	  reports	  are	  true.	  The	  closest	  Hirsch	  
comes	  to	  arguing	  for	  why	  charity	  to	  perception	  should	  be	  given	  special	  weight,	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  “very	  strong	  presumption	  that	  any	  language	  contains	  sentences	  used	  to	  make	  percep-­‐
tual	  reports,	  and	  that	  these	  reports	  are	  generally	  accurate”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  149).	  Hirsch	  takes	  it	  
for	  granted	   that	  our	  beliefs	   in	  ordinary	  objects	  are	   supported	  by	  our	  perceptual	  experiences,	  
but	   this	   doesn’t	   entail	   truth.	   Hirsch	   claims	   that	   because	   ontologists	   must	   view	   disagreeing	  
folks	  as	  delivering	  mistaken	  perceptual	  reports,	  they	  violate	  charity	  to	  perception	  (2011,	  p.	  153).	  	  
	   Let	   perceptual	   reports	   be	   sentences	   speakers	   of	   English	   are	   disposed	   to	   utter	   to	   de-­‐
scribe	  which	   physical	   objects	   there	   are	   on	   a	   given	   occasion.	   As	   has	   been	   alluded	   to	   several	  
times,	   it	   is	  quite	  clear	  that	  revisionary	  ontologists	  must	  hold	  that	  many	  of	  the	  perceptual	  re-­‐
ports	  of	  English	  speakers	  are	  false.98	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  I’m	  here	  ignoring	  the	  other	  objects	  she	  perhaps	  believes	  the	  room	  contains,	  such	  as	  the	  material	  the	  chair	  is	  made	  
out	  of,	  the	  table’s	  legs,	  the	  particles	  that	  make	  up	  the	  objects,	  and	  so	  on.	  I	  do	  this	  for	  ease	  of	  presentation.	  	  
98	  This	  depends	  on	  what	  kind	  of	  revisionist	  ontologist	  one	  is.	  Nihilists	  must	  reject	  most	  ordinary	  assertions,	  while	  
presumably	  universalists	  must	  reject	  quite	  few.	  This	  depends	  on	  how	  one	  considers	  what	  is	  said,	  though:	  When	  the	  
ordinary	  person	  says	  that	  all	  she	  sees	   is	  a	  table	  and	  a	  chair,	  we	  might	  understand	  this	  as	  excluding	  that	  there	  are	  
other	  composite	  objects	  apart	  from	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  table	  and	  the	  chair.	  If	  we	  understand	  the	  ordinary	  person	  thus,	  
then	  the	  universalist	  also	  has	  to	  reject	  many	  assertions.	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To	  sum	  this	  up,	  charity	   to	  perception	   is	   the	  presumption	  that	  an	   interpretation	  must	  
let	  perceptual	  reports	  come	  out	  generally	  accurate.	  Perceptual	  reports	  being	  true	  is	  one	  salient	  
explanation	  of	  why	  they	  are	  correct,	  but	  it’s	  not	  the	  only	  one.	  Hirsch	  writes	  that:	  	  
	  
Revisionists	  have	  no	  plausible	  way	  of	  explaining	  why	  people	  make	  the	  mistakes	  revisionists	  al-­‐
lege.	  According	  to	  (quasi-­‐)	  nihilists,	  for	  example,	  people	  mistakenly	  judge	  tables	  to	  be	  in	  front	  of	  
them	  when	  there	  are	  no	  tables	  in	  front	  of	  them.	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  113)	  
	  
Note	  that	  this	  denies	  that	  the	  revisionist	  can	  satisfy	  Expl	  with	  regard	  to	  perceptual	  reports.	  The	  
challenge	   is	   this:	  The	  revisionist	  must	  explain	  how	  it	  can	  be	  that	  ordinary	  people	  are	  correct	  
(don’t	  make	  mistakes)	  when	  giving	  perceptual	  reports	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  existence	  of	  composites.	  
This	   challenge	  can	  be	  met.	  For	   the	   revisionist	   can	  argue	   that	  we	  have	   the	  perceptual	  
experiences	  and	  beliefs	  as	  of	  composite	  objects	  merely	  because	  of	  biological	  and	  cultural	  con-­‐
tingencies,	   and	   not	   because	   of	   what	   there	   is;	   there	   is	   no	   sufficient	   explanatory	   connection	  
between	  our	  beliefs	  about	  what	  there	  is	  and	  the	  facts	  about	  what	  there	  is.99	  For	  on	  the	  assump-­‐
tion	  of	  realism,	  our	  perceptual	  experiences	  must	  somehow	  be	  a	  function	  of	  the	  object	  facts	  if	  
we	  are	  to	  give	  them	  any	  ultimate	  epistemic	  value	  when	  determining	  what	  there	  is.	  In	  the	  ab-­‐
sence	  of	  such	  an	  explanatory	  connection,	  our	  perceptual	  experiences	  about	  which	  composite	  
objects	  exist	  are	  ultimately	  undermined	  as	  truth-­‐conducive.	  One	  the	  other	  hand,	  that	  doesn’t	  
mean	   ordinary	   people	   don’t	   have	   good	   reasons	   for	   relying	   on	   their	   perceptual	   experiences	  
when	   forming	   beliefs.	   As	   I	   argue	   below,	   the	   revisionist	   can	   say	   that	   perceptual	   reports	   are	  
generally	  accurate	  without	  being	  true.100	  	  
I	  have	  provided	  the	  gist	  of	  what	  the	  revisionary	  ontologist	  would	  say	  about	  perceptual	  
experiences	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  what	  there	  is.	  The	  relevance	  to	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  is	  that	  if	  
perception	  ultimately	  does	  not	  provide	   justification	   for	   believing	   in	  ordinary	  objects,	   then	   if	  
the	  revisionist	  can	  explain	  that	  perceptual	   reports	  are	  generally	  accurate,	  HI	  and	  RI	  would	  be	  
equally	  good	  interpretations.	  I	  will	  now	  consider	  details	  and	  objections.	  	  
A	  natural	  objection	  is	  that	   it	  appears	   as	   if	   there	  are	  tables	  and	  chairs,	  and	  that	   in	  the	  
language	  we	  speak	  –	  English	  –	   it	   is	  correct	  to	  describe	  certain	  situations	  as	  containing	  tables	  
and	  chairs.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  it	   looks	  as	   if	   there	  are	  tables	  and	  chairs,	  and	  that	  our	  lan-­‐
guage	  naturally	  carves	  reality	  up	  in	  such	  things,	  but	  these	  data	  points	  are	  the	  result	  of	  biologi-­‐
cal	   and	   cultural	   contingencies	   that	   undermines	   them	   as	   truth-­‐conducive.	   Our	   perceptual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Compare	  Korman	  (2014).	  I	  discovered	  Korman’s	  recent	  paper	  in	  the	  process	  of	  working	  on	  this	  section.	  It	  is	  the	  
only	   paper	   I	   know	   of	   that	   considers	   these	   topics	   in	   any	   detail.	   Korman	   (2014,	   p.	   2)	   writes	   that	   such	   arguments	  
haven’t	  been	  examined	  in	  any	  detail.	  His	  paper	  gives	  a	  good	  presentation	  of	  the	  argument,	  and	  generally	  presents	  a	  
good	  overview	  of	  this	  type	  of	  argument,	  so	  I	  will	  to	  some	  extent	  rely	  on	  his	  paper	  in	  this	  discussion.	  	  
100	  For	  a	  detailed	  framing	  of	  the	  argument,	  with	  thoughts	  on	  whom	  it	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	  explanation-­‐formulation	  I	  choose	  and	  a	  sensitivity-­‐version	  of	  the	  argument,	  see	  Korman	  (2014,	  p.	  3–6).	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system	  has	  contingent	  features	  that	  privilege	  “seeing	  something”	  only	  if	  the	  parts	  that	  make	  it	  
up	   are	   related	   in	   a	   special	  way.101	  When	  we	   recognize	   this,	  we	   recognize	   that	   our	  perceptual	  
experiences	  don’t	  give	  us	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  exactly	  those	   things	  exist.	  This	  doesn’t	  mean	  
that	   ordinary	   people	   don’t	   have	   good	   reasons	   for	   believing	  what	   they	   do,	   inter	   alia	   because	  
they	  don’t	  have	  the	  defeater	  I’m	  now	  presenting.	  Relying	  on	  one’s	  perceptual	  system	  is	  prima	  
facie	  reasonable	  (more	  on	  this	  below).	  Perceptual	  reports	  are	  based	  on	  perceptual	  experiences,	  
so	   if	  perceptual	  experiences	  aren’t	  guides	   to	  what	  composite	  objects	   there	  are,	  we	  have	   little	  
reason	  to	  consider	  perceptual	  reports	  true	  for	  the	  sole	  reason	  that	  they	  are	  perceptual	  reports.	  	  
Recall	   that	   everyone	   agrees	   that	   in	   the	   room	  described	   above,	   there	   are	   particles	   ar-­‐
ranged	  chairwise	  and	  tablewise.	  More	  generally,	  they	  agree	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  fundamental	  
particles	  and	  the	  laws	  of	  physics.	  The	  ontological	  question	  is	  whether	  there	  are	  more	  objects	  in	  
the	  room.	  Our	  answer	  is	  that	  perception	  won’t	  tell	  us,	  because	  perceptual	  systems	  aren’t	  sensi-­‐
tive	  to	  which	  composite	  objects,	  if	  any,	  there	  are.	  As	  Cian	  Dorr	  puts	  it:	  
	  
If	  your	  visual	  system	  is	   functioning	  normally,	  your	  visual	  experience	  depends	  only	  on	  the	  mo-­‐
tions	  of	   the	  photons	   in	   the	  vicinity	  of	  your	  eyes.	  And	   it	   seems	  to	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  any	  re-­‐
motely	  acceptable	  theory	  about	  photons	  that	  the	  behaviour	  of	  photons	  depends	  entirely	  on	  the	  
arrangement	  of	  small	  things:	  what	  sorts	  of	  elementary	  particles	  there	  are,	  and	  how	  they	  stand	  to	  
one	  another;	  what	   the	  curvature	   is	   at	   each	  point	   in	   spacetime;	   that	   sort	  of	   thing.	  Nowhere	   in	  
physics	  do	  we	  come	  across	  a	  law	  that	  predicts	  that	  a	  photon	  will	  behave	  one	  way	  when	  it	  comes	  
across	  some	  particles	  that	  compose	  something,	  and	  behave	  a	  different	  way	  when	  it	  comes	  across	  
some	  particles	  of	  the	  same	  sorts,	  arranged	  in	  the	  same	  ways,	  that	  don’t	  compose	  anything.	  Simi-­‐
lar	  claims	  seem	  to	  be	  true	  for	  the	  other	  sense	  modalities.	  Hence,	  whenever	  some	  things	  in	  your	  
environment	  compose	  something,	  things	  would	  have	  looked,	  sounded,	  felt,	  smelt	  and	  tasted	  to	  
you	  exactly	  the	  same	  way	  that	  they	  actually	  do	  if	  those	  things	  had	  been	  arranged	  exactly	  as	  they	  
actually	  are,	  without	  composing	  anything.	  (Dorr	  2002,	  p.	  26)	  
	  
The	   same	  point	   applies	   if	   there	   are	  more	   composite	  objects	   than	  ordinary	  people	   recognize,	  
e.g.	   arbitrary	   sums	   or	   temporal	   parts.	   Thus	   the	   object	   facts	   themselves	   seem	   immaterial	   in	  
determining	  one’s	  perceptual	  experience.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  particle	  facts	  are	  essential	  to	  
determine	  perceptual	  experiences.	  This	  explains	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  ordinary	  people	  are	  correct	  
about	  what	  there	  is:	  given	  the	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  a	  composite	  objects	  and	  its	  parts	  
(they	  are	  at	  exactly	  the	  same	  location,	  the	  particles	  collectively	  weigh	  the	  same	  as	  the	  compo-­‐
site,	   and	   so	  on),102	  we	   can	   explain	   that	  ordinary	  people	   form	  beliefs	   that	   is	   a	   function	  of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  We	   should	   distinguish	   the	   biological	   and	   the	   cultural	   contingencies	   relevant	   for	   explaining	   why	   we	   have	   the	  
beliefs	  we	  have	  in	  (1)	  perception	  and	  in	  (2)	  language/thought.	  One	  question	  concerns	  to	  what	  extent	  our	  evolution-­‐
ary	  developed	  perceptual	  system	  privileges	  certain	  distributions	  of	  light	  and	  edges	  and	  present	  “objects	  grouped	  up”	  
to	  us.	  Another	   is	  how	  one’s	  personal	   environment	  affects	  how	   the	  perceptual	   system	   functions.	  A	  quite	  different	  
question	   is	  how	  culture	  and	  other	   factors	  may	   influence	  which	  things	  we	  consider	  objects	   for	  other	   reasons	   than	  
“seeing	  them	  as	  one”.	  For	  instance,	  we	  may	  have	  practical	  reasons	  to	  talk	  about	  some	  particles	  as	  one	  object.	  The	  
reason	  for	  not	  going	  deeper	  into	  these	  questions	  is	  that	  they	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  central	  point:	  the	  truth	  of	  perceptual	  
reports	  are	  not	  supported	  by	  any	  obvious	  data	  from	  perception	  or	  language.	  
102	  For	  a	  more	  thorough	  treatment	  of	  the	  relationship,	  see	  Sider	  (2007)	  and	  in	  general	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  composi-­‐
tion	  as	  identity.	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particle-­‐facts.	   The	   way	   our	   perceptual	   system	   is	   set	   up,	   we	   experience	   only	   some	   particle-­‐
arrangements	   as	   a	   thing,	   but	   our	   experiences	   as	   of	   tables	   and	   chairs,	   but	   not	   table-­‐chairs,	  
appears	  to	  be	  a	  biological	  contingency	  without	  any	  explanatory	  relationship	  to	  the	  object	  facts.	  	  
One	   could	   object	   to	   this	   line	   of	   argument	   and	   say	   that	   our	   perceptual	   systems	   have	  
evolved	  to	  fit	  the	  object	  facts,	  and	  thus	  that	  our	  perceptual	  experiences	  do	  stand	  in	  an	  explana-­‐
tory	  relationship	  to	  them.	  Our	  perceptual	  experiences	  are	  the	  result	  of	  the	  sophisticated	  pro-­‐
cessing	   of	   the	   light	   registered	   on	   our	   retinas	   by	   our	   perceptual	   systems,	   and	   the	   perceptual	  
system	  has	  evolved	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  object	  facts.103	  This	   is	  not	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  objects	  
are	   there	   because	   our	   perceptual	   system	   says	   so,	   but	   rather	   that	   our	   perceptual	   system	  pre-­‐
sents	  the	  objects	  as	  there	  because	  it	  has	  evolved	  to	  recognize	  them.	  
There	  are	   two	  responses	   to	   this	  argument.	  The	   first	   is	   that	  evolution	   is	  not	  a	  process	  
that	  always	  leads	  to	  truth;	  it	  is	  a	  process	  that	  leads	  to	  organisms	  having	  certain	  properties	  (the	  
fit	  ones),	  but	  those	  don’t	  have	  to	  be	  related	  to	  truth	  in	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  fashion.104	  So	  for	  instance,	  
the	  claim	  that	  perception	  has	  ended	  up	  matching	  reality	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  all	  ordinary	  objects,	  
and	  no	  arbitrary	  sums	  of	  those,	  exist,	  is	  rather	  implausible.	  Hawthorne	  is	  onto	  the	  same	  idea:	  
	  
Barring	  a	  kind	  of	  anti-­‐realism	  that	  none	  of	  us	  should	  tolerate,	  wouldn't	  it	  be	  remarkable	  if	  the	  
lines	  of	  reality	  matched	  the	  lines	  that	  we	  have	  words	  for?	  The	  simplest	  exercises	  of	  sociological	  
imagination	  ought	  to	  convince	  us	  that	  the	  assumption	  of	  such	  harmony	  is	  altogether	  untoward,	  
since	  such	  exercises	  convince	  us	  that	  it	  is	  something	  of	  a	  biological	  and/or	  cultural	  accident	  that	  
we	  draw	  the	  lines	  that	  we	  do.	  (Hawthorne	  2006,	  p.	  109)	  
	  
One	  would	  expect	  the	  crooked	  path	  of	  evolution	  to	  create	  some	  divergences	  between	  fact	  on	  
the	  one	  side,	  and	  perceptual	  experiences	  and	  how	  we	  talk	  about	  them	  on	  the	  other.105	  	  
Furthermore,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  object	  facts	  have	  no	  role	  in	  explaining	  what	  kind	  
of	  perceptual	  experiences	  are	  adaptive	   (Korman	  2014,	  p.	  2).	  Assume	   that	   in	   the	   situation	  de-­‐
scribed	  above,	  there	  are	  no	  tables	  or	  chairs,	  but	  rather	  an	  upthair	  and	  a	  downthair,	  that	  is,	  one	  
object	  composed	  of	  the	  upper	  half	  of	  the	  atoms	  arranged	  tablewise	  and	  chairwise,	  and	  another	  
object	  composed	  of	  the	  lower	  half	  of	  the	  atoms	  arranged	  tablewise	  and	  chairwise.	  Given	  such	  a	  
situation,	   we	   wouldn’t	   be	   at	   an	   evolutionary	   disadvantage	   compared	   to	   someone	   who	   con-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Our	   perceptual	   system	   is	   magnificently	   sophisticated.	   The	   light	   that	   hit	   our	   retina	   is	   only	   registered	   in	   two	  
dimensions,	  even	   though	   they	  come	   from	  a	   three-­‐dimensional	   space,	   so	   there	   is	  an	  underdetermination	  of	   infor-­‐
mation.	  The	  visual	  system	  has	  certain	  transformation	  mechanisms	  that	  incorporate	  information	  of	  how	  light	  usually	  
is	  reflected	  from	  particulars	  and	  to	  the	  sensory	  registration	  of	  the	  retina,	  and	  uses	  these	  transformations	  to	  make	  
generally	  accurate	  perceptual	  states.	  Visual	   illusions	  are	  examples	  of	  cases	  where	  our	  visual	  system	  is	   “tricked”	   to	  
represent	  a	  situation	  inaccurately.	  See	  Burge	  (2010)	  for	  much	  more	  on	  this.	  	  
104	  See	  Burge	  (2010,	  pp.	  292–308)	  for	  a	  thorough	  criticism	  of	  “naturalistic”	  meaning	  theories	  that	  attempt	  to	  analyze	  
truth	  and	  representation	  in	  non-­‐semantic	  terms.	  	  
105	  This	  is	  not	   to	  say	  that	  the	  process	  is	  random.	  Independently	  of	  whether	  there	  are	  composite	  objects	  or	  not,	  the	  
fundamental	  particles	  that	  make	  up	  these	  composite	  objects	  are	  there,	  and	  their	  distribution	  and	  interaction	  with	  
photons	  have	  contributed	  essentially	   to	  how	  the	  evolution	  of	   the	  perceptual	   system	  of	  humans	   (along	  with	  more	  
random	  elements	  of	  evolution	  such	  as	  fit	  relative	  to	  other	  organisms	  and	  so	  on).	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ceives	  of	   it	  as	  a	  situation	  with	  an	  upthair	  and	  downthair,	   for	  we	  can	  respond	  to	  the	  environ-­‐
ment	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Such	  examples	  can	  be	  reiterated	  for	  temporal	  parts.	  
I’ve	  been	  asking	  for	  an	  explanatory	  relationship	  between	  the	  object	  facts	  and	  our	  per-­‐
ceptual	  experiences	  to	  ground	  the	  supposition	  of	  Hirsch	  that	  we	  must	  interpret	  ordinary	  peo-­‐
ple’s	  perceptual	  reports	  as	  true.	  Can’t	  one	  object	  that	  an	  ordinary	  person’s	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
chair	  and	  a	  table	  in	  the	  room	  is	  true	  because	  these	  objects	  cause	  her	  to	  have	  an	  experience	  as	  
of	   a	   table	   and	  a	   chair?	  That	   is,	   the	  explanation	  of	  our	  beliefs	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  objects	   facts	   is	  
simply	   causation.106	  Because	   the	   objects	   cause	   the	   perceptual	   states,	  we	  must	   interpret	   ordi-­‐
nary	  people	  as	  speaking	  truthfully	  when	  they	  talk	  about	  ordinary	  objects.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  object	  facts	  themselves	  that	  interact	  with	  us.	  Photons	  in-­‐
teract	  with	  the	  particles	  of	  the	  alleged	  ordinary	  objects,	  but	  the	  ordinary	  object	  isn’t	  identical	  
with	  the	  particles,	  so	  we	  don’t	  causally	  interact	  with	  them.107	  Rather,	  the	  information	  from	  the	  
environment	   is	  processed	  by	  our	  perceptual	   systems,	   formed	  as	   they	  are	  by	  our	  evolutionary	  
history	  and	  cultural	  contingencies.	  Faced	  with	   the	  recognition	   that	   the	  photons	  meeting	  our	  
retina	  would	  be	  the	  same	  whether	  there	  are	  chairs	  or	  upthairs,	  the	  causal	  relation	  between	  the	  
objects	  sending	  off	  light	  and	  the	  perceptual	  state	  presenting	  chairs	  and	  tables	  is	  not	  sufficient	  
to	  vindicate	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  chairs	  “out	  there”,	  as	  opposed	  upthairs	  and	  downthairs.108	  
The	  scope	  of	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  argument	  must	  not	  be	  misunderstood:	  most	  of	  the	  
facts	   about	   what	   there	   is	   would	   be	   untouched	   by	   the	   argument,	   such	   as	   there	   being	   some	  
particles	   arranged	   spherewise	   there,	   some	   particles	   reflecting	   light	  with	  wavelength	   500-­‐550	  
nanometers	  over	  here,	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  causal	  relationship	  between	  such	  facts	  and	  our	  percep-­‐
tual	  experience	  explains	  why	  we	  have	  the	  perceptual	  experiences	  we	  do	  on	  a	  given	  occasion.	  In	  
contrast,	  if	  there	  are	  tables,	  this	  fact	  would	  seem	  causally	  inert.	  	  
Hirsch’s	  strategy	  for	  answering	  arguments	  that	  threaten	  common	  sense	  ontology	  is	  to	  
say	  that	  they	  are	  based	  on	  premises	  that	  must	  be	  false	  in	  English,	  because	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  
sentences	   contradicting	   revisionary	   claims	   far	  outweighs	   the	  number	  of	   sentences	  with	   revi-­‐
sionary	  consequences	   (see	  section	  3.4)	  Regardless	  of	   the	  merits	  of	   such	  an	  argument,	  my	  ar-­‐
gument	  of	  this	  section	  cannot	  be	  avoided	  in	  this	  way.	  For	  while	  revisionary	  arguments	  are	  part	  
of	   ontology,	   the	   argument	   of	   this	   section	   is	   an	   epistemological	   “debunking	   argument”	   with	  
counterparts	   in	   inter	   alia	   metaethics	   and	   the	   philosophy	   of	   mathematics.	   So	   for	   instance,	  
Benacerraf	  (1965)	  famously	  argued	  that	  as	  we	  don’t	  stand	  in	  a	  causal	  relationship	  to	  mathemat-­‐
ical	  entities,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  we	  have	  knowledge	  of	  mathematical	  objects	  if	  Platonism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  For	  philosophers	  who	  suppose,	  but	  do	  not	  argue,	  that	  causal	  connections	  between	  ordinary	  objects	  and	  belief	  in	  
ordinary	  objects	  are	  sufficient	  to	  answer	  my	  argument,	  see	  Joyce	  (2006,	  p.	  182)	  and	  Schetchter	  (2010,	  p.	  438).	  	  
107	  This	  is	  if	  one	  doesn’t	  accept	  the	  thesis	  called	  composition	  as	  identity,	  see	  Cotnoir	  and	  Baxter	  (2014).	  
108	  This	  kind	  of	  causal	  link	  is	  sometimes	  said	  to	  be	  deviant.	  See	  Peacocke	  (1979,	  p.	  128)	  on	  deviant	  causal	  links.	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is	  true.	  In	  metaethics,	  Joyce	  (2006)	  among	  others	  have	  argued	  against	  moral	  realism	  by	  point-­‐
ing	  out	  that	  our	  moral	  beliefs	  are	  likely	  results	  of	  evolution,	  and	  that	  it’s	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  we	  
have	  knowledge	  of	  moral	  facts.	  Such	  arguments	  are	  structurally	  similar	  to	  my	  argument:	  they	  
point	   out	   an	   explanatory	  disconnect	  between	   the	   alleged	   facts	   and	  our	  beliefs.	   I	   take	   it	   that	  
Hirsch	  doesn’t	  reject	  this	  kind	  of	  argument	  out	  of	  hand,	  and	  thus	  he	  must	  either	  come	  up	  with	  
some	  response	  to	  my	  argument,	  or	  accept	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  don’t	  give	  justification	  
for	  believing	   in	  ordinary	  objects,	   so	   there	   is	  no	  pressure	   from	  charity	   to	   interpret	  perceptual	  
reports	  as	  true.	  That	  they	  are	  correct,	  or	  “generally	  accurate”,	  is	  enough.	  	  
I	   have	   argued	   that	  perception	  does	  not	  provide	   justification	   for	  believing	   in	  ordinary	  
objects.	   But	   to	   successfully	   show	   that	   HI	   and	   RI	   are	   equally	   good	   interpretations,	   and	   thus	  
undermine	   the	   argument	   from	   charity,	   something	   more	   must	   be	   said	   about	   how	   it	   is	   that	  
ordinary	   people’s	   perceptual	   reports	   are	   correct.	   First,	   because	   it	   looks	  as	   if	   there	   are	   tables	  
and	  chairs,	  but	  no	  table-­‐chairs,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  people	  rely	  on	  their	  perceptual	  systems	  
and	  culturally	  entrenched	  languages	  to	  report	  what	  they	  see.	  But,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  how	  things	  
appear	  is	  not,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  a	  guide	  to	  which	  physical	  objects	  there	  are	  over	  and	  above	  
particles.	  The	  folk’s	  lacking	  interest	  in	  philosophy	  explains	  why	  they	  keep	  relying	  on	  perceptu-­‐
al	  experiences	  and	  thus	  are	  wrong.	  Second,	  people	  are	  correct	  because	  perceptual	  experiences	  
do	  depend	  to	  a	  considerable	  degree	  on	  what	  there	  is.	  There	  is	  a	  determinate	  relationship	  be-­‐
tween	  the	  fundamental	  particles,	  photons	  and	  our	  perceptual	  systems’	  processing	  of	  the	  pho-­‐
tons	  meeting	  the	  retina.	  Third,	  the	  object	  facts	  are	  largely	  irrelevant	  to	  how	  we	  orientate	  and	  
interact	  with	  reality.	  Most	  ontologists	  agree	  that	  ontological	  theories	  don’t	  have	  direct	  empiri-­‐
cal	   consequences,	   so	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   ordinary	   people	   haven’t	   noticed	   the	   potential	  
falsity	  of	   their	  beliefs.	  But	   this	  doesn’t	  make	  the	   folks	   incorrect	  or	   irrational,	   rather	   the	   folks	  
are	  quite	  rational	  when	  they,	  absent	  an	  undercutting	  defeater,	  rely	  on	  their	  perceptual	  systems	  
and	  language	  to	  talk	  about	  which	  things	  there	  are.	  Their	  beliefs	  are	  close	  to	  true.109	  In	  a	  sense,	  
their	  beliefs	  are	  correct.	  	  
Lastly,	  and	  fortunately,	  Hirsch	  has	  to	  a	   large	  extent	  provided	  the	  resources	  to	  explain	  
this	   notion	   of	   correctness	   for	   us	   already.	   In	   chapter	   1,	   I	   showed	   how	  Hirsch	   construed	   the	  
truth-­‐conditions	  of	   a	  perdurantist	   language	   in	   an	  endurantists	   language,	   and	  vice	   versa,	   and	  
the	  same	  for	  a	  universalist	  and	  common-­‐sense	  view	  on	  composition.	  The	  same	  definitions	  can	  
be	   used	   to	   define	   what	   we	   may	   call	   the	   correctness-­‐conditions	   of	   the	   ordinary	   ontological	  
assertions	  of	  ordinary	  people.110	  Thus	  a	  universalist	  can	  construe	  the	  correctness-­‐conditions	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  For	   an	   explication	   of	   this	   notion,	   and	   a	   description	   of	   the	   “belief	   and	   practice”	   of	   ordinary	   people	   in	   light	   of	  
quasi-­‐nihilism,	  see	  Merricks	  (2001,	  chapter	  7).	  	  
110	  See	  Chalmers	  (2009)	  for	  a	  related	  notion.	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ordinary	   people	   by	   restricting	   the	   quantifier,	   for	   example.	   But	   correctness	   is	   not	   truth,	   and	  
thus	  it	  is	  open	  to	  ontological	  debate	  what	  there	  is.	  
Charity	   to	   perception	  was	   above	   described	   as	   the	   very	   strong	   presumption	   “that	   any	  
language	  contains	  sentences	  used	  to	  make	  perceptual	  reports,	  and	  that	  these	  reports	  are	  gen-­‐
erally	  accurate”	   (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	   149).	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	   the	   revisionary	  ontologist	  can	  accom-­‐
modate	   this.	  Our	  perceptual	   reports	   are	  generally	   accurate	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   reflect	   the	  
distributions	  of	  particles,	  and	  they	  are	  correct	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  work	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
ordinary	  people.	  Because	  there	  is	  no	  explanatory	  connection	  between	  the	  object	  facts	  and	  our	  
beliefs	   about	  what	   there	   is,	  Hirsch	   cannot	   claim	   to	   have	   an	   interpretation	   that	   lets	   the	   folk	  
come	  out	  more	  correct	  or	   rational	   than	   the	   revisionist,	   so	   there	   is	  not	  pressure	   to	  choose	  HI	  
over	  RI.	  This	  is	  what’s	  required	  to	  undermine	  Hirsch’s	  argument	  from	  charity	  to	  perception.	  	  
3.3.2	   Problems	  with	  charity	  to	  understanding	  
A	  second	  element	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  that	  was	  mentioned	  in	  section	  1.4.2	  was	  charity	  to	  
understanding.	  Hirsch	   claims	   that	   there	   is	   a	  presumption	   that	   fluent	   speakers	  of	   a	   language	  
have	   a	   “sufficiently	   adequate	   grasp	   of	   their	   linguistic	   and	   conceptual	   resources	   so	   that	   they	  
don’t	   generally	  make	   a	   priori	   conceptually	   false	   assertions,	   especially	   when	   these	   assertions	  
seem	   to	  be	   relatively	   simple”	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   149).	  This	   is	   supposed	   to	  be	   a	   problem	   for	   the	  
revisionary	  ontologist	  because	  she	  holds	  that	  questions	  of	  ontology	  are	  a	  priori	  knowable,	  and	  
thus	  is	  forced	  to	  concede	  that	  ordinary	  people	  make	  a	  priori	  mistakes.	  When	  a	  nihilist	  claims	  
that	  the	  sentence	  “There	  is	  at	  least	  one	  building	  in	  New	  York	  City”	  is	  false,	  a	  sentence	  ordinary	  
speakers	  consider	  true,	  she	  violates	  charity	  to	  understanding	  because	  she	  by	  implication	  says	  
that	  ordinary	  people	  are	  wrong	  about	  something	  that	   is	  a	  priori	  knowable.	  According	  to	  this	  
line	  of	  argument,	  it	   is	   implausible	  that	  fluent	  English	  speakers	  make	  a	  priori	  conceptual	  mis-­‐
takes,	  so	  there	  is	  a	  presumption	  against	  an	  interpretation	  of	  English	  that	  implies	  that.	  
It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  charity	  to	  understanding	  always	  imposes	  a	  strong	  pressure	  to	  inter-­‐
pret	  people	  in	  conformity	  to	  the	  a	  priori	  conceptual	  truths.	  Mathematics	  and	  logic	  are	  consid-­‐
ered	   a	   priori	   disciplines	   that	   discover	   necessary	   truths,	   but	   there	   isn’t	   thereby	   pressure	   to	  
interpret	   individuals	   to	   be	   correct	   about	   the	  more	   complicated	   aspects	   of	  mathematics	   and	  
logic.	  For	  instance,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  axiom	  of	  choice	  and	  the	  continuum	  
hypothesis	   of	   Zermelo–Frankel	   set	   theory	   is	   a	   priori	   knowable	   does	   not	   create	   pressure	   to	  
interpret	  people	  in	  conformity	  to	  these	  truths.	  Hirsch	  takes	  this	  into	  account,	  and	  claims	  that	  
charity	   to	  understanding	   is	   important	  when	   the	  assertions	   seem	  to	  be	   relatively	   simple,	   “not	  
ostensibly	   involving	  any	  complicated	  calculations	  or	   computations	   (2011,	  p.	   149).	  So	   it	  would	  
seem	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   a	   priority	   in	   itself	   that	  matters,	   but	   rather	   a	   certain	   obviousness,	   or	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“simplicity”,	  ordinary	  people	  associate	  with	  sentences	  such	  as	  “There	  is	  at	  least	  one	  building	  in	  
New	  York	  City”.	  	  
Hirsch’s	  main	  point	  seems	  to	  be,	  again,	   that	   the	  revisionary	  ontologist	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  
good	  explanation	  of	  why	  ordinary	  people	  would	  make	  such	  mistakes:	  	  
	  
If	  revisionists	  interpret	  the	  ontological	  assertions	  of	  common	  sense	  as	  a	  priori	  necessarily	  false	  
then,	  assuming	  there	  are	  other	  available	  interpretations,	  this	  does	  prima	  facie	  violate	  the	  princi-­‐
ple	  of	  charity,	   since	  people	  are	  not	  normally	   thought	   to	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  assert	  what	   is	  a	  
priori	  necessarily	  false.	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  100)	  
	   	  
Thus	   again	   the	   question	   becomes	  whether	   ordinary	   people	   have	   good	   reasons	   for	  making	   a	  
priori	  necessarily	  mistaken	  ontological	  assertions,	  which	   is	   just	  another	   instantiation	  of	  Expl.	  
In	   contrast	   to	   attempts	   to	   explain	   how	   ordinary	   people	   are	   rational	   and	   correct	   in	   spite	   of	  
having	   false	   beliefs,	   the	   specific	   question	   of	  why	   they	   can	  make	   a	   priori	   knowable	  mistakes	  
hasn’t,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  know,	  been	  given	  much	  attention	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  
It	  would	  seem	  the	  obviousness	  of	  ordinary	  ontological	  claims	  disappears	  when	  we	  con-­‐
sider	  the	  conclusions	  of	  section	  3.3.1.	  I	  argued	  that	  even	  though	  our	  perceptual	  experiences	  in	  
the	   end	  don’t	   give	   reason	   to	  believe	   in	   tables,	   that	  doesn’t	  mean	   that	   it	   is	   incorrect	   to	  utter	  
“There	  are	  tables”	  when	  faced	  with	  particles	  arranged	  tablewise.	  To	  some	  extent,	  this	  contrib-­‐
utes	   to	   undermine	   the	   obviousness	   of	   ordinary	   ontological	   claims,	   for	   this	   obviousness	   is	  
presumably	   in	   part	   based	   on	   the	   truth	   of	   perceptual	   reports.	   Hirsch	   holds	   that	   the	   truth-­‐
conditions	  of	  the	  English	  sentence	  “There	  are	  tables”	  are	  what	  we	  would	  otherwise	  character-­‐
ize	  as	  there	  being	  particles	  arranged	  tablewise.	  But	  having	  removed	  the	  perceptual	  justification	  
for	  such	  truth-­‐conditions,	  it	  seems	  that	  it	  is	  utterly	  unobvious	  –	  though	  perhaps	  still	  a	  priori	  –	  
whether	  “There	  are	  tables”	  is	  true.	  If	  we	  undermine	  the	  obviousness	  associated	  with	  sentences	  
about	  ordinary	  objects,	  we	  also	  remove	  some	  of	  the	  pressure	  from	  charity	  to	  understanding.	  	  
One	  may	  also	  take	  issue	  with	  how	  Hirsch	  construes	  the	  “a	  priori”,	  and	  based	  on	  it	  de-­‐
rives	  a	  kind	  of	  obviousness	   that	  we	  must	   respect	   in	   interpretation.	  Hawthorne	   (2009,	  p.	  217)	  
argues	  that	  many	  real-­‐life	  ontologists	  don’t	  fit	  Hirsch’s	  “profile”,	   i.e.	  his	  assumption	  that	  they	  
treat	  ontological	  questions	  as	  being	  answerable	  by	  a	  priori	  reasoning,	  and	  writes	  that:	  
	  
Even	  if	  they	  [ontologists]	  regard	  their	  favored	  ontology	  as	  necessary,	  they	  often	  do	  not	  presume	  
any	  special	  a	  priori	  access	  to	  its	  truth.	  Being	  content	  rather	  to	  defend	  it	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  broad	  
theoretical	  virtues	  like	  simplicity,	  reasonable	  conformity	  with	  common	  sense,	  elegance,	  and	  so	  
on.	  They	  thus	  regard	  such	  theses	  as	  that	  the	  physical	  facts	  fix	  the	  phenomenal	  facts,	  that	  there	  is	  
some	   elite	   stock	   of	   fundamental	   properties	   and	   that	   classical	   mereology	   is	   correct	   as	   quasi-­‐
empirical	  thesis	  whose	  tenuous	  connection	  to	  experience	  is	  not	  different	  in	  kind	  to	  that	  of	  vari-­‐
ous	  bits	  of	  high-­‐level	  physical	  theory.	  (David	  Lewis	  is	  a	  good	  example.)	  (Hawthorne	  2009,	  p.	  217)	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Hawthorne’s	  argument	  can	  be	  construed	   in	   two	  ways.	  One	  take	  on	   it	   is	   that	   it	   rejects	  all	   to-­‐
gether	   that	   ontological	   truths	   are	   a	   priori	   discernable:	   a	   priori	   reasoning	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	  
determine	  what	   there	   is.	  Another	  way	   to	   construe	   it	   is	   that	  mainstream	  ontology	   involves	   a	  
whole	   battery	   of	   a	   priori	   considerations	   that	   must	   be	   weighed	   against	   each	   other,	   such	   as	  
conformity	   to	   common	   sense,	   elegance,	   integration	   of	   other	   theories,	   simplicity,	   and	   so	   on.	  
The	   first	   construal	   would	   undercut	   charity	   to	   understanding	   playing	   a	   role,	   for	   if	   sound,	   it	  
implies	   that	   people	   aren’t	  making	   a	   priori	  mistakes.	   But	   also	   the	   second	   version	  will	   under-­‐
mine	  Hirsch’s	   application	   of	   charity	   to	   understanding,	   for	   it	  makes	   the	   answers	   of	   ontology	  
unobvious	  (this	  holds	  for	  the	  first	  construal	  of	  the	  argument	  as	  well).	   It	   is	  unclear	  why	  the	  a	  
priority	  of	  ontological	  questions	  should	  be	  given	  special	  attention	  in	   interpretation.	  Tracking	  
back	   to	   Hirsch’s	   explanatory	   challenge,	   we	   can	   explain	   that	   ordinary	   people	   make	   a	   priori	  
mistakes	   because	   the	  questions	   require	   sophisticated	   a	   priori	   reasoning	   to	   answer.	  Ordinary	  
people	  have	   gone	   through	  no	   such	   reasoning,	   reasonably	   relying	  on	   their	   perceptual	   experi-­‐
ences	  and	  culturally	  entrenched	  languages	  to	  express	  what	  there	  is.	  Thus	  there	  is	  no	  pressure	  
from	  charity	  to	  understanding	  to	  choose	  an	  interpretation	  that	  treats	  ordinary	  people’s	  utter-­‐
ances	  as	  true,	  because	  they	  do	  have	  good	  reasons	  for	  their	  mistakes,	  cf.	  Expl.	  	  
	   In	   general,	   the	   revisionist	   ontologist	   would	   want	   to	   say	   that	   answering	   ontological	  
questions	  is	  so	  difficult	  that	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  irrationality	  associated	  with	  any	  position	  per	  
se	   (though	  there	  might	  of	  course	  be	  irrationality	  on	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  react	  
rationally	   to	   the	   arguments).	   In	   any	   case,	  we	   can	  hardly	   attribute	  problematic	   levels	   of	   irra-­‐
tionality	  as	  long	  as	  a	  party	  with	  a	  position	  on	  the	  matter,	  e.g.	  an	  ordinary	  person	  who	  believes	  
that	  there	  are	  tables,	  hasn’t	  been	  faced	  with	  an	  argument	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  their	  commonsense	  
ontology	  is	  false,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  obviously	  true.	  Charity	  to	  understanding	  hardly	  has	  a	  role	  to	  
play	   in	   determining	   how	   to	   interpret	   English	   ontological	   claims,	   for	   incorrectness	   doesn’t	  
follow	  from	  being	  wrong	  about	  ontological	  questions.	  	  
3.3.3	   Problems	  with	  charity	  to	  retraction	  
Finally,	  consider	  the	  element	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  charity	  that	  Hirsch	  calls	  charity	  to	  retraction.	  
As	   I	   explained	   in	   subsections	   1.4.2	   and	   3.2.2,	   this	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	   an	   element	  of	   charity	  
that	  may	   block	   a	   given	   interpretation	   as	   charitable	   if	   it	   doesn’t	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	  
potential	  change	  in	  assertions	  and	  belief	  in	  the	  face	  of	  new	  evidence.	  	  
	   As	   such,	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   charity	   to	   retraction	   could	   only	   benefit	   the	   revisionary	  
ontologist.	  For	  she	  believes	  that	  ordinary	  people	  are	  wrong	  in	  many	  of	  their	  assertions	  about	  
physical	   objects.	   Treating	   it	   as	   a	   live	   possibility	   that	   she	   is	   correct,	   we	   cannot	   exclude	   the	  
possibility	  of	  ordinary	  English	  speakers	  eventually	  being	  persuaded	  and	  retract	  their	  ordinary	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ontological	  assertions.	  Charity	  to	  retraction	  would	  thus,	  in	  an	  interpretation	  of	  English,	  imply	  
that	  we	  should	  choose	  an	  interpretation	  conforming	  to	  the	  true	  ontological	  theory.	  	  
	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  not	  obvious	  that	  any	  revisionary	  ontology	  is	  true,	  let	  alone	  which	  
one.	  Instead,	  Hirsch	  could	  be	  correct	  that	  what	  exists	  is	  exactly	  what	  we	  ordinarily	  talk	  about	  
there	  being.	  Thus	  the	  most	  neutral	  view	  on	  charity	  to	  retraction	  is	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  impose	  any	  
constraints	  or	  presumptions	  when	  interpreting	  English.	  It	  doesn’t	  create	  any	  pressure	  towards	  
interpreting	  commonsense	  ontological	  utterances	  as	  true,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  create	  any	  pressure	  to	  
interpreting	  them	  as	  false	  either.	  	  
	   One	  could	  imagine	  Hirsch	  trying	  to	  impose	  a	  converse	  retraction-­‐consideration	  against	  
revisionary	  ontology:	  Because	  ordinary	  people	  are	  not	  disposed	  to	  retract	  their	  common	  sense	  
ontological	  assertions,	  there	  is	  a	  presumption	  to	  interpret	  those	  sentences	  as	  true.	  It	  should	  be	  
noted	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  standard	  application	  of	  charity	  to	  retraction.	  It	  doesn’t	  say	  we	  shouldn’t	  
interpret	   in	   a	   certain	   way	   because	   that	   interpretation	   doesn’t	   respects	   how	   ordinary	   people	  
would	  alter	  their	  assertions	  about	  what	  there	  is	  in	  face	  of	  additional	  evidence,	  but	  rather	  that	  
absence	  of	  retraction	  creates	  a	  presumption	  that	  there	  is	  no	  more	  relevant	  evidence.	  Thus	  this	  
reverse	  argument	  doesn’t	  have	  the	  same	  standing	  as	  an	  argument	  based	  on	  the	  presumption	  of	  
charity	   to	   retraction,	   but	  we	  need	  not	   take	   a	   stance	   on	   the	   difficult	   question	   of	   the	   general	  
plausibility	  of	   this	  reverse	  retraction	  presumption	  since	  the	  argument	  based	  on	   it	  can	  be	  an-­‐
swered.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  following	  bears	  resemblances	  to	  subsection	  3.2.2	  above.	  
	   Observe	  that	  the	  argument	  put	  forward	  on	  behalf	  of	  Hirsch	  presupposes	  the	  empirical	  
claim	  that	  ordinary	  people	  won’t	   retract	  their	  assertions	  in	  the	  face	  of	  new	  philosophical	  evi-­‐
dence	   indicating	   that	   their	   belief	   in	   ordinary	   objects	   are	   wrong.111	  As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   both	  
Hirsch	  and	  Sider	  have	  appealed	  to	  the	  dispositions	  of	  English	  speakers	  in	  an	  apparent	  attempt	  
say	  something	  about	  this	  argument.	  Hirsch	  reports	  that	  when	  he	  taught	  a	  metaphysics	  course	  
and	  tried	  to	  explain	  four-­‐dimensionalism,	  a	  linguistics	  student	  “had	  a	  seizure	  of	  uncontrollable	  
laughter”	  and	  told	  him	  afterwards	  that	  “she	  thought	  that	  four-­‐dimensionalism	  was	  an	  absolute	  
hilarious	  aberration	  of	  the	  English	  language”	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  128).	  Ted	  Sider	  replies:	  
	  
My	  students’	  resistance	  to	  such	  sentences	  fades	  when	  they	  come	  to	  appreciate	  the	  subtleties	  of	  
quantifier	  domain	   restriction.	   (Compare	   initial	   resistance	   to	   “there	  are	   six	   tables	   in	   the	   room”	  
said	  of	  a	  room	  with	  two	  large	  tables,	  each	  made	  up	  of	  two	  smaller	  ones.)	  Resistance	  fades	  fur-­‐
ther	   when	   students	  master	   spatiotemporal	   thinking.	   Resistance	   (of	   the	   uninitiated	  —	   not	   of	  
Hirsch!)	  is	  partially	  due	  to	  failure	  to	  grasp	  the	  proposed	  nature	  of	  strange	  objects.	  After	  a	  bit	  of	  
innocent	  coaching,	  students	  see	  the	  analogy	  between	  strange	  and	  commonsense	  objects,	  and	  no	  
longer	  finds	  the	  former	  linguistically	  preposterous.	  In	  my	  experience,	  only	  philosophers	  put	  up	  
enlightened	  resistance.	  (Sider	  2004,	  p.	  680)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  Hirsch	  seems	  to	  believe	  this,	  see	  section	  3.4.	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It	   should	   go	   without	   saying	   that	   these	   kinds	   of	   first-­‐hand	   experiences	   bear	   little	   evidential	  
weight	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  ordinary	  people112	  in	  general	  would	  react	  to	  philosophical	  evidence.	  
I	  would	  prefer	  some	  empirical	  data	  on	  this,	  but	  without	  any	  such,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  reverse	  
charity	  to	  retraction	  argument	  would	  overgeneralize	  in	  an	  implausible	  way.	  	  
It	  seems	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  philosophers	  don’t	  evaluate	  the	  evidence	  and	  ar-­‐
guments	   concerning	   a	   philosophical	   topic	   alike,	   it	   is	   implausible	   that	   all	   “ordinary”	   people	  
would	  be	  disposed	  to	  evaluate	  the	  evidence	  and	  arguments	  uniformly.	  This	  is	  so	  in	  ontology,	  
but	  also	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  philosophy	  there	  is	  a	  perhaps	  surprising	  amount	  of	  disagreement.113	  I	  
doubt	  there	  is	  much	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  ontological	  arguments	  are	  generally	  less	  persuasive	  
than	  for	  instance	  arguments	  trying	  to	  establish	  an	  epistemological	  or	  ethical	  conclusion.	  If	  we	  
want	   to	   speculate	   about	  how	  ordinary	   people	  will	   react	   to	   ontological	   arguments	   for	   a	   revi-­‐
sionary	  conclusion,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  a	  reasonable	  assumption	  is	  that	  they	  won’t	  be	  more	  or	  
less	  disposed	   to	   retract	   their	  ordinary	  utterances	  about	  ordinary	  objects	   than	   they	  are	   to	   re-­‐
tract	  their	  knowledge-­‐assertions	  in	  the	  face	  of	  skeptical	  arguments,	  or	  their	  ethical	  assertions	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  ethical	  anti-­‐realist	  arguments.	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  a	  reverse	  
charity	   to	   retraction	   presumption	  would	   generalize	   to	   other	   arguments	   in	   philosophy	   in	   an	  
unwanted	  and	  implausible	  way.	  I	  find	  it	  unreasonable	  to	  think	  that	  skepticism	  is	  false	  merely	  
because	   people	   are	   disposed	   to	   reject	   skeptical	   arguments,	   and	   by	   analogy,	   we	   should	   not	  
reject	  an	  interpretation	  of	  English	  simply	  because	  it	  goes	  against	  “common	  sense”.114	  
3.3.4	   The	  argument	  from	  charity	  summarized	  
In	  the	  previous	  subsections	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  merit	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  charity.	  I	  argued	  
that	   the	   argument	   from	   charity	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   explanatory	   challenge	   to	   the	  
revisionist	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  assertions	  of	  ordinary	  people	  about	  ordinary	  objects	  are	  correct,	  
albeit	  false.	  To	  answer	  the	  argument	  from	  charity,	  the	  revisionist	  has	  to	  show	  that	  a	  revisionary	  
interpretation	  of	  ordinary	  people’s	  assertions,	  RI,	  lets	  them	  come	  out	  as	  correct	  as	  a	  Hirschean	  
interpretation,	  HI.	   I	  have	  provided	  arguments	   for	  why	  ordinary	  people	  are	  correct	  when	  they	  
take	  there	  to	  be	  ordinary	  objects	  and	  no	  arbitrary	  sums	  thereof.	  	  
	   I	  considered	  three	  distinct	  elements	  of	  charity.	  Charity	  to	  perception	  asks	  for	  an	  expla-­‐
nation	  of	  why	  ordinary	  people	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  ordinary	  objects,	  and	  I	  argued	  that	  upon	  
reflection,	   there	   is	   little	   reason	   to	  believe	   that	  we	  have	  direct	  perceptual	  evidence	   for	   taking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Perhaps	  neither	  linguistics	  students	  nor	  Sider’s	  students	  are	  “ordinary	  people”,	  but	  in	  that	  case	  their	  reactions	  are	  
even	  less	  relevant	  to	  the	  general	  question	  of	  how	  ordinary	  people	  will	  react.	  	  
113	  See	   the	   empirical	   studies	  published	   in	  Bourget	   and	  Chalmers	   (2014).	   For	   a	  direct	  discussion	  of	   the	  widespread	  
disagreement,	  and	  lack	  of	  consensus	  in	  philosophy,	  see	  Chalmers	  (forthcoming).	  	  
114	  That’s	  not	  to	  say	  that	  some	  may	  consider	  the	  conclusions	  of	  such	  arguments	  as	  so	  preposterous	  that	  they	  won’t	  
believe	  them	  and	  thus	  are	  motivated	  to	  find	  arguments	  against	  them.	  But	  as	  far	  as	  I’m	  concerned,	  this	  says	  nothing	  
about	  the	  soundness	  of	  the	  skeptical	  arguments.	  	  
	   72	  
there	  to	  be	  ordinary	  objects	  (section	  3.3.1).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  folks	  are	  correct	  in	  trusting	  their	  
perceptual	  systems,	  since	  there	  is	  an	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  what	  there	  is	  and	  percep-­‐
tual	  experiences;	  their	  beliefs	  are	  formed	  based	  on	  perceptual	  experiences	  that	  are	  the	  function	  
of	  the	  fundamental	  particles,	  their	  beliefs	  work	  for	  their	  practical	  purposes	  and	  they	  don’t	  have	  
defeaters.	  I	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  a	  priority	  of	  ontological	  theories	   imposes	  no	  presumption	  to	  
interpret	  English	  sentences	  about	  ordinary	  objects	  to	  be	  true,	  because	  such	  questions	  are	  very	  
difficult	  to	  answer,	  so	  the	  a	  priority	  of	  the	  answers	  doesn’t	  impose	  any	  significant	  incorrectness	  
on	  ordinary	  people	   if	   they	  happen	   to	  be	  wrong	   (section	   3.3.2).	   Finally,	   a	   converse	   charity	   to	  
retraction-­‐argument	  has	  little	  bearing	  on	  whether	  English	  sentences	  such	  as	  “There	  are	  tables”	  
are	  true	  (section	  3.3.3).	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  does	  not	  deliver	  the	  conclu-­‐
sion	  that	  ordinary	  claims	  about	  what	  there	  is,	  such	  as	  “There	  are	  tables”	  and	  “There	  is	  no	  ob-­‐
ject	  that	  has	  Plato’s	  nose	  and	  the	  Eiffel	  Tower	  as	  parts”	  are	  true.	  Thus	  it	   is	  open	  for	  the	  revi-­‐
sionist,	  as	  long	  as	  she	  is	  ready	  to	  meet	  the	  explanatory	  challenges	  I’ve	  discussed,	  to	  argue	  that	  
revisionary	  ontological	  claims	  are	  true	  in	  English.	  	  
As	  I	  said	  at	  the	  outset,	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  was	  not	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  specific	  onto-­‐
logical	   conclusion,	   but	   simply	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   argument	   from	   charity	   does	   not	   entail	   that	  
English	  sentences	  about	  ordinary	  objects	  are	  true.	  That’s	  what	  I’ve	  done.	  	  
3.4	   The	  Outweighing	  Argument	  
What	  will	  Hirsch	  say	  to	  my	  arguments?	  To	  those	  who	  claim	  that	  sentences	  such	  as	  “There	  are	  
tables”	  and	  “There	  is	  no	  object	  that	  has	  the	  Eiffel	  tower	  and	  Plato’s	  nose	  as	  parts”	  are	  not	  trivi-­‐
ally	   true	   in	   English,	   Hirsch’s	   reply	   has	   been	   as	   follows:	   The	   apparently	   true	   sentences	   that	  
make	   out	   the	   premises	   of	   the	   argument	   against	   common	   sense	   are	   far	   outweighed	   by	   the	  
number	  of	  apparently	  true	  sentence	  that	  supports	  common	  sense.	  So	  the	  premises	  must,	  cor-­‐
rectly	  interpreted	  using	  the	  principle	  of	  charity,	  be	  false.	  Thus	  my	  argument	  is	  unsound.	  
This	  is	  the	  response	  Hirsch	  gives	  to	  David	  Lewis’	  (1986,	  p.	  202–204)	  argument	  from	  the	  
nature	  of	  temporal	  intrinsics	  to	  the	  doctrine	  of	  temporal	  parts.	  Hirsch	  writes	  that:	  
	  
For	  it	  [Lewis’	  argument]	  is	  hardly	  likely	  to	  have	  the	  power	  to	  convert	  typical	  English	  speakers.	  
Surely	  the	  typical	  speaker’s	  disposition	  to	  talk	  like	  an	  endurantist	  far	  outweighs	  any	  disposition	  
to	  worry	  about	  temporal	  intrinsics.	  So	  plain	  English	  remains	  E-­‐English	  [a	  language	  in	  which	  the	  
typical	  assertions	  of	  endurantists	  are	  true].	   Insofar	  as	  the	  philosophers	   involved	  in	  the	  dispute	  
claim	  to	  be	  speaking	  plain	  English,	  that’s	  all	  they	  need	  to	  know.	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  231)	  
	  
This	  argument	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  reverse	  charity	  to	  retraction-­‐argument	  discussed	  in	  sec-­‐
tion	  3.3.3.	  Hirsch	  talks	  about	  “dispositions”	  outweighing	  others.	  If	  a	  set	  of	  dispositions	  to	  talk	  a	  
certain	   way	   outweighs	   another	   set	   of	   dispositions,	   then	   that’s	   all	   we	   “need	   to	   know”	   about	  
which	  language	  we	  are	  speaking.	  English	  speakers	  are	  disposed	  to	  consider	  “There	  are	  tables”	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as	  true,	  so	  Hirsch’s	  common	  sense	  ontology	  follows,	  entailing	  the	  falsity	  of	  revisionary	  ontolog-­‐
ical	   claims,	   and	   also	   entailing	   the	   falsity	   of	   the	   sentences	   (premises)	   in	   the	   arguments	   that	  
have	  revisionary	  conclusions,	  for	  they	  are	  “outweighed”.	  Here	  is	  another	  example:	  
	  
But	  if	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  philosophical	  sentence	  conflicts	  with	  endurantism,	  as	  Lewis	  claims,	  then	  
this	  sentence	  is	  false	  in	  E-­‐English.	  The	  overwhelming	  considerations	  of	  charity	  to	  use	  that	  indi-­‐
cate	   that	   the	   language	  of	  our	  community	   is	  E-­‐English	  –	   the	  charity	   to	  use	   that	  appeals	   to	   the	  
typical	  speakers’	  confident	  assertions	  of	  innumerable	  endurantist	  sentences	  –	  must	  be	  weighed	  
against	  charity	  to	  the	  philosophical	  sentence.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  contest.	  (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  232)	  
	  
So	  Hirsch	  seems	  to	  focus	  on	  maximizing	  the	  number	  of	  sentences	  a	  linguistic	  community	  as	  a	  
whole	  accepts	  as	  true	  when	  determining	  the	  truth	  of	  other	  sentences,	  where	  we	  also	  pay	  atten-­‐
tion	  to	  the	  confidence	  the	  speakers	  have	  in	  their	  truth.	  The	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  revisionary	  
ontological	  theories	  are	  explained	  away	  by	  arguing	  that	  ordinary	  people	  are	  much	  more	  prone	  
to	  accept	  sentence	  such	  as	  “Ordinary	  objects	  don’t	  have	  temporal	  parts”	  than	  “Qualities	  such	  
as	   shapes	   are	   not	   relations,	   but	   intrinsic	   properties”.	  Hirsch	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   231)	   claims	   that	  
“Surely	  the	  typical	  speaker’s	  disposition	  to	  talk	  like	  an	  endurantist	  far	  outweighs	  any	  disposi-­‐
tion	  to	  worry	  about	  temporary	  intrinsics”,	  and	  finds	  this	  sufficient	  argument	  for	  endurantism,	  
which,	  as	   I’ve	  said,	   implies	   that	  revisionary	  theories	  of	  persistence	  are	   false.	   (For	  another	  ex-­‐
ample	  of	  such	  an	  argument,	  see	  Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  185.)	  
Hirsch	   seems	   to	   take	   the	   presently	   assumed	   truth	   of	   sentences	   as	   a	   given,	   and	   then	  
evaluates	   sentences	   with	   non-­‐commonsensical	   philosophical	   implications,	   S,	   against	   these.	  
The	  number	  of	  sentences	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  true	  in	  the	  community	  that	   implies	  ~𝑆	  will	   far	  
outweigh	  S	   in	  number	  and	  confidence,	  so	  S	  must	  be	  false.	  We	  may	  then	  characterize	  the	  gen-­‐
eral	  method	  thus.	  Take	  a	  set	  of	  sentence,	  s,	  that	  are	  confidently	  assumed	  to	  be	  true	  in	  English,	  
and	  then	  evaluate	  every	  sentence	  with	  potentially	  revisionist	  consequences,	  S,	  against	  this	  set.	  
In	  most	  cases,	  because	  of	   the	   infrequent	  philosophical	  discovery	  of	   sentences	   that	  seem	  true	  
that	  (in	  an	  argument)	  implies	  that	  common	  sense	  ontology	  is	  wrong,	  or	  not	  obviously	  true,	  the	  
number	  of	  sentences	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  sentences	  in	  s	  will	  far	  outweigh	  our	  
confidence	  in	  S,	  so	  S	  must	  be	  false.	  Thus	  no	  revisionary	  ontological	  theory	  can	  be	  true	  in	  Eng-­‐
lish.	  	  
Evaluating	  this	  general	  theory	  of	  truth-­‐in-­‐a-­‐language	  would	  bring	  us	  too	  far	  away	  from	  
the	  central	   topic	  of	   this	   thesis,115	  but	  we	  should	  again	  question	  Hirsch’s	   insight	   into	  ordinary	  
people’s	  dispositions.	  Basically,	  Hirsch	   is	  predicting	  how	  English	  speakers	  will	   react	  to	  philo-­‐
sophical	   arguments.	  We	   should	  note	   that	   this	   isn’t	   a	  prediction	   that	   entails	   that	   the	  English	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  A	  discussion	  of	  Hirsch’s	  overall	  view	  of	  language	  would	  be	  interesting,	  but	  difficult,	  and	  I’ve	  not	  found	  the	  space	  
for	  it.	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  I	  find	  Hirsch’s	  approach	  to	  “truth	  in	  a	  language”	  somewhat	  simplistic	  and	  implausible.	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language	   can’t	   change.	  Hirsch	   is	   surely	   open	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	  meaning	   of	   our	   terms	  
changing,	  so	  that	  it	  becomes	  true	  to	  talk	  about	  arbitrary	  sums	  or	  temporal	  parts	  in	  English.	  But	  
he	  thinks	  that	  we	  need	  to	  remain	  responsible	  to	  the	  language	  we	  claim	  to	  be	  using,	  and	  if	  we	  
understand	  English	   sentences,	   then	   it	   is	   true	   that	   there	  are	   tables	   (Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  85).	  What	  
Hirsch	  must	   reject	   is	   that	   there	   can	   be	   rational	   grounds	   for	   speakers	   of	   English	   to	   give	   up	  
common	   sense	   ontology	   at	   the	   present	   time,	   which	   is	   just	   what	   the	   revisionist	   believes.	   So	  
Hirsch	  predicts	  that	  given	  the	  meaning	  of	  our	  terms	  now,	  people	  won’t	  have	  a	  rational	  basis	  for	  
changing	  their	  beliefs	  and	  assertions	  about	  which	  physical	  objects	  there	  are.	  
This	  is	  a	  prediction	  I	  find	  dubious,	  but	  it	  should	  perhaps	  be	  recognized	  that	  one’s	  pre-­‐
dictions	   in	   this	   area	   are	   influenced	   by	   one’s	   stand	   on	   the	   arguments	   against	   common	   sense	  
ontology.	  I	  feel	  some	  pressure	  to	  at	  least	  reevaluate	  my	  ontological	  beliefs	  in	  the	  face	  of	  onto-­‐
logical	   arguments,	   and	   thus	   I	   expect	   that	   others	  will	   reconsider	   their	   beliefs	   as	  well.	   In	   any	  
case,	  I	  think	  we	  should	  abstain	  from	  basing	  an	  argument	  on	  a	  prediction	  about	  ordinary	  people	  
before	  we	  have	  some	  empirical	  data.	  
In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  the	  number	  of	  common	  sense	  quantificational	  
sentences	   outweighs	   the	   number	   of	   sentences	   with	   revisionist	   consequences	   cannot	   be	   the	  
whole	  story	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  either	  theory.	  This	  is	  the	  point	  about	  charity	  to	  retraction,	  and	  as	  I	  
argued	  in	  3.3.3,	  charity	  to	  retraction	  doesn’t	  create	  any	  interpretative	  pressure	   in	  this	  debate,	  
because	  we	  don’t	  know	  what	  the	  object	  facts	  are.	  	  
My	  objection	  to	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  if	  my	  argument	  of	  section	  3.3.1	  is	  sound,	  then	  or-­‐
dinary	  English	   speakers	   should,	  after	  being	   faced	  with	   that	  argument,	  accept	   that	   they	  don’t	  
have	  a	   rational	  basis	   for	  believing	   in	  ordinary	  objects	  based	  on	   their	  perceptual	   experiences.	  
The	  argument	  of	  section	  3.3.1	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  in	  general	  undermines	  the	  confidence	  in	  the	  
sentences	  in	  s,	  because	  it	  shows	  that	  our	  reasons	  for	  believing	  in	  objects	  are	  not	  tracking	  which	  
composites	  there	  are	  in	  an	  adequate	  way.	  We	  therefore	  have	  a	  systematic	  altering	  of	  the	  confi-­‐
dence	   in	   the	  sentences	   in	  s,	   alternatively	  a	  general	   retraction	  of	   them,	   in	  effect	   reducing	   the	  
pressure	   from	   charity	   to	   interpret	   S	   as	   false.	   It	   would	   seem	   that	   the	   outweighing	   argument	  
loses	  force	  when	  we	  can	  undercut	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  sentences	  that	  are	  used	  to	  outweigh	  
the	  truth	  of	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  arguments	  undermining	  common	  sense	  ontology.	  In	   light	  of	  
the	  argument	  of	  section	  3.3.1,	  then,	  ordinary	  people	  should	  reevaluate	  or	  retract	  many	  of	  their	  
utterances,	  in	  effect	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  utterances	  supporting	  common	  sense	  ontology.	  	  
Importantly,	  the	  argument	  of	  section	  3.3.1	  is	  not	  an	  ontological	  argument,	  but	  an	  epis-­‐
temological	  argument	  that	  undermines	  the	  reasons	  we	  have	  for	  our	  common	  sense	  assertions.	  
If	  Hirsch	  also	  wants	  to	  undermine	  epistemological	  arguments	  that	  go	  against	  “common	  sense”	  
by	  the	  outweighing	  argument,	  then	  I	  must	  rest	  my	  case	  given	  the	  space	  here.	  I	  think	  the	  revi-­‐
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sionary	  ontologist	  should	  be	  satisfied	  if	  she	  can	  show	  that	  substantive	  ontology	  is	  no	  worse	  off	  
than	  other	  parts	  of	  philosophy.	  	  
Second,	  if	  the	  argument	  of	  section	  3.3.1	  is	  sound,	  people	  should	  consider	  it	  “additional	  
evidence”.	  The	  argument	  seems	  to	  eliminate	  the	  most	  obvious	  grounds	  for	  believing	  in	  compo-­‐
sites,	  and	   thus	   it	  creates	  a	   rational	   requirement	   to	  at	   least	  evaluate	   the	   truth	  of	  one’s	  beliefs	  
and	   assertions	   about	   ordinary	   objects,	   with	   the	   potential	   requirement	   to	   also	   consider	   the	  
more	   traditional	   ontological	   arguments	   about	   composites.	   If	   someone	   undercuts	   your	   evi-­‐
dence,	   it	   is	   only	   rational	   to	   start	   thinking	   of	   other	   grounds	   for	   and	   against	   the	   beliefs	   that	  
evidence	  earlier	  was	   thought	   to	  support.	  Thus	   it	  would	  seem	  that	   if	   the	  argument	   in	  section	  
3.3.1	   is	   sound,	   it	   opens	   up	   the	   dispute,	  where	   there	   are	   arguments	   that	   undercuts	   the	   other	  
reasons	   one	  may	   have	   to	   believe	   in	   composite	   objects	   (Merricks	   2001),	   or	   that	   suggest	   that	  
there	  are	  many	  more	  objects	  than	  ordinary	  people	  believe	  (Sider	  2001b).	  	  
In	   ending,	   I	  will	   suggest	   an	  explanation	  of	  Hirsch’s	   tendency	   to	  disregard	   revisionary	  
theories.	  Hirsch	  sometimes	  frames	  his	  arguments	  as	  a	  question	  about	  which	  of	  his	  completely	  
interpreted	  languages	  is	  English.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  1,	  Hirsch’s	  arguments	  involve	  the	  stipu-­‐
lation	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  different	  ontological	  languages,	  where	  it	  follows	  from	  the	  stipulation	  
of	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	   languages	   that	  certain	   target	   sentences,	   such	  as	   “There	  are	  no	   tables”,	  
are	   true.	   But	   the	   purpose	   of	   Quinean	   ontology	   conducted	   in	   any	   language	   is	   to	   determine	  
which	  quantificational	  sentences	  are	  true,	  and	  it	  appears	  Hirsch	  has	  underestimated	  the	  diffi-­‐
culty	  of	  this	  process.	  Hirsch	  usually	  defines	  a	  language,	  “Eli	  Hirsch”-­‐English	  in	  (2011,	  p.	  164),	  E-­‐
English	   in	   (2011,	   p.	   231),	   in	   which	   a	   common	   sense	   ontological	   theory	   is	   true.	   Because	   EH-­‐
English	  is	  the	  language	  that’s	  most	  similar	  to	  what	  most	  people	  think	  is	  true	  in	  English,	  Hirsch	  
concludes	  that	  EH-­‐English	  must	  be	  English.	  What	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  
interpretation	  of	  English	   is	  much	  harder	  than	  such	  a	  crude	  comparison	  between	  English	  and	  
fully	   interpreted	   stipulated	   ontological	   languages	   suggest,	   and	   that	   revisionary	   ontological	  
claims	   aren’t	   “trivially	   false”	   in	   English.	   Perhaps	   Hirsch’s	   stipulations	   of	   different	   languages	  
with	   already-­‐defined	   truth-­‐conditions	   have	  made	   him	   blind	   to	   the	   non-­‐trivial	   task	   of	   deter-­‐
mining	   the	   truth-­‐values	  of	  natural	   language	   sentences.	   If	   this	   isn’t	   such	  a	   trivial	   task,	   as	   I’ve	  
been	  arguing,	  perhaps	  there	  is	  room	  for	  ontology	  in	  English.	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4	   Normative	  Quantifier	  Invariantism	  
4.1	   Ontology	  Needs	  a	  Plan	  B	  
Suppose	  that	  the	  arguments	  of	  chapter	  2	  and	  3	  fail.	  Weak	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  true,	  and	  the	  
argument	   from	   charity	   implies	   that	   revisionary	   ontological	   claims	   are	   false	   in	   English.	   Then	  
there	  is	  no	  point	  for	  ontologists	  to	  conduct	  their	  inquiry	  in	  English,	  and	  choosing	  to	  do	  ontol-­‐
ogy	   in	   some	   other	   ontological	   language	   seems	   to	   imply	   an	   arbitrariness	   ontologists	   wish	   to	  
avoid.	   Is	   all	   hope	   out	   for	  mainstream	   ontology?	   Perhaps	   not,	  maybe	   there	   is	   a	   “plan	   B”	   for	  
ontology,	  as	  Ted	  Sider	  argues	  (2011,	  p.	  74).	  This	  chapter	  examines	  Sider’s	  proposed	  rescue	  plan	  
for	  ontology	  and	  evaluates	  whether	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  answering	  the	  challenge	  from	  quanti-­‐
fier	  variantism.	  There	  are	  other	  ways	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  substantivity	  of	  ontology,116	  but	  as	  Sider’s	  
theory	  is	  developed	  in	  direct	  engagement	  with	  Hirsch’s	  arguments,	  adopts	  a	  Quinean	  view	  of	  
ontology,	  and	  has	  received	  much	  attention	  lately,	  it	  is	  the	  most	  interesting	  theory	  to	  focus	  on	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  fact	  that	  Hirsch	  thinks	  that	  the	  most	  significant	  response	  to	  
his	   deflationary	   arguments	   are	   found	   in	   Sider’s	   work	  makes	   it	   all	   the	  more	   natural	   to	   look	  
closer	  at	  Sider’s	  response	  (e.g.	  Hirsch	  2011,	  p.	  121;	  Hirsch	  2013).	  	  
	   In	  chapter	  2	  I	  argued	  against	  Hirsch	  by	  targeting	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism.	  Sider,	  on	  
the	   other	   hand,	   seems	   to	   accept	   the	   basic	   claim	   of	   weak	   quantifier	   variantism	   (2011,	   p.	   74f;	  
172f).117	  His	  suggestion	  on	  behalf	  of	  mainstream	  ontology	  is	  to	   instead	  reject	  strong	  quantifier	  
variantism,	  which	  was	  defined	  in	  chapter	  1	  as:	  	  
	  
(ii) The	  possible	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  languages	  are	  of	  equal	  metaphysical	  
merit.	  
	  
Given	   the	   definitions	   in	   chapter	   1,	   rejecting	   (ii)	   is	   normative	   quantifier	   invariantism.	   It	   says	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  best,	  or	  privileged,	  ontological	  language.	  Following	  Sider,	  we	  call	  this	  language	  –	  
if	   there	   is	   any	   such	   –	   Ontologese.	   Different	   ontological	   languages	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent,	  so	  the	  normative	  quantifier	  invariantists	  must	  hold	  that	  Ontologese	  is	  a	  metaphys-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Contemporary	  metaontology	  provides	  several	   frameworks	  for	  ontology.	  Some	  adopt	  the	  Quinean	  conception	  of	  
ontology	  and	  attempts	  to	  avoid	  Hirsch	  (e	  .g.	  Dorr	  2005,	  van	  Inwagen	  2014),	  while	  others	  reject	  the	  Quinean	  picture	  
and	  instead	  introduces	  distinctive	  ideology	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  make	  room	  for	  substantive	  ontology,	  for	  instance	  
Fine’s	   reality-­‐operator	   (2001,	   2009),	   and	   Schaffer’s	   notion	   of	   ground	   (2009).	   As	   these	   latter	   projects	   reject	   the	  
Quinean	  picture	  underlying	  Hirsch’s	   arguments,	   they	   are	  unfit	   for	   discussion	  here.	   Place	   constraints	   inhibits	  me	  
from	  discussing	  the	  other	  “Quinean”	  alternatives.	  	  
117	  Sider	   concedes	   that	   there	   are	   several	   quantifier	   meanings,	   so	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   he	   accepts	   weak	   quantifier	  
variantism	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  74f;	  172f).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  section	  4.5,	  exactly	  how	  to	  characterize	  
his	  reply	  to	  Hirsch	  is	  perhaps	  a	  little	  more	  complicated	  than	  what	  I’ve	  said	  indicates.	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ically	  better	  language	  along	  some	  dimension	  that	  isn’t	  truth;	  when	  talking	  about	  what	  there	  is,	  
truth	  is	  not	  enough:	  
	  
For	  a	  representation	  to	  be	  fully	  successful,	  truth	  is	  not	  enough;	  the	  representation	  must	  also	  use	  
the	  right	  concepts,	  so	  that	  its	  conceptual	  structure	  matches	  reality’s	  structure.	  There	  is	  an	  objec-­‐
tively	  correct	  way	  to	  “write	  the	  book	  of	  the	  world”.	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  vi)	  
	  
Truth	  has	  traditionally	  been	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  inquiry	  and	  belief.118	  What’s	  dis-­‐
tinct	  –	  and	  novel119	  –	  with	  Sider’s	  account,	  is	  that	  it	  postulates	  on	  a	  new,	  constitutive	  epistemic	  
norm	  for	  inquiry	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  Ontologese	  is	  better	  than	  other	  ontological	  languages	  (2011,	  
p.	  61;	   172).	  I	  will	  get	  back	  to	  the	  exact	  formulation	  of	  this	  norm	  after	  I’ve	  presented	  the	  basic	  
tenets	  of	  Sider’s	  theory,	  but	  we	  may	  already	  now	  note	  that	  this	  requires	  that	  we	  use	  the	  “right	  
concepts”	  when	  describing	   reality.	  When	   talking	  about	  what	   there	   is,	  we	  must	  use	   the	   right	  
quantifier,	  which	  Ontologese	  is	  defined	  to	  employ.	  The	  existence	  of	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  besides	  
truth	   is	   what	   makes	   Ontologese	   privileged,	   and	   such	   a	   norm	   is	   the	   essential	   ingredient	   of	  
normative	  quantifier	  variantism.	  
	   Sider	   (2011)	   offers	   a	   completely	   new	   framework	   for	  metaphysics,	   if	   not	   philosophy	   in	  
general.	  The	  theory	  is	  complex,	  and	  has	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  applications	  and	  subtleties.	  To	  make	  
the	  discussion	  of	  Sider’s	  specific	  answer	  to	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  manageable	  in	  the	  allotted	  
space,	  I’ve	  chosen	  to	  focus	  quite	  narrowly	  on	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  novel	  epistemic	  norm	  he	  
suggests	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  normative	  quantifier	  variantism.	  This	  meshes	  well	  with	  the	  dialec-­‐
tical	  emphasis	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  strong	  and	  weak	  quantifier	  variantism,	  and	  is	  a	  topic	  
that	   to	  my	  knowledge	  hasn’t	   received	  much	  attention	   so	   far	   in	   the	   literature.	  This	   rules	   out	  
some	  important	  connections	  between	  Sider’s	  view	  and	  quantifier	  variantism	  in	  general,	  but	  I	  
will	  briefly	  return	  to	  these	  in	  section	  4.5.	  Thus	  this	  chapter	  will	  not	  be	  about	  quantification	  per	  
se,	  but	  instead	  about	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  privileged	  quantificational	  description	  of	  reality.	  
The	   connections	  between	  Sider’s	   general	   theory	  of	   structure	   and	   the	   epistemic	  norm	  
that	   makes	   Ontologese	   privileged	   for	   ontology	   is	   somewhat	   intricate,	   so	   I	   will	   start	   with	   a	  
general	  overview	  of	  Sider’s	  theory	  in	  section	  4.2.	  I	  describe	  the	  norm	  in	  4.3,	  followed	  by	  section	  
4.4,	  which	  argues	  that	  such	  a	  norm	  is	  not	  well	  enough	  supported,	  which	  seems	  to	  undermine	  
Sider’s	  defense	  of	  ontology	  against	  quantifier	  variantism.	  However,	  section	  4.5	  points	  to	  some	  
complications	  with	  characterizing	  Sider’s	  view	  as	  normative	  quantifier	   invariantism,	  and	  sug-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  Bernard	  Williams	  has	  said	  that	  truth	  is	  the	  “aim	  of	  belief”	  (1973,	  p.	  148)	  and	  Searle	  has	  claimed	  that	  beliefs	  have	  
mind-­‐to-­‐world	  direction	  of	   fit	   (1979).	   If	   they	  are	  correct,	  our	  conclusion	   follows.	  Whatever	   the	  nature	  of	  belief	   in	  
and	  of	  itself,	  I	  take	  it	  as	  uncontroversial	  that	  the	  aim	  in	  metaphysics	  and	  ontology	  is	  (at	  least)	  truth.	  	  
119 	  See	   Hirsch’s	   (2013,	   p.	   713)	   remarks	   about	   the	   differences	   between	   Sider’s	   metametaphysics	   and	   the	  
metametaphysics	  of	  other	  philosophers	  (among	  them	  Fine	  and	  Schaffer).	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gests	  a	  way	   in	  which	  Sider’s	   framework	  can	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  a	  response	  to	  Hirsch	  without	  
relying	  on	  a	  new	  epistemic	  norm.	  	  
4.2	  	   Structure	  
The	  theory	  that	  Sider’s	  variant	  of	  normative	  quantifier	   invariantism	  is	  part	  of	   is	  not	  merely	  a	  
metaontology.	  Sider	  (2011)	  puts	  forward	  a	  framework	  that	  is	  in	  the	  full	  sense	  a	  metametaphys-­‐
ics	  with	  consequences	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  fields.120	  The	  goal	  of	  Sider	  (2011)	  is:	  
	  
…	   to	   push	   forward	   the	   front	   of	   realism	   about	   structure.	   I	   want	   to	   expand	   our	   conception	   of	  
structure’s	   importance,	  generalize	  the	  concept	  of	  structure,	   investigate	  its	  nature,	  use	  it	  as	  the	  
foundation	  of	  ‘metametaphysics’,	  and	  reconceptualize	  metaphysics	  in	  terms	  of	  it.	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  
5)	  
	  
The	   breadth	   of	   the	   project	   is	   vast.	   The	   central	   thesis	   of	   the	   theory	   is	   that	   “The	  world	   has	   a	  
distinguished	  structure,	  a	  privileged	  description”	  (2011,	  p.	  vi).	  We	  may	  note	  initially	  that	  there	  
are	  two	  claims	  being	  made	  here.	  One	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  world	  has	  a	  distinguished	  structure,	  
another	   the	  claim	  that	   there	   is	  a	  privileged	  description	  of	   this	   structure.	   It’s	   this	   latter	  claim	  
that	  is	  related	  to	  the	  epistemic	  norm;	  it	   is	   in	  virtue	  of	  the	  norm	  there	  is	  a	  privileged	  descrip-­‐
tion.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  central	  notion	  is	  structure,	  which	  is	  a	  primitive	  notion	  and	  an	  ideologi-­‐
cal	  novelty	  defined	  by	  the	  theoretical	  role	  it	  plays	  (2011,	  p.	  10).121	  The	  notion	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  
generalization	  of	  David	  Lewis’	  notion	  of	  naturalness	  (inter	   alia	  Lewis	  1983b,	   1984	   1986).122	  Be-­‐
fore	   I	  move	  on	   to	   the	  notion	   itself,	   it	  will	   therefore	  be	  useful	   to	   say	   something	  about	  Lewis’	  
original	  notion.	  
According	  to	  Lewis,	   some	  predicates	   “carve	  nature	  at	   the	   joints”.	  The	   intuitive	   idea	   is	  
that	  some	  predicates	  provide	  a	  better	  fit	  with	  objective	  reality	  than	  others	  (Bøhn	  2014,	  p.	  337).	  
There	  are	  many	  different	  properties,	  but	  some	  properties	  are	  more	  natural	   than	  others	   (they	  
constitute	  an	  elite	  class	  of	  properties);	  naturalness	  is	  a	  property	  of	  properties123	  and	  properties	  
vary	   in	   naturalness	   (a	   property	   can	   be	   said	   to	   have	   a	   ‘degree	   of	   naturalness’).	   The	   perfectly	  
natural	  properties	  tell	  us	  what	  the	  world	   is	   like,	   fundamentally	  speaking,	  and	  constitutes	  the	  
joints	  in	  nature.	  Lewis	  connects	  naturalness	  to	  objective	  similarity:	  natural	  properties	  go	  better	  
together	   than	   less	   natural	   properties.	   A	  much-­‐used	   example	   to	   illustrate	   the	   notion	   is	   that	  
green	  is	  a	  more	  natural	  property	  than	  the	  property	  of	  being	  observed	  before	  t	  and	  being	  green,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  The	   theory	   is	   broad	   in	   scope,	   developed	   to	   reconceptualize,	   substantiate	   and	   clarify	   debates	   about	  modality,	  
causation,	  time,	  logic,	  and	  so	  on.	  One	  application	  of	  it	  is	  to	  ontology,	  and	  that’s	  the	  one	  I	  will	  be	  concerned	  with.	  
But	  it	  must	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  basic	  notion	  of	  structure	  has	  an	  impact	  and	  application	  beyond	  ontology.	  
121	  I	  will	  not	  go	  into	  the	  number	  of	  topics	  Sider	  connects	  to	  structure,	  but	  they	  help	  explain	  the	  notion	  and	  show	  that	  
it	  can	  be	  of	  use	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  philosophical	  areas.	  The	  number	  of	  connections	  is	  also	  important	  for	  our	  grasp	  of	  
the	  notion,	  as	   it	   is	   through	  these	  connections	   that	  we	  grasp	   it.	  See	  Sider	   (2011,	  chapter	  2)	  on	  the	  epistemology	  of	  
structure.	  	  
122	  Another	  predecessor	  of	  the	  notion	  is	  Armstrong’s	  theory	  of	  universals	  (1978a,b).	  	  
123	  I	  use	  ‘properties’	  here	  to	  include	  both	  monadic	  properties	  and	  relations.	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or	  not	  observed	  before	  t	  and	  being	  blue	  (grue)	  (Goodman	  1955).	  Green	  things	  are	  more	  similar	  
than	  grue	  things;	  they	  mark	  a	  more	  natural	  joint	  in	  nature.	  Likewise,	  the	  property	  of	  being	  an	  
electron	  is	  more	  natural	  than	  the	  property	  of	  being	  an	  electron	  or	  a	  cow.	  Electrons	  go	  better	  
together	  than	  electrons	  and	  cows.	  Naturalness	  is,	  like	  structure,	  a	  posit	  understood	  and	  justi-­‐
fied	  by	  the	  theoretical	  role	  it	  plays,124	  and	  it	  is	  supposed	  to,	  inter	  alia,	  make	  for	  objective	  simi-­‐
larity	  and	  classification	  (Lewis	  1983b,	  1986),	  solve	  Putnam’s	  paradox	  (Lewis	  1984)	  and	  figure	  in	  
natural	  laws	  (Lewis	  1983b,	  1986).	  
Whereas	   Lewis’	   notion	   of	   naturalness	   only	   applies	   to	   properties,	   the	   central	   idea	   be-­‐
hind	  Sider’s	  structure	  is	  to	  extend	  the	  notion	  “beyond	  the	  predicate”	  (2011,	  chapter	  6).	  Sider’s	  
“structure”	  applies	  across	   linguistic	  categories	  –	  beyond	  the	  predicate	  –	  making	   it	  possible	  to	  
query	  whether	  an	  expression	  of	  any	  grammatical	  category	  is	  structural	  (2011,	  pp.	  91–92).125	  Let’s	  
use	  “struc(𝜙)”126	  to	  say	  that	  the	  world	  contains	  𝜙-­‐structure	  and	  that	  “𝜙”	  is	  a	  structural	  term.127	  	  
Even	  though	  we	  say	  that	  it	  is	  concepts,	  or	  pieces	  of	  ideology,	  that	  are	  structural,	  struc-­‐
ture	   is	  nonetheless	  worldly	   (Sider	  2011,	  p.	   5fn;	  85f).	  This	   is	  analogous	   to	  naturalness.	  We	  ask	  
whether	  a	  certain	  predicate	  –	  a	  concept,	  a	  piece	  of	  ideology	  –	  is	  joint-­‐carving,	  and	  realize	  that	  
by	  being	  joint-­‐carving	  it	  expresses	  something	  objective	  about	  the	  world;	  the	  perfectly	  natural	  
properties,	  the	  world’s	  joints.	  By	  extending	  structure	  beyond	  the	  predicate,	  also	  concepts	  that	  
don’t	   predicate	  objects	   (such	   as	   tense	  operators	   and	  modal	   operators)	   can	  be	   structural	   and	  
mark	  something	  objective	  about	  reality.	  Grammatical	  categories	  besides	  predicates	  can	  express	  
something	   objective	   and	   fundamental	   about	   reality	   without	   predicating	   anything.	   For	   in-­‐
stance,	  quantifiers	  can’t	  be	  treated	  as	  predicates	  or	  relations,128	  so	  structure	   is	   “entity	   free”	   in	  
contrast	  to	  naturalness	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  90).	  Thus	  the	  expression	  of	  “carving	  nature	  at	  the	  joints”	  
becomes	  less	  apt,	  but	  Sider	  (and	  I)	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  predicate	  “joint-­‐carving”	  to	  express	  that	  
a	  certain	  linguistic	  item	  is	  structural.	  	  
Sider	   connects	   structure	   to	   fundamentality.	   The	   joint-­‐carving	   notions	   are	   the	   funda-­‐
mental	   notions	   (2011,	   p.	   vi).	  Details	   aside,	   discerning	   reality’s	   structure	   becomes	   a	  matter	   of	  
determining	  which	   concepts	   are	   structural.	  An	   example:	   If	   tense-­‐operators	   are	   joint-­‐carving,	  
then	  the	  world	  contains	  temporal	  structure,	  so	  tense	  is	  fundamental,	  and	  any	  comprehensive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  But	  it	  is	  perhaps	  different	  from	  structure	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  while	  structure	  is	  only	  defined	  and	  grasped	  in	  terms	  of	  
its	  theoretical/inferential	  role,	  we	  also	  has	  a	  grasp	  of	  naturalness	  through	  its	  connection	  to	  similarity.	  	  
125	  So	  whereas	  only	  properties	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  natural,	  concepts	  of	  any	  grammatical	  category	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  
structural.	  We	  can	  ask	  whether	  modal	  operators,	  temporal	  operators,	  quantifiers	  and	  even	  truth-­‐functional	  connec-­‐
tives	  are	  structural.	  Deciding	  these	  questions	  amounts	  to	  discerning	  the	  fundamental	  structure	  of	  the	  world.	  I	  will	  
use	  the	  expressions	  “concepts”,	  “ideology”,	  “expression”,	  etc.	  to	  talk	  about	  what	  may	  instantiate	  𝜙.	  See	  section	  4.3.	  
126	  Sider	  (2011,	  p.	  91)	  uses	  a	  symbol	  where	  I	  use	  “struc”,	  but	  this	  does	  of	  course	  not	  matter.	  	  
127	  I	  will,	  as	  Sider,	  slip	  into	  quantifying	  over	  structure.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  structure	  isn’t	  a	  thing	  in	  reality.	  	  
128	  One	  can	  treat	  some	  notions	  of	  interest	  as	  predicates	  and	  relations;	  negation	  and	  disjunction	  can	  be	  analyzed	  as	  
standing	  for	  relations,	  for	  instance,	  but	  that	  would	  require	  propositions,	  and	  Sider	  wants	  to	  keep	  the	  question	  of	  the	  
existence	  of	  propositions	  open	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  85).	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description	   of	   reality	   must	   contain	   tensed	   vocabulary	   to	   be	   complete.	   Asking	   “Struc(𝜙)?”	  
amounts	  to	  asking	  a	  question	  about	  whether	  the	  world	  contains	  𝜙-­‐structure.129	  Sider’s	  “recon-­‐
ceptualization”	   of	   metaphysics	   consists	   in	   transforming	   questions	   about	   the	  metaphysics	   of	  
time,	  modality,	  ontology	  and	  so	  on	  into	  questions	  about	  whether	  the	  terms	  we	  use	  to	  express	  
such	  notions	  are	  joint-­‐carving.	  On	  the	  topic	  of	  metaphysics,	  Sider	  writes	  that:	  
	  
The	  truly	  central	  question	  of	  metaphysics	  is	  that	  of	  what	  is	  most	  fundamental.	  So	  in	  my	  terms,	  
we	  must	  ask	  which	  notions	  carve	  perfectly	  at	  the	  joints.	  By	  using	  ‘red’	  and	  ‘blue’,	  we	  carve	  more	  
closely	   to	   reality’s	   joints	   than	  do	   speakers	   of	   the	   ‘bred’/’rue’	   language.	  But	  we	  do	  not	   thereby	  
carve	  perfectly	  at	  the	  joints;	  colors	  are	  presumably	  not	  perfectly	  fundamental.	  To	  carve	  perfect-­‐
ly,	  one	  must	  use	   the	  most	   fundamental	   concepts,	   expressing	   the	   facets	  of	   reality	   that	  underly	  
the	  colors.	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  5)	  
	  
In	  order	  for	  this	  reconceptualization	  to	  be	  successful,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  several	  types	  of	  terms	  
must	  be	  able	  to	  be	  structural,	  not	  just	  predicates.	  Because	  it	  is	  ideology	  that	  carve	  at	  the	  joints,	  
we	   can	   talk	   about	   a	   fundamental	   language	   that	   uses	   only	   joint-­‐carving	   notions.	   Given	   the	  
epistemic	  norm	  mentioned	  above,	  ‘‘there	  is	  an	  objectively	  correct	  way	  to	  ‘write	  the	  book	  of	  the	  
world’’’	  (Sider,	  p.	  vii).130	  	  
	   The	  justification	  for	  believing	  in	  the	  general	  framework	  of	  structure	  is	  that	  it	  enhances	  
our	   understanding	   of	   the	   world	   (Sider	   2011,	   p.	   9).	   The	   applications	   and	   interconnections	   of	  
structure	  provide	  it	  with	  a	  rich	  theoretical	  role.	  Structure	  improves	  our	  theories	  and	  thus	  is	  a	  
justified	  posit	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  10).	  This	  justifies	  the	  general	  framework	  of	  structure,	  but	  whether	  
a	  certain	  structure	  obtains,	  for	  instance	  quantificational	  structure,	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  specific	  argu-­‐
ment	  turning	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  a	  fundamental	  description	  of	  reality	  must	  include	  
that	   specific	   notion.	   Sider	   (2011,	   pp.	   180–189)	   has	   a	   lengthy	   discussion	   of	   the	   arguments	   for	  
quantificational	  structure;	  quantification	  is	   indispensable	   in	  a	  complete	  description	  of	   funda-­‐
mental	  reality.	  While	  I	   find	  those	  arguments	  persuasive	  and	  interesting,	  I	  will	  keep	  my	  focus	  
on	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  we	  must	  describe	  this	  structure,	  if	  it	  is	  
there,	  using	  Ontologese.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Sider	  suggests	  a	  distinct	  way	  of	  deciding	  questions	  of	  how	  much	  structure	  the	  world	  contains,	  but	  a	  presentation	  
and	  evaluation	  of	  this	  method	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  See	  Sider	  (2011,	  p.	  13f)	  for	  details.	  	  
130	  The	  question	  of	  which	  concepts	  are	  structural	  thus	  concerns	  how	  the	  world	  fundamentally	  is.	  As	  a	  theory	  about	  
fundamentality,	  Sider’s	  view	  is	  that	  facts	  of	  fundamentality	  consist	  in	  facts	  of	  the	  form	  “T	  is	  structural”,	  where	  “T”	  is	  
a	  sub-­‐sentential	  part	  of	  language	  (see	  Fine	  2013,	  p.	  725).	  If	  the	  world	  contains	  quantificational	  structure,	  then	  there	  
are	  some	  things	  in	  the	  fundamental	  sense	  of	  “there	  is”.	  If	  reality	  lacks	  modal	  structure,	  then	  modal	  facts	  are	  non-­‐
fundamental,	  and	  hold	  true	  merely	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fundamental	  facts	  (Sider	  2011,	  chapter	  12).	  Answering	  questions	  
about	  which	  concepts	  are	  structural	  amounts	  to	  answering	  questions	  about	  how	  the	  world	  fundamentally	  is.	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4.3	   A	  New	  Epistemic	  Norm	  of	  Inquiry	  
What	  I’ve	  said	  hopefully	  gives	  a	  relatively	  clear	  picture	  of	  Sider’s	  view.131	  What	  about	  his	  privi-­‐
leged	  description-­‐claim,	  which	  must	  be	  kept	  apart	  from	  the	  structure-­‐claim?132	  The	  different	  
ontological	  languages	  are	  supposedly	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent,	  so	  Sider’s	  defense	  of	  
ontology	  is	  that	  “truth	  is	  not	  enough”	  –	  there	  is	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  besides	  truth	  to	  the	  effect	  
that	  it	  is	  better	  to	  think	  and	  speak	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms	  (2011,	  p.	  61).	  Ontologese	  by	  definition	  
employs	  a	  joint-­‐carving	  quantifier,	  so	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  there	  is	  quantificational	  struc-­‐
ture,	  Ontologese	  is	  epistemically	  better	  than	  other	  ontological	  languages.	  In	  essence,	  this	  is	  
Sider’s	  response	  to	  quantifier	  variantism.	  	  
To	   continue	   the	   unpacking	   of	   the	   privileged	   description	   claim,	   consider	   what	   Sider	  
writes:	  
	  
The	  goal	  of	  inquiry	  is	  not	  merely	  to	  believe	  truly	  (or	  to	  know).	  Achieving	  the	  goal	  of	  inquiry	  re-­‐
quires	  that	  one’s	  belief	  state	  reflect	  the	  world,	  which	  in	  addition	  to	  lack	  of	  error	  requires	  one	  to	  
think	   of	   the	  world	  in	   its	   terms,	  to	   carve	   the	  world	   at	   its	   joints.	  Wielders	   of	   non-­‐joint-­‐carving	  
concepts	  are	  worse	  inquirers.	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  61)	  
	  
The	   representations	   of	   the	   structure,	   i.e.	   the	   language	  we	   use	   to	   describe	   the	  world,133	  must	  
“use	  the	  right	  concepts,	  so	  that	  its	  conceptual	  structure	  matches	  reality’s	  structure”	  (2011,	  p.	  vi).	  
So	   there	  must	   be	   some	  kind	  of	   “match”	  between	   the	   concepts	   of	   a	  metaphysical	   theory	   and	  
reality’s	  structure	  for	  the	  theory	  to	  be	  fully	  successful.	  	  
Those	  who	  fail	  to	  use	  structural	  concepts	  when	  describing	  the	  world	  are	  making	  a	  ra-­‐
tional	  mistake	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  2).	  They	  violate	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  Sider	  appeals	  to:	  it	  is	  better	  to	  
think	  and	   speak	   in	   joint-­‐carving	   terms.	  According	   to	  Sider,	   this	   is	   a	   “constitutive	   aim	  of	   the	  
practice	   of	   forming	   beliefs,	   as	   constitutive	   as	   the	  more	   commonly	   recognized	   aim	   of	   truth”	  
(2011,	  p.	  61).	  I	  will	  call	  this	  the	  s-­‐norm.	  The	  s-­‐norm	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  conscious	  goal,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  
standard	  by	  which	  beliefs	   and	  believers	   can	  be	   evaluated	   (Sider	   2011,	   p.	   61).	  This	   section	  de-­‐
scribes	  the	  norm	  in	  more	  detail	  and	  the	  next	  section	  criticizes	  the	  arguments	  for	  it.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  if	  there	  is	  quantificational	  structure	  and	  an	  s-­‐
norm,	  then	  ontology	  is	  rehabilitated.	  But	  how	  are	  we	  to	  understand	  the	  norm	  that	  it	  is	  “better	  
to	  think	  and	  speak	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms”?	  
A	   first	   question	   concerns	  when	   this	   norm	   is	   operative.	   Considering	   that	   Sider	   thinks	  
those	  who	  fail	   to	  conform	  to	  the	  norm	  are	  making	  rational	  mistakes,	   it	  would	  seem	  that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  That’s	  not	  to	  say	  that	   it	  gives	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  Sider’s	   theory!	  The	  theory	   is	  brimming	  with	  applica-­‐
tions	   and	   subtleties,	   but	   I’ve	   chosen	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   most	   important	   question	   for	   our	   purposes:	   whether	   Sider	  
establishes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  privileged	  description	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
132	  That	  these	  claims	  are	  of	  different	  nature	  can	  be	  gleaned	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  the	  structure-­‐claim	  is	  a	  descrip-­‐
tive	  claim	  about	  the	  world,	  the	  privileged	  description-­‐claim	  is	  a	  normative	  claim	  about	  inquirers.	  	  
133	  The	  language	  we	  use	  to	  “write	  the	  book	  of	  the	  world”	  in	  Sider’s	  phrasing.	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norm	  would	   imply	   too	   strong	   a	  demand	  on	  people	   if	   it	  were	   always	  operative.	   For	   instance,	  
when	   knitting	   a	   sweater	   with	   a	   complicated	   pattern	   in	   different	   colors,	   it	   would	   seem	   too	  
demanding	   to	   require	   that	   the	   knitter	   think	   of	   the	   colors	   in	   terms	   of	   photon	   wavelengths.	  
Humans	  have	  limited	  cognitive	  resources,	  and	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  practical	  situations	  where	  the	  
goal	   isn’t	   to	   discern	   reality’s	   structure,	   it	   would	   be	   puzzling	   to	   say	   that	   people	   are	  making	  
rational	  mistakes	  because	  they	  don’t	  think	  and	  speak	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms.	  
In	   the	   knitting-­‐scenario,	   the	   goal	   of	   the	   process	   is	   to	   create	   a	   sweater,	   not	   to	   attain	  
truth.	  But	  even	   in	  some	  cases	  where	   the	  goal	   is	   truth	  would	   it	  be	  odd	  to	  say	   that	  people	  are	  
making	   a	   rational	   mistake	   merely	   because	   they	   aren’t	   thinking	   in	   joint-­‐carving	   terms.	   For	  
instance,	   if	   I	  need	   to	   catch	   the	   last	  boat	  off	   some	  distant	   island,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   I	   know	  
when	   the	  boat	   is	   leaving.	   If	   I	  use	   a	   time-­‐indexical	   to	  do	   so,	   for	   instance	   “The	  boat	   leaves	   50	  
minutes	  from	  now”,	  and	  the	  world	  turns	  out	  not	  to	  contain	  temporal	  structure,	  my	  descriptive	  
belief	  is	  not	  using	  joint-­‐carving	  terms	  (because	  there	  are	  no	  joints	  for	  “now”	  to	  carve	  at).	  How-­‐
ever,	  it	  would	  seem	  odd	  to	  say	  that	  I’m	  making	  a	  rational	  mistake	  merely	  because	  I	  expressed	  
my	  belief	  in	  just	  this	  way,	  rather	  than	  by	  using	  eternalist	  vocabulary.	  	  
Sider	  himself	   is	   a	   little	  unclear	  about	  when	  he	   thinks	   the	  norm	   is	  operative.	  One	   the	  
one	   hand,	   he	  writes	   that	   “we	   ought	   not	   to	   speak	   the	   ‘grue’	   language”,	   which	   seems	   to	   be	   a	  
general	  statement	  about	  it	  being	  epistemically	  sub-­‐optimal	  simpliciter	  to	  use	  non-­‐joint-­‐carving	  
terms	   (Sider	   2011,	   p.	   61).	   But	   in	  most	   places,	   he	   seems	   to	   connect	   the	   norm	   to	   inquiry,	   and	  
more	  specifically	   fundamental	   inquiry.	  Sider’s	  book	  is	  sparse	  on	  reflection	  on	  the	  norm	  itself,	  
but	  as	  mainstream	  ontology	   takes	   it	  as	   its	  goal	   to	  discern	  what	   the	  world	   is	   (fundamentally)	  
like,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  ontology,	  at	  least,	  qualifies	  as	  a	  type	  of	  inquiry	  in	  which	  the	  s-­‐norm	  is	  
operative.	  	  
A	  second	  question	  is	  what	  “better”	  means.	  It	  must	  mean	  that	  using	  joint-­‐carving	  terms	  
is	   simply	  epistemically	  better;	  we	   fulfill	   the	  goal	  of	   inquiry	   to	  a	   larger	  extent	   if	  we	  use	   joint-­‐
carving	  terms	  (see	  section	  4.4	  below).	  Thus	  if	  we	  fail	  to	  use	  joint-­‐carving	  terms,	  but	  have	  true	  
beliefs,	  we	  are	  making	  a	  rational	  mistake	  of	  some	  sort.	  Sider	  writes:	  “Ontological	  questions	  in	  
Ontologese	  are	  substantive,	  even	  if	  those	  in	  ordinary	  language	  are	  not.	  Moreover,	  Ontologese	  
is	  a	  better	  language,	  since	  its	  structure	  better	  matches	  reality’s	  structure”	  (2011,	  p.	  172).	  This	  is	  
what	  makes	  Ontologese	  privileged;	  by	  using	  it,	  we	  use	  a	  joint-­‐carving	  quantifier	  that	  matches	  
reality’s	  structure,	  and	  thus,	  when	  our	  quantificational	  claims	  are	  true,	  we	  achieve	  the	  full	  goal	  
of	  inquiry.	  
A	  third	  question	  is	  what	  the	  exact	  content	  of	  the	  norm	  is.	  Sider	  formulates	  the	  s-­‐norm	  
both	  in	  terms	  of	  “concepts”	  (2011,	  p.	  vii;	  p.	  2)	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  “terms”	  (2011,	  p.	  19;	  61f).	  I’ve	  cho-­‐
sen	  the	  formulations	  from	  the	  section	  “Epistemic	  value”	  (2011,	  p.	  61f),	  where	  he	  argues	  for	  the	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claim	   that	   it	   is	   better	   to	   think	   and	   speak	   in	   joint-­‐carving	   terms,	   but	   Sider	   doesn’t	   say	  what	  
exactly	  he	  means	  by	  “term”.	  To	  evaluate	  the	  norm,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  know	  the	  precise	  content	  
of	  it.	  	  
Consider	  Sider’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  structure-­‐claim,	  “struc(𝜙)”,	  where	  “𝜙”	  is	  some	  term,	  
concept,	  notion,	  or	  what	  have	  you,	  of	   any	  grammatical	   category.	  How	  are	  we	   to	  understand	  
“𝜙”	  if	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  construe	  true	  structure-­‐claims?	  One	  alternative	  is	  to	  let	  complex	  terms	  take	  
the	  place	  of	   “𝜙”.	   In	   that	  case,	   structure-­‐claims	  about	  disjunctive	  predicates	  could	  be	  true.	  So	  
for	   instance,	   if	   we	   suppose	   that	   “green”	   expresses	   a	   perfectly	   natural	   property,	   then	  
struc(green)	   would	   be	   true,	   and	   struc(grue)	   would	   be	   false.	   But	   the	   problem	   with	   such	   an	  
understanding	  of	  struc(𝜙)	  is	  that	  “green”	  is	  definable	  in	  terms	  of	  “grue”	  and	  “bleen”,	  which	  are	  
both	   non-­‐structural	   terms	   themselves.134	  So	   this	   complex	   definition	   of	   “green”	   in	   terms	   of	  
“grue”	   and	   “bleen”,	   “𝜑 ”,	   would	   be	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   to	   “green”,	   and	   thus	   if	  
“struc(𝜙)”	  allows	  for	  complex	  expression,	  then	  any	  expression	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  to	  
some	  structural	  primitive	  term	  can	  take	  the	  place	  of	  “𝜙”,	  and	  thus	  water	  out	  Sider’s	  notion	  of	  
structure.	  This	   carries	   over	   to	   the	   s-­‐norm,	  which	  would	   then	  only	   require	   that	  we	  use	   some	  
terms	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  structure,	  not	  the	  structural	  terms	  themselves.	  This	  would	  go	  directly	  
against	  Sider’s	  claim	  about	  there	  being	  a	  “privileged	  description”.	  Instead,	  Sider’s	  idea	  seems	  to	  
be	  that	  some	  primitive	  terms	  are	  better	  than	  others	  to	  describe	  the	  world.	  “Green”	  and	  “grue”	  
are	   different	   primitive	   terms,	   and	   it	   is	   better	   to	   use	   “green”	   (and	   “blue”)	   than	   “grue”	   (and	  
“bleen”)	   to	   describe	   what	   there	   is,	   even	   though	   the	   expressions	   are	   interdefinable.	   This	   is	  
because	  “struc(green)”	  is	  true	  and	  “struc(grue)”	  is	  false.	  Thus	  “𝜙”	  must	  be	  a	  primitive	  term	  of	  
the	  language	  it	  is	  part	  of.	  	  
That	   Sider	   understands	   “term”	   in	   the	   s-­‐norm	   as	   primitive	   terms	   in	   the	   language	   of	  
those	  engaged	   in	   inquiry	   is	   also	   supported	  by	  his	  discussion	  of	   logic	   (2011,	   chapter	   10).	  Sider	  
raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  logical	  structure.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  we	  can	  ask	  whether	  
any	  grammatical	   category	   is	   structural,	   so	  which	  of	   the	   logical	   constants	   carve	  at	   the	   joints?	  
For	  instance,	  is	  it	  “or”	  or	  “and”	  that	  carve	  at	  the	  joints?	  As	  we	  know,	  if	  we	  also	  have	  negation,	  
then	  these	  expressions	  are	  interdefinable,	  so	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  if	  both	  expressions	  carve	  at	  the	  
joints,	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  redundancy	  to	  the	  world’s	  structure	  (2011,	  p.	  218f).	  Sider	  is	  not	  fond	  of	  
such	  redundancy,	  but	  eventually	  allows	  it	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  there	  is	  no	  principled	  reason	  for	  
favoring	  any	  of	  the	   logical	  constants.	   If	  Sider	  thought	  struc(𝜙)	  took	  complex	  values,	  this	  dis-­‐
cussion	  wouldn’t	  make	  much	  sense,	  because	  the	   interdefinability	  of	  the	  notions	  would	   imply	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  The	  following	  description	  defines	  “green”	  in	  the	  grue/bleen-­‐language:	  Something	  is	  green	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  either	  
grue	  and	  has	  been	  examined	  before	  t,	  or	  bleen	  and	  has	  not	  been	  examined	  before	  t.	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that	  both	   “or”	  and	   “and”	  could	  be	   taken	   to	   talk	  about	   the	  same	  structure.	  This	   suggests	   that	  
Sider	  believes	  that	  “struc(𝜙)”	  can	  be	  true	  only	  if	  “𝜙”	  is	  a	  primitive	  notion.	  	  
Sider	  connects	   the	   terms	   in	   the	   “book	  of	   the	  world”	   to	   the	  s-­‐norm:	   it	   is	  better	   to	  use	  
structural	  terms.	  Based	  on	  what	  I’ve	  argued,	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  s-­‐norm	  must	  be	  carried	  out	  
under	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  s-­‐norm	  has	  the	  following	  content:	  To	  fully	  achieve	  the	  goal	  of	  
inquiry,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  think	  and	  speak	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms,	  where	  “terms”	  are	  primitives.	  
On	  this	  view,	  joint-­‐carving	  terms	  are	  better	  because	  there	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  “match”	  be-­‐
tween	  the	  terms	  used	  to	  describe	  structure	  and	  structure	  itself.	  It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  it	  is	  
hard	  to	  get	  a	  grip	  of	  this	  notion	  of	  “matching”	  when	  we	  potentially	  have	  entity-­‐free	  structure,	  
but	  able	  philosophers	  have	   raised	  epistemological	  objections	  elsewhere,135	  and	   I	  wish	   to	  keep	  
the	  focus	  on	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  s-­‐norm	  required	  to	  uphold	  normative	  quantifier	  invariant-­‐
ism,	  and	  so	  will	  not	  press	  such	  objections	  (see	  Sider	  (2011,	  chapter	  2)).	  	  
We	   have	   seen	   that	   Sider’s	   defense	   of	   ontology	   against	   quantifier	   variantism	   requires	  
two	  things:	  (1)	  that	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  quantificational	  structure	  (the	  structure	  claim),	  and	  (2)	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  best	  way	  to	  describe	  this	  structure	  (the	  privileged	  description	  claim).	  Before	  moving	  
on	  to	  criticism	  of	  the	  s-­‐norm,	  I	  will	  remark	  that	  one	  cost	  of	  adopting	  Sider’s	  response	  to	  quan-­‐
tifier	  variantism	  is	  that	  it	  brings	  with	  it	  heavy	  theoretical	  commitments.	  One	  must	  endorse	  a	  
specific	   metametaphysical	   outlook	   that	   requires	   substantial	   assumptions	   about	   the	   correct	  
method	   for	   metaphysics,	   what	   “correct	   representation”	   comes	   to	   (see	   section	   4.4.1	   below),	  
about	  which	  questions	  are	  substantive	  (e.g.	  that	  it	  is	  a	  substantial	  question	  which	  of	  the	  logical	  
constants	  carves	  at	  the	  joints),	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  the	  arguments	  of	  chapter	  2	  and	  3	  
didn’t	  require	  such	  a	  substantial	  “reconceptualization”	  of	  metaphysics.	  Compared	  to	  the	  argu-­‐
ments	   in	  chapter	  2	  and	  3,	   then,	  Sider’s	   reply	   to	  quantifier	  variantism	  requires	  a	  considerable	  
theoretical	  buy-­‐in.	   Sider’s	   reply	  makes	   significant	   assumptions	   that	  one	  must	  make	  up	  one’s	  
mind	   about.	   There	   are	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   associated	   with	   such	   a	   theory-­‐dependent	  
reply.	   Sider’s	   theory	   is	  massively	   powerful	   and	   has	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   applications,	   but	   on	   the	  
other	  hand,	  if	  you	  want	  to	  defend	  ontology	  on	  a	  budget,	  his	  offer	  is	  not	  for	  you.	  	  
Another	  thing	  that	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  when	  making	  up	  one’s	  mind	  about	  whether	  
to	  adopt	  the	  framework	  is	  that	  it	  has	  been	  developed	  quite	  recently	  and	  is	  currently	  undergo-­‐
ing	  scrutiny.136	  Both	  the	  assumptions	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  Sider’s	  theory	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  
be	  problematic	  after	  closer	  inspection.	  The	  only	  new	  commitment	  one	  must	  make	  by	  adopting	  
Sider’s	   theory	   that	   I	   will	   critically	   discuss	   is	   the	   new	   epistemic	   norm	   relevant	   to	   normative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  See	  the	  symposia	  in	  Analysis	  73	  (2013,	  pp.	  716–750)	  and	  Philosophical	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  87	  (2013,	  pp.	  
708–732).	  See	  also	  Chalmers	  (2009).	  	  
136	  See	  inter	  alia	  the	  symposia	  referred	  to	  in	  footnote	  135.	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quantifier	   invariantism.	   I	  don’t	   think	   that	   the	   failure	  of	   this	  norm	   is	   sufficient	   to	  undermine	  
the	  whole	  program	  (see	  section	  4.5),	  but	  I	  hope	  the	  following	  discussion	  is	  a	  small	  contribution	  
to	  the	  current	  project	  of	  exploring	  Sider’s	  rich	  work.	  	  
4.4	   Arguments	  for	  the	  s-­‐norm	  
If	   Sider’s	   defense	   of	   ontology	   against	   quantifier	   variantism	   is	   a	   form	  of	  normative	  quantifier	  
invariantism,	  then	  for	  it	  to	  be	  successful	  it	  must	  justify	  that	  it	  is	  better	  to	  think	  and	  speak	  with	  
a	   joint-­‐carving	   quantifier.	   This	   claim	   crucially	   depends	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   s-­‐norm	   that	  
carries	   over	   to	   quantification.	   Sider	   believes	   that	   this	   norm	   is	   a	   basic	   constitutive	   norm	   for	  
belief,	  and	  not	  derivable	  from	  other	  values	  (2011,	  pp.	  61–62).	  Since	  the	  postulation	  of	  this	  norm	  
is	  an	  epistemic	  novelty	  that	  diverges	  from	  orthodoxy	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  inquiry	  and	  
belief,	  so	  we	  should	  ask	  for	  relatively	  good	  arguments	  for	  believing	  in	  it.	  To	  put	  my	  cards	  on	  
the	  table,	  I’m	  skeptical	  about	  such	  a	  norm,	  and	  think	  Sider’s	  arguments	  for	  it	  are	  unsuccessful.	  
If	  Sider’s	  defense	  of	  ontology	  through	  Ontologese	  depends	  on	  this	  norm,	  then	  I’d	  want	  look	  for	  
other	  options.	  Given	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  norm	  to	  Sider’s	  (2011)	  project,	   it	   is	  puzzling	  that	  he	  
spends	   relatively	   few	  pages	  discussing	  and	  defending	   it.137	  On	   the	  positive	   side,	   this	  makes	   it	  
possible	  to	  evaluate	  his	  four	  arguments	  for	  the	  s-­‐norm	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
4.4.1	  	   Knee-­‐jerk	  Realism	  
The	  first	  argument	  for	  the	  s-­‐norm	  is	  somewhat	  implicit,	  derivable	  from	  what	  Sider	  says	  about	  
knee-­‐jerk	  realism,	  which	  is	  an	  “unargued	  presupposition	  of	  this	  book”	  (2011,	  p.	  18).	  Sider	  (2011,	  
p.	  18)	  describes	  knee	  jerk	  realism	  as	  the	  conviction	  that	  the	  point	  of	  human	  inquiry	  is	  to	  “con-­‐
form	  itself	  to	  the	  world”;	  the	  world	  is	  “out	  there”,	  and	  our	  job	  as	  inquirers	  is	  to	  wrap	  our	  minds	  
around	  it.	  Sider	  concedes	  that	  this	  is	  a	  “vague	  picture	  rather	  than	  a	  precise	  thesis”	  (2011,	  p	  18).	  
Basing	  an	  argument	  on	  an	  unargued	  presupposition	  may	  be	  considered	  problematic,	  but	  as	  we	  
will	  see,	   the	  crucial	  premise	  of	   the	  argument	   is	  plausible	  and	   likely	  to	  be	  embraced	  by	  many	  
philosophers	  of	  a	  realist	  disposition,	  so	  the	  argument	  is	  worth	  discussing.	  	  
The	  argument	   is	   this	   (Sider	  2011,	  p.	   19).	  Let	  A	  be	   the	  set	  of	   true	  sentences	   in	   the	   lan-­‐
guage	  of	  complete	  physics.	  Consider	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  propositions:	  P	  is	  the	  set	  of	  propositions	  
expressed	  by	  A	  under	  their	  intended	  interpretation.	  The	  second	  set,	  S,	  consists	  of	  “scrambled”	  
propositions	  construed	  by	  reinterpreting	  all	  the	  non-­‐logical	  symbols	  of	  the	  language	  of	  physics	  
under	  an	  arbitrary	  permutation	  of	   the	   totality	  of	  object	   (Sider	  2011,	  pp.	  23–35).	  This	   is	  analo-­‐
gous	  to	  the	  arbitrary	  permutations	  driving	  Putnam’s	  paradox	  (1980).	  Thus	  S	  contains	  proposi-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  It	  is	  of	  course	  a	  little	  hard	  to	  say	  exactly	  how	  many	  pages	  are	  devoted	  to	  arguing	  for	  the	  norm,	  and	  perhaps	  Sider	  
will	  say	  that	  somehow	  the	  whole	  book	  is	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  norm	  because	  he	  considers	  it	  central	  to	  his	  project	  (Sider	  
2011,	  p.	  65),	  but	  the	  pages	  devoted	  to	  arguments	  for	  the	  norm	  are	  pp.	  19–20	  and	  pp.	  61–65,	  a	  totality	  of	  7	  pages.	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tions	  that	  are	  true,138	  but	  do	  not	  use	  the	  non-­‐logical	  symbols	  of	  physics	  and	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  
how	   the	   world	   is	   “out	   there”,	   because	   S	   is	   a	   description	   of	   reality	   using	   arbitrary	   terms.	   In	  
Sider’s	  words,	   “P	  constitutes	  a	  better	  description	  of	   reality	   than	  S”;	   to	  deny	   this	  would	  be	   to	  
admit	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  “mandatory	  about	  physics”	  (2011,	  p.	  19),	  and	  this	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  
knee-­‐jerk	  realism.	  This	  betterness	  is	  supposedly	  objective,	  and	  Sider	  concludes	  that	  the	  reason	  
for	  this	  objective	  betterness	  is	  that	  the	  propositions	  in	  P	  are	  cast	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms,	  while	  
the	  propositions	  of	  S	  are	  not	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  19).	  Thus	  the	  s-­‐norm	  explains	  why	  we	  prefer	  P	  over	  
S.	  This	  is	  the	  argument	  from	  knee-­‐jerk	  realism.	  
Sider	   formulates	   this	   as	  an	  argument	  having	  knee-­‐jerk	   realism	  as	  a	  premise,	   and	   it	   is	  
sound	  if	  we	  take	  Sider’s	  claims	  about	  the	   implications	  of	  knee-­‐jerk	  realism	  to	  be	  true.	  But	  as	  
Sider	   admits,	   knee-­‐jerk	   realism	   is	   a	   vague	   picture,	   and	   not	   the	   best	   premise	   to	   build	   one’s	  
arguments	  on.	  Instead	  of	  arguing	  against	  knee-­‐jerk	  realism,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  accept	  the	  
important	  insight	  of	  this	  argument	  without	  thereby	  accepting	  that	  one	  must	  use	  the	  terms	  of	  
physics	  when	   talking	   about	   these	   aspects	   of	   reality.	   The	   important	   insight	   is	   that	   physics	   is	  
privileged	   (“mandatory”)	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   discerning	   what	   certain	   aspects	   of	   the	  world	   are	  
like,	  but	   that	   the	   language	  of	  physics	   is	  not	  mandatory	  when	  describing	   those	  aspects.	   If	   the	  
insight	  can	  be	  preserved	  without	  accepting	  the	  s-­‐norm,	   there	  seems	  to	  be	  nothing	   in	   the	  ar-­‐
gument	  that	  supports	  the	  s-­‐norm.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  for	  this	  criticism	  that	  physics	  tells	  us	  which	  predicates	  to	  use	  when	  de-­‐
scribing	  the	  world,	  and	  which	  properties	  are	   instantiated.139	  I	  will	   therefore	  consider	  whether	  
the	  claim	   that	  physics	   says	   that	   some	  properties	  are	   structural	   entails	   that	   it	   is	  better	   to	  use	  
certain	  predicates	  to	  describe	  what	  there	  is,	  which	  is	  what	  the	  s-­‐norm	  comes	  to.	  	  
To	   do	   this,	   I	   will	   consider	   an	   argument	   from	   another	   work	   of	   Hirsch.	   Hirsch	   (1997,	  
chapters	  3	  and	  4)	  investigates	  whether	  it	  follows	  from	  the	  assumption	  of	  Lewisian	  naturalness	  
that	  we	   should	   use	   some	   concepts	   rather	   than	   others,	   i.e.	   that	   there	   being	   perfectly	   natural	  
properties	  entails	  that	  some	  words	  are	  better	  than	  others.	  Hirsch	  uses	  illustrative	  examples	  to	  
bring	  out	  the	  problems	  with	  such	  inferences.	  None	  of	  these	  examples	  are	  in	  terms	  of	  predicates	  
from	  physics,	  but	  I	  will	  get	  to	  that	  in	  a	  second.	  Here	  is	  a	  recent	  statement	  of	  such	  an	  example:	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  Because	  reinterpretation	  under	  a	  permutation	  preserves	  truth	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  19).	  
139	  A	  complete	  physical	  description	  of	  the	  world	  will	  not	  only	  consist	  of	  predicates.	  For	   instance,	   it	   is	  a	  significant	  
question	  whether	  it	  includes	  temporal	  operators,	  and	  it	  very	  plausibly	  will	  contain	  quantifiers.	  However,	  it	  doesn’t	  
seem	  that	  we	  can	  infer	  anything	  about	  the	  quantifier	  employed	  without	  auxiliary	  premises	  (see	  Sider	  2011,	  pp.	  186–
187	  for	  one	  such	  argument).	  The	  fact	  that	  physics	  uses	  a	  quantifier	  only	  suggests	  that	  any	  complete	  description	  of	  
reality	  must	   use	   a	   quantifier	   that	   quantifies	   over	   the	   fundamental	   physical	   particles,	   fields,	   or	  what	   have	   you.	   It	  
would	  seem	  that	  different	  ontological	   languages	  agree	  on	  the	   fundamental	  physical	  description	  of	   reality,	  as	   they	  
usually	  agree	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  fundamental	  particles.	  For	  potential	  complications,	  see	  section	  4.5.	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Imagine	  people	  who	  are	   cognitively	  disposed	   (“hard-­‐wired”)	   to	  apply	  words	   to	  disjunctions	  of	  
natural	  properties	  and	  to	  realize	  that	  this	  is	  what	  they	  are	  doing.	  Their	  language	  is	  made	  up	  of	  
such	  words	  as	  “cubound”	  and	  “rindical”	  that	  refer,	  respectively,	  to	  things	  that	  are	  either	  cubical	  
or	  round	  and	  things	  that	  are	  either	  round	  or	  cylindrical.	  One	  completely	  misses	  the	  point	  of	  my	  
question	   if	   on	   fails	   to	  understand	   that	   these	  people	  agree	  with	  us	   about	  which	  properties	   are	  
natural	  and	  which	  unnatural.	  It’s	  just	  that	  they	  have	  words	  for	  the	  unnatural	  ones	  and	  complex	  
terms	  for	  the	  natural	  ones.	  (Hirsch	  2013,	  pp.	  711–712)	  
 
Suppose	  that	  the	  words	  “cubical”,	  “round”	  and	  “cylindrical”	  stand	  for	  natural	  properties.	  These	  
foreigners	  can	  talk	  about	  the	  same	  natural	  properties	  as	  we	  do.	  For	  instance,	  “cubical”	  can	  be	  
expressed	  by	  “cubound	  and	  not	  rindical”	  and	  “round”	  by	  “cubound	  and	  rindical”	  (Hirsch	  2013,	  
p.	  712).	  In	  a	  word,	  the	  descriptions	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent.	  Even	  though	  their	  way	  of	  
expressing	  these	  natural	  properties	  is	  unfamiliar,	  counterproductive	  (for	  us),	  and	  may	  initially	  
strike	  us	  as	  irrational,	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  these	  imaginary	  foreigners	  are	  making	  a	  rational	  mis-­‐
take,	  as	  Sider	  believes	  happens	  in	  such	  cases	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  2).	  Is	  there	  an	  s-­‐norm	  here	  that	  our	  
foreign	  friends	  are	  breaking?	  They	  are	  hard-­‐wired	  to	  think	  a	  specific	  way,	  and	  thus	  formulate	  
their	  theories	  in	  a	  way	  that	  suits	  their	  cognitive	  disposition,	  but	  nonetheless	  accept	  that	  their	  
concepts	  thereby	  don’t	  carve	  at	  the	  joints.	  But	  they	  are	  still	  able	  to	  express	  and	  grasp	  the	  joints.	  
It	  seems	  wrong	  to	  hold	  their	  cognitive	  disposition	  against	  them,	  judging	  them	  irrational	  mere-­‐
ly	  because	  of	  the	  way	  they	  prefer	  to	  formulate	  their	  theories.	  
	   Does	   changing	   the	   example	   to	   physical	   predicates	   change	   this	   verdict?	   Suppose	   that	  
these	   people	   didn’t	   have	   physicists	   themselves,	   but	   instead	   were	   told	   about	   our	   physicists,	  
their	   sophisticated	   methods	   and	   epistemic	   virtues.	   Being	   rational,	   they	   would	   presumably	  
agree	   that	   the	  properties	  discerned	  by	  physicists	  are	  more	  objective	   than	  the	  gerrymandered	  
ones	  they	  usually	  talk	  about.	  This	  is	  analogous	  to	  how	  we	  understand	  that	  photon	  wavelength	  
is	  more	   fundamental	   than	   colors,	   but	   as	   long	   as	   they	   can	  define	  predicates	   for	   the	  perfectly	  
natural	   properties	   without	   using	   the	   exact	   predicates	   of	   physics,	   yet	   still	   acknowledge	   the	  
priority,	  or	  mandatoriness,	  of	  physics,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  nothing	  epistemically	  amiss	  here.140	  I	  
submit	   that	   Sider’s	   scrambled	   propositions	   are	   not	   epistemically	   inferior,	   and	   that	   we	   can	  
acknowledge	  the	  privilege	  of	  physics	  in	  discerning	  reality	  without	  accepting	  an	  s-­‐norm.	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  it	  seems	  that	  within	  science	  itself,	  it	  is	  truth-­‐conditional	  equivalence	  that	  
matters.	  When	  individuating	  theories	  of	  physics,	  we	  do	  so	  in	  terms	  of	  truth-­‐conditional	  equiv-­‐
alence.	   There	   are	   several	   provably	   truth-­‐conditionally	   equivalent	   formulations	   of	   classical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  Another	  matter	  is	  whether	  this	  is	  practically	  plausible.	  Could	  these	  foreign	  people	  really	  come	  to	  have	  predicates	  
that	  are	  adequate	  to	  describe	  the	  world’s	  physical	  structure	  without	  using	  the	  predicates	  we	  tell	  them	  about	  from	  
our	  physics?	  We	  may	  instead	  consider	  some	  other	  foreign	  people	  that	  are	  cognitively	  disposed	  to	  immediately,	  and	  
as	  a	   result	  of	  hard-­‐wiring,	   create	  disjunctive	  properties	  out	  of	   every	  physical	  predicates	  we	   teach	   them:	  when	  we	  
teach	  them	  “mass”	  and	  the	  sentence	  “if	  two	  objects	  are	  of	  different	  mass	  they	  will	  attract	  other	  objects	  with	  different	  
gravitational	  force”,	  they	  will	  create	  the	  predicate	  “schmass”	  which	  means	  “mass	  or	  everything	  is	  self-­‐identical”,	  but	  
their	  schmass-­‐theory	  will	  be	  of	  the	  same	  predictive	  value	  as	  our	  theory.	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mechanics,	  for	  instance.	  The	  Hamiltonian	  formulation	  is	  perhaps	  more	  elegant	  than	  Newton’s,	  
but	   as	   long	   as	   physicists	   don’t	   distinguish	   these	   in	  matters	   of	   descriptive	   power	   or	   level	   of	  
precision,	  presumably	  we	  wouldn’t	  want	  to	  distinguish	  one	  of	  these	  as	  better	  because	  of	  some	  
novel	  s-­‐norm.	  Relatedly,	  Newtonian	  mechanics	  and	  Einstein’s	  general	  relativity	  have	  the	  same	  
predictions	  for	  relatively	  large	  objects	  at	  relatively	  small	  speeds,	  so	  Newtonian	  physics	  is	  used	  
for	  many	  practical	  purposes	  because	  it	  is	  simply	  easier	  to	  work	  with	  and	  compute	  than	  general	  
relativity.	  Within	   a	   certain	   domain,	   they	   are	   equivalent,	   but	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   choose	   to	   use	  
Newtonian	  physics	  for	  practical	  purposes	  doesn’t	  mean	  it’s	  any	  better	  objectively	  speaking.	  
Here	  is	  a	  possible	  objection:	  Sider	  writes	  that	  a	  goal	  of	  his	  book	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  “ideolo-­‐
gy	  matters”	  (2011,	  p.	  vii).	  A	  theory’s	  ideology	  is	  as	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  theory	  as	  its	  
ontology,	  he	  claims,	  because	  the	  theory	  “represents	  the	  world	  as	  having	  structure	  correspond-­‐
ing	  to	   its	  primitive	  expressions”	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  viii).	  While	  this	  claim	  would	  warrant	  claiming	  
that	   the	   predicates	   of	   physics	   are	   privileged	   and	   better	   for	   describing	   the	   world,	   this	   claim	  
about	  ideology	  itself	  seems	  to	  be	  begging	  the	  question	  against	  the	  foreigners:	  if	  they	  are	  hard-­‐
wired	   to	   think	   of	   the	  world	   in	   a	  way	   that	   doesn’t	   correspond	   to	   the	   joints,	   but	   nonetheless	  
realize	  this	  and	  formulate	  their	  theories	  using	  their	  non-­‐structural	  concepts	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  
structure,	   it	   is	  unreasonable	  to	  say	  that	  their	  chosen	   ideology	  represents	   the	  world	  as	  having	  
the	   structure	   corresponding	   to	   their	   primitive	   expressions.	   Rather	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   our	  
foreign	  friends	  should	  insist	  that	  it	  isn’t	  a	  consequence	  of	  choosing	  ideology	  that	  those	  primi-­‐
tives	   represents	   the	  world	   as	   having	   structure	   corresponding	   to	   the	   primitive	   expressions	   of	  
the	  theory.	  
The	   foreign	   people	   would	   presumably	   hold	   that	   they	   only	   make	   statements	   about	  
structure	  when	  they	  say	  struc(𝜑),	  where	  “𝜑”	  is	  some	  complex	  expression	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  non-­‐
structural	   primitives,	   not	  when	   they	   state	   their	   primitives.	   Their	   “book	   of	   the	  world”	  would	  
thus	  be	  in	  terms	  of	  primitives	  that	  don’t	  carve	  at	  the	  joints	  themselves.	  What	  Sider	  requires	  is	  
that	   all	   primitives	   in	   Ontologese	   are	   themselves	   structural.	   The	   notion	   that	   the	   primitive	  
ideology	  of	  a	  theory	  must	  itself	  carve	  at	  the	  joints,	  instead	  of	  the	  whole	  theory	  expressing	  the	  
joints,	  seems	  to	  presuppose	  an	  s-­‐norm,	  and	  thus	  does	  not	  provide	  independent	  argument	  for	  
an	   s-­‐norm.	   If	  we	   reject	   the	   s-­‐norm,	  we	   should	   deny	   that	  we	   implicitly	   take	   a	   stance	   on	   the	  
world’s	  structure	  when	  we	  choose	  to	  formulate	  a	  theory	  in	  some	  ideology.	  	  
It	  would	  seem,	  then,	  that	  we	  could	  grant	  that	  physics	  is	  mandatory	  when	  exploring	  the	  
world	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  must	  talk	  about	   the	  structure	  physics	  discovers,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  
entail	   that	   there	   is	   an	   s-­‐norm,	   thus	  we	  don’t	  have	   to	  carry	  out	   that	   talking	   in	  any	  particular	  
ideology.	  For	  Hirsch’s	  example	  seems	  to	  show	  that	  we	  can	  talk	  about	   structure	  without	  using	  
structural	   concepts.	   This	   distinction	   between	   structure	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   there	   being	   a	  
	   89	  
rational	   requirement	   to	   talk	   about	   it	   in	   a	   given	  way	   (the	   s-­‐norm),	   will	   be	   important	   in	   the	  
following.	  I	  will	  time	  and	  again	  return	  to	  it	  to	  deflect	  Sider’s	  arguments.	  	  
4.4.2	   Beliefs	  aim	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  world	  
The	  second	  argument	  is	  contained	  in	  this	  paragraph:	  
	  
First,	  the	  aim	  of	  joint-­‐carving	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  the	  same	  source	  as	  the	  aim	  of	  truth:	  beliefs	  
aim	  to	  conform	   to	   the	  world.	  Here	  is	  a	  simplified	  but	   intuitive	  picture.	  The	  realist	  about	  struc-­‐
ture	  thinks	  of	  the	  world	  as	  coming	  “ready-­‐made”	  with	  distinguished	  carvings.	  By	  analogy	  with	  
the	  notion	  of	  a	  mathematical	  structure,	  think	  of	  The	  World	  as	  a	  structure:	  a	  set	  E	  of	  entities	  to-­‐
gether	  with	  a	  set	  R	  of	  relations	  over	  E	  (think	  of	  the	  relations	  here	  simply	  as	  ’tuples	  of	  members	  
of	  E).	  Now,	  ignoring	  partial	  belief,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  of	  the	  beliefs	  of	  a	  subject,	  S,	  as	  consisting	  
of	  the	  representation	  of	  a	  structure:	  the	  subject	  represents	  there	  being	  objects,	  ES,	  together	  with	  
a	  set	  RS	  of	  relations	  over	  E.	  Given	  this	  picture,	  it	  is	  utterly	  natural	  to	  think	  of	  full	  conformity	  to	  
The	  World	  as	  requiring	  (ES,	  RS)	  to	  be	  identical	  to	  (E,	  R).	  Conformity	  requires	  the	  believer	  to	  rep-­‐
resent	   the	  structured	  world	  exactly	  as	   it	   in	   fact	   is,	  and	  thus	  requires	   the	  represented	  relations	  
RS	  to	  be	   identical	   to	   the	  world’s	   structuring	   relations	  R.	  Thus	   if	  belief	   aims	   to	  conform	   to	   the	  
world,	  and	  if	  belief	  and	  the	  world	  are	  both	  structured,	  belief	  aims	  not	  just	  at	  truth,	  but	  also	  at	  
the	  right	  structure	  –	  truth	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms.	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  62)	  
	  
This	   argument	  presupposes	   that	   the	   source	   of	   both	   the	   s-­‐norm	  and	   the	   truth-­‐norm	   is	   “con-­‐
formity	   to	   the	   world”.	   The	   conformity-­‐claim	   is	   supposedly	   part	   of	   knee-­‐jerk	   realism,	   but	   I	  
intend	  to	  evaluate	  it	  on	  independent	  grounds	  due	  to	  the	  vagueness	  of	  knee-­‐jerk	  realism.	  From	  
the	  claim	  of	  “conformity”,	  Sider	  argues	  that	  because	  structure	  is	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  our	  beliefs	  
should	  “conform”	  to	  the	  world’s	  structure,	  so	  we	  should	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  structural	  notions.	  	  
It	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  the	  source	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  truth	  is	  this	  more	  fundamental	  conformi-­‐
ty	  norm	  (more	  on	  this	  below).	  It	  is	  a	  quite	  common	  assumption	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  aim	  of	  
belief	   that	   there	   is	  a	  sui	   generis	   truth-­‐norm	  for	  belief,141	  but	  Sider’s	  argument	  seems	  to	  reject	  
this.	  The	  derivation	  of	  the	  s-­‐norm	  from	  the	  conformity-­‐norm	  also	  seems	  to	  go	  against	  Sider’s	  
own	  view	  that	  the	  s-­‐norm	  is	  a	  basic	  norm	  not	  derivable	  from	  others.	  	  
Setting	   these	  problems	  aside,	  why	   should	  we	  accept	   the	  conformity-­‐norm	   in	   the	   first	  
place?	  Sider’s	  argument	   is	  that	  the	  conformity	  norm	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  s-­‐norm,	  so	  we	  must	  
already	  accept	  the	  conformity	  norm	  to	  be	  persuaded	  by	  this	  argument.	  One	  notable	  problem	  is	  
that	  Sider	  hasn’t	  provided	  any	  independent	  arguments	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  norm,	  only	  
claimed	  that	  it	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  unargued	  presupposition	  of	  his	  book,	  namely	  knee-­‐jerk	  realism.	  
I’ll	  nonetheless	  evaluate	  the	  plausibility	  of	  such	  a	  norm.	  
If	  there	  is	  a	  conformity-­‐norm,	  then	  it	  is	  the	  source	  both	  of	  the	  s-­‐norm	  and	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  
truth	   for	  belief	   (the	   truth-­‐norm).	  So	  we	  can	  argue	  against	   the	  plausibility	  of	   the	  conformity-­‐
norm	  by	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  implausible	  that	  it	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  truth-­‐norm.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  See,	  for	  instance,	  most	  of	  the	  essays	  in	  Chan	  (2013).	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The	  main	  problem	   is	   that	   it	   is	   unclear	  what	   “conformity”	   comes	   to	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
truth,	   and	   thus	   that	   it	   is	   unclear	   that	   the	   conformity-­‐norm	   is	   the	   source	   of	   the	   truth-­‐norm.	  
First,	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  understand	  truth	  better	  than	  we	  understand	  conformity,	  for	  the	  notion	  
of	  “conformity	  to	  the	  world”	  seems	  to	  be	  just	  another	  analysis	  of	  truth,	  alongside	  deflationist	  
accounts,	  coherentist	  accounts,	  and	  correspondence	  accounts,	  and	  so	  on	  (conformity	  is	  proba-­‐
bly	   a	   beefed-­‐up	   version	   of	   correspondence	   theories).	   Thus	   we	   are	   more	   committed	   to	   the	  
validity	  of	  the	  truth-­‐norm	  than	  we	  are	  to	  any	  analyses	  of	  truth	  that	  may	  entail	  the	  truth-­‐norm.	  
Furthermore,	  it	  is	  implausible	  that	  truth	  can	  always	  be	  analyzed	  as	  conformity,	  which	  is	  
a	   requirement	   of	   the	   truth-­‐norm	  having	   the	   conformity-­‐norm	   as	   its	   source.	   For	   instance,	   in	  
what	   sense	   does	   the	   true	   sentence	   “There	   are	   no	   unicorns”	   conform	   to	   the	  world?	   There	   is	  
nothing	  in	  the	  world	  for	  it	  to	  conform	  to,	  for	  there	  are	  no	  unicorns,	  but	  the	  sentence	  is	  none-­‐
theless	  true.	  Correspondence-­‐accounts	  of	  truth	  have	  a	  general	  problem	  with	  negative	  existen-­‐
tial	   assertions,	   and	   it	  would	   seem	  to	  carry	  over	   to	   the	  conformity	  analysis	  of	   truth.	   It	   is	   also	  
unclear	  how	  the	  sentence	  “There	  are	  two	  ways	  to	  win	  this	  game”	  conforms	  to	  the	  world.	  What	  
is	   the	   “way”-­‐structure	   that	   the	   sentence	   latches	  onto,	  and	   if	   there	   is	  no	  such	  structure,	  what	  
makes	   the	   claim	   “conform”?	  We	   nonetheless	   think	   these	   sentences	   are	   true,	   but	   they	   don’t	  
seem	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  world.	  The	  goal	  here	  is	  not	  to	  refute	  conformity	  accounts	  of	  truth,	  but	  
to	   illustrate	   the	   sense	   in	  which	   they	   are	  more	   problematic	   than	   truth	   itself.	  We	  understand	  
truth	  better	  than	  conformity,	  which	  seems	  to	  undermine	  that	  the	  conformity-­‐norm	  can	  be	  the	  
source	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  truth.	  	  
Even	  if	  such	  questions	  can	  be	  answered,	  it	  seems	  tendentious	  to	  say	  that	  the	  origin	  of	  
the	   truth-­‐norm	   for	   beliefs	   is	   conformity	   all	   the	   time	   this	   (1)	   seems	   to	   presuppose	   a	   specific	  
account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  truth,	  and	  (2)	  we	  understand	  truth	  better	  than	  conformity.	  	  
Sider	  may	  object	  that	  I	  fail	  to	  understand	  his	  claim	  about	  conformity.	  Perhaps	  there	  is	  a	  
sense	  in	  which	  we	  are	  making	  a	  mistake	  if	  we	  don’t	  use	  the	  right	  concepts	  when	  we	  describe	  
the	  world.	  But	  such	  claims	  make	  me	  recall	  the	  hard-­‐wired	  foreigners,	  who	  are	  as	  conscientious	  
inquirers	   as	  we	   are,	   but	   are	  hard-­‐wired	   to	   think	   and	   talk	   in	  non-­‐structural	  ways.	   I	   don’t	   see	  
how	   pointing	   to	   this	  mysterious	   “conformity-­‐norm”	   would	  make	   them	   realize	   that	   they	   are	  
making	   a	   rational	  mistake.	   Perhaps	   I’m	   not	   the	   right	   kind	   of	   knee-­‐jerk	   realist,	   but	   then	   I’d	  
rather	  reject	  Sider’s	  knee-­‐jerk	  realism	  and	  accept	  some	  other	  form	  of	  realism,	  for	  I’m	  decidedly	  
concerned	  with	  having	  true	  beliefs,	  but	  I’m	  not	  so	  sure	  whether	  I	  think	  they	  must	  “conform”.	  	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  Sider’s	  “natural”	  belief	  that	  our	  beliefs	  must	  have	  the	  form	  (ES,	  RS)	  to	  
match	   up	  with	   reality’s	   structure	   (E,	   R),	   this	   is	   dependent	   on	   two	   claims:	   (a)	   beliefs	   aim	   to	  
conform	  to	  the	  world,	  and	  (b)	  beliefs	  are	  in	  general	  structured	  in	  this	  way	  (cf.	  the	  last	  sentence	  
of	   the	  quoted	  passage).	   (a)	  would	  seem	  to	  depend	  on	   there	  being	  an	   intelligible	  conformity-­‐
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norm	  applicable	  to	  belief,	  which	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  object	  to.	  And	  (b)	  is	  a	  substantive	  claim	  
about	  the	  “form”	  or	  “structure”	  of	  our	  beliefs.	  There	  are	  several	  accounts	  of	  belief,	  and	  it	   is	  a	  
controversial	  and	  difficult	  topic	  how	  much	  structure	  they	  have,	  but	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  Sider	  is	  
not	  deriving	  the	  structure	  of	  belief	   from	  an	  analysis	  of	  belief	   itself,	  but	  rather	  derives	   it	   from	  
the	   s-­‐norm.	  On	   another	  note,	   as	   I	   have	   stressed,	  we	   can	  have	   true	  beliefs	   about	   the	  world’s	  
structure	   without	   the	   primitive	   constituents	   of	   language	   or	   thought	   “matching”	   the	   world’s	  
structure,	  so	  it	  seems	  unimportant	  that	  our	  beliefs	  actually	  conform	  to	  the	  world.	  The	  example	  
seems	  to	  be	  working	  more	  as	  an	  illustration	  than	  an	  argument.	  If	  our	  beliefs	  have	  this	  struc-­‐
ture,	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  alleged	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  belief	  to	  conform	  to	  
the	  world,	   and	  not	   something	  we	   arrive	   at	   by	   reflection	   on	   belief.	   But	   it	   seems	   simpler	   and	  
more	  in	  accordance	  with	  our	  common	  assumptions	  to	  reject	  (b),	  insisting	  that	  without	  further	  
justification	  of	  the	  s-­‐norm	  our	  beliefs	  doesn’t	  have	  this	  form.	  	  
I	   think	  we	  based	  on	   this	   should	  conclude	   that	   there	  are	   too	  many	  unanswered	  ques-­‐
tions	  and	  problems	  with	  the	  conformity	  norm	  to	  at	  this	  point	  take	  it	  as	  sufficient	  grounds	  for	  
believing	  in	  the	  s-­‐norm.	  That’s	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  argument	  for	  an	  s-­‐norm	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
basic	  conformity-­‐norm,	  but	  I	  don’t	  see	  how	  such	  an	  argument	  would	  go.	  	  
4.4.3	   Epistemic	  value	  
The	  third	  argument	  Sider	  puts	  forward	  is	  a	  set	  of	  observations	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  persuade	  
us	  that	  claims	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms	  are	  better	  than	  claims	  that	  are	  not.	  To	  criticize	  the	  argu-­‐
ment,	  it	  will	  be	  convenient	  to	  have	  the	  whole	  passage	  in	  front	  of	  us:	  
	  
…	  we	   think	  of	   scientific	  discovery	  as	   satisfying	   the	  aims	  of	   inquiry	  particularly	  well;	  why?	  An-­‐
swer:	  it	  is	  because	  scientific	  discoveries	  are	  phrased	  in	  particularly	  joint-­‐carving	  terms.	  Related-­‐
ly,	  we	   think	  of	   truths	   that	   are	   stated	   in	   extremely	  non-­‐joint-­‐carving	   terms	   –	   for	   example,	   the	  
scrambled	  propositions	  of	  section	  2.6	  –	  as	  being	  comparatively	  worthless.	  Relatedly,	  imagine	  (or	  
recall)	   first	  coming	  to	  believe	   that	  morality,	  beauty,	   justice,	  knowledge,	  or	  existence	   is	  a	  mere	  
projection	  of	  our	  conceptual	  scheme	  –	  that	  the	  truth	  in	  these	  domains	  is	  conventional,	  subjec-­‐
tive,	  or	  otherwise	  nonsubstantive.	  Why	  does	  that	  feel	  so	  deflating;	  why	  does	  it	  diminish	  the	  ur-­‐
gency	  of	  finding	  the	  truth;	  and	  why	  does	  it	  diminish	  the	  value	  of	  the	  truth	  once	  found?	  Answer:	  
though	  we	  might	  not	  put	   it	  exactly	   thus,	  our	  original	  picture	   in	   these	   lofty	  domains	   is	   that	  of	  
joint-­‐carving.	  Morality,	  beauty,	  and	  the	  rest	  are	  built	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  things,	  we	  naively	  think,	  
rather	  than	  being	  mere	  projections.	  Giving	  up	  on	  objectivity	  means	  giving	  up	  on	  joint-­‐carving,	  
and	  hence	  diminishes	  the	  value	  of	  truth.	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  62)	  
	  
The	  passage	  appeals	   to	  how	  we	  “think	  of	  scientific	  discovery”,	  our	  experience	  of	  some	  truths	  
being	  “worthless,”	  and	  a	   feeling	  of	  deflation	  when	  we	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  certain	  truths	  are	  
projections	  of	  our	  conceptual	   schemes	   to	   show	  that	  we	  care	  about	   the	   truth	   in	   joint-­‐carving	  
terms.	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   There	   are	   three	   short	   arguments	   here	   of	   essentially	   the	   same	   form:	   an	   s-­‐norm	   is	   the	  
best	   explanation	   of	   these	   different	   beliefs.	   For	   instance:	   There	   being	   an	   s-­‐norm	   is	   the	   best	  
explanation	  of	  why	  we	  think	  scientific	  discovery	  satisfies	  the	  aims	  of	  inquiry	  particularly	  well.	  
Thus	  my	   strategy	   in	   arguing	   against	   Sider	   will	   be	   to	   attempt	   to	   show	   that	   there	   are	   other,	  
equally	  good	  explanations	  of	  our	  beliefs.	  This	   is	  not	  a	  watertight	  argumentative	  strategy,	  but	  
seems	   to	  be	  of	   the	   same	  kind	  as	   Sider’s	   own	  arguments.	  After	   considering	   the	   three	   cases,	   I	  
question	   whether	   our	   beliefs,	   feelings	   or	   otherwise	   subjective	   dispositions	   provide	   good	  
grounds	  for	  drawing	  general	  conclusions	  about	  the	  s-­‐norm.	  
First,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  our	  impression	  of	  the	  epistemic	  success	  of	  science	  is	  related	  to	  
scientific	  discoveries	  being	   cast	   in	   joint-­‐carving	   terms.	  This	   is	   a	   very	   general	   claim,	   and	   it	   is	  
thus	  hard	   to	  know	  whether	  my	  alternative	  explanation	  accounts	   for	  what	  Sider	  has	   in	  mind,	  
but	  I	  will	  try.	  Here	  is	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  of	  this	  data	  point:	  Science	  is	  the	  best	  we	  have	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  inquiry,	  and	  we	  care	  about	  the	  truths	  it	  discerns	  because	  we	  know	  they	  are	  
epistemically	  well	  grounded.	  Science	  absorbs	  the	  best	  epistemic	  methods	  and	  institutionalizes	  
and	  refines	  them.	  For	  instance,	  science	  is	  based	  on	  trial	  and	  error;	  experiments	  hold	  everything	  
except	   what	   one	   is	   testing	   constant;	   science	   develops	   systematic	   and	   explanatory	   powerful	  
theories,	  and	  revises	  them	  in	  light	  of	  new	  evidence.142	  To	  me,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  these	  merits	  
of	  science	  constitutes	  an	  equally	  good	  explanation	  of	  why	  we	  think	  of	  “scientific	  discovery	  as	  
satisfying	  the	  aims	  of	  inquiry	  particularly	  well”	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  62).	  Sider	  infers	  the	  s-­‐norm	  from	  
this	  data	  point,	  but	  it	  would	  seem	  my	  explanation	  could	  account	  for	  it	  as	  well.	  As	  my	  suggested	  
account	   brings	   in	   fewer	   commitments	   than	   Sider’s	   (which	   requires	   the	   s-­‐norm),	   one	   should	  
prefer	  mine.	  Objection:	  There	  is	  room	  for	  more	  than	  one	  explanation,	  and	  an	  s-­‐norm	  also	  has	  a	  
role	   to	   play	   in	   explaining	   our	   attitude	   toward	   science.	   Answer:	   Sider’s	   formulation	   doesn’t	  
suggest	  that	  he	  thinks	  there	  are	  several	  explanations,	  but	  if	  we	  grant	  that,	  we	  can	  answer	  that	  
also	   the	   foreign	   people	   I	   constantly	   return	   to	  would	   relish	   science,	   and	   that	   they	   can	   relish	  
science	  without	  conceding	  that	  they	  do	  so	  because	  of	  the	  terms	   science	  uses	  to	  express	  their	  
discoveries.	   They	   value	   science	   because	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	   discoveries	   of	   science.	   It	   is	   the	  
content,	  not	  the	  form,	  of	  such	  discoveries	  that	  matters.	  
The	  second	  point,	  that	  truths	  stated	  in	  non-­‐joint	  carving	  terms	  are	  “worthless”,	  seems	  
like	  a	  red	  herring.	  Our	  foreign	  friends	  that	  uses	  “cubound	  and	  not	  rindical”	  to	  say	  “cubical”	  and	  
thereby	   talk	   about	   the	   (supposedly)	   natural	   properties,	   and	   regard	   the	   propositions	   about	  
structure	  as	  valuable,	  but	  that	   is	  because	  they	  express	  something	  objective	  about	  reality,	  and	  
has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  terms	  they	  use.	  An	  alternative	  explanation	  of	  our	  belief	  that	  scram-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  aren’t	  significant	  questions	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  about	  how	  science	  proceeds,	  
what	  scientific	  discoveries	  really	  are,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  I	  hope	  what	  I’ve	  said	  is	  rather	  uncontroversial.	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bled	  propositions	  are	  worthless	  is	  that	  they	  have	  no	  practical	  value	  to	  us.	  They	  are	  framed	  in	  
primitive	  vocabulary	  that’s	  unfamiliar	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  unintelligible	  to	  us,	  so	  it’s	  not	  surprising	  
that	  we	  don’t	  care	  about	  them.	  But	  that	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  our	  belief	  is	  grounded	  in	  us	  accept-­‐
ing	   an	   s-­‐norm.	  Rather,	   our	   attitude	   towards	   “scrambled”	   propositions	   could	   be	   grounded	   in	  
our	  cognitive	  dispositions	  and	  such	  propositions’	  lack	  of	  instrumental	  value	  to	  us.	  Besides	  this,	  
I	  refer	  back	  to	  what	  I	  said	  in	  response	  to	  knee-­‐jerk	  realism	  in	  section	  4.4.1	  above.	  	  
The	  third	  part	  of	  the	  argument	  –	  that	  we	  lose	   interest	   in	  aesthetics,	  ethics,	  and	  so	  on	  
when	  we	  realize	  that	  our	  aesthetic	  or	  ethical	  beliefs	  are	  merely	  projections	  of	  our	  conceptual	  
schemes	  –	  is	  also	  unsuccessful.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  a	  correct	  empirical	  observation	  about	  philoso-­‐
phers	  (and	  laymen	  in	  general),	  but	  if	  we	  want	  to	  frame	  this	  in	  Sider’s	  vocabulary,	  it	  seems	  that	  
we	  lose	  interest	  when	  we	  understand	  that	  there	  are	  no	  joints,	  not	  because	  we	  realize	  that	  there	  
is	  no	  privileged	  description	  of	   these	   joins.	  Sider	  seems	  to	  conflate	   these	   issues.	  Furthermore,	  
what	  we	  care	  about	  is	  that	  our	  beliefs	  are	  not	  merely	  projections,	  but	  structure	  is	  not	  necessary	  
to	  explain	  this.	  Structure	  is	  but	  one	  way	  of	  cashing	  out	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  objective,	  and	  what	  
we	  care	  about	  is	  that	  beliefs	  concern	  something	  objective.	  As	  the	  discussion	  of	  moral	  facts	  in	  
metaethics	  shows,	  we	  certainly	  don’t	  have	  to	  accept	  Sider’s	   framework	  of	  structure	   to	  accept	  
that	  there	  are	  moral	  facts	  (potential	  problems	  with	  this	  notwithstanding).	  Personally,	  at	  least,	  I	  
would	  care	  as	  much	  about	  ethics	  in	  a	  scenario	  where	  there	  is	  an	  s-­‐norm	  as	  in	  one	  where	  there	  
isn’t	  one.	  What’s	  important	  to	  us	  is	  that	  there	  is	  something	  objective	  about	  these	  disciplines,	  
not	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  “correct	  description”	  of	  the	  ethical	  or	  aesthetic	  facts.	  	  
Is	  this	  reply	  uncharitable	  to	  Sider?	  I	  claim	  that	  Sider	  is	  making	  the	  mistake	  of	  not	  dis-­‐
tinguishing	  between	   the	   structure-­‐claim	  and	   the	  privileged	  description-­‐claim,	   and	   that	  he	   is	  
taking	  our	   intuitions	  about	  objectiveness	   in	  general	   in	   support	  of	   the	  s-­‐norm.	   Implicitly,	   I’m	  
claiming	  that	  he	  doesn’t	  really	  see	  these	  distinctions	  in	  these	  cases.	  This	  might	  be	  because	  we	  
have	   opposing	   views	   on	   the	   independence	   between	   the	   structure-­‐claim	   and	   the	   privileged	  
description-­‐claim,	  but	  the	  arguments	  I’m	  discussing	  are	  from	  the	  section	  “Epistemic	  Value”	  of	  
Sider’s	  book,	  a	  section	  devoted	  to	  arguing	  for	  the	  s-­‐norm	  being	  a	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  forming	  
beliefs	   (2011,	  p.	  61).	   I	  will	   therefore	   take	   it	   that	  Sider	   thinks	   these	  observations	   support	  an	  s-­‐
norm	  over	  and	  above	  the	  claim	  of	  structure	  and	  the	  epistemic	  goal	   to	  describe	   the	  structure	  
completely,	  which	  is	  just	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  truth-­‐norm.	  	  
Having	  suggested	  some	  alternative	  explanations	  of	  the	  attitudes,	  we	  should	  ask	  wheth-­‐
er	   Sider’s	   argumentative	   strategy	   is	   a	   good	  one	   for	  determining	  whether	   there	   is	   an	   s-­‐norm.	  
Are	  the	  kinds	  of	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  Sider	  appeal	  to	  feasible	  data	  to	  establish	  whether	  there	  is	  
an	  s-­‐norm	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  The	  s-­‐norm	  must	  be	  a	  general	  epistemic	  norm,	  applicable	  to	  all	  
rational	  agents,	   independently	  of	  their	  cognitive	  or	  biological	  make-­‐up	  and	  hard-­‐wiring.	  This	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is	  necessary	  because	  the	  norm	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  belief	  that	  reflects	  some-­‐
thing	  about	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  an	  inquirer	  and	  represent	  reality	  “as	  it	  is”.	  Thus	  the	  arguments	  
for	  it	  cannot	  trade	  on	  humans’	  cognitive	  dispositions	  or	  instrumental	  concerns.	  
In	   light	  of	  examples	   like	   the	   foreign	  people	  of	  Hirsch,	  we	  should	  be	  suspicious	  of	   the	  
value	  of	  our	  attitudes	  providing	  evidence	  for	  an	  s-­‐norm.	  That	  we	  prefer	  some	  descriptions	  over	  
others	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  a	  matter	  of	  our	  own	  cognitive	  dispositions	  than	  of	  a	  norm	  applicable	  
to	   all	   rational	   agents.	   Some	   of	   Sider’s	   remarks	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	  we	  wouldn’t	   be	   able	   to	  
make	   rational	   predictions	   and	   giving	   correct	   explanations	   if	   we	   don’t	   use	   the	   “right	   con-­‐
cepts”.143	  But	   this	   claim	  would	   seem	   to	   trade	   on	   the	   contingent	   cognitive	   dispositions	   of	   us	  
humans,	  and	  does	  not	   imply	  that	   it	   is	   impossible	  to	  make	  rational	  predictions	  without	   joint-­‐
carving	  terms.	  The	  s-­‐norm	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  completely	  independent	  of	  our	  cognitive	  disposi-­‐
tions	  or	  preferences,	  but	  it	  is	  implausible	  that	  our	  attitudes	  and	  beliefs	  are	  independent	  in	  this	  
way.	  Thus	  we	  should	  be	  somewhat	  skeptical	  of	  the	  weight	  of	  Sider’s	  arguments.	  	  
The	  consequences	  of	  there	  not	  being	  such	  a	  norm	  is	  perhaps	  not	  as	  devastating	  as	  Sider	  
seems	  to	  think	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  65).	  For	  our	  foreign	  friends	  do	  accept	  structure,	  and	  they	  can	  talk	  
about	   it	  and	  care	  about	  discovering	  and	  describing	  it.	  A	  final	  point	  can	  be	  made	  about	  these	  
examples.	  If	  the	  attitudes	  Sider	  appeals	  to	  in	  support	  of	  our	  implicit	  acceptance	  of	  an	  s-­‐norm	  
should	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  for	  such	  a	  norm,	  we	  must	  note	  that	  they	  are	  all	  about	  there	  being	  
some	  predicates	  that	  are	  better	  to	  use,	  not	  about	  quantifiers.	  I’ve	  been	  using	  predicates	  in	  my	  
examples	   because	  we	   seem	   to	   have	   a	   firmer	   grasp	   of	   them	   than	  we	   do	   on	   “quantificational	  
structure”	  and	  because	  Sider	  also	  focuses	  quite	  exclusively	  on	  predicates	  when	  arguing	  for	  the	  
s-­‐norm,	  but	  we	  may	  nonetheless	  note	  that	  most	  of	  the	  evidence	  Sider	  has	  put	  forward	  for	  an	  s-­‐
norm	  so	  far	  trades	  on	  predicate	  structure.	  So	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  even	  if	  the	  arguments	  just	  sur-­‐
veyed	  establish	  an	  s-­‐norm,	   that	  norm	  can	  be	  said	   to	  carry	  over	   to	  ontology	  or	  other	  parts	  of	  
metaphysics.	  	  
4.4.4	   A	  series	  of	  scenarios	  	  
The	  last	  argument	  Sider	  gives	  for	  the	  s-­‐norm	  takes	  as	  its	  starting	  point	  five	  scenarios	  where	  the	  
match	   between	   our	   beliefs	   and	   reality’s	   structure	   is	   gradually	   eroded	   (2011,	   p.	   63).	   The	   idea	  
behind	  the	  argument	  is	  to	  reflect	  on	  our	  opinions	  on	  what	  we	  care	  about	  when	  forming	  beliefs.	  
The	  consequence	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  that	  we	  don’t	  just	  care	  about	  our	  beliefs	  being	  merely	  true	  
–	  we	  also	  care	  about	  “truth	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms”	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  63).	  	  
I	  will	  not	  present	  all	  the	  scenarios	  here	  and	  repeat	  Sider’s	  remarks	  about	  them,	  because	  
the	  argument	  seems	  to	  suffer	  from	  the	  same	  shortcomings	  as	  the	  arguments	  discussed	  above;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  Compare	  Hirsch	  (2013,	  p.	  715).	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there	  are	  other	  alternative	  explanations	  just	  as	  salient	  as	  there	  being	  an	  s-­‐norm.	  By	  maintain-­‐
ing	  a	  strict	  distinction	  between	  the	  structure-­‐claim	  and	  the	  privileged	  description-­‐claim	  we	  see	  
that	  it’s	  hard	  to	  find	  evidence	  for	  the	  s-­‐norm.	  	  
Consider	  the	  contrast	  between	  Scenario	  1,	  in	  which	  “the	  physical	  world	  is	  pretty	  much	  
the	  way	  we	  think	  it	  is;	  it	  includes	  physical	  objects	  in	  addition	  to	  spacetime”	  and	  Scenario	  2,	  in	  
which	   “the	   physical	   world	   consists	   of	   nothing	   more	   than	   propertied	   points	   and	   regions	   of	  
spacetime”	  (2011,	  p.	  63).	  The	  suggestion	  is	  that	  if	  we	  suppose	  we	  have	  the	  beliefs	  we	  now	  have	  
in	  these	  scenarios,	  we	  fail	  more	  epistemically	  in	  Scenario	  2	  than	  1,	  and	  Sider	  thinks	  this	  shows	  
that	  we	  care	  about	  the	  truth	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms.	  But	  this	  might	  be	  explained	  equally	  well	  by	  
the	   fact	   that	   our	  beliefs	   about	   the	   structure	  of	   reality	   are	  more	  wrong	   in	   Scenario	   2	   than	   in	  
Scenario	   1.	  What	  we	   care	   about	   is	   that	  we	   have	   true	   beliefs	   about	  what	   the	   structure	   is.	   In	  
scenario	  2,	  our	  ordinary	  beliefs	  about	  the	  world	  are	  to	  some	  extent	  false.	  Again	  we	  may	  appeal	  
to	  our	  foreign	  friends	  who	  care	  equally	  much	  about	  discerning	  reality’s	  structure,	  but	  employ	  
non-­‐joint	  carving	  terms.	  They	  would	  also	  think	  that	  they	  are	  worse	  off	  epistemically	  in	  Scenar-­‐
io	  2	  than	  Scenario	  1,	  but	  we	  wouldn’t	  say	  that	  this	  is	  because	  they	  use	  non-­‐joint-­‐carving	  terms	  
when	   expressing	   their	   beliefs.	   Rather,	  we	   are	  worse	   off	   in	   scenario	   2	   because	  we	   don’t	   have	  
correct	   beliefs.	   There	   is	   nothing	   in	   the	   scenarios	   that	   suggests	   that	   our	   “intellectual	   failure”	  
occurs	  because	  we	  don’t	  think	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms.	  
	  Consider	  also	  the	  contrast	  between	  Scenario	  4,	  where	  “our	  ordinary	  beliefs	  are	  caused	  
by	  The	  Matrix,	  a	  computer	  simulation	  that	  directly	  stimulates	  our	  brains	  while	  our	  bodies	  lie	  
in	  stasis”	  and	  Scenario	  5,	  where	  “I	  am	  a	  disembodied	  brain	  floating	  in	  an	  utterly	  empty	  space;	  
the	  changes	  in	  my	  brain	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  my	  “mental	  states”	  happen	  purely	  by	  chance”	  (Sider	  
2011,	  p.	  63).	  Even	  though	  we	  have	  false	  beliefs	  in	  both	  these	  cases,	  we	  are	  epistemically	  worse	  
off	  in	  Scenario	  5	  than	  in	  Scenario	  4.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  best	  explained	  by	  us	  caring	  about	  truth	  in	  
joint-­‐carving	  terms.	  The	  belief-­‐forming	  process	  in	  Scenario	  5	  is	  random,	  and	  it	  moreover	  gen-­‐
erates	  “beliefs”	  that	  hardly	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  content	  at	  all.	  In	  Scenario	  4,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
we	  can	  clearly	   imagine	  different	  ways	  for	  the	  belief-­‐forming	  process	  to	  function	  at	   least	  non-­‐
randomly	   and	  have	   content	   that	  may	  be	   about	   something	   (perhaps	   aspects	   of	   the	   computer	  
program).	   These	   examples	   can	   be	   clearly	   distinguished	   from	   Scenario	   1,	   where	   our	   beliefs-­‐
forming	  processes	  (most	  centrally	  perception)	  is	  functioning	  as	  we	  believe	  it	  does,	  which	  puts	  
us	  in	  a	  good	  epistemic	  position.	  This	  appeal	  to	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  our	  belief-­‐forming	  pro-­‐
cesses	  seems	  apt	  to	  explain	  the	  epistemic	  differences	  between	  the	  scenarios.	  In	  general,	  then,	  
Sider’s	  argument	  from	  scenarios	  seems	  unsuccessful	  in	  establishing	  the	  s-­‐norm.	  	  
After	  having	  considered	  these	  four	  direct	  arguments	  for	  why	  there	  is	  an	  epistemic	  value	  
in	  thinking	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms,	  I	  conclude	  that	  they	  don’t	  provide	  good	  enough	  reasons	  for	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believing	  there	  to	  be	  an	  s-­‐norm	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  good	  old	  truth-­‐norm.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  good	  
positive	  arguments,	  our	  fallback	  position	  should	  be	  to	  reject	  this	  novel	  epistemic	  norm.	  
Most	  of	  Sider’s	  arguments	  are	  based	  on	  examples	  where	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  see	  that	  we	  
already	  implicitly	  care	  about	  the	  truth	  in	  joint-­‐carving	  terms.	  Even	  though	  I	  do	  feel	  the	  pres-­‐
sure	  to	  prefer	  joint-­‐carving	  descriptions,	  I	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  see	  that	  there	  are	  sufficiently	  
good	  reasons	  for	  believing	  these	  instincts	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  general	  s-­‐norm.	  My	  main	  argument	  
against	  such	  a	  norm	  has	  been	  that	   it	   is	  wrong	  to	  attribute	   irrationality	  and	  “epistemic	  short-­‐
coming”	   to	  agents	  hard-­‐wired	   to	   think	   in	  non-­‐joint-­‐carving	   terms,	  but	  who	  nonetheless	  care	  
about	   structure.	   Furthermore,	   it	   seems	   that	   we	   can	   come	   up	   with	   other	   equally	   good	   and	  
plausible	  explanations	  of	  our	   intuitions	  about	  epistemic	  success	   in	   the	  cases	  Sider	  asks	  us	   to	  
consider,	  and	  we	  should	  also	  be	  somewhat	  skeptical	  of	  whether	  our	  intuitions	  are	  good	  guides	  
to	  objective	  epistemic	  norms	  beyond	  truth,	  because	  it	  might	  simply	  be	  the	  unfamiliarity	  of	  the	  
terms	  that	  creates	  our	  intuitive	  reactions.	  Finally,	  we	  may	  restate	  that	  the	  resulting	  view	  isn’t	  
as	  bad	  as	  Sider	  seems	  to	  think.	  We	  can	  accept	  that	  Sider	  has	  given	  us	  good	  reasons	  to	  think	  
that	  we	   care	   about	  whether	  we	  have	   true	  beliefs	   about	   the	  world’s	   structure	   (if	   there	   is	   any	  
such),	  but	  this	  is	  simply	  a	  fall-­‐out	  of	  the	  truth-­‐norm,	  and	  does	  not	  provide	  evidence	  for	  an	  s-­‐
norm.	  	  
4.5	   Saving	  ontology	  without	  the	  s-­‐norm?	  
Above	   I	   argued	   that	   Sider	  hasn’t	   given	  us	   good	   enough	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   there	   is	   an	   s-­‐
norm.	   If	   there	   is	   no	   s-­‐norm,	   Ontologese	   cannot	   be	   a	  metaphysically	   privileged	   language	   in	  
virtue	  of	  there	  being	  an	  s-­‐norm,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  Sider’s	  main	  reason	  for	  believing	  that	  Onto-­‐
logese	  is	  privileged.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  result	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Hirsch’s	  arguments,	  because	  it	  implies	  
that	  Sider’s	  flavor	  of	  normative	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  unsuccessful,	  or	  at	   least	  that	  we	  need	  
better	  arguments	  to	  accept	  the	  privilege	  of	  Ontologese	  for	  purposes	  of	  ontology.	  By	  analyzing	  
Sider’s	  arguments	  for	  the	  s-­‐norm,	  we	  have	  gotten	  better	  insight	  into	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  
cashing	  out	  and	  justifying	  one	  sense	  in	  which	  “truth	  is	  not	  enough”.	  	  
But	  even	  if	   there	   is	  no	  s-­‐norm	  and	  normative	  quantifier	   invariantism	  is	   false,	  perhaps	  
Ontologese	  can	  be	  “privileged”	  in	  another	  way.	  After	  all,	  one	  can	  use	  Ontologese	  to	  talk	  about	  
quantificational	  structure	   if	   there	   is	  any.	  As	  I’ve	   flagged,	   I	  haven’t	  discussed	  whether	  there	   is	  
any	  quantificational	   structure,	  but	   if	   there	   is,	   then	  by	  definition	  any	  complete	  description	  of	  
reality	  must	  use	  a	  quantifier	   that	  at	  has	  expressive	  resources	   to	   talk	  about	  all	   the	  quantifica-­‐
tional	   structure.	   If	  Ontologese	  can	  be	  used	   to	   talk	  about	   the	  quantificational	   structure,	   then	  
Ontologese	  is	  privileged	  after	  all,	  but	  in	  a	  less	  exotic	  way	  than	  the	  s-­‐norm	  promised.	  The	  privi-­‐
lege	  of	  Ontologese	  would	  then	  merely	  be	  a	  fall-­‐out	  of	  the	  truth-­‐norm	  and	  the	  goal	  of	  providing	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a	   complete	   description	   of	   reality,	   for	   reality	   contains	   quantificational	   structure.	   This	   section	  
explores	  this	  alternative	  version	  of	  Sider’s	  response	  to	  Hirsch.	  	  
Sider	   (2011,	   pp.	   180–189)	   argues	   that	   there	   is	   quantificational	   structure:	   any	   complete	  
description	   of	   reality	  must	   use	   quantifiers.	   This	  means	   that	  we	   can	   stipulate	   that	   there	   is	   a	  
joint-­‐carving	  quantifier	  (Sider	  2011,	  pp.	  171–172).	  Given	  that	  there	  is	  quantificational	  structure,	  
structure	   is	   “something	   in	   the	  world”,	   and	   thus	   languages	   that	   don’t	   use	   the	   structural	   con-­‐
cepts,	  for	  instance	  presumably	  English,	  seem	  to	  miss	  out,	  especially	  if	  there	  is	  more	  quantifica-­‐
tional	  structure	  than	  English	  talks	  about.	  In	  fact,	  Hirsch	  makes	  some	  comments	  on	  a	  position	  
that	   isn’t	   too	  unlike	   this.	  He	  writes	   that	  quantifier	  variantism	   isn’t	  compatible	  with	   the	  view	  
that	   there	   is	   a	   “unique	   sentence-­‐shaped	   thing	   in	   the	   world”	   (Hirsch	   2011,	   p.	   79).144	  It	   would	  
seem	  that	  Sider’s	   focus	  on	   some	   terms	  being	   structural,	   thus	  expressing	   something	  objective	  
about	  reality,	  has	  something	  in	  common	  with	  such	  a	  view.	  On	  Sider’s	  view,	  there	  is	  an	  objec-­‐
tively	   best	  way	   to	   “write	   the	   book	   of	   the	  world”.145	  Quantificational	   structure	   thus	   threatens	  
weak	   quantifier	   variantism	   (instead	   of	   strong	   quantifier	   variantism)	   because	   it	   appears	   that	  
there	  are	  some	  truths	  we	  can	  only	  express	  using	  Ontologese.	  	  
Whether	  this	  is	  part	  of	  what	  Sider	  has	  in	  mind	  when	  he	  says	  that	  Ontologese	  is	  better	  
than	  other	  ontological	  languages	  I	  do	  not	  know,	  but	  at	  least	  this	  reply	  doesn’t	  depend	  on	  the	  s-­‐
norm.146	  Much	  of	  what	  he	   says	  about	   “truth	  not	  being	  enough”	  and	   the	  arguments	   for	   the	   s-­‐
norm	  suggest	   that	   this	   isn’t	  Sider’s	  preferred	  position,	  but	   it	  might	  still	  be	  enough	  to	  defend	  
ontology	  against	  Hirsch.	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  difference	  between	  quantifi-­‐
cational	  and	  predicate	  structure	  here.	  For	  while	  in	  the	  case	  of	  predicate	  structure	  we	  can	  use	  
disjunctive	  or	  other	  non-­‐joint-­‐carving	  predicates	  to	  talk	  truthfully	  and	  exhaustively	  about	  the	  
world’s	  distinguished	  predicate	  structure,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  how	  we	  would	  do	  that	  for	  quantifi-­‐
cational	   structure.	   On	   the	   assumption	   of	   quantificational	   structure,	   how	   does	   things	   stand	  
with	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  ontological	  languages	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent?	  
Hirsch’s	  (2013)	  suggests	  a	  response	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  that	  skirts	  this	  
problem	  elegantly:	  he	   suggests	   that	  all	  quantifiers	  are	   structural.	   In	   that	   case,	  we	  don’t	  have	  
this	   problem,	   though	   one	   may	   object	   to	   the	   massive	   redundancy	   of	   such	   structure	   (Sider	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  This	  is	  originally	  a	  formulation	  from	  Putnam	  (1993,	  p.	  301).	  	  
145	  These	  formulations	  ignore	  what	  was	  clearly	  stated	  above:	  that	  structure	  isn’t	  a	  thing	  in	  the	  world.	  	  
146	  Thus	   I	   don’t	   really	   know	  whether	   Sider	   should	   be	   classified	   as	   a	   normative	   quantifier	   invariantist	   or	   simply	   a	  
quantifier	  invariantist.	  In	  the	  grand	  scheme	  of	  things,	  this	  isn’t	  very	  important,	  but	  when	  I	  chose	  to	  write	  this	  thesis	  
I	  had	  to	  make	  some	  dispositional	  choices.	  One	  of	   these	  was	  how	  to	  present	  and	  classify	  Hirsch’s	  views	  and	  argu-­‐
ments,	  and	  I	  found	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  weak	  and	  strong	  quantifier	  variantism,	  and	  consequently	  between	  
quantifier	   invariantism	   and	   normative	   quantifier	   invariantism,	  was	   both	   tidy	   and	   illuminating.	  When	   describing	  
Sider’s	  view,	  these	  categories	  are	  perhaps	  less	  apt,	  but	  I	  hope	  that	  I’ve	  been	  able	  to	  give	  a	  comprehensible	  account	  of	  
Sider’s	  view	  nonetheless.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  consider	  different	  ways	  of	  understanding	  Sider’s	  position.	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2013).147	  However,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  assess	  Sider’s	  defense	  of	  ontology,	  and	  also	  to	  understand	  the	  
relationship	   between	   quantifier	   variantism	   and	   Sider’s	   structure,	   we	  must	   evaluate	   whether	  
Ontologese	  is	  in	  some	  way	  better	  than	  alternative	  quantificational	  languages	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
an	  s-­‐norm.	  	  
Surprisingly,	  an	  asymmetry	  between	  “big”	  and	  “small”	   languages	  not	  unlike	  the	  asym-­‐
metry	  I	  argued	  against	  in	  section	  2.3	  seems	  to	  reemerges	  here.	  Suppose	  that	  Ontologese	  uses	  a	  
quantifier	  we	  call	  Q,	  and	  only	  quantifies	  over	  fundamental	  particles.	  It	  would	  them	  seem	  that	  
someone	   speaking	   a	   “bigger	   language”,	   for	   instance	   Universalese,	   could	   say	   “struc(Q)”,	   but	  
don’t	  feel	  pressured	  to	  actually	  speak	  Ontologese,	  because	  (i)	  there	  is	  no	  s-­‐norm,	  and	  (ii)	  she	  
can	   talk	   about	   all	   the	   quantificational	   structure	   (the	   fundamental	   particles)	   in	   her	   own	   lan-­‐
guage.	   Universalese	   gives	   the	   impression	   that	   there	   is	  more	   quantificational	   structure	   than	  
there	  really	  is,	  so	  is	  in	  a	  way	  imprecise,	  but	  as	  long	  as	  she	  agrees	  that	  struc(Q),	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
s-­‐norm	  doesn’t	  push	  her	  towards	  revising	  her	  language,	  for	  there	  is	  nothing	  wrong	  about	  not	  
“matching”	  reality’s	  structure	  with	  one’s	  language.	  As	  I	  noted	  in	  relation	  to	  ideology	  in	  section	  
4.4.1	  above,	  choosing	  to	  use	  a	  certain	  ideology	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  entail	  that	  we	  thereby	  represent	  
the	  world	  as	  having	  the	  structure	  of	  that	  ideology.	  So	  Universalese	  has	  the	  same	  metaphysical	  
merit	  as	  Ontologese.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   if	   the	   quantifier	   Q*	   in	   Ontologese	   quantifies	   over	   any	   arbitrary	  
mereological	  sum,	  then	  someone	  speaking	  Nihilish	  has	  a	  problem.	  For	  if	  a	  speaker	  of	  Nihilish	  
utters	   “struc(Q*)”,	   it	  would	   seem	   that	   she	   concedes	   that	  her	   language	   is	  missing	  out	   on	  de-­‐
scribing	  reality	  completely,	  for	  struc(Q*)	  implies	  that	  there	  are	  mereological	  sums	  in	  the	  objec-­‐
tively	  best	  meaning	  of	  the	  quantifier,	  so	  there	  are	  mereological	  sums	  “out	  there”,	  but	  Nihilish	  
does	  not	  quantify	  over	  them	  as	  such.	  So	  Nihilish	  is	  expressively	  impoverished.	  	  
This	   is	   somewhat	  puzzling,	  but	  upon	  reflection	   it	   should	  perhaps	  be	  expected.	   If	  one	  
adopts	   such	   a	   substantial	   notion	   of	   reality	   as	   Sider’s	   theory	   of	   structure	   seems	   to	   imply,	  
Hirsch’s	   arguments	   from	   truth-­‐conditional	   equivalence	  of	   chapter	   1	   starts	   to	   erode.	  For	  with	  
the	   assumption	   of	   quantificational	   structure,	   one	   is	   close	   to	   insisting	   that	   there	   are	   these	  
things	  out	   there	   that	  one	  must	  quantify	  over	   to	  completely	  describe	   reality	  –	   there	  are	   “sen-­‐
tence-­‐shaped	  facts”	  that	  must	  be	  accommodated	  in	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  reality.	  Quantifi-­‐
cational	   structure	   seems	   to	   supply	   the	   “objectivity”	   of	   certain	   objects	   that	   any	   complete	   de-­‐
scription	  of	   reality	  must	  countenance,	   independently	  of	  which	   language	  one	   is	   speaking,	   en-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Another	  potential	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  mandatory	  to	  use	  every	  ontological	  language	  if	  one	  aims	  to	  
describe	   the	  world	   completely,	   because	   there	   is	   so	  much	   structure	   one	  needs	   to	   describe.	   This	   seems	   somewhat	  
puzzling:	  that	  there	  is	  so	  much	  structure	  in	  the	  world	  that	  we	  can	  never	  accomplish	  to	  describe	  it	  all	  (because	  we	  
can	  never	  use	  all	  languages).	  In	  Sider’s	  (2013)	  reply	  to	  Hirsch,	  it	  is	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  lot	  of	  
redundancy,	  and	  that	   there	   is	  a	  general	  epistemological	  presumption	  that	  non-­‐redundancy	   is	  more	  plausible	   that	  
massive	  redundancy,	  which	  he	  relates	  to	  the	  general	  epistemic	  norm	  of	  believing	  the	  comparatively	  simplest	  theory.	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tailing	   the	   falsity	   of	   quantifier	   variantism	  because	  we	  must	   inquire	   into	   the	   quantificational	  
structure	   to	   find	   out	   whether	   different	   ontological	   languages	   really	   are	   truth-­‐conditionally	  
equivalent.	  	  
We	  might	   consider	   how	   this	   differs	   from	   Sider’s	   official	   view.	   If	   there	   is	   no	   s-­‐norm,	  
then	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  use	  the	  privileged	  quantifier	  to	  describe	  what	  there	  is.	  It	  would	  seem	  
to	   be	   sufficient	   to	   have	   a	   language	   that	   quantifies	   over	   more	   things	   than	   the	   joint-­‐carving	  
quantifier	   does,	   as	   the	   example	  with	  Universalese	   above	   suggested.148	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   to	  
determine	  what	  there	  is	  (in	  the	  joint-­‐carving	  sense	  of	  “there	  is”),	  one	  must	  use	  a	  joint-­‐carving	  
quantifier,	  for	  the	  quantifier	  of	  Universalese	  is	  defined	   to	  quantify	  over	  arbitrary	  mereological	  
sums,	  and	  thus	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  leave	  any	  room	  for	  ontological	  inquiry	  and	  discovery.	  This	  sits	  
well	  with	  the	  discussion	   in	  4.4.1	  above:	   to	  discern	  what	   there	   is,	  we	  must	  do	  physics,	  but	  we	  
don’t	  have	   to	  use	   the	  primitives	  of	   the	   theories	  of	  physics	  when	  describing	  what	   there	   is.	  By	  
using	  a	  joint-­‐carving	  quantifier,	  one	  has	  stipulated	  that	  it	  should	  carve	  at	  the	  joints,	  and	  given	  
Sider’s	  metaontological	  framework,	  using	  such	  a	  quantifier	  warrants	  that	  one	  follow	  the	  meth-­‐
od	  of	  contemporary	  analytic	  ontology	  when	  trying	  to	  discern	  what	  there	  is	  (Sider	  2011,	  pp.	  168–
173).	   So	  we	   still	   need	  Ontologese,	   but	   aren’t	   rationally	   required	   to	   speak	   it	  when	   describing	  
what	  there	  is.	  	  
These	   remarks	  are	   insufficient	  as	  a	  complete	  account	  of	  how	  Sider’s	  view	  of	  ontology	  
interacts	  with	  quantifier	  variantism,	  and	  exactly	  where	   the	  rubber	  hits	  the	  road	  is	  still	  a	  little	  
unclear.	   But	   given	   quantificational	   structure,	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   –	   depending	   on	  what	   that	  
structure	  actually	   is	   like	  –	   it	  might	  not	  be	   the	  case	   that	   all	   the	  ontological	   languages	  Hirsch	  
discuss	  are	  truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent	  after	  all.	  In	  that	  case,	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  
quantificational	   structure	   have	   a	   powerful	   argument	   against	   quantifier	   variantism,	   for	   some	  
languages	   are	   simply	   expressively	   stronger.	   In	   that	   case,	   this	   is	   an	   argument	   against	   weak	  
quantifier	  variantism,	  and	  one	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  an	  s-­‐norm.	  Truth	  is	  enough:	  Speakers	  of	  
Ontologese	   (or	   some	   equally	   or	   more	   expansive	   language)	   are	   simply	   able	   to	   state	   all	   the	  
truths,	  and	  speakers	  of	  some	  restricted	  languages	  are	  not.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  we	  cannot	  explicate	  the	  betterness	  of	  Ontologese	  
by	  it	  being	  better	  because	  it	  expresses	  more	  truths,	  as	  the	  above	  response	  suggests,	  then	  an	  s-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  This	   is	   somewhat	   simplified.	   There	   might	   be	   other	   reasons	   for	   the	   necessity	   of	   using	   such	   a	   quantifier.	   For	  
instance,	  Sider	  makes	  certain	  further	  claims	  about	  what’s	  fundamental	  and	  what	  the	  fundamental	  is	  like.	  First,	  it	  is	  
complete,	   i.e.	  every	  non-­‐fundamental	   truth	  holds	   in	  virtue	  of	   some	   fundamental	   truth	   (Sider	  2011,	  p.	   115)	  and	   the	  
fundamental	   is	  also	  supposed	  to	  be	  pure,	   i.e.	   fundamental	  truths	   involve	  only	   fundamental	  notions	  (Sider	  2011,	  p.	  
115).	  Thus	  a	  fundamental	  language	  has	  all	  and	  only	  the	  structural	  concepts	  in	  its	  lexicon,	  and	  completely	  describes	  
reality.	  The	  book	  of	  the	  world	  is	  written	  in	  a	  fundamental	  language.	  If	  all	  this	  is	  correct,	  then	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  a	  
successful	   representation	   of	   reality	  must	   use	   structural	   concepts	   because	   the	   fundamental	   is	   pure	   and	   complete.	  
The	  relationship	  between	  this	  rationale	   for	  using	   joint-­‐carving	  concepts	  and	  the	  s-­‐norm	  can	  unfortunately	  not	  be	  
explored	  further	  here.	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norm	  is	  necessary	  for	  Sider	  to	  provide	  a	  successful	  defense	  of	  ontology	  against	  quantifier	  vari-­‐
antism.	  What	   I	   hope	   to	   have	   shown	   is	   that	   as	   far	   as	   Sider’s	   answer	   to	   quantifier	   variantism	  
should	   be	   construed	   as	   a	   form	  of	   normative	   quantifier	   variantism,	   it	   is	   unsuccessful.	   Sider’s	  
arguments	   for	  quantificational	  structure	  are	  rather	  compelling,	  but	  whether	  his	  account	  ulti-­‐
mately	  succeeds	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Hirsch’s	  arguments	  is	  a	  question	  for	  another	  day.	  	  
4.6	   Concluding	  remarks	  
This	  chapter	  has	  focused	  on	  arguing	  against	  the	  s-­‐norm.	  The	  s-­‐norm	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  important	  
part	  of	  Sider’s	  defense	  of	  ontology	  against	  quantifier	  variantism,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  
theory	  that	  is	  rather	  unexplored	  in	  the	  literature	  so	  far.	  In	  section	  4.4,	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  argu-­‐
ments	   Sider	   provides	   for	   the	   s-­‐norm	   don’t	   justify	   postulating	   it,	   as	   it	   isn’t	   necessary	   to	   use	  
structural	   terms	   to	   talk	   about	   structure.	   This	   undermines	   the	   defense	   of	   ontology	   that	   it	   is	  
most	  natural	   to	   take	  Sider	   to	  be	   advocating.	  But	   as	  we	   saw	   in	   section	  4.5,	   Sider’s	  defense	  of	  
ontology	  might	  go	  through	  even	  without	  the	  s-­‐norm.	  In	  any	  case,	  I’m	  positive	  that	  this	  isn’t	  the	  
last	  that	  is	  written	  on	  Sider’s	  defense	  of	  ontology.	  The	  general	  theory	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  is	  com-­‐
plex,	  subtle	  and	  powerful,	  and	  there	  may	  be	  even	  more	  routes	  to	  a	  defense	  of	  ontology	  implicit	  
in	  the	  theory	  than	  I’ve	  been	  able	  to	  see.	  	  
	   In	  closing,	  I	  wish	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  a	  potential	  general	  problem	  with	  Sider’s	  defense	  
against	  quantifier	  variantism.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  section	  3.1,	  many	  of	  the	  questions	  that	  ontolo-­‐
gy	  seeks	  to	  answer	  arise	  in	  plain	  old	  English.	  The	  paradoxes	  of	  persistence	  and	  the	  problems	  of	  
composition	  formulated	  in	  English	  don’t	  go	  away	  if	  we	  migrate	  our	  ontological	  disagreements	  
to	  Ontologese.	  For	   this	   reason,	   I	   find	  a	  defense	  of	  ontology	  against	  Hirsch	  along	  the	   lines	  of	  
chapters	  2	  and	  3	  more	  satisfactory,	  for	  the	  ontological	  problems	  arising	  in	  English	  presumably	  
constitute	   the	   reason	   to	   engage	   in	   ontology	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   and	   I	  would	   still	   want	   to	   see	  
them	  solved.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Sider	  will	  perhaps	  claim	  that	  ontology	  in	  English	  should	  be	  
understood	   as	   the	   metasemantic	   task	   of	   determining	   the	   meaning	   of	   our	   words,	   and	   that	  
English	  is	  therefore	  irrelevant	  to	  discerning	  what	  there	  is	  (this	  seems	  suggested	  in	  Sider	  2011,	  p.	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5	   CONCLUSION	  	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  have	  discussed	  Eli	  Hirsch’s	  deflationary	  arguments	  against	  ontology.	  Chapter	  1	  
provided	  a	  clear	  statement	  of	  Hirsch’s	  arguments,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  them	  in	  
later	  chapters.	  We	  saw	  that	  the	  argument	  for	  quantifier	  variantism	  crucially	  hinges	  on	  a	  notion	  
of	  “truth-­‐conditionally	  equivalent”	  languages,	  and	  that	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  consists	  of	  a	  
detailed	  interpretation	  of	  the	  linguistic	  behavior	  of	  ontologists.	  
	   In	   chapter	   2	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   consequences	   of	   quantifier	   variantism	   are	  more	  wide-­‐
ranging	   than	   commonly	   thought,	   and	   that	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   semantic	   arguments	   of	  
Eklund,	  Hawthorne	  and	  Harris,	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  has	  to	  accept	  that	  different	  ontological	  
languages	   have	   different	   semantic	   categories.	   But	   this	   eventually	   led	   to	   the	   conclusion	   (2.3)	  
that	  predicates	  differ	  in	  meaning	  between	  ontological	  languages,	  undermining	  the	  deflationary	  
conclusions	  of	  quantifier	  variantism,	  since	  there	  not	  being	  Fs	  doesn’t	  have	  bearing	  on	  whether	  
there	  are	  F*s	  (where	  “F”	  and	  “F*”	  are	  different	  predicates).	  I	  know	  of	  no	  way	  to	  avoid	  predicate	  
variantism,	  but	  even	  if	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  should	  be	  able	  to	  find	  one,	  I	  also	  argued	  (2.4)	  
that	  her	  position	  entails	  that	  mathematical	  terms	  have	  different	  meanings	  in	  different	  ontolog-­‐
ical	   languages	  –	  a	  rather	  uncomfortable	  consequence.	  I	   further	  argued	  (2.5)	  that	  Hirsch’s	  no-­‐
tion	  of	  truth-­‐conditional	  equivalence	  is	  hard	  to	  grasp,	  and	  that	  Hirsch	  has	  trouble	  accounting	  
for	   the	   fact	   that	   ontologists	   often	  disagree	   about	  what’s	   possible.	  Chapter	   2	   thus	   considered	  
several	   foundational	   questions	   concerning	   quantifier	   variantism,	   and	   formulated	   some	   im-­‐
portant	  objections	  that	  the	  quantifier	  variantist	  must	  address.	  
In	  chapter	  3,	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  came	  under	  scrutiny.	  I	  argued	  that	  ontologists	  
should	   be	   taken	   to	   speak	   English,	   but	   that	   Hirsch’s	   argument	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   denials	   of	  
common	  sense	  ontological	  claims	  are	  “trivially	  false”	  in	  English	  is	  too	  quick.	  We	  can	  resist	  this	  
argument	  when	  we	  realize	  that	   it	   is	   far	   from	  clear	  that	  perception	  gives	   justification	  for	  peo-­‐
ple’s	  belief	  in	  ordinary	  objects.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  the	  argument	  from	  charity	  does	  not	  stand	  in	  
the	  way	  of	  ontology	  conducted	  in	  English.	  There	  are	  of	  course	  other	  problems	  with	  revisionary	  
ontology	  not	  addressed	   in	   this	   thesis.	  Ontology	   is	  difficult,	   and	  we	   shouldn’t	   expect	   the	  dis-­‐
putes	  to	  be	  resolved	  any	  time	  soon,	  but	  I	  hope	  this	  thesis	  provides	  some	  ways	  for	  ontologists	  to	  
move	  on	  from	  Hirsch’s	  attack,	  and	  eventually	  get	  back	  to	  ontology.	  	  
Finally,	  in	  chapter	  4	  I	  considered	  an	  alternative	  way	  to	  respond	  to	  Hirsch’s	  arguments,	  
due	  to	  Ted	  Sider	  (2011).	  He	  argues	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  engage	  in	  substantive	  ontology,	  we	  must	  
migrate	  ontological	  disputes	  from	  English	  to	  the	  dedicated	  ontological	  language	  Ontologese.	  I	  
argued	   that	   his	   version	   of	   normative	   quantifier	   variantism	   fails,	   because	   it	   depends	   on	   an	  
implausible	  epistemic	  norm.	  While	  this	  might	  not	  be	  the	  last	  word	  on	  the	  matter	  (4.5),	  I	  be-­‐
lieve	  (1)	  that	  quantifier	  variantism	  is	  false,	  and	  (2)	  that	  my	  argument	  against	  Hirsch’s	  argument	  
from	  charity	  shows	  that	  ontology	  in	  English	  is	  possible.	  Thus	  ontologists	  need	  not	  hang	  their	  
hopes	  on	  Sider’s	  Ontologese	  –	  perhaps	  they	  can	  continue	  their	  inquiry	  in	  plain	  old	  English.	  	  
	   102	  
REFERENCES	  	  
Armstrong.	  D.	  M.	  1978a,	  Nominalism	  and	  Realism,	  volume	  1	  of	  Universals	  and	  Scientific	  Real-­‐
ism,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1978b,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Universals,	  volume	  2	  of	  Universals	  and	  Scientific	  Realism,	  Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1980,	  “Identity	  Through	  Time,”	  in	  P.	  van	  Inwagen	  (ed.),	  Time	  and	  Cause,	  Dordrecht:	  D.	  
Reidel,	  pp.	  67–78.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1997,	  A	  World	  of	  States	  of	  Affairs,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
Ayer,	  A.	  J.	  1978,	  Language,	  Truth	  and	  Logic,	  London:	  Penguin	  Books.	  	  
Benacerraf,	  P.	  1965,	  “What	  Numbers	  Could	  Not	  Be,”	  Philosophical	  Review,	  74,	  pp.	  47–73.	  	  
Bennett,	  K.	  2009,	  “Composition,	  Colocation	  and	  Metaontology,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley,	  
and	  R.	  Wasserman	  (eds.),	  Metametaphysics,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  38-­‐
76.	  
Bøhn,	  E.	  2014,	  “From	  Hume’s	  Dictum	  via	  Submergence	  to	  Composition	  as	  Identity	  or	  Mereo-­‐
logical	  Nihilism,”	  Pacific	  Philosophical	  Quarterly,	  95	  (3),	  pp.	  336–355.	  	  
Bourget,	  D.	  and	  Chalmers,	  D.	  2014,	  “What	  Do	  Philosophers	  Believe?”	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  
170(3),	  pp.	  465–500.	  	  
Burge,	  T.	  1979,	  “Individualism	  and	  the	  Mental,”	  Midwest	  Studies	  in	  Philosophy	  4,	  pp.	  73–121.	  
Reprinted	  in	  Burge	  2007,	  pp.	  100–150.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1986,	  “Individualism	  and	  Psychology,”	  The	  Philosophical	  Review,	  95,	  pp.	  3-­‐45.	  Reprinted	  
in	  Burge	  2007,	  pp.	  221–253.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2007,	  Foundations	  of	  Mind:	  Philosophical	  Essays	  Volume	  2,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2010,	  Origins	  of	  Objectivity,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
Callender,	  C.	  2001,	  “Humean	  Supervenience	  and	  Rotating	  Homogenous	  Matter,”	  Mind,	  110,	  pp.	  
25–43.	  
Carnap,	  R.	  1950,	  “Empiricism,	  Semantics,	  and	  Ontology,”	  Revue	  Internationale	  de	  Philosophie,	  
4,	  pp.	  20–40.	  	  
Cartwright,	  “Scattered	  Objects,”	  in	  K.	  Lehrer	  (ed.)	  Analysis	  and	  Metaphysics,	  Dordrecht:	  D.	  
Reidel,	  pp.	  153–171.	  
Cameron,	  R.	  2007,	  “The	  Contingency	  of	  Composition,”	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  136,	  pp.	  99–121.	  
Chalmers,	  D.	  1996,	  The	  Conscious	  Mind,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
	   103	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2009,	  “Ontological	  Anti-­‐Realism”,	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley	  and	  R.	  Wesserman	  (eds.),	  
Metametaphysics,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  77–129.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2011,	  “Verbal	  Disputes,”	  Philosophical	  Review,	  120	  (4),	  pp.	  515–566.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  forthcoming,	  “Why	  isn’t	  there	  more	  Progress	  in	  Philosophy,”	  in	  T.	  Hondrich	  (ed.),	  Phi-­‐
losophers	  of	  our	  Times.	  URL=<http://consc.net/papers/progress.pdf>,	  last	  entered	  
[10.16.2014].	  	  
Chalmers,	  D.,	  Manley,	  M.	  and	  Wasserman,	  R.	  2009,	  Metametaphysics;	  new	  essays	  on	  the	  foun-­‐
dations	  of	  ontology,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
Chan,	  T.	  2013,	  The	  Aim	  of	  Belief	  (ed.),	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
Chisholm,	  R.	  1976,	  Person	  and	  Object:	  A	  Metaphysical	  Study,	  London:	  Allen	  and	  Unwin.	  	  
Cotnoir,	  A.	  J.	  and	  Baxter,	  D.	  L.	  M.	  2014,	  Composition	  as	  Identity,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press.	  
Dorr,	  C.	  2002,	  The	  Simplicity	  of	  Everything,	  Ph.D.	  thesis,	  Princeton	  University.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2005,	  “What	  We	  Disagree	  About	  When	  We	  Disagree	  About	  Ontology”,	  in	  M.	  Kalderon	  
(ed.)	  Fictionalism	  in	  Metaphysics,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
Eklund,	  M.	  2007,	  “The	  Picture	  of	  Reality	  as	  an	  Amorphous	  Lump,”	  in	  T.	  Sider,	  J.	  Hawthorne,	  
and	  D.	  Zimmermann	  (eds.),	  Contemporary	  Debates	  in	  Metaphysics,	  London:	  Wiley-­‐
Blackwell.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2009,	  “Carnap	  and	  Ontological	  Pluralism,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley,	  and	  R.	  Wasser-­‐
man	  (eds.),	  Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Ontology,	  Oxford:	  
Clarendon	  Press,	  pp.	  231–259.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2011,	  “Review	  of:	  Quantifier	  Variance	  and	  Realism:	  Essays	  in	  Ontology,”	  Notre	  Dame	  
Philosophical	  Review,	  URL=<https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24764-­‐quantifier-­‐variance-­‐and-­‐
realism-­‐essays-­‐in-­‐metaontology/>,	  last	  entered:	  [08.21.2014].	  
Fine,	  K.	  2001,	  “The	  Question	  of	  Realism,”	  Philosopher’s	  Imprint,	  1,	  pp.	  1–30.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2009,	  “The	  Question	  of	  Ontology,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley,	  and	  R.	  Wasserman	  (eds.),	  
Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Ontology,	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  
Press,	  pp.	  157–177.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2013,	  “Fundamental	  Truths	  and	  Fundamental	  Terms,”	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  
Research,	  87(3),	  pp.	  725–732.	  	  
Frege,	  G.	  1980,	  The	  Foundations	  of	  Arithmetic,	  trans.	  J.	  L.	  Austin,	  Evanston,	  Ill:	  Norwestern	  
University	  Press.	  
Goodman,	  N.	  1955,	  Fact,	  Fiction,	  and	  Forecast,	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  	  
Harris,	  J.	  H.	  1982,	  “What’s	  So	  Logical	  about	  the	  ‘Logical’	  Axioms?”	  Studia	  Logica,	  41,	  pp.	  159–171.	  
Hawthorne,	  J.	  2006	  “Plenitude,	  Convention,	  and	  Ontology”,	  in	  J.	  Hawthorne	  Metaphysical	  
Essays,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
	   104	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2009,	  “Superficialism	  in	  Ontology,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley	  and	  R.	  Wesserman	  (eds.),	  
Metametaphysics,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  213–259.	  
Hofweber,	  T.	  2009,	  “Ambitious,	  yet	  Modest,	  Metaphysics,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley	  and	  R.	  
Wesserman	  (eds.),	  Metametaphysics,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  260–289.	  
Hirsch,	  E.	  1982,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Identity,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1997,	  Dividing	  Reality,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1999,	  “Objectivity	  Without	  Objects,”	  in	  R.	  Cobb-­‐Stevens	  (ed.)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Twenti-­‐
eth	  World	  Congress	  on	  Philosophy:	  Epistemology,	  volume	  5,	  Charlottesville,	  VA:	  Philos-­‐
ophy	  Documentation	  CTR,	  pp.	  189–197.	  Reprinted	  in	  Hirsch	  2011,	  pp.	  36–44.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2002a,	  “Quantifier	  Variance	  and	  Realism,”	  Philosophical	  Issues,	  12,	  pp.	  51–73.	  Reprinted	  
in	  Hirsch	  2011,	  pp.	  68-­‐95.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2002b,	  “Against	  Revisionary	  Ontology,”	  Philosophical	  Topics,	  30	  (1),	  pp.	  103–127.	  Reprint-­‐
ed	  in	  Hirsch	  2011,	  pp.	  96-­‐123.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2005,	  “Physical-­‐Object	  Ontology,	  Verbal	  Disputes,	  and	  Common	  Sense	  Ontology,”	  Philo-­‐
sophical	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research,	  70(1),	  pp.	  67–97.	  Reprinted	  in	  Hirsch	  2011,	  pp.	  
144–177.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2008a,	  “Ontological	  Arguments:	  Interpretative	  Charity	  and	  Quantifier	  Variance,”	  in	  T.	  
Sider,	  J.	  Hawthorne	  and	  D.	  Zimmerman	  (eds.),	  Contemporary	  Debates	  in	  Metaphysics,	  
Blackwell.	  Reprinted	  in	  Hirsch	  2011,	  pp.	  178–196.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2008b,	  “Language,	  Ontology,	  and	  Structure”	  Noûs,	  42	  (3),	  pp.	  509–528.	  Reprinted	  in	  
Hirsch	  2011,	  pp.	  197–219.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2009,	  “Ontology	  and	  Alternative	  Languages,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley,	  and	  R.	  Was-­‐
serman	  (eds.),	  Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Ontology,	  Oxford:	  
Clarendon	  Press,	  231–259.	  Reprinted	  in	  Hirsch	  2011,	  pp.	  220–250.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2011,	  Quantifier	  Variance	  and	  Realism:	  Essays	  in	  Ontology,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2013,	  “The	  Metaphysically	  Best	  Language,”	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research,	  
87(3),	  pp.	  709–716.	  	  
Hume,	  D.	  1993,	  An	  Enquiry	  Concerning	  Human	  Understanding,	  London:	  Hacket	  Publishing.	  
Originally	  published	  in	  1748.	  	  
Jackson,	  B.	  B.	  2013,	  “Metaphysics,	  Verbal	  Disputes	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Charity,”	  Philosophy	  and	  
Phenomenological	  Research,	  86	  (2),	  pp.	  412–434.	  	  
Joyce,	  R.	  2006,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Morality,	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  University	  Press.	  	  
Kaplan.	  D.	  1989,	  “Demonstratives,”	  in	  J.	  Almog,	  J.	  Perry	  and	  H.	  Wettstein	  (eds.)	  Themes	  from	  
Kaplan,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  481-­‐563.	  
	  
	   105	  
Korman,	  D.	  Z.	  2014,	  “Debunking	  Perceptual	  Beliefs	  about	  Ordinary	  Objects,”	  Philosophers’	  
Imprint,	  14,	  no.	  13.	  	  
Kripke,	  S.	  1982,	  Wittgenstein	  on	  Rules	  and	  Private	  Language,	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  Univer-­‐
sity	  Press.	  	  
Leondard,	  H.	  S.	  and	  Goodman,	  N.	  1940,	  “The	  Calculus	  of	  Individuals	  and	  Its	  Uses,”	  Journal	  of	  
Symbolic	  Logic,	  5	  (2),	  pp.	  45–55.	  
	  
Lewis,	  D.	  K.	  1983a,	  Philosophical	  Papers	  I,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1983b,	  “New	  Work	  For	  a	  Theory	  of	  Universals,”	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  61,	  pp.	  
343–377.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1984,	  “Putnam’s	  Paradox,”	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  62,	  pp.	  221–236.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1986,	  On	  the	  Plurality	  of	  Worlds,	  Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishers.	  
Manley,	  D.	  2009,	  “Introduction:	  A	  Guided	  Tour	  of	  Metametaphysics,”	  in	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  
Manley,	  and	  R.	  Wasserman	  (eds.),	  Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  of	  
Ontology,	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  pp.	  1–37.	  
Markosian,	  N.	  1998,	  “Brutal	  Composition,”	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  92,	  pp.	  211–249.	  
Maudlin,	  T.	  2007,	  The	  Metaphysics	  Within	  Physics,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
McCulloch,	  G.	  2003,	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Phenomenological	  Externalism,	  London:	  
Routledge.	  
McGrath,	  M.	  2008,	  “Conciliatory	  Metaontology	  and	  the	  Vindication	  of	  Common	  Sense,”	  Noûs,	  
42,	  pp.	  482–508.	  
Meinong,	  A.	  1960,	  “A	  Theory	  of	  Objects,”	  in	  R.	  Chisholm	  (ed.)	  Realism	  and	  the	  Background	  of	  
Phenomenology,	  trans.	  I.	  Levi,	  B.	  D.	  Terrell,	  and	  R.	  Chisholm,	  Atascadero,	  CA:	  
Ridgeview	  Publishing,	  pp.	  76–117.	  	  
Merricks,	  T.	  2001,	  Objects	  and	  Persons,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Peacocke,	  C.	  1979,	  “Deviant	  Causal	  Chains,”	  Midwest	  Studies	  in	  Philosophy	  4,	  pp.	  123–155.	  
Parsons,	  T.	  1980,	  Nonexistent	  Objects,	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  	  
Putnam,	  H.	  1975,	  “The	  Meaning	  of	  ‘Meaning’,”	  Minnesota	  Studies	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  7,	  
pp.	  131–193.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1980,	  “Models	  and	  Reality,”	  Journal	  of	  Symbolic	  Logic,	  45,	  pp.	  464–482.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1981,	  Reason,	  Truth,	  and	  History,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1987,	  The	  Many	  Faces	  of	  Realism,	  La	  Salle,	  Ill:	  Open	  Court.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1993,	  “The	  Question	  of	  Realism,”	  in	  J.	  Conant	  (ed.),	  Words	  and	  Life,	  Harvard	  University	  
Press,	  pp.	  295–312.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2004,	  Ethics	  without	  Ontology,	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
	   106	  
Quine,	  W.	  V.	  O.	  1940,	  Mathematical	  Logic,	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1948,	  “On	  What	  There	  Is,”	  Review	  of	  Metaphysics,	  2,pp.	  21–38.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1984,	  “Sticks	  and	  Stones;	  or,	  the	  Ins	  and	  Outs	  of	  Existence,”	  in	  L.	  S.	  Rouner	  (ed.)	  On	  
Nature:	  Boston	  Studies	  in	  Philosophy	  and	  Religion,	  6,	  pp.	  13–26.	  Reprinted	  in	  D.	  
Føllesdal	  and	  D.	  B.	  Quine	  (eds.),	  Quine	  in	  Dialogue	  (2008),	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  
University	  Press,	  pp.	  312–324.	  	  
Rayo,	  A.	  2013,	  The	  Construction	  of	  Logical	  Space,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Rayo,	  A.	  and	  Uzquiano,	  G.	  2006,	  Absolute	  Generality,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
Schaffer,	  J.	  2009,	  “On	  What	  Grounds	  “hat,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley,	  and	  R.	  Wasserman	  
(eds.),	  Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Ontology,	  Oxford:	  Claren-­‐
don	  Press,	  pp.	  347–383.	  
Schaffer,	  J.	  and	  Rose,	  D.	  draft,	  “Folk	  Mereology	  is	  Teleological,”	  draft	  of	  June	  6th	  2014,	  
URL=<http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/folkmer.pdf>.	  Last	  entered:	  [21.08.2014].	  
Schetcher,	  J.	  2010,	  “The	  Realiability	  Challenge	  and	  the	  Epistemology	  of	  Logic,”	  Philosophical	  
Perspectives,	  24,	  pp.	  437–464.	  
Searle,	  J.	  1979,	  Expressions	  and	  Meaning,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
Sider,	  T.	  1993,	  “Van	  Inwagen	  and	  the	  Possibility	  of	  Gunk,”	  Analysis,	  53,	  pp.	  285–289.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2001a,	  “Criteria	  of	  Personal	  Identity	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Conceptual	  Analysis,”	  Philosophi-­‐
cal	  Perspectives,	  15,	  pp.	  189–209.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2001b,	  Four-­‐Dimensionalism,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2004,	  “Replies	  to	  Gallois,	  Hirsch	  and	  Markosian,”	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  
Research,	  68	  (3),	  pp.	  674–687.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2007,	  “NeoFregeanism	  and	  Quantifier	  Variance,”	  Aristotelian	  Society	  Supplementary	  
Volume,	  81	  (1),	  pp.	  201–232.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2009,	  “Ontological	  Realism,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley	  and	  R.	  Wasserman	  (eds.),	  
Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Ontology,	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  
Press,	  pp.	  384–423.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2011,	  Writing	  the	  Book	  of	  the	  World,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2013,	  “Replies	  to	  Dorr,	  Fine	  and	  Hirsch,”	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research,	  87	  
(3),	  pp.	  733–754.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2014,	  “Hirsch’s	  Attack	  on	  Ontologese,”	  Noûs,	  48,	  pp.	  565–572.	  
Stanley,	  J.	  and	  Szabó,	  Z.	  G.	  2000,	  “On	  Quantifier	  Domain	  Restriction,”	  Mind	  &	  Language,	  15	  
(2&3),	  pp.	  219–261.	  
Thomasson,	  A.	  2007,	  Ordinary	  Objects,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2009	  “Answerable	  and	  Unanswerable	  Questions,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley	  and	  R.	  
	   107	  
Wasserman	  (eds.),	  Metametaphysics,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  444–471.	  
Turner,	  J.	  2008,	  Ontology,	  Quantification,	  and	  Fundamentality,	  Ph.D.	  thesis,	  Rutgers,	  The	  State	  
University	  of	  New	  Jersey.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2010,	  “Ontological	  Pluralism,”	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  CVII(1),	  pp.	  5–34.	  	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2011,	  “Ontological	  Nihilism,”	  in	  Oxford	  Studies	  of	  Metaphysics,	  volume	  6,	  K.	  Bennett	  and	  
D.	  Zimmerman	  (eds.),	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  press,	  pp.	  3–54.	  
Urmson,	  J.	  O.	  1956,	  Philosophical	  Analysis,	  London:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
van	  Inwagen,	  P.	  1987,	  “When	  are	  Objects	  Parts?”	  in	  J.	  Tomberlin	  (ed.),	  Philosophical	  Perspec-­‐
tives	  1:	  Metaphysics,	  pp.	  21–47.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1990,	  Material	  Beings,	  Itchaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  1998,	  “Meta-­‐ontology”,	  Erkenntnis,	  48,	  pp.	  233–250.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2009,	  “Being,	  Existence,	  and	  Ontological	  Commitment,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley,	  and	  
R.	  Wasserman	  (eds.),	  Metametaphysics:	  New	  Essays	  on	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Ontology,	  
Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  pp.	  472–506.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2014,	  “Introduction:	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  ontology	  room”	  in	  Existence:	  Essays	  in	  Ontol-­‐
ogy,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  1–15.	  	  
Yablo,	  S.	  1998,	  “Does	  Ontology	  Rest	  on	  a	  Mistake?”	  Aristotelian	  Society	  Supplementary	  Volume,	  
72	  (1),	  pp.	  229–261.	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.	  2009,	  “Must	  Existence-­‐Questions	  have	  Answers?,”	  in	  D.	  Chalmers,	  D.	  Manley	  and	  R.	  
Wesserman	  (eds.),	  Metametaphysics,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  507–526.	  
Williams,	  B.	  1973,	  “Deciding	  to	  believe”	  in	  Problems	  of	  the	  Self,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  Univer-­‐
sity	  Press,	  pp.	  136–151.	  
Williams,	  J.	  R.	  G.	  2007,	  “Eligibility	  and	  inscrutability,”	  Philosophical	  Review,	  116,	  pp.	  361–399.	  
Williamson,	  T.	  1987–1988,	  “Equivocation	  and	  Existence,”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  Socie-­‐
ty,	  88,	  pp.	  109-­‐127.	  
Wittgenstein,	  L.	  1953,	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  G.	  E.	  M.	  Anscombe	  and	  R.	  Rhees	  (eds.),	  G.	  
E.	  M.	  Anscombe	  (trans.),	  Oxford:	  Blackwell.	  
	  	  
